Embodied understanding: Discovering the body
from cognitive science to psychotherapy
In-Mind Italia
V 1–6
http://it.in-mind.org
ISSN 2240-2454
Laura Galbusera and Thomas Fuchs
University of Heidelberg. Germany
Keywords
Embodiment, enactivism, intersubjectivity, participatory sense-making, psychotherapy
Towards an embodied and enactive
understanding of mind
In everyday life we are used to describing our activities and interactions with expressions like “I am cutting a slice of bread” or “I am shaking your hand.”
Our common sense understanding of everyday
actions implies a subject, “I,” followed by a verb
expressing action. We take for granted that we are
the “I” and that we act upon our surrounding environment. But what is the “I”? Is it our self, our
mind? What do we actually mean with these abstract
nouns, and where can we find such a thing as “mind”
in the process of action?
As Gregory Bateson in 1972 pointed out, when
looking at a blind man with his stick, one may face
many problems when trying to think of where his
“I” begins and ends in the process of perceiving
and understanding the world. Can we set boundaries between the man’s brain and his body? Or
between his body and the stick he uses to perceive the surroundings? Or even between the stick
and these surroundings? Gregory Bateson, considering these boundaries as meaningless, grounded
the concept of mind in the whole extended system:
“We may say that ‘mind’ is immanent in those circuits of the brain which are complete within the
brain. Or that mind is immanent in circuits which
are complete within the system, brain plus body. Or,
finally, that mind is immanent in the larger system
man plus environment” (Bateson, 1972, p. 317).
Although enlightening, Gregory Bateson’s
concept of embodied mind was ahead of his
time. Our commonsense thinking is still based on the Cartesian division between an abstract concept of mind, relegated to some ineffable dimension inside us, and the material world,
Fig. 1. Dance (Henri Matisse, 1910): Sense-making may be
seen as a participatory dynamic dance.
including our body and the reality outside us.
The development of cognitive science since the
1950s – with the goal of understanding mind and
the mechanisms of cognition – remained stuck
within the classic mind-body problem (see glossary) of Cartesian dualism. The epistemological (see
glossary) gap between mind and matter, rooted in
our Western model of science, informed the scientific research program of cognitive science since the
very beginning, undermining its potential results.
Only in the last two decades a general shift towards
embodied and situated cognition has taken place in
cognitive science; slowly, it is challenging the traditional mentalistic and abstract view of cognition.
Corrisponding author :
Laura Galbusera
Clinic for General Psychiatry
University of Heidelberg,Voss- Strasse 4, DE-69115
Heidelberg, Germany
E-mail: [email protected]
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Cognitivism: Representing reality and
others’ minds inside the head
The first metaphor of mind within the cognitivist
tradition was the computer model: Comparing mind
to a computer machine, mental processes were considered to be carried out by the manipulation of internal symbols that were thought to represent the
external world. The mental was only the software,
the hardware was not even taken into consideration:
The computational activity of the mind was disconnected from the body. Furthermore, these computational cognitive processes were taken to be inaccessible to personal awareness and radically separated
from consciousness and meaning. Hence, not only
did cognitivism fail to solve the classic mind-body
problem, but also it created a new explanatory gap
between computational nonconscious cognition and
subjective experience: The so called mind-mind
gap. How we subjectively experience reality was
considered to be irrelevant for the mind’s understanding of the world (Thompson, 2007).
Within cognitive science, the problem of social
cognition (see glossary) stemmed from the basic
supposition that others’ minds are inaccessible to us
and we therefore need some extra cognitive skills
to infer, to represent and understand them. The two
outstanding theories of social cognition, namely
theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), are
based on these assumptions. According to these theories, in order to understand mental states of other
persons we need to employ common sense beliefs
about their behaviour or we need to simulate in our
mind their mental states as if we were in their situation. Processes of abstraction and inference of
others’ mental states are assumed to be the primary
way in which we understand others; so we would
need to represent the mental state of the other person,
anyhow, in order to understand it (Gallagher, 2008).
By relying on such high cognitive abilities,
not only are cognition and social cognition placed in a disembodied, Cartesian mind, but they
are also detached from the surrounding environment: Human beings are, according to this
approach, considered to be detached observers trying to understand others and the environment from a third person observational stance.
Embodiment and enactivism:
Enacting a world of meaning
Only at the beginning of the 1990s, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) proposed an alternative to
the dominant cognitivist tradition: An embodied and
enactive approach (see glossary). Twenty years after
Galbusera & Fuchs
Bateson’s concept of the embodied mind, the awareness that our brains are embodied and our bodies are
embedded in the world gradually spread within the
fields of psychology and of cognitive science. This
has also implications for social cognition (see next
paragraph).
