Thomas Aquinas on Happiness
Summary of Aquinas’s Meta-Ethics
From Shawn Floyd‘s article on “Aquinas Moral Philosophy”
http://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-moral/
According to Aquinas’s meta-ethics, human goodness depends on performing acts that are in accord
with our human nature. But what sort of acts are those? In other words, what feature or features
serve to distinguish human acts from acts of a different kind? Here we must go beyond the simple
claim that an action is human just insofar as it is rational. For while this claim is no doubt true, the
nature of rationality itself needs explanation. This section seeks to explore more fully just what
rationality or reason consists in according to Aquinas. Only then can we understand the nature of
human action and the end at which such action aims.
Aquinas provides the most comprehensive treatment of this subject in the second part of the Summa
theologiae. There, he explains that reason is comprised of two powers: one cognitive, the other
appetitive. The cognitive power is the intellect, which enables us to know and understand. The
intellect also enables us to apprehend the goodness a thing has. The appetitive power of reason is
called the will. Aquinas describes the will as a native desire for the understood good. That is, it is an
appetite that is responsive to the intellect’s estimations of what is good or choice worthy (ST Ia
82.1; QDV 3.22.12). On this view, all acts of will are dependent on antecedent acts of intellect; the
intellect must supply the will with the object to which the latter inclines. In turn, that object moves
the will as a final cause “because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an
end” (ST Ia 82.4).
From the abbreviated account of intellect and will provided thus far, it may appear that the intellect
necessitates the will’s acts by its own evaluative portrayals of goodness. Yet Aquinas insists that no
single account of the good can necessitate the will’s movement. Most goods do not have a necessary
connection to happiness. That is, we do not need them in order to be happy; thus the will does not
incline to them of necessity (ST Ia 82.2). But what of those goods that do have a necessary
connection to happiness? What about the goodness of God or those virtues that lead us to God “in
whom alone true happiness consists” (Ibid.)? According to Aquinas, the will does not incline
necessarily to these goods, either. For in this life we cannot see God in all his goodness, and thus the
connection between God, virtue, final happiness will always appear opaque. Aquinas writes: “until
through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does
not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God” (Ibid.).
In this life, then, our intellectual limitations prevent us from apprehending what is good simpliciter.
Instead, we are presented with competing goods between which we must choose (ST Ia 82.2 ad 1).
Some goods provide immediate gratification but no long-term fulfillment. Other goods may
precipitate hardship but eventually make us better people. Indeed, sometimes we must exercise
considerable effort in ignoring superficial or petty pleasures while attending to more difficult yet
enduring goods. To employ Aquinas’s parlance, the will must exercise efficient causality on the
intellect by instructing it to consider some goods rather than others (ST Ia 82.4). This happens
whenever we, through our own determination, direct our attention away from certain desirable
objects and toward those we think are more choice worthy. Of course, our character will often
govern the goods we desire and ultimately choose. Even so, Aquinas does not think that our
character wholly determines our choices, as evidenced by the fact that we sometimes make decisions
that are contrary to our established habits. This is actually fortunate for us, for it suggests that even
people disposed toward evil can manage to make good choices and perhaps begin to correct their
more hardened and inordinate inclinations.
Now we are prepared to answer the question posed at the beginning of this section: what actions are
those we can designate as human? The answer is this: human actions are those over which one has
voluntary control (ST IaIIae 1.1). Unlike non-rational animals, human beings choose their actions
according to a reasoned account of what they think is good. Seen this way, human actions are not
products of deterministic causal forces. They are products of our own free judgment (liberum
arbitrium), the exercise of which is a function of both intellect and will (ST Ia 83.3). When discussing
what it is that makes an action "human," then, Aquinas has in mind those capacities whereby one
judges and chooses what is good. For it is through one's ability to deliberate and judge in this way
that one exercises mastery over one's actions (ST IaIIae 1.1).
