Word

Philosophy 473
Wittgenstein
Fall 2016
Professor Edwin McCann, [email protected]
Office hrs.: MHP 205F Tuesdays and Thursdays 2:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.
The course traces the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical thought, both early
and late, and considers and evaluates his views on meaning, reference, mind, and
action. After a brief consideration of the picture theory of meaning put forward in the
Tractatus (published 1922), we will focus on the criticism of this theory carried out in
Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously in 1953), and explore the theories
of meaning, mind and language developed in that later work. We will consider and
discuss Saul Kripke’s very influential interpretation and/or original philosophical
reflections on the private language argument, and we will also discuss several important
critical responses to Kripke’s book. We will then work through G. E. M. Anscombe’s
book Intention, which is an important early application of key Wittgensteinian insights
and method and which provided the impetus to the development of the field now known
as philosophy of action. We will conclude by tracking points of agreement and
disagreement between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and the ‘ordinary language
philosophy’ of J. L. Austin, and in this connections we will consider Stanley Cavell’s
treatment of the ‘ordinary’, which is heavily influenced by both Austin and Wittgenstein.
Course learning objectives
1. To come to a detailed understanding of the major philosophical writings of
Wittgenstein and their relation to one another
2. To explore key claims about the nature of language, meaning, mind, and
philosophical method made by Wittgenstein at various points in his career.
3. To understand the influence that Wittgenstein’s philosophy had on later philosophers
(notably Anscombe, Cavell and Kripke)
4. To develop and enhance the students’ facility in close reading of difficult texts and
arguments and the critical analysis of these texts and arguments.
Books
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (tr. C. Ogden) (Humanities
Press)
2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 4th edition (tr. G. E. M. Anscombe,
P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte) (Wiley-Blackwell)
3. Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard U.P.)
4. G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention 2nd Edition (Cornell University Press)
Requirements
1. Regular attendance and participation in class discussion (20% of course grade).
2. Two 5 page papers, one on a topic concerning Wittgenstein's Tractatus and one on a
topic concerning the Philosophical Investigations. Suggested topics will be posted, but
students may propose their own topics, subject to instructor’s approval. Each paper
counts for 20% of course grade.
3. One 10-12 page term paper, counting for 40% of course grade. Suggested topics will
be posted; students may propose their own topics, subject to instructor’s approval. Any
suggested topics must be submitted and approved no later than November 22.
Schedule of topics and readings
Week one
Aug 23: Introduction and overview of course; background in Frege and Russell, brief
overview of further development in Logical Positivism
Aug 25.Tractatus: The nature of the world and the nature of the proposition. Reading:
TLP 1s and 2s ; Warren Goldfarb, ‘Das Überwinden: Anti-Metaphysical Readings of the
Tractatus’
Week two
Aug 30: Tractatus: logical form and the picture theory. Reading: TLP 3s and 4s down
to 4.2 ; Thomas Ricketts, ‘Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense’ in H. Sluga, ed.
Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein
Sep 1: Tractatus: the status of logical truth; philosophical consequences: solipsism,
showing and saying, the nature of value. Reading: TLP 4.2-7; Scott Soames,
‘Propositions, the Tractatus, and “The Single Great Problem of Philosophy” ‘, W. D.
Hart, ‘The Whole Sense of the Tractatus’ available at:
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy1.usc.edu/stable/2025199
Week three
Sep 6: Philosophical Investigations: language learning, language use, ostensive
definition. Reading: PI §§ 1-36, pp. 1-27
Sep 8: Philosophical Investigations names and simple objects, analysis, the method of
language-games. Reading: PI §§ 37-65, pp. 22-35
FIRST SHORT PAPER DUE Monday September 12 at 11:59 p.m.
