The Information Revolution, Security, and International

The Information Revolution, Security, and International Relations: (IR) Relevant Theory?
Author(s): Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello
Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.
27, No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 221-244
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International Political Science Review (2006), Vol 27, No. 3, 221-244
I PSR
I
RS
P
The Information Revolution, Security, and
International Relations: (IR)relevant Theory?
JOHAN ERIKSSONAND GIAMPIEROGIACOMELLO
The purpose of this article is twofold: to analyze the impact of
ABSTRACT.
the information revolution on security and to clarify what existing inter
national relations theory can say about this challenge. These pertinent
questions are initially addressed by a critical review of past research. This
review shows that the concern for security issues is largely confined to a
specialist literature on information warfare and cyber-security, while
neither the general literature on information society nor security studies
to information-technology-related
security
pay any serious attention
issues. The specialist literature is mostly policy oriented, and only very
from the international relations
rarely informed by theory, whether
discipline or any other field. In this article, three general international
relations "schools" (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) are scruti
nized with regard towhat they can say about security in the digital age. It
and
is argued that the liberal focus on pluralism, interdependence,
the constructivist emphasis on language, symbols, and
globalization,
images (including "virtuality"), and some elements of realist strategic
to an understanding
of
studies (on information warfare) contribute
digital-age security. Finally, it is suggested that pragmatism might help to
bridge the gap between theory and practice, and overcome the dualistic,
contending nature of international relations theories.
Keywords: * Information
technology * International
* Security * Theory
relations
* Practice
Social scientists and experts on technology
generally agree that states and societies
on
for better or worse,
increasingly
dependent
the world over are becoming,
of informa
The development
and interconnectedness
information
technologies.
tion and communications
technologies
(ICTs) such as the Internet, email, satellite
phones are diffusing globally at an impressive speed. The
television, and mobile
From only a handful
of
the most
Internet
striking example.
is undoubtedly
DOI: 10.1177/0192512106064462 C 2006 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications
(London,
Thousand
Oaks,
CA and New Delhi)
222
International Political Science Review 27 (3)
at
in the early 1990s, the Internet grew to contain several million websites
websites
and
Moreover,
the costs of producing,
using,
the turn of the millennium.
ICTs available
to
information
have constantly
communicating
decreased, making
(Choucri, 2000: 248-52; Nye,
an increasing number of people all over the world
the
is still a significant
"digital gap," dividing
2003: 215-6, 2004a, 2004b). There
in terms of access and usage, a long-standing
and well
haves from the have-nots
and between
societies
both within
(Choucri,
2000;
documented
problem
the
persistent
inequalities,
Hammond,
2001; Norris,
2001). Notwithstanding
costs of ICTs have made
and
them widespread
image is clear: the shrinking
far beyond
the political
and economic
elites of western
reaching
decentralized,
societies.
among
These observations
the limit of consensus
informed
apparently mark
is particularly
the basic question
apparent when
observers. The lack of consensus
of the information
of the present article is addressed: what are the implications
for national
and international
security? Some would
argue that the
revolution
adapting)
its role
(although
state is still the main player in the field, maintaining
as the supreme provider of security, even in cyberspace
2001). Others
(Fountain,
economies
of "virtual states" and network
claim that the emergence
imply a
and hence
decline
of interstate violence,
that security generally
plays a signifi
"sketches
cantly lesser role than in previous times. This truly optimistic perspective
zone of international
1999:
a future with an ever-widening
(Rosecrance,
peace"
the
revolution
has greatly increased
24). Still others hold that the information
net
of firms, interest organizations,
social movements,
transnational
significance
In this vein, these non-state actors may be challengers
to, as
works, and individuals.
1998: 376;
well as providers
of, security
2001; Castells,
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
in
Henry and Peartree,
1998; Nye, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). The general observation
is that the information
revolution makes
security an
this perspective,
however,
in all sectors of society.
increasingly
important concern
In 1962, Arnold Wolfers wrote that national security is the absence of threat to a
are
If modern,
countries
core
values.
developed
economically
society's
"information
societies,"
then, following Wolfers'
argument,
increasingly becoming
threats to information
can be seen as threats to the core of these societies. The
for security and the state still remains
of the information
revolution
challenge
issues. We argue
unexplored,
however, both in terms of policy and substantive
and policy
past research on this topic has been
idiosyncratic
that, in general,
to apply or develop
theory. In particular,
oriented, with little or no effort made
to apply international
relations
(IR) theory in
very few attempts have been made
an exercise which seems warranted
both for
the information
analyzing
revolution,
of the impact of the information
the understanding
revolution on security and for
this article, we intend to take a step toward
of IR theory.' With
the development
filling this gap.
the discipline
of IR was quite
For most of its post-Second-World-War
existence,
of IR theory strongly emphasized
content with itself. The development
parsimony
and universality,
at the expense of empirical applicability
(Wight, 2002). It can be
and
that empirical
requires a greater degree of complexity
argued
applicability
than has been provided
and
by the dominant
contingent
thinking
contextually
more
IR theories
(George and Bennet,
2005). However, whether
parsimonious
or Keohane
and Nye's
theories
such as Kenneth Waltz's
neorealism
theory of
of real-world
complex
interdependence
actually gave an accurate understanding
to
either irrelevant or secondary
politics
(that is, external validity) was considered
223
ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO:
The Information Revolution
claims
of internal
validity
(Keohane
and Nye,
1977: vi; Waltz,
1979: 6-7; Wight,
2002).
obsession
with
this inward-looking
sign of discomfort
with
The first major
came with the end of the cold war (Allan and Goldmann,
consistency
theoretical
1995). The end of the cold war resulted in a major
1995; Lebow and Risse-Kappen,
the most successful of IR theories), which
crisis not only for neorealism
(reputedly,
had failed to predict and explain that turn of events, but also for IR in general. But
although much has been written about the cold war's end and the associated need
IR theory, particularly
for increasing
its external validity, surpris
for redefining
revolution and what challenges
ingly little has been written about the information
this implies for IR theory.
for
relevance
three bodies of literature of ostensible
We begin by reviewing
revolution
for security: general
understanding
the impact of the information
society; the specific
of the information
theory and research on the emergence
and cyber-security;
and,
lastly, security
on information
operations
literature
IR perspectives
are
three main
subfield of IR. Subsequently,
studies, a growing
in terms of what they nominally
have to say about security in the digital
discussed
age: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.
Past Research on the Digital Age and Security
on
revolution
When
reviewing past research on the impact of the information
to
is that the three bodies of literature which purport
security, the first observation
not been
informed
by each
to say about this have apparently
have something
themes. Theory and research on the
they deal with overlapping
other, although
of the global information
society say very little about security, and,
emergence
rather
when
they do, the focus lies primarily on the security of firms and markets
is also a specific literature on war
than the security of states and societies. There
typically comes in the form of idiosyncratic
and terror in the digital age, which
theory
with the more general
policy analyses, but which does not communicate
and
in terms of theoretical
is very weak
application
and
and
research,
development.
TheDigital-Age Literature and its Silence on theSecurity Issue
"information
society" first appeared.
It is difficult to ascertain when the expression
in the USA began to write and
In the early 1990s, many observers and journalists
Bill Clinton's
talk about the "information
highway," especially after US President
White House began popularizing the term. Almost accidentally (The Economist,
of
became
the icon of the digital age, and particularly
the Internet
2002),
(1984).