Contrasting the traditional representational view
of cognition, embodied and enactive approaches
are based on the sensorimotor coupling of organism and environment. From an enactive stance we
do not perceive the world in a passive manner, but
through our ongoing bodily activity (palpating a
surface with our moving hands, scanning an object
with our gaze, etc.). Moreover, we always already
perceive the objects as offering opportunities for
interaction with our body. According to our needs
and affective condition, they present themselves as
attractive, interesting, worthwhile, or as threatening,
repulsive etc. Affectivity is the primary way an organism makes sense of its environment. Therefore
we do not perceive reality from a neutral detached
stance; every individual experiences reality in a
different way which fundamentally influences how
he comes to understand it. In this way, enactive accounts of cognition also try to build a bridge between embodied accounts of mind and phenomenological (see glossary) accounts of subjectivity. Not
only our body but also our subjective experience of
the world plays a fundamental role in constituting
and defining the cycles of perception, cognition and
action (Thompson, 2007). Thus, from an enactive
point of view, embodiment and subjective experience are interrelated aspects, both central to cognition.
One of the core assumption of the enactive approach is that the human being is conceived as a
self-organizing dynamic system: The concepts of
autonomy, or operational closure, and of adaptivity
constitute the basis of this idea. On the one hand,
autonomy is the property of a system that can selforganize and self-constitute itself. On the other
hand, in order to preserve its identity, an autonomous system needs to regulate its behavior in relation to the perturbations of the environment; it has
to anticipate and act upon what may support selfconstitution and what may threaten it. This capacity
is called adaptive behavior or adaptivity (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher & Froese, 2009).
Autonomous and adaptive systems, in the dynamic and recursive interaction with the environment,
constitute or enact a world of meaning. Cognitive
structures and processes emerge from recurrent sensory-motor interactions involving the brain, the body
and the environment. Accordingly, the mind is an
embodied dynamic system embedded in the world,
rather than an organ mirroring the external reality
Embodiment in clinical practice
from inside the head (Fuchs, 2011; Thompson, 2007).
To summarize, cognitive agents cannot be determined from outside like a computer system which
responds to input data by a certain output predetermined by the programmer. Instead, cognitive agents
engage in active sense-making processes free of
external determination. Further, according to the
enactive stance, actions and movements play a central role in the sense-making activity of individuals:
It is through our movement that we enact a world of
meaning and self-generate our identity in the process.
But is the human being the only constitutive agent
of its own identity? Are we the only captains of our
souls, of our behavior and our social interactions?
An enactive account of social
understanding: Co-constructing
meaning in interaction
The embodied approach has challenged the assumption supporting mainstream social cognition
theories (i.e., theory theory and simulation theory),
namely that others’ minds are inaccessible to us. We
do not need to simulate or represent what is going
on in the other’s mind in order to understand it, but
we can access it through more embodied, primary
and direct ways. According to Gallagher (2008), for
instance, the moment of perception already plays
an important role in the process of understanding
others. When we see another person we immediately resonate with her: “We see emotion. We do not
see facial contortions and then make the inference
that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom” (Wittgenstein,
1980 , as cited in Gallagher, 2008). Within the act of
perceiving we are already able to capture the meaning of what we perceptually grasp, without the need
of inferences or interpretations (Gallagher, 2008).
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), though recognizing the importance of this theoretical shift, have
criticized these new embodied proposals for still
remaining within an individualist framework. They
argued that if we are to conceive cognition from an
enactive stance, or the human being as a dynamic
system, we cannot stop with the individual. Thus,
they propose a new enactive approach to social cognition: The concept of participatory sense-making.
Drawing on current empirical research of joint
action and interpersonal coordination, they describe how the dynamics of coordination between two
social agents can influence the unfolding of their
encounter, thus rendering the interaction an emergent, autonomous and self-organizing process. The
authors illustrate this idea by an everyday example: When two persons walk towards each other
in a narrow corridor, they have to decide whe-
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ther to move to the left or to the right in order to
get past each other. It may happen that they move
symmetrically, thus again finding the other person
in their way. At this point, due to the spatial constraints of the corridor, it is likely that their next
move will be another mirroring one, which again
will impede them from continuing on their way.
The initial goal of the two agents is to get past
each other. Unintended dynamics of coordination,
however, may occur and prolong the interaction. The
interactive process then takes on a life of its own,
thus overcoming the intentions of the individuals.