So far, we’ve established that human actions are actions that are governed by a reasoned
consideration of what is good. Aquinas also thinks that the good in question functions as an end—
the object for the sake of which the agent acts. “For the object of the will is the end and the good”
(Ibid.). There are two worries that emerge here, both of which can be resolved rather quickly. First,
it seems we do not always act for the sake of an end. Many actions we perform are not products of
our own deliberation and voluntary judgment (like nervous twitches, coughs, or unconscious tapping
of the foot). Yet Aquinas points out that acts of this sort are not properly human acts “since they do
not proceed from the deliberation of the reason” (Ibid., ad 3). In order for an act to count as
a human act, it must be a product of the agent’s reasoned consideration about what is good. Second,
it appears that Aquinas is mistaken when he says that the ends for the sake of which we act are
good. Clearly, many things we pursue in life are not good. Aquinas does not deny this. He agrees that
cognitive errors and excessive passion can distort our moral views and, in turn, incline us to choose
the wrong things. Aquinas's point, however, is that our actions are done for the sake of what
we believe (rightly or wrongly) to be good. Whether the ends we pursue are in factgood is a separate
question—one to which we will return below.
Aquinas does not simply wish to defend the claim that human acts are for the sake of some good.
Following Augustine, he insists that our actions are for the sake of a final good—a last end which we
desire for its own sake and for the sake of which everything else is chosen (ST Ia 1.6 sed contra). If
there was no such end, we would have a hard time explaining why anyone chooses to do anything at
all. The reason for this is as follows. Aquinas argues that for every action or series of actions there
must be something that is first in “order of intention” (ST Ia 1.4). In other words, there must be
some end or good that is intrinsically desirable and serves the will’s final cause. According to this
view, such a good is a catalyst for desire and is therefore necessary in order for us to act for the sake
of what we desire. MacDonald writes, “one can explain [a given action] only by appealing to some
end or good that is itself capable of moving the will—that is, by appealing to an end that is viewed
desirable in itself” (MacDonald, 1991b: 44). Were you to remove the intrinsically desirable end, then
you would remove the very principle that motivates us to act in the first place (ST IaIIae 1.4). This
account also helps explain why we cannot postulate an “indefinite series of ends” when explaining
human actions (Ibid.). For the existence of an indefinite series of ends would mean that there is no
intrinsically desirable good for the sake of which we act. In the absence of any such good, we would
not desire anything and thus never have the necessary motivation to act (Ibid.). So there must be a
last end or final good that we desire for its own sake.
This last claim still does not capture what Aquinas ultimately wishes to show, namely, that there is
a singleend for the sake of which all of us act (ST IaIIae 1.5). To put the matter as starkly as possible,
Aquinas wants to argue that every human act of every human being is for the sake of a single end that is
the same for everyone (ST IaIIae 1.5-7). The previous argument did not require us to think that the
final end for which we act is the same for everyone. Nor did it show that the end at which every
human being aims consists in a specific, solitary good (as opposed to a constellation of goods).
What, exactly, is this last end at which we aim? As we saw in the preceding section, all of us seek
after our own perfection (ST Ia 1.6). We do so by performing actions we think will—directly or
indirectly—contribute to or facilitate a life that is more complete or fulfilling than it would be
otherwise. In other words, the last end—the end or good that we desire for its own sake—is
happiness, whereby “happiness” Aquinas means the sort of perfection or fulfillment just described.
Admittedly, this claim is fairly abstract and uncontroversial. After all, Aquinas does not say what
happiness consists in--the thing in which it is realized. He simply wishes to show that there is
something everyone desires and pursues, namely, ultimate fulfillment. He says, “everyone desires the
fulfillment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfillment in which the last end consists”
(ST IaIIae 1.7; emphasis mine). So construed, the idea of the last end is, as MacDonald explains, a
“formal concept…of the complete and perfect good, that which completely satisfies desire”
(MacDonald, 1991b: 61). But while everyone acts for the sake of such an end abstractly conceived,
Aquinas recognizes that there is considerable disagreement over what it is in which happiness
consists (ST IaIIae 1.7). So there is a difference between the idea of the last end (an idea for the sake
of which everyone acts) and the specific object in which the last end is thought to consist (Ibid.). Some
people think that the last end consists in the acquisition of external goods, like riches, power, or
fame (ST IaIIae 2.1-4). Others think it consists in goods of the body, like comeliness or physical
pleasure (ST IaIIae 2.5 and 6). And still others think that happiness consists in acquiring goods of
the soul such as knowledge, virtue, and friendship (ST IaIIae 2.7). But as laudable as some of these
good are (particularly those of the latter category), they are all beset with unique deficiencies that
preclude them from providing the kind of complete fulfillment characteristic of final happiness.