"cyberspace," a term coined by novelist William Gibson
the first and most
influ
Castells has been among
Marxist
sociologist Manuel
that
of the digital age. As early as the late 1980s, he noted
ential prophets
in
productivity
information
the major primary resource of material
had become
the newly emerging
"knowledge
(Castells, 1989). Crucial services such
economy"
on
relied more
and more
air travel, water or energy distribution
as banking,
It was only a matter
of time before
information
technology
(IT) to function.
an indispensable
cornerstone
for
in the 1990s, would
become
information,
a whole
advanced
societies. Castells
(1996, 1997, 1998, 2000) dedicated
modern,
to the loss of sovereignty
trilogy to the dawn of a global network society, pointing
224
International Political Science Review 27 (3)
by nation-states
and the emergence
of alternative
identities
and communities.
From Castells' perspective,
transnational
organized
crime will become
the greatest
potential
threat to global security.
Castells' view of the effect of changing
information
is consistent
technologies
with the work of IR scholars such as Hamid Mowlana.
The study of the security
in Castells as well as in Mowlana,
dimension
is limited to the impact of
however,
ICTs on organized
crime (Castells, 1997, 1998, 2000), military strategic communi
cations, and the use of information
as "propaganda"
(Mowlana, 1997). Mowlana's
work is empirically
insightful, but weak in linking the information
to IR
revolution
theory.
Political scientists have for a considerable
time identified
the ability to control
information
flows as a function
necessary
to preserve
national
sovereignty
and
boost national
security
(Agnew and Corbrige,
1995; Anderson,
1995; Krasner,
1995). States have, however,
faced multiple
in this endeavor,
obstacles
as the
and availability of communication
development
means have been a double-edged
sword. In the past, one-to-many
communication
systems
(that is, radio and
television)
allowed national governments
to reach out to an entire citizenry with
their own message,
often with nationalistic
rhetoric. Increasingly
in recent years,
however, professional
media
organizations
(such as the BBC or CNN),
human
rights organizations,
and individuals
have all learned
to take advantage
of the
same systems to distribute
nongovernmental
information,
inde
counterclaims,
pendent
reports, and so on. This international
flow of messages
and images has
grown at an extraordinarily
rapid rate, thus saturating
the capabilities
of a state to
monitor
closely what
information
goes in and what goes out of its territory.
this traffic flows through
Moreover,
increasingly
integrated worldwide
communi
cation systems, which are no longer dominated
by national bodies
(Camilleri and
Falk, 1992).
As early as the 1970s, the new information
were thought
technologies
to be
likely to increase the vulnerability
of states. A report to the Swedish government,
the Tengelin Report
(Tengelin,
the main risks of a networked
1981), emphasized
society
on foreign vendors
(including
dependence
and the threat of hackers'
raids). Currently, most governments
are well aware that, through
the Internet,
individuals and groups from all over the world can communicate
information
over
which a single government
has little or no control. This information may affect the
attitude of their citizenry vis-a-vis the political
and economic
structures of their
countries. This is not a new phenomenon,
since nation-states
have had a similar
with
radio and television
experience
is different
What
is the
broadcasting.
of information
and the multiple
magnitude
that have further
entry points
the capabilities
exhausted
of states and their resources
to block the penetration
of
that information.
There are two factors that are peculiar
to the global information
society and are
for appreciation
of how ICTs have changed
significant
the concept of security. The
first factor is the centrality of machines
that communicate
with each other and the
effects that this centrality
psychological
than other machines
in the
implies. More
of computers
past, the development
has resulted in optimistic
visions of technical
to societal problems,
solutions
or "technological
fixes," as well as in feelings of fear
(Volti, 1995). Movies such as 2001: A Space Odyssey, War Games, The Terminator, and
The Matrix are all sagas that depict "evil" computers
taking over the world and are
of a culturally
symptomatic
and profound
broad-based
fear of technological
If the idea of depending
on machines
development.
can be unnerving,
knowing
ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO:
The Information Revolution
that our well-being
make vital decisions
and safety is trusted
is hard to bear. Thus,
to computers
that may be
the psychological
dimension
225
to
required
of network
societymatters considerably.
The most famous computer
network,
the Internet, has a distinctive
character
istic: it is at the same time an infrastructure
(that is, the actual computer
network)
and a communications
medium.2 On the same wires and with the same protocol,
packets transport bytes that represent
radically different
information:
an email to
a friend, details on one's flight itinerary, online multiplayer
gaming, statistics on a
water consumption,
municipality's
or credit card numbers. With
the exception
of
the last, which,
like virtually all financial
transactions, would be encrypted, most
other communications
are available in public,
that is, anyone using the medium
could read them.
When
computer
networks were proprietary,
for example
a
linking together
bank with its subsidiaries or US strategic command with nuclear missile
silos, they
were so expensive
that only a very few organizations
or institutions
could afford
them. Furthermore,
they used protocols
that authorized
only their legitimate users
to be in each network. Today, the Internet has opened
up countless
communi
cation channels,
the cost of networking,
reduced
and allowed human
rights
to spread
dissidents
their message.
The
Internet was designed
to maximize
simplicity of communication,
not security of communication.
The price for this
has been the increasing opportunity
for criminals or wrongdoers
to exploit
the
of the network for their own ends.
vulnerabilities
TheAtheoreticalLiterature on Information Operations and Cyber-Terrorism
Whether
hype or reality, cyber-threats
an indisputable
have achieved
in
salience
post-cold-war
security thinking, particularly among analysts and makers of defense
and security policy. Critical infrastructure
protection,
information warfare,
infor
mation operations,'
information
assurance, cyber-terrorism,
inMilitary
Revolution
Affairs (RMA) , and similar buzzwords are common
currency in policy documents,
defense bills, and security doctrines
of the early 21st century. While
conventional
forces and military budgets have been generally
downsized
the end of
following
the cold war, the new emphasis
on information
security and cyber-threats
are a
noteworthy
In North America,
exception.
Europe, Russia, China, and other parts
of the world, governments
are setting up new units and employing
personnel
for
and countering
monitoring,
analyzing,
the perceived
risks and threats of the
global network society.
The conception
of cyber-threats
has grown out of the fear of increased
and loss of control
that presumably
is the result of moving
vulnerability
from an
industrial
to an information
society
(Alberts, 1996a, 1996b; Alberts
and Papp,
1997; Henry and Peartree,
1998; O'Day, 2004). Without
the development
of global
networks
and communications,
computer
would
be difficult
cyber-threats
to
imagine except as science fiction. Notions
of cyber-threats have originated
in both
the private and public sphere, among military
as well as civilian actors. In the
business community
and within
the police, cyber-crime has become
a particularly
salient threat image. Within
the military-bureaucratic
establishment,
perceived
threats have been framed as information warfare,
information
operations,
cyber
terrorism, and cyber-war. Among
computer
and network
scientists,
technicians,
threat images are usually much
operators,
an emphasis
on
narrower, with
computer
network attacks, exploits, and disruptions
(implying an adversary) and
226
International Political ScienceReview 27 (3)
can
such as software conflicts and other bugs which
on structural vulnerabilities
bug).
the Year 2000 or 'Y2K" computer
lead to systems crashes (for example,
and
typically involve a very broad range of adversaries
Images of cyber-threats
targets, including both state and non-state actors (Campen et al., 1996; Erbschloe,
et al., 1999;
1998; Herd, 2000; Khalilzad
2001; Furnell, 2002; Henry and Peartree,
2002). States are still
1996; Yourdon,
2001; Schwartau,
O'Day, 2004; Polikanov,
enemy,
able to
type of potential
important
typically seen as the single most
(for example,
of another country
effectively
the critical infrastructures
neutralize
but non-state actors are gaining attention
by shutting down telecommunications),
as well.