During this moment of coupling, it may even occur
that the individuals’ goals change and they may decide to keep interacting (for example, by engaging
in conversation). Thus, the interaction can produce
new intentions and meanings (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010).
Individual agents do not only constitute their
social interactions but are at the same time constituted by them in a participatory sense-making
process: Social understanding also occurs in the
“in between” of people, in the moment-to-moment
interaction between embodied subjects (De Jaegher & Froese, 2009; Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009).
Fig. 1I. Snapshot of tango argentino: An example of bodily
and intuitive understanding in the moment-to-moment
interaction between two persons.
Implications for psychotherapy and
for clinical practice
From this brief review of the development of enactive and embodied approaches in cognitive science,
three main ideas seem to be of particular relevance
for psychotherapy, namely, embodiment, interaction
and presence.
First, embodiment, or the enactive idea that we
make sense of the world through our body and our
movement in the world, has crucial implications for
clinical practice.
Most psychotherapeutic approaches are based on
verbal communication. Since the Freudian talking
cure, words have been the most powerful medium of
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psychological treatment and the main source of therapeutic change. Without underestimating this medium, enactive and embodied approaches remind us
that in every conversation and encounter, we are also
communicating with our body and our movement.
Narratives are in our words as well as in our flesh.
In clinical practice, different kinds of interventions use the body as a medium for yielding therapeutic change, for instance body psychotherapy,
dance therapy, drama therapy. For example, in
body oriented psychotherapy for persons with schizophrenia (Röricht, 2000), anomalous self-experiences like transitivism (i.e., the experienced loss
of boundary between oneself and other persons)
are addressed primarily at the implicit bodily level. Simply put, instead of only verbally reflecting
about personal boundaries, the therapist may act.
One possible task can be to walk towards a patient,
reaching the closest point the patient can tolerate;
the therapist does this repeatedly from different
directions, asking the patient to stop her at a point
that feels comfortable. Through such exercises on
distance regulation, patients may begin to feel, first
at the very bodily level, that there is a boundary
which should not be overstepped. Through bodily,
implicit experiences of this kind, patients start setting boundaries, perceive their own personal space and relate to other persons as separate beings.
Therapeutic change may therefore be achieved by addressing first and foremost the implicit
embodied dimension. According to the bidirectionality principle of embodiment theory (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, &
Ric, 2005), in fact, movement and bodily interactions constitute basic levels of sense-making with
afferent feedbacks to the phenomenal, emotional
and cognitive levels (Koch, Morlinghaus, & Fuchs, 2007; Ritter & Graf Low, 1996). This may
have important implications especially for therapeutic situations where verbal interaction is not
possible or not the most suitable therapeutic mean
(e.g., with very impaired patients, with children).
A second idea, namely, that of interaction, refers to the constitutive role of interaction processes
for social understanding and identity generation.
In clinical practice, this idea may also be found in
social constructionist approaches to psychotherapy,
which developed from the tradition of systemic
psychotherapy and constructivist approaches (see
Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000; Ugazio, 1998/2012).
According to social constructionism, human
beings are not only self-constituting systems but
are also constituted within the context of their social relationships: Reality is co-constructed through conversational processes of joint sense-making
Galbusera & Fuchs
(Cronen, Johnson, & Lannamann, 1982; Gergen,
2009). In every interactive situation, two levels of
sense-making occur: First, the individual construction of meanings characterized by a strategic dimension, which refers to the aims and intentions
that each participant brings into the interaction; second, the interactive level of co-construction of meanings, which is characterized by the contingency
and unpredictable unfolding of the interaction (De
Koster, Devisè, Flament, & Loots, 2004; Fruggeri,
1998; Ugazio, 1985). Accordingly, psychotherapy
may be considered as a place where meanings are
co-constructed in conversation and where the encounter between therapist and patient creates opportunities for change. The therapist’s stance therefore needs to be participative rather than instructive.
Third, the role that the contingent unfolding of
the interaction plays for sense-making processes
highlights the importance of the here and now dimension, namely the idea of presence: “Social understanding arises in the moment-to-moment interaction of two subjects” (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009,
p. 476). According to Stern (2004a), psychotherapeutic change is the result of the present situation
of two interacting individuals, which cannot be
planned or controlled by one side alone. He describes the process of psychotherapy as a process
of continuous approximation, an unpredictable
process of co-creation leading to emergent properties that are not ascribable to the individuals:
“This change process may provide some parallels
with many kinds of interactions, some negotiations
included, where two or more people are trying to
arrive at a goal, but where the goal cannot be precisely known in advance. Only some of its boundaries are preconceived. The actual final goal (not the
desired goal) is to be created, not discovered, because it does not yet exist a priori. And the process
for getting to the goal is created as they proceed,
within certain boundaries” (Stern, 2004b, p. 368).