Week four
Sep 13: Philosophical Investigations: games and family resemblance, philosophical
‘super-concepts’ [§ 97]. Reading: PI §§ 66-138, pp. 36-51
Sep15: Philosophical Investigations: understanding the meaning of a word, grasping a
rule. Reading: PI §§ 139-182, pp. 59-80
Week five
Sep 20: Philosophical Investigations: the paradox of rule-following. Reading: PI §§
183-242, pp. 80-95
Sep 22: Philosophical Investigations: the private language argument [1]. Reading: PI
§§ 243-301, pp. 95-108
Week six
Sep 27: Philosophical Investigations: the private language argument [2]. Reading: PI
§§ 243-301, pp. 95-108
Sep 29: Philosophical Investigations: thinking and mental states, the notion of
grammar. Reading: PI §§ 302-397, pp. 108-127
Week seven
Oct 4: Philosophical Investigations: the visual room and the notion of the ‘I’. Reading:
PI §§ 398-428, pp. 127-135
Oct 6: Philosophical Investigations: the harmony between thought and reality, orders
and fulfilling orders, the picturing of meaning. Reading: PI §§ 429-533, pp. 135-152
Week eight
Oct 11: Philosophical Investigations: meaning and states of mind. Reading: PI §§ 534610, pp. 152-167
Oct 13: Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment [Part II of Philosophical Investigations]:
meaning, experiences, and pictures of states of mind. Reading: PPF i-x, PI pp. 183202
SECOND SHORT PAPER DUE Monday October 17 at 11:59 p.m.
Week nine
Oct 18: Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment [Part II of Philosophical Investigations]:
Seeing-as. Reading: PPF xi §§ 111-260, PI pp. 203-225
Oct 20: Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment [Part II of Philosophical Investigations]:
Seeing-as (cont.). Reading: PPF xi §§ 261-364, PPF xii, xiii, xiv PI pp. 225-243
Week ten
Oct 25: Philosophical Investigations: rule-following and the private language argument
(refresher). Reading: PI §§ 198-311, pp. 86-110
Oct 27 Kripke on the Wittgensteinian skeptical paradox about rule-following
Reading: Kripke pp.vii-x, 1-54
Week eleven
Nov 1 Kripke on the skeptical solution and the private language argument
Reading: Kripke pp. 55-113
Nov 3 Kripke on Wittgenstein on other minds
Reading: Kripke pp. 114-145
Week twelve
Nov 8: Critical responses to Kripke. Reading: Warren Goldfarb, ‘Kripke on Wittgenstein
on Rules’ Journal of Philosophy 82:9 (Sep. 1985): 471-488, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026277; Paul Hoffman, ‘Kripke on Private Language’
Philosophical Studies 47:1 (Jan. 1985): 23-28, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319727; George M. Wilson, ‘Kripke on Wittgenstein on
Normativity’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 366-390 (reprint in Alexander
Miller and Crispin Wright, eds. Rule-Following and Meaning (Acumen Publishing, 2002),
on library reserve); Scott Soames, ‘Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy,
Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Supplementary Volume 23 (1998): 211-249; Scott Soames, ‘Facts, Truth Conditions,
and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox’ Philosophical Perspectives,
12: Language, Mind, and Ontology (1998): 313-348.
Nov 10: Philosophical Investigations: meaning, intending, willing. Reading: PI §§ 611693, pp. 168-181
Week thirteen
Nov 15 Anscombe, Intention: Answers to ‘Why’ questions; non-observational knowledge
Reading: §§1-16, pp. 1-25
Nov 17: Anscombe, Intention: Action under a description; intentions as mental states
Reading: §§17-31, pp. 25-55
Week fourteen
Nov. 22: Anscombe, Intention: Practical knowledge and practical reasoning
Reading: §§ 32-52, pp. 57-94
Thanksgiving recess Nov 23-26
Week fifteen
Nov 29: Comparison and contrast: J. L. Austin Reading: ‘A Plea for Excuses’, ‘Other
Minds’
Dec 1: Cavell on Wittgenstein and Austin. Reading: Stanley Cavell, ‘Must we mean
what we say?’ in Stanley Cavell, Must we mean what we say? And Other Essays;
Stanley Cavell ‘The Uncanniness of the Ordinary’ in Stanley Cavell In Quest of the
Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism University of Chicago Press, 1994.
FINAL PAPER DUE Thursday Dec. 8 1:00 p.m.