terrorist
argues that "Tomorrow's
Council
Research
A study by the National
2001;
than with a bomb"
(Bendrath,
may be able to do more with a keyboard
Tom Ridge
Security Director
2001a: 282).5 Former US Homeland
Denning,
to one
connected
that "Terrorists can sit at one computer
(2002) observed
need bombs or
network and can create world havoc - [they] don't necessarily
a power grid." Such
or shutdown
to cripple a sector of the economy,
explosives
on information
of the entire discourse
is characteristic
rhetorical dramatization
view is that as societies and governments
security and cyber-threats. The common
technology,
they are also
reliable with respect to information
are becoming more
to all sorts of cyber-threats.
becoming more vulnerable
in the literature
is that of an "electronic
dramatization
The most cataclysmic
2004;
2002; O'Day,
2000; Forno,
2001; Everard,
Pearl Harbor"
(Bendrath,
Pearl Harbor"
to the "electronic
1998).6 According
Schwartau,
1997; Smith,
scenario, phone systems could collapse, subway cars suddenly stop, and the money
as banks and automatic
teller
become
inaccessible
of people
of thousands
In such an apocalyptic
vision, overall critical infra
machines
stop functioning.
lose
would
to the point that society and government
structures would be disrupted
Pearl
image of an "electronic
the ability to function
normally. The evocative
in the US media and in certain circles of policy
adopted
Harbor" was immediately
argued
John Hamre
2003). Former Deputy Defense Minister
makers
(Bendrath,
is going
... There
Pearl Harbor
that "We're facing the possibility of an electronic
attack on this country some time in the future" (CNN, 1997).
to be an electronic
is
have argued that the "electronic Pearl Harbor" scenario
Some commentators
than sober analysis. For
about
and is more
fear-mongering
highly unlikely,
defined
as digital attacks
(2001b) argues that cyber-terrorism,
example, Denning
is extremely unlikely.7 Few, if any,
and human deaths,
causing physical destruction
as acts of terrorism. Even the US Naval War
could be characterized
cyber-attacks
concluded
that an "electronic
with the Gartner Group,
in cooperation
College,
Pearl Harbor," although
theoretically
possible, was highly unlikely: "There are far
from hoax phone calls
simpler and less costly ways to attack critical infrastructure,
to truck bombs and hijacked airliners" (The Economist, 2002: 19).
of improving
or
as a means
are seen not merely
Information
operations
physical attack, but as a means of replacing physical destruction
complementing
1999: 12; O'Day,
and Ochmanek,
1999; Harshberger
with electronic
(Denning,
can have
of
web
attacks
and
the
certainly
Denial-of-service
pages
defacing
2004).
the result
transactions,
For firms operating
with online
material
consequences.
the major impact is symbolic and the
losses.8 Nevertheless,
can be huge financial
are attacks with and
To a large degree,
cyber-attacks
main effect is humiliation.
for attacking
in particular,
is a means
against symbols and images. Net-defacing,
is being done on an everyday basis by "hacktivists" on
symbols, something which
ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO:
The Information Revolution
both
sides of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict,
the China-Taiwan
227
conflict,
and
the
Protestant-Catholic conflict inNorthern Ireland.9
Most
observers
focus on the transnational
and network-based
character
of
cyber-threats
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
1999, 2001; Deibert
and Stein, 2003; Henry
and Peartree,
1998; Keohane
and Nye, 1998; O'Day, 2004; Pfaltzgraff and Shultz,
are typically seen as operating
1997). ? Adversaries
in loosely organized
networks
consisting of relatively independent
nodes of individuals, groups, organizations,
or
even states, capable of quickly assembling
and dispersing,
even long before an
attack has been discovered.
In particular,
network actors capable of using such
means
can resort
to "asymmetric
warfare"
(Applegate,
2001; Arquilla
and
Ronfeldt,
2001; De Borchgrave
et al., 2000; Erbschloe,
2001; Herd, 2000; O'Day,
2004; Sofear and Goodman,
2001). Although
they might be incapable of engaging
states in a conventional
military
conflict,
they can inflict serious damage
by
attacking and exploiting
the vulnerabilities
of information
systems by resorting
to
cyber-attacks
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
1999, 2001; Cordesman,
2002).
The widely acknowledged
framing of cyber-threats
implies that boundaries
are
dissolved between
the international
and the domestic,
between
civil and military
spheres, between
the private and public, and between
peace and war. If taken
seriously, this framing suggests that not only the security of information
systems
is challenged,
but also, and more
fundamentally,
the sovereignty
of states
(Everard, 2000; Fountain,
2001; Giacomello,
2005; Giacomello
and Mendez,
2001;
Rosecrance,
1999). Cyber-threats
challenge
primarily
internal sovereignty
(effec
tive control of the national
territory and of the people
living within
it), but not
necessarily external sovereignty
(the formal recognition
of independence
by other
states) (compare Philpott, 2001). At stake are not only the tangible and intangible
values of information,
but also the ability of governments
to control the course of
events.
In conclusion,
while
there is a growing body of specialized
literature dealing
with the manifold
aspects of digital-age
security, there is also an alarmist tendency
in this literature. Furthermore,
this literature
is policy oriented
and hardly ever
involves the application
or development
of theory.
Silence on theInformationRevolution in SecurityStudies
A major issue in theoretically oriented
security studies (a growing subfield of IR) is
the very meaning
of the essentially contested
concept of security. Two contending
- those of traditionalists
can be discerned
positions
and those of wideners.
hail typically from the realist camp and practice state-centric
Traditionalists
and
military-oriented
"strategic studies" (Ayoob, 1997; Walt, 1994). They maintain
that
of ethnic and religious insurgence,
despite the emergence
global terrorism, trans
national crime, and global warming,
there is no need to broaden
the definition
of
for the sake of conceptual
security. Allegedly
clarity and theoretical
parsimony
(Ayoob, 1997; Goldmann,
1999), and arguably because of their underlying
ideo
logical priorities,
traditionalists
to approach
continue
security from the viewpoint
of the nation-state
and interstate war.
Wideners
(who represent a mix of liberals and critical theorists) claim that the
security concept should be broadened
to encompass
"new" threats and challenges,
spanning political,
and environmental
sectors (Buzan, 1991;
societal, economic,
Buzan et al., 1998; Deibert,
1997; Muiller, 2002; Stern, 1999). In addition, wideners
a range of "new" actors in their analyses, notably nongovernmental
incorporate
International Political Science Review 27 (3)
228
terrorist organizations,
private firms,
social movements,
organizations
(NGOs),
in "human
interest
has spawned
and individuals. The focus on the individual
policy.
security," which also has had an impact on United Nations
the wideners
have
in light of their broadened
perspective,
Rather surprisingly
revolution
and its impact on security.
the information
only very rarely addressed
ecological,
political,
security concepts
typically cover economic,
Their expanded
of the Internet and other
and cultural issues, but seldom address the emergence
revolution.
elements of the information
of information
technol
the development
Some traditionalists
have addressed
of military capabilities
improvement
ogy, but only with regard to the technological
have always played a crucial role in a state
capabilities
1999). Material
(Lonsdale,
on national security (compare Knox and
centric and military-oriented
perspective
and psychological
gathering
1991).
Intelligence
Murray,
2001; Van Creveld,
are also "material" capabilities
operations)
warfare
(which are part of information
of warfare.
Likewise,
elements
technological
important
and have always been
of machine
the military,
from the invention
have always interested
revolutions
of radar and satellites. "Electronic warfare"
to the development
guns and airplanes
the military
for several
and practice within
has been an established
concept
technol
traditionalists
(and realists imprimis), information
decades. But for most
a new fancy add-on (compare Biddle,
2004; Everard, 2000: 109;
ogies are merely
Lonsdale, 1999).
perspective
of the theoretical
Regardless
be filled in security studies: to address the
of security in
for the general understanding
variation in security relations and
explaining
there is obviously a gap to
advocated,
revolution
impact of the information
the contemporary
world, as well as for
policies across the world.
