Chapter
Fourteen
Strategy
Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game
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Page 475 Solved Problem 14.1
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Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent
Pays to Prevent Entry
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Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat
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Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred
Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria
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Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred
Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria (cont’d)
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Table 14.2 Entrant’s Best Response
and Profit
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Figure 14.4
Cournot and
Stackelberg
Equilibria
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Figure 14.5
Incumbent
Commits to a
Large Quantity
to Deter Entry
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Figure 14.6
Incumbent Loss
If It Deters Entry
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Page 488 Solved Problem 14.3
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Figure 14.7 Investment Game Tree
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Figure 14.8 Raising-Costs Game Tree
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Figure 14.9 Advertising
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Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal
Benefit of Advertising
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Table 14.3 Advertising Game
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Cross Chapter Analysis Page 508
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