In contrast to the psychoanalytic tradition, which
has always focused primarily on the past, Stern
(2004a) emphasizes the importance of the present
dimension, or the here and now engagement, for
psychotherapy (see also Stanghellini & Lysaker,
2007). He further argues that the nature of the present moment implies something more than a mere
technical or interpretative response, namely, a shared experience or an encounter. This requires authentic responses, fitting to the situation, rather
than some neutral therapeutic comment. Even if the
unpredictability of present moments can produce
anxiety, hiding behind standard technical interventions may hinder the opportunity to establish a truly
beneficial experiential encounter (Stern, 2004a).
Embodiment in clinical practice
A last example of what is meant by presence
may be the open dialogue approach to acute psychoses (Seikkula & Olson, 2003), according to
which the ongoing conversation is the core of the
treatment process (Seikkula & Trimble, 2005). Its
efficacy does not depend on brilliant interventions
by professionals but on the dialogue-based process among participants:”Although the content of
the conversation is of primary importance for the
network members, the primary focus for the team
members is the way that the content is talked about.
More important than any methodological rule is just
being present in the moment, and thereby adapting
one’s actions to every turn in the dialogue. Every
treatment meeting is unique; all the issues addressed in previous meetings gain new meanings in
the present moment” (Seikkula & Trimble, 2005,
p. 467). Here, conversation is considered embodied, supported by a participative rather than instructive stance and attuned to the immediacy of
the present moment (Seikkula & Trimble, 2005).
We have seen how recent ideas developed in
the fields of cognitive science and philosophy of
mind may shed new light on the process of psychotherapy. More interdisciplinary scientific collaboration is needed in order to understand how
these new concepts and discoveries may inform
and challenge psychotherapy research and practice.
As human beings, we make sense of the
world and of our relationships inter- acting in
it, with our body. Cognition is not only in the
brain and psychotherapy is not only in words.
Glossary
Mind-body problem. The mind- body problem is the
philosophical problem of how to consider the relation
between mind and matter. Descartes’ dualist view created
an explanatory gap between the non-material mind and
the material body, thereby opening the discussion on how
to conceive the relation between body and mind, nature
and consciousness.
Epistemology. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy
that investigates how we recognize and understand things
or persons, and what is the nature of our knowledge.
Social cognition. The problem of social cognition is to
explain how we come to understand others’ minds, intentions and beliefs.
Embodiment. The embodied mind thesis stems from
the assumption that minds are embedded in our bodies
and that bodies are embedded in the surrounding environment. Cognitive processes cannot therefore be confined in the brain but are formed and influenced by the
whole body system.
Enactivism. Initiated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
(1991), enactivism shares its basic assumptions with embodied cognition, i.e. that the mind cannot be understood as separated from the body. Beside this, enactivism
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draws on dynamic system theory and phenomenology,
trying to integrate these two accounts in order to understand the mind.
Phenomenology. Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy investigating consciousness and the very structure
of experience (e.g., embodiment, temporality, spatiality,
intersubjectivity etc.). This philosophical tradition was
initiated by the seminal work of Edmund Husserl.
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Galbusera & Fuchs
Laura Galbusera obtained her Msc in
Clinical Psychology from the University of Bergamo and is currently an
Early Stage Fellow of the INT Marie
Curie Network, “TESIS: Towards an
Embodied Science of Intersubjectivity”. She is writing her Phd dissertation under the supervision of Prof.
Thomas Fuchs at the Psychiatric Clinic of the University of Heidelberg,
Germany. Her research focus is on
the dimension of embodied intersubjectivity in the case
of schizophrenia and she is carrying out her investigation mainly drawing on phenomenological psychiatry
and enactivist theories.
Prof. Thomas Fuchs is professor at
the Psychiatric Department Center
of Psychosocial Medicine and Karl-Jaspers-Professor for Philosophical Foundations of Psychiatry at the University
of Heidelberg. Philosopher and Psychiatrist, his research work on psychopathology always maintains an interdisciplinary quality and takes place in the
encounter of disciplines like philosophy, psychiatry, anthropology, psychology, cognitive science and neurobiology. He is involved
in a wide range of research projects such as: “The Brain
as an organ of interrelations – Interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of socially induced capacities”,
“TESIS”, “Neuroscience and concepts of personhood”.