International Relations Theory and Security in the Digital Age
theoretical
perspec
stand out as the main
liberalism, and constructivism
Realism,
IR. Although
overlaps,
linkages, and internal varieties are
tives in contemporary
and portrayed
as separate
perceived
of discussion,
they are generally
matters
can nominally
say about
Asking what each of these perspectives
perspectives.
relevance of each perspective,
security in the digital age will clarify the potential
for further theory building and empirical
and may serve as a source of inspiration
research.
Realism
of realism are: (1) the state is the primary unit of analysis;
The core assumptions
interests; and (3) power
(2) the state acts in a rational way to satisfy its national
of realism,
the
and security are the core values of the state. In all versions
of central government)
is essentially
Anarchy
worldview
pessimistic.
(absence
forces states to act out of their
system, which
characterizes
the international
tragically
lead to the
conditions
national
self-interest
(survival). Anarchical
in terms of military
capabilities
Power, measured
primarily
"security dilemma."
and the associated
striving for security, is the main driving force in world politics
1993; Schmidt, 2002).
(Gilpin, 1986; Morgenthau,
to turn realism into a scientific,
Kenneth Waltz attempted
systemic theory of
its scope. In so
international
politics, with foreign and security policy beyond
of how world
a universal
and parsimonious
he provided
explanation
doing,
ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO:
The Information Revolution
229
politics functions,
but at the cost of downplaying
the real-world relevance of his
theory (Waltz, 1979: 5-7). Mearsheimer,
in his most
recent
however, endeavors
book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), to fill the gap left byWaltz by laying
the groundwork
for a neorealist
theory that is not only logically consistent,
but
also applicable
to the study of foreign and security policy.
In principle,
realists do not see a need
to revise their theories
for under
in the digital age. The state is still seen as the main
standing
security
and
actor. Moreover,
sometimes
a narrow
only important
of
(military)
definition
security ismaintained,
thus denying
that non-state actors may exercise any degree
of (military)
power. Realists would
tackle the challenge
presumably
of the
in much
information
revolution
the same way as they have tackled previous
of transnationalization,
challenges
and globalization.
complex
interdependence,
These
trends are seen as epiphenomena,
which may very well affect the policies
structures
and domestic
of states, but which
do not undermine
the anarchic
system of international
politics, and thus do not affect the primacy of the state as
the supreme political unit.
Realists might
consider
IT-related security threats to be largely an economic
issue, not necessarily
affecting
the security of states and not in themselves
security
threats. Indeed, there are some realists, or realist-inspired
theorists, who generally
of security, but who argue that if any widening
defend a narrow, military definition
of the concept
it should be in order to include the economic
should be made,
dimension
(Buzan, 1991; Walt, 1994).
Some realists would
likely consider
information warfare as relevant, if defined
as a new technological
in otherwise
component
traditional
interstate
conflict
(Lonsdale,
1999). Psychological
warfare
has been a central element
in military
thinking at least since Chinese
strategist Sun Tzu wrote his famous The Art of War
some 2000 years ago.1' Electronic warfare, such as the electronic
jamming of radio
has been an element
of interstate conflict
communication,
for a much
shorter
time (since the Second World War), but is also a precursor
of the much more
recent talk of warfare
in the digital age. The introduction
of information warfare
in strategic studies and military planning
(which generally has been informed by
realist thinking)
could be seen as a marker
of continuity
rather than dramatic
is new, as is the global capacity of resourceful
change. Some of the technology
digital adversaries, but the basic notions of attacking and defending
information
and information
systems are as old as warfare
itself - basically, old wine in new
bottles.
Liberalism
Liberalism
is a broad perspective
which
inter alia, Wilsonian
idealism
includes,
and neoliberal
theories
(Moravcsik, 1998, 1999; Walker,
1993), democratic
peace
theory (Russett and Antholis,
1993), interdependence
theory (Keohane and Nye,
1977, 1989), second-image
the bureaucratic
theory (Gourevitch,
1978),
politics
approach
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999), and domestic
politics approaches
(Risse
Kappen,
1995; Snyder, 1991). The most important contributions
of liberal theory
to the discipline
of IR can thus be summarized
as: (1) the emphasis on a plurality
of international
of domestic
actors;
factors
in
(2) the importance
political
the international
of states; (3) the role of international
behavior
determining
in establishing
not enforcing)
institutions'2
rules of behavior
(although
(or
for state actors; and (4) expanding
the agenda of international
regimes)
studies
230
International Political Science Review 27 (3)
in the subfield of international
(particularly
political economy)
by focusing
"Hobbesian"
set of issue areas than mere
broader
survival in an anarchic
on a
inter
national environment.'3
Liberals agree with realists that states are central actors in world politics, but in
contrast
to realists, argue that states are by no means
the only actors that play
roles in international
in
relations. Indeed, the most prominent
significant
change
recent years in the field of international
politics has been the emergence
of a wide
international
actors (transnational
range of new non-state
corporations,
social
and terrorists).
movements,
pressure
groups, political
party networks, migrants,
to show awareness
of the emergence
of new
Thus
liberalism has the potential
in chat rooms and "blogs," and through new types of
online groups, operating
ICTs.
audio-visual
In most
liberal readings of contemporary
it is argued
that the
world politics,
of the nation-state
is being
sovereignty
permeated
and fragmented
by the
of transnational
relations. Though
a single transnational
actor is
development
the political, military, or economic
seldom able to challenge
power of a state, the
increasingly
complex
and globally
penetrating
web of transnational
relations
states to the extent
that sovereignty
is hardly more
than a
perforates
sovereign
in reality, is no longer sustainable.
symbol of territorial integrity which,
Indeed,
is a burden rather than a power
some liberals go as far as to claim that sovereignty
asset, as suggested
by Rosenau's
(1990) distinction
between
"sovereignty-bound"
and "sovereignty-free"
actors.'4
realists and liberals in IR has, to some extent,
The long-standing
clash between
the two. In particular,
similarities between
realism and
overshadowed
important
an emphasis
liberalism share a rationalistic
epistemological
approach,
including
on interest-based
interaction
and Wendt,
(Buzan et al., 1998; Fearon
2002;
et al., 1998; Schmidt, 2002). This distinguishes
realism and liberalism
Katzenstein
and even more
so from other "interpretative"
from constructivism,
approaches
on
such as post-structuralism
and postmodernism.
with its emphasis
Liberalism,
non-state
actors with transnational
that the economy
capacity and its insistence
matters
as much
as security (the former is seen as the underlying
element
for the
the definition
of what international
relations is about.
latter), broadens
In general,
tends to emphasize
liberalism
the positive
outcomes
of inter
and interconnectedness,
rather than the increasing vulnerability
and
dependence
that might
ensue. There are two possible
reasons for this "optimistic"
insecurity
liberalism. First, modern
liberalism
is influenced
tendency within
by Kantian and
idealism
is on the possi
Wilsonian
(Duncan et al., 2003: 21-2, 32-4). Emphasis
bilities of overcoming
conflicts
in particular,
by peaceful means,
by norm and
institution building at an international
level. In contrast to realists, liberals believe
that humans
then at least morally
are, if not inherently
receptive.
