The notion of “the minimal self”
and types of conscious experience
Ryszard Auksztulewicz
Studenckie Koło Kognitywistyczne
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza
Minimal self (Gallagher 2000)
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Phenomenologically (in terms of how one experiences
it):
–
Consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of
experience
–
Unextended in time
–
Depends on brain processes and an ecologically
embedded body
Unessential features of self stripped away, a basic,
immediate, primitive 'something' that we are willing to
call a self
Strawson's Mental Self (1997)
(1) a thing
(2) a mental thing
(3) synchronically single
(4) diachronically single
(5) ontically distinct from all other things
(6) a subject of experience
(7) an agent
(8) character / personality
The Self as an agent
●
Movement / action constituting the self
Sense of agency:
The sense that I am the one
who is causing or generating
an action
= [intended state vs.
efference copy] comparator
Sense of ownership:
The sense that I am the one
who is undergoing an
experience
= [actual state vs. predicted
state] comparator
Minimal self
The self and consciousness
●
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Feinberg: questions regarding the self identical
to questions regarding consciousness
(1) unification, (2) subjectivity, (3) location
Marcel
– non-reflexive consciousness = phenomenal
experience; sensation
– reflexive consciousness
● awareness of our phenomenal experience
= type of knowledge
● awareness of self = not a different type of
experience, but a matter of the object of its
focus (suggesting attention)
Consciousness without self (?) asomatognosia
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asomatognosia:
– right parietal lesion => patient A.R. denies the
ownership of the contralateral limb
– attributes the hand to his mother
– screams when the hand is squeezed
patient F.B. (Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, Vallar, 2002)
– attributes the hand to her niece
– warned that 'the niece's hand' will be touched,
reports tactile sensations
asomatognosia as a Capgras syndrome (= delusional
misidentification syndrome) for body parts (Vié, in: Feinberg,
2005)
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Capgras syndrome for persons (under-personalization)
and places (inversed: Frégoli syndrome)
Consciousness without self (?) schizophrenia
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Delusions of control, intrusive thoughts and
verbal hallucinations = sense of ownership
without sense of agency
Problem:
– is no sense of agency equal to no sense of
minimal self? (agent vs. author)
Depersonalisation as a candidate for a
consciouss sensation without the sense of
minimal self
Between FPP and self-consciousness
first-person perspective
non-reflective self-awareness
sense of agency
reflective self-consciousness
narrative/conceptual self-consciousness
Minimal self
Conclusions
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Sense of agency and ownership are
heterogenous; it should be doubted that they
stand for a homogenous self
Minimal self as a specification of FPP (from the
phenomenon of consciousness to the act of
consciousness)
Focus on operationalising / naturalising the
sense of agency and ownership
References
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Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive
science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 14-21.
Strawson, G. (1997). The Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, 5/6, 405-428.
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de Vignemont, F., Fourneret, P. (2004). The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical
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review of the “Who” system. Consciousness and Cognition, 13, 1-19.
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Feinberg, T.E., Keenan, J.P. (2005). Where in the brain is the self? Consciousness and
Cognition, 14, 661-678.
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Marcel, A.J. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In: Marcel, A.J., Bisiach E.
(eds) Consciousness in contemporary science. Oxford Clarendon Press. pp. 121-158.