What is it, then, in which our last end really consists or is realized? For Aquinas, the last end of
happiness can only consist in that which is perfectly good, which is God. Because God is perfect
goodness, he is the only one capable of fulfilling our heart’s deepest longing and facilitating the
perfection at which we aim. Thus he says that human beings “attain their last end by knowing and
loving God” (ST IaIIae 1.8). Aquinas refers to this last end—the state in which perfect happiness
consists—as the beatific vision. The beatific vision is a supernatural union with God, the enjoyment
of which surpasses the satisfaction afforded by those goods people sometimes associate with the last
end. But if perfect happiness consists in the beatific vision, then why do people fail to seek it?
Actually, all people do seek it—at least in some sense. As we have already noted, all of us desire our
own perfection, which is synonymous with final happiness. Unfortunately, many of our actions are
informed by mistaken views of what happiness really consists in. These views may be the result of
some intellectual or cognitive error (say if one’s views are the result of ignorance or ill-informed
deliberation). But more than likely, our mistaken views will be the result of certain appetitive
excesses that corrupt our understanding of what is really good. For this reason, good actions require
excellences—or virtues—of both mind and appetite. The next section seeks to explain more fully
what those virtues are and why we need them.
Aquinas’s Writing’s on Happiness in the Summa Theologiae
Prima Secundæ Partis - Question 3
Article 2
Whether happiness is an operation?
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according
to perfect virtue."
I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say
that it is an operation. For happiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so
far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist
in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore
the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can
be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in
other things, too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3).
Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.
Reply to Objection 1. Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And
thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown (I-II:2:5) that the being of a man, no matter in
what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that His Being is
His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle
of life is made actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in
this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that
they may know Thee, the only true God."
Reply to Objection 4. Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things
capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings
applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His
operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in
respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of
theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the
final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation
neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being
discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained
by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it
is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men."
But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven"
(Matthew 22:30).
Article 3
Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the
intellective part only?
On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have
not happiness in common with us. Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3)
consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially.
For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last
end, as shown above (Article 1): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses.
Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (I-II:2:5), man's happiness does not consist
in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and
consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since
the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the
very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily
senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be
explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II:82-85). But then the operation
whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.
Article 4
Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the
intellect or of the will?
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Psalm 147:3):
"Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will.
Therefore man's happiness is in the will.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (John 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the
only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (Article 2, Reply to Objection 1).
Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
I answer that, As stated above (I-II:2:6) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is
the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected
with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in
an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (Articles 1 and 2; I-II:2:7)
that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the
very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it desires it; and present,
when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the
attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the
end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it.
Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than
an act of the will.
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through
an act of the will, the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But
at the moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner;
and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to
attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect;
and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results
from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is
"joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.
Article 5
Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical
intellect?
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the
goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys."
I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the
practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation,
it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that of his highest power
in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the
Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.
Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of
Divine things. And since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to
Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But
the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these
very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end cannot consist in
the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in
common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like
by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in
common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely
in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally
in contemplation, but secondarily, in an operation of the
practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.
Article 8
Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?
On the contrary, It is written (1 John 3:2): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and
[Vulgate: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the
Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not
perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that
the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect
is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore
the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore
an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of
the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause
simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is.
Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in
the man the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder,
and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a
man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what
that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry
cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more
of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause,
but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy.
Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause.
And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which
alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (Articles 1 and 7; I-II:2:8).