"good,"
is generally
seen as a
Modernization,
including
technological
development,
and peaceful
this background,
liberals
vehicle of enlightenment
change. Against
notions such as collective
have promoted
security, and cooperative
security, which,
the United Nations,
and the Organization
among others things, have influenced
in Europe.
for Security and Co-operation
to realist state-centric
Liberalism
has also responded
and security-oriented
theories of international
relations by emphasizing
the significance
of non-state
actors and "non-security"
liberals have
issues, such as trade and travel. Many
of security for granted, and have taken a critical
actually taken a realist perspective
stance against addressing
issues labeled "security" altogether.
the
Consequently,
The Information Revolution
ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO:
231
liberal critique
of realist
liberalism
from
security
thinking
has prevented
on security.
developing
its own perspective
Some liberals have advocated a widened
This problem has not gone unnoticed.
for example,
includes
and human
perspective,
which,
economic,
ecological,
security concerns.
Paradoxically,
however, few liberals seem to have apprehended
the challenge
of the information
those that have are still
revolution. Moreover,
silent on its implications
for security. The influential
theory of complex
inter
in the 1970s byJoseph Nye and Robert Keohane,
dependence,
initially developed
has recently been updated
to meet
the challenges
of the digital age (Keohane and
In this updated
version,
Nye, 1998; Nye, 2003, 2004b).
the costs of interdepen
are added as a new component
to the theory.
dence
(sensitivity and vulnerability)
In addition,
relations is
the impact of the information
revolution on international
are framed
analyzed. It is, however, noteworthy
that the costs of interdependence
as matters
of national
or
in economic
merely
terms, and are not portrayed
international
security (Nye, 2003: 199-202,
2004b).
as the absence of threat to
Nye briefly observes
that national
security, defined
to elabo
major values, can be at stake. He does not, however, make any attempt
threats within his own theoretical
rate, critique, or place images of cyber-security
of "soft power"
is relevant for our topic
framework. Nye's
influential
concept
is "the ability to get what you want through attraction
nonetheless.
Soft power
or payments.
of a country's
rather than coercion
It arises from the attractiveness
... Soft power rests on the ability to shape the
culture, political ideals, and policies
preferences
of others" (Nye, 2004a: x, 5). Nye argues that soft power is becoming
more important in the digital age than ever before, mainly because of the evolving
of global communication
which
easily transcend
sovereign
multiple
channels
boundaries
(Nye, 2004b: Ch. 7). Importantly,
however, soft power is more about
form than content. Soft power and the global ICTs that facilitate it are not simply
instruments of cooperation,
democratization,
and peace, as Nye and other liberals
would
like to have it, but may just as easily be means of deception,
propaganda,
and terror.
If idealism and the fear of treading on realist ground by doing security analysis
are removed,
liberal theory implicitly provides
insight into the nature of security
to the increasing
in the digital age. In particular,
it does so by paying due attention
of non-state actors, which are "sovereignty
free," and to
plurality and significance
its costs in terms of sensitivity and
global complex
interdependence,
particularly
trends that are consistent with the
socioeconomic
vulnerability. Two contemporary
of liberal theory are important
for our analysis:
dictum
(1) the expanding
the public and private sectors to provide services and (2) the
partnership
between
of the civil and military spheres. Because of these trends, the distinctions
merging
in jurisdiction,
to different
competencies,
duties, and risks that used to pertain
segments of societies have become blurred.
that they alone cannot provide
the
Governments
have increasingly
recognized
societies. The trend toward
growing number of public services needed by modern
and privatization
evident in, among others, the health,
public-private
partnership
to national
and transportation
sectors has even extended
security. For
education,
of the
in the USA,
to Secure
the National
example,
Strategy
Cyberspace
Board of September
Protection
President's
Critical Infrastructure
2002 relies on
secure
that "Government
alone cannot
public-private
partnership,
conceding
of the
be seen as a "civilianization"
cyberspace"
(PCCIP, 2000: 5). This might
of society. For instance, the recent "war on
military or, perhaps, a "militarization"
232
International Political Science Review 27 (3)
terrorism" is being waged with a mix of military and law enforcement
approaches.
The post-9/11
reform resulting in the new US Department
of Homeland
Security
In a speech
(DHS)
is yet another
illustration.
to the Electronics
Industries
Tom Ridge
Alliance,
Homeland
Security Director
that the DHS
(2002) argued
at all levels.
indeed encouraged
interoperability
and cooperation
The integration
and complex
interdependencies
that follow from the infor
in the telecom sector. The military has always
mation
revolution are most apparent
to some extent, but, currently,
of
used civilian telecom networks
the vast majority
is transmitted
communication
military
through civilian networks
and is indeed
in the
dependent
upon
them. Computer
networks
have become
incorporated
of hard military
the mainstay
power, but they have also become
of
development
soft power (Fountain, 2001; Nye, 2002, 2004a).
a theory
The question
that was originally
whether
remains,
nonetheless,
in a political
for analyzing
actors and processes
designed
primarily
economy
context can capture
on security. Is the
the impact of the information
revolution
of global ICTs mainly
a continuation
of the trans
and expansion
development
nationalization
of society and economy which first began with trade and travel or
is it something
qualitatively
different?
Liberal
analysts, including Nye, seem to
should remain open for further inquiry and
suggest the former, but the question
and enlightenment
tends to make
critique. The inherent bias toward modernism
the positive
rather than the negative
liberals emphasize
aspects of complex
interdependence and information technology.'5
are clear and
and other challenges
of the information
revolution
Cyber-threats
of the more
present
elements
general
trend of globalization,
which
arguably
and security of the state. Non-state
actors are becoming
the sovereignty
weakens
and powerful
even more numerous
because of the information
revolution.
The
not only made
of the Internet
real-time
communications
emergence
global
for existing NGOs, but also for new, exclusively
online groups. This can
possible
effects: integration,
obviously have both positive as well as negative
cooperation,
and liberation may be eased, but also terrorism,
transnational
crime, and the
of states.'6
destabilization
The liberal emphasis on a plurality of world actors is perhaps the most valuable
to theory building with regard to security in the digital age. This
contribution
is still underdeveloped.
and Ronfeldt
theme, however,
Arquilla
(2001) are among
the few scholars who not only adopt mainstream
of globalization
liberal notions
and other challenges
to state sovereignty,
but also explicitly address the issue of
actor plurality
in the security problems
of the digital age. They do so mainly by
and applying general network
introducing
theory. Nevertheless,
they do not make
to communicate
with or contribute
to theory. Although
any explicit
attempt
a theoretically
informed
to
providing
analysis,
their writing
is most
accessible
and policy-makers,
rather
than to students
of international
policy
analysts
relations.
Constructivism
In the late 1980s, social constructivism
was explicitly
(or simply "constructivism")
in the IR discipline.
introduced
Since
then, IR constructivism
has expanded
a significant
in particular,
on meta-theoretical
enormously,
making
impact,
on theory building
and empirical
research in IR.'7 The
debates, and increasingly
for IR constructivism
came partly
from attacking
the meta
breakthrough
The Information Revolution
ERIKSSON/GiACOMELLO:
233
to both realism and liberalism18 and
theoretical
rationalism which
is common
partly from providing
substantive
interpretations
of those processes
and factors
downplayed
by these theories. The end of the cold war implied a crisis for both
realism and liberalism, as both perspectives
failed to account for this paradigmatic
a window of opportunity
for constructivism.
In
opened
change. This consequently
terms of ontological
IR constructivists
claim to
and epistemological
positioning,
have seized the "middle ground" between
rationalism and postmodernism
(Adler,
1997;Wight, 2002: 36).
of the interpretation
(and thus
Constructivists
emphasize
the unavoidability
of social and
of reality, especially with respect to the understanding
distortion)
is,
political
activity. The ambition
to uncover
causal mechanisms
and patterns
seen as entirely compatible
notwithstanding,
with constructivism.
Constructivists
and cables) as
maintain
computers
that there is a material
reality (for example,
and that it is
well as a social reality (identities,
interests, norms, and institutions),
to distinguish
the two. The argument
here is that, unlike
between
meaningful
and so is consequently
material
reality, social reality is socially constructed,
always
Thus constructivists
to change.
that social realities such as
argue
susceptible
interests and identities can never be seen as static or be taken for granted, but
and reproduced.
should be seen as constantly produced
Rather
than asking what
ask how social realities become what they are
social realities are, IR constructivists
(Adler,2002;Wendt, 1992).
come in many forms and guises (modernist,
critical, and prag
Constructivists
and an even wider range
matic) and advocate a very wide range of methodologies
of particular
IR theories. Some constructivists
focus entirely on states and the
interstate system (Wendt, 1999), while others study, for example, NGOs and trans
(Adler,
national communities
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and epistemic communities
1992; Haas, 1990). Adler
(2002: 108, 110) has also suggested
that constructivists
In terms of providing
on the individual.
should
focus more
frameworks
for
world politics, constructivism
is clearly much more heterogeneous
understanding
than realism and liberalism (Checkel, 1997; Fearon and Wendt,
2002: 56).
If there is anything
a core constructivist
theorem on what forces
resembling
it goes something
like this. At the
shape world politics or social reality in general,
most basic level, actors have a set of norms - beliefs about right and wrong. Norms
of "we" from "them." In turn, identities
shape
shape identities - the separation
interests. Importantly and in contrast to rationalism,
all of these elements
are seen
it is because
shift
as inherently dynamic. If interests change,
there is an underlying
in identities and norms (Adler, 2002: 103-4; compare Ruggie, 1998).
Social factors are seen not only as dynamic, but also as strongly conditional.
does not aim for universal
Unlike
realism and liberalism, constructivism
theory,
but for conditional
generalizations
(Adler, 2002: 101). Unlike
postmodernists,
do not resort to idiosyncratic
but rather strive
narrations,
however, constructivists
of similarities
to uncover
constructivism
con
and differences.
What
patterns
stance on material
as well as social reality,
tributes is a pragmatic meta-theoretical
on conditional
as to what
an emphasis
and a few guidelines
generalizations,
inter
substantive
IR theories should include and look at, especially
the dynamic
interests, and institutions.
play between social factors such as norms, identities,
on the
both with elaborations
Constructivist
security studies have contributed
and with more
substantive
security concept
analyses of security policy, as well as
the relationship
between
illuminating
security policy and national
identity (Buzan
et al., 1998; Katzenstein,
1996; Waever et al., 1993).
234
International Political ScienceReview 27 (3)
When using a theoretical framework based in realism or liberalism, it ismore or
realists
as to what can or cannot be a security threat. In general,
less prescribed
threats (interstate war), while liberals tend to apply a
focus on violent actor-based
including both non-state actors and structural threats (compare
wider perspective,
on the other hand, does not take a general
1983). Constructivism,
Sundelius,
stance as to what can or cannot be framed as a security threat and how such
rather
focuses on the verb "become"
threats can be dealt with. Constructivism
security
constructivist
(Adler, 2002: 95). Nevertheless,
than "can" or "cannot"
as
related threats, particularly
identity and culturally
studies tend to emphasize
in realist and liberal accounts of security (Buzan et
these have been downplayed
to address
makes
it possible
of constructivism
al., 1998). The empirical openness
In
terms
of
threats to
threats.
of
security
range
perceived
the widest
possible
include not only digital attacks,
this could, for example,
critical infrastructures,
as well as
but also technical collapses and bugs such as the infamous Y2K problem,
and volcanic eruptions.
natural disasters such as earthquakes
is the theory of "securiti
to security
approach
A noteworthy
constructivist
and
school." This is about how, when,
by the "Copenhagen
zation," developed
as amatter of
(anything)
political actors frame something
with what consequences
is on
2003). The emphasis
1995; Williams,
security (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever,
this has for political
and the implications
language)
"speech acts" (that is, political
relations. Securitization
implies that an "existential
and political
agenda-setting
the issue on the political
threat" is identified, and that this "speech act" prioritizes
such as secrecy, the use of force, and
extraordinary measures
agenda,
legitimating
a wide
advocating
of privacy. The Copenhagen
school, while
the invasion
revolution at all.
the information
of security, has not considered
understanding
of information
(2001a, 2001b), however, has studied the securitization
Eriksson
frames of
in Swedish politics. His analysis shows the impact of different
technology
responsibility
IT-related threats on whom or what is blamed, and who is allocated
For instance, framing an incident as "cyber-crime"
for dealing with the problems.
for
and that the police are responsible
implies that criminals are to be blamed,
the very same incident can also be framed as an
dealing with them. In contrast,
to a given nation
implies that enemies
instance of "information warfare," which
state (other states or non-state actors) are to be blamed, and that the military has a
to respond to the threat (Bendrath, 2001; Eriksson, 2001a, 2001b).
responsibility
security currently
of digital-age
accounts
constructivist
In the few additional
a multi
is mainly on how information warfare challenges
the emphasis
available,
of identity. Everard
(2000) argues that
tude of boundaries,
notably, boundaries
in which all kinds of
is a particular kind of "identity warfare"
information warfare
divide.
the classical domestic-international
are challenged,
including
boundaries
it may very well adapt,
is at stake, although
the identity of the nation-state
Hence,
of formally
sovereign
to the constant
than succumb,
penetration
rather
in cyberspace
of new identities
and articulation
and the emergence
boundaries
(compare Saco, 1999).
in a virtual world
implies
analysis of power and security
The constructivist
to the material
of images and symbols in addition
the significance
emphasizing
to Der Derian
(2000), one of many
and cables. According
reality of computers
(some) actors from the bloody
effects of war in the digital age is that it distances
distance
is not about
rendering
geographical
reality of war. This distancing
a computer
in
of a hacker
attacking
the possibility
irrelevant
(for example,
in St Petersburg). While not
in Seattle, via a computer
from a computer
Shanghai
ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO:
The Information Revolution
235
the significance
discounting
of decreasing
geographical
distance, what we are
rather referring to here is how virtuality affects the perception
and conduct of war.
Digital war is similar to computer
games,
to the extent
that simulation
is per
formed and perceived
in the same way, that is, by using the mouse and keyboard of
a computer. Virtuality
thus blurs the boundary between
the real and the imagined.
It is no coincidence
that the entertainment
industry, including
the film and
computer-gaming
industries with their effects and tactical tools and software, are
also an increasingly
important source of inspiration and expertise
for the military
(Der Derian, 2000; Everard, 2000).
The study of "symbolic politics" (the use and abuse of symbols for manipulating
political discourse
and public opinion)
is highly relevant for studying digital-age
security. The symbolic politics approach,
first and foremost represented
by Murray
is a constructivist
Edelman,
in social science, introduced
contribution
long before
the information
revolution
(Edelman,
1964, 1977, 1985, 1988; Merelman,
1993;
Sears, 1993; 't Hart, 1993). One study has been conducted
regarding
the digital
symbolic politics of US presidential
and Perrin, 2000),
campaigning
(Klinenberg
yet the symbolic politics approach
has not previously been applied
in studies of
digital-age security.
is a noteworthy
Defacing websites
practice of symbolic politics,
less antagonistic
than, but nonetheless
comparable
to, the burning of an enemy's flag. The cost of
a website and securing a server are usually negligible
mending
in comparison with
the cost in terms of lost confidence,
and feelings of vulnerability.
disparagement,
Assaults
and counterattacks
against US and Chinese
government
websites
by
hackers from the respective
countries
have transpired.
Similar digital wars are
Israeli and Arab hackers and between
going on between
Pakistani
and Indian
ones. A symbolic politics approach
shows how and why these actions are seen as an
to national pride (or a corporate brand). The Internet could be
insult, an offense
seen as the vast new global arena for symbolic politics par excellence.
Constructivist
analysis can, moreover,
illustrate
the function
and impact of
in digital-age
language
security. By making
use of analogies
to things familiar in
the "real" or off-line world
to "bugs," "viruses," "worms," and "fire
(comparisons
the abstract and technically complex world of cyber-security
walls," for example),
ismade
intelligible and indeed meaningful.
The use of terms such as information
Pearl Harbor"
"warfare" and "electronic
that which
convey a special meaning:
is
digital by nature has, nonetheless,
physical consequences
to those of
comparable
conventional
war. Constructivist
analysis can contribute
to revealing and under
of such rhetoric and symbolic actions.
standing the significance
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted
to demonstrate
the need
to develop middle
range theories
that integrate
liberalism,
and realism for under
constructivism,
the impact of the information
standing
revolution
on security. The specialist
literature on security in the digital age is policy oriented with little or no ambition
to apply or contribute
to theory, and IR scholars have, with few exceptions,
paid
to the security problems of the digital age. In this conclusion,
only scant attention
we seek to provide
some initial guiding
as to how this gap between
direction
theory and research can be bridged.
Liberalism
and constructivism
seem to have more
to say about our
nominally
topic than is the case with realism. If stripped from its idealist and antirealist pre
International Political Science Review 27(3)
236
of security in the digital age: the
tensions, liberalism grasps many of the elements
of non-state
actors with
transnational
capacity, network economies,
multiplicity
of formally
and the consequent
perforation
interdependence,"
"vulnerability
the
constructivism
seems
apt for analyzing
sovereign
boundaries.
Likewise,
security. In general,
aspects of digital-age
symbolic, rhetorical, and identity-based
of the digital age as it has tackled other features of
realism tackles the challenge
- by largely ignoring
to
security
it, or by subsuming
information
globalization
in the
either political economy or domestic politics, none of which fit comfortably
of
application
is, however,
another
possible
(neo) realist field of vision. There
is a key
information warfare
(classical) realist thought in strategic studies in which
is the technological
continuation
In this perspective,
information warfare
concept.
recently, of electronic
warfare
and, more
of classical
forms of psychological
a military
the analysis does not go beyond
warfare. Yet even in this perspective,
and state-centric orientation.
in
problems
The foregoing
analysis has shown that there are two interrelated
security in the digital age. First, theory and practice
past efforts at understanding
are so distant
that they hardly ever inform each other. Second,
on this matter
IR theories are plagued
dualism,
implying great diffi
by an entrenched
existing
in analyses of the complexities
of
and application
culties for theoretical adaptation
new digital world.
the emerging
a more
is by adopting
"prag
these problems
One possible way of overcoming
there are several strands of pragmatist
philosophy,
matic"
approach.'9 While
advocates
between
theory and practice,
bridge building
generally
pragmatism
methodological
pluralism, contingent generalizations, and theoretical comple
(Bauer and Brighi,
rather than entrenched
opposition
mentarities
and tolerance
to bridge
is needed
the gap between
2002: iii). This seems to be exactly what
in academic
IR.
the dualistic conflicts
theory and practice, and to help overcome
security
digital-age
There
is thus no reason why the scholar trying to understand
on insights from a diverse
range of IR theories,
cannot
draw simultaneously
and on insights from
as contending
or incompatible,
often depicted
unfortunately
literature.
the policy-oriented
is another word
for
The critical reader might wonder whether
"pragmatist"
for "not smart enough
for theory"
or, more
cynically worded,
"empiricist"
or ethos, than a
ismore of an orientation,
1992). Indeed, pragmatism
(Lewontin,
the chasm between
first step to overcoming
theory. This is, however, a necessary
a fruitful
and while
a particular
theory is not proffered,
theory and practice,
in the digital age is
of theory on security
starting point for the development
to case studies and compar
such a pragmatic
applied
approach
provided. With
further
to build a foundation
it is possible
upon which
theory
ative analyses,
an emphasis
on middle-range
can be done, with
theory and on
building
rather than universal generalizations.
conditional
Notes
1.
A
No.
noteworthy
3). This
however.
published
interesting
or should
isMillenniums
exception
issue deals
Contemporary
on national
with
primarily
Security
Studies
security
in the
policy-relevant
the
say about
points,
empirical
but
the digital
issue on IR and
(Vol. 31,
age
special
in general,
IR theory
and
the information
age
a
has
also
had
issue
24, No.
(Vol.
1)
special
issue makes
several
information
age. This
special
does
puzzle.
not
The
tackle
same
the question
weakness
of what
plagues
can
IR theory
an otherwise
237
The Information Revolution
ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO:
useful
2. A
on
volume
andPeartree
possible
all
nearly
newspapers
the point,
about
The
financial
a
on
unencrypted)
forecast.
US
taken
own
or
television
same
the
of
Department
information
one's
International
edited
Security,
by Henry
radio
radio
on
of other
utilities
travels
functioning
or
and relatives
in "intimate"
messages
or television.
on the
Data
and
functioning
network
wavelength
NATO
also
IO is a broad
that
concept
or a hammer)
as well
as
digital
are
If the tools used
then
digital,
the
adopted
information
(Department
means
clear"
news
morning
information
includes
Hence,
bomb
"in
travel
the
rechristened
has
information
and
adversary
and
information
systems"
information
not
does
with
along
has
Defense
(IO).
operations
to affect
the
to friends
with
emails
along
is not
the case with
of
management
"actions
and
about
and
transactions,
networks
computer
chat groups.
This
3. The
Revolution
Information
(1998).
true for
is whether
that might
be raised
here
this is not
by the reader
point
information
and even books
and
Radio,
television,
technologies.
telegraph,
infrastructure
and medium.
This possible
misses
criticism
are, after all, both
With
the Internet
information
about
of the network,
however.
the status
warfare
same
is,
(that
weather
as
(IW)
IO
definition.
are
systems while
of Defense,
defending
1998: vii).
a
precision
that objective.
(for example,
physical
to fulfill
(a virus or a "hoax")
falls
into
the subclass
operation
means
the
or
of
Computer
(CNO). CNO are further divided into Computer Networks
Operations
(CNE), Computer Networks Attacks (CNA), and Computer Networks
Exploitation
Defense
(CND). CNO are also divided into nonlethal and lethal CNO. The former
Networks
is much
group
and
The
goal
damage
information
or
4. RMA,
which
considerable
on
work
tively
comprises
to
management
on commercial
is to control,
kill
people.
infrastructures
a
depicts
diverse
psychological
web
websites,
to
economic
provoke
driven
technologically
attention
both
scholarly
information
within
and
security
(see Goldman,
empiricist
the most
from
actions,
ranging
propaganda
denial-of-service
operations
(psychops),
and
defacement,
espionage,
cyber-crime.
use of information,
more
to cause
than
alter, or deny
disrupt,
or
at destruction
class of CNO
The
latter
aims
of
disruption
and
larger
perception
attacks
(DoS)
technology,
2005; Goldman
or even casualties.
damage
in military
has received
strategy,
change
and beyond
the military.
Like most
other
the RMA
is distinc
literature
however,
and Mahnken,
and Von
2004; Gongora
Riekhoff, 2000; Laird, 1999; Matthews and Tredderick, 2001; Sloan, 2002).
5. See also the following statement by US Senator John Edwards (2002): "We live in a
gun
6. This
can
a terrorist
where
world
as much
do
damage
a
with
keyboard
a modem
and
as with
a
or a bomb."
is a metaphor
that has been
so-called
"infowarriors"
the
since
among
circulating
coined
the creator
ofwww.infowar.com.
Schwartau,
by Winn
reportedly
a
the destruction
of bits and bytes
38) hoists
(1997:
against
equating
warning
some
war
the bloodshed
of conventional
and
terrorism.
To
the edited
extent,
mid-1990s,
7. Libicki
with
volume
Latham
that type of association.
(2003)
suggests
by Robert
inadvertently
in 1994,
the Russian
hacker
"Vladimir
Lenin"
transferred
instance,
$10
illegally
from
million
the American
Citibank
PBS Online,
2002;
Freedman,
2000;
(Cordesman,
8. For
2002).
9. On
this point,
see,
for
example,
secure (2003).
10. This
is illustrated
by well-known
intruded
successfully
forces
information.
voked
the
fear
young
(2001a,
Denning
of
wars
policy
have
rendered
is too
(2001:
ES-4),
and
F
cyber-attacks.
computer
(Bendrath, 2001; Cordesman, 2002: 40; DSBTF, 2001: 2).
to several scholars (Kaldor, 1999; Keegan,
11. According
contemporary
state's
foreign
DSBTF
In 1998,
three young
hackers
sensitive
armed
with
US
systems
dubbed
"Solar
Sunrise,"
pro
subsequently
initially
attack by a "hostile
of
nation,"
supposedly
Iraq. Two
to be
in California
in Israel
located
and
the
third
of
incidents
hundreds
upon
The
incident,
of a possible
information
out
hackers
turned
2001b),
limited
Clausewitz
a
concept.
obsolete.
Sun
War
Tzu
1993; Van Creveld,
as a rational
(1963)
with
instrument
his
emphasis
1991),
of a
on
International Political Science Review 2 7 (3)
238
surprise,
of modern
deception,
times.
attacking
Clausewitz
and
weak
points,
(a romantic,
readers
many
"unlimited
seems
war"
to be
theorist
the
was
complicated
European)
more
was
much
His
articulate
than
however.
that
imagine,
might
point
as
as well
war
are
is no distinction
is policy
There
between
and
war;
they
politics.
politics
more
is much
Clausewitz's
conclusion
network
part of the same game.
apt for modern
on
As
than many
societies
and more
societies
grow more
expect.
might
dependent
their
The
also
increase
artificial
distinction
networks,
computer
they
vulnerability.
and
dialectic,
and war)
that Clausewitz
and war
warned
(or peace
politics
against
acquires
in the
age.
meaning
digital
are a few liberal
of regime
and
institutionalization
12. There
analyses
building
concerning
concern
the Internet
and other
elements
of the digital
age. Some
mainly
non-security
between
new
issues (Franda, 2001; Rosenau
only
also
16. An
al-Qaeda,
anathema
transnational
IR
in contemporary
scholars
it can
controversial
and
identities
approach.
19. Pragmatism
this a way
as
merely
is a philosophical
scholars
have
a
tried
special
to this
as
overview
the
two of
risks
new
of
the original
IR constructivism
of how
con
on
based
and
thus
developed
in
of
theory
background
pragmatism
interests
action
constructivism
subsuming
a
is exaggerated
and constructivism
et al., 1998).
This
1997; Katzenstein
is made
that a division
of labor
between
mainly
(1963) and John Dewey
to restore
issue
of
orientation
Sanders Peirce
devoted
(Checkel,
however,
presupposes,
action
(rationalism)
interests
which
shape
considers
(2002:
108-9)
of seeing
constructivism
on
quiet
rationalism
that
argument
instrumental
explaining
norms
and
as Charles
but
(2002).
the gap between
be bridged
should
claim
a useful
For
theory.
since then, see Adler
has developed
that
example,
International,
on modern
the development
of and
reliance
analysis,
increasing
as nuclear
new risks. In
has the effect
of constantly
power,
producing
is on the side effects
of new
the focus
for communication,
technologies
In
and commerce.
Beck
the ecological
risks
particular,
emphasizes
energy
production,
new
Beck
of living with
is, however,
technologies.
strikingly
in
ICTs in general,
and on cyber-threats
particular.
are
and Wendt
17. Onuf
(1992)
(1989)
generally
acknowledged
and
not
for
such
technologies,
this perspective,
18. Some
32-4).
liberalism
is the contagious
fear that democratically
elected
decision
state
domestic
let alone
and
guard
provide
security,
society
against
of "risk society,"
threats. With
his theory
German
Ulrich
Beck
sociologist
a fundamental
of liberal,
visions
of moderniz
critique
Utopian
provides
1999)
In Beck's
structivists
29,
(2003:
(1977, 1989) and Camilleri and Falk (1992).
for
cannot
(1992,
ation.
et al.
Duncan
example,
and Nye
(2000) and Giacomello
actors
that
include,
acknowledge
"sovereignty-free"
the International
and Amnesty
Fund,
Motors,
Monetary
the Irish Republican
and the Cosa Nostra.
Army,
would
General
makers
for
see,
14. On this point, see also Keohane
15. Liberals
2002), but Valeri
and Singh,
are
(2005)
exceptions.
13. For an overview
of IR liberalism,
and
explaining
(constructivism).
under
rationalism,
an
otherwise
by American
(1948). Recently,
IR. Millennium
(Vol.
the
Adler
a way
rationalistic
thinkers
a handful
31, No.
3)
such
of IR
recently
topic.
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Biographical Notes
JOHANERIKSSON
isAssociate Professor of Political Science at Sodertorn University
Institute
of International
at the Swedish
Affairs,
College
and Researcher
His research interests are international
relations theory, foreign policy
Stockholm.
the politics of expertise,
and
analysis, security studies, cyber-security,
ethnopolitics,
social science and public policy. His publications
include
the relationship
between
International Relations and Security in theDigital Age (Routledge,
2006), co-edited
and Threat Politics: Newv Perspectives of Security, Risk and
with Giampiero
Giacomello,
for which
he was a contributing
editor.
2001),
Crisis Management
(Ashgate,
Sodertorn
SE-141
ADDRESS: Department
of Political Science,
University
College,
Huddinge, Sweden [email: [email protected]].
is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the
GiAMPIERO
GIACOMELLO
di Bologna.
His research
Dipartimento
di Politica,
Istituzioni,
Storia, Universita
studies, cyber-terrorism,
foreign policy analysis, and
interests
include
strategic
He
is the co-editor
of International
political
(with Johan Eriksson)
psychology.
Relations and Security in theDigital Age (Routledge,
2006) and author of National
Governments and Control of the Internet (Routledge,
2005). ADDRESS: Dipartimento
di Bologna,
Strada Maggiore
45, 40125
Politica,
Istituzioni,
Storia, Universita
Bologna, Italy [email: [email protected]].
Acknowledgements. The research and collaboration behind this article was made possible by a
generous grant from the US Social Science Research Council's program on Information
Technology, International Cooperation and Global Security. We are also thankful for the
support we received from Olav F. Knudsen's research project on power and security in the
Baltic Sea region, and from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency. Many thanks to
all of those who have commented on earlier versions of the paper - too many to list here including participants in the panel on theorizing security in the digital age, which we
inMontreal
in March
organized at the meeting of the International Studies Association
2004. Thanks also for the constructive comments we received from the anonymous
reviewers and the editors.