Remarks on Chapter III Convention Contrasted
of David Lewis’s Conventions
Kinga Kowalczyk
Structure:
1. Aim of Chapter III
2. Theses of Chapter III
3. Lewis's arguments
4. Topics to discuss
1. Aim of Chapter III
•
to confront Lewis's conceptualization of
convention, i.e. to extract similarities and
divergences, with other parallel terms. Namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Agreement
Social Contracts
Norms
Rules
Conformative Behavior
Imitation
2. Theses of Chapter III
• 2.1. → Explicit agreement is only one of several possible
origins for conventions (vide p. 86). In other words, it is
not true that all conventions could originate by
agreement.
• 2.2. → The concept of social contract is different in
principle from Lewis’s concept of convention (vide p. 88).
Extensions of these concepts do not coincide, though
they overlap heavily.
• 2.3. → Convention per se is not a normative term, but it
may be a type of norms (vide p. 97). That is, some
regularities to which one should conform.
2. Theses of Chapter III
• 2.4. → It is certainly legitimate to named many
conventions as rules. Nevertheless, not all so-called rules
are conventions (p. 100).
• 2.5. → Despite the close resemblance, there are some
dissimilarities between Lewis’s convention and Shwayder’s
conformative behavior (p. 107).
• 2.6. → There is no ground for assuming that all regularity
which originates or persists by some sort of mutual imitation
is a convention. Lewis indicates few counterfeits.
3.1. Arguments for 2.1. (agreement)
• Background for his arguments:
It is true that face to face agreement is good mean of establishing
conventiont. But, Lewis’s premise is that it is necessary for
preserving the essence of convention to decrease the direct
inluence of this face to face agreement.
Quotation: „In fact, aconvention begun by agreement may not become
a convention, on my definition, until the direct influence of the
agreement has had time to fade ”.
3.1. Arguments for 2.1. (agreement)
•
Three examples of non-agreement originate of
conventions
1.
Origin by manifestation. Lewis gives an example of
Hume’s rowers.
A kind of convention which could be destroy by explicit
agreement. Lewis gives an example of politicians’s
facade of hostility.
Origin by display of conformity to action without
involving language or other conventional activity. He
gives an example of establishing language.
2.
3.
3.2. Arguments for 2.2. (social contract)
• Conceptual background:
- Definitions of both terms, i.e. social contract and convention,
diverge in the nature of the general preference for general confomity
(p. 90). [It is quite twisted]
- Definition of the state of nature: a state in which no one is relying
very heavily on any anticipated regularity in others’ action.
- Lewis distinguishes two types of preferences:
* narrow sense: the resultant of choice-determining forces other than
a sense of duty
* ordinary sense: the resultant of all enduring forces (especially
moral obligation)
3.2. Arguments for 2.2. (social contract)
Lewis presents few instances of dissimilarities between
social contract and convention:
1.
He established complex hypothetical construction, which enables him
to conclude that social contract is not a convention when someone
adopt narrow sense of preference. It is due to the fact that wider
concept of preferences, which is an influence of moral obligation or
sense of duty, perfectly coincides with Lewis’s notion of convention. It
happens because: „[…] it is hard to see how it could become
common knowledge that people would reguralry act against
preference, since action against preference is inherently exceptional”
(p. 93). This proposition is quite problematic.
2.
Lack of an alternative. In order to have only one possible
alternative, namely the state of nature, social contract is not a
convention. Moreover, the state of nature is not a real alternatrive
for social contract, because it need not be a coordination
equilibria.
3.2. Arguments for 2.2. (social contract)
• 3. „The items of common knowledge required in the
defenition of convention are not the same as those
required in the defenition of social contract” (p. 96).
3.3. Arguments for 2.3. (norms)
Lewis describes relation between convention and norms
as an one-sided strengthening; that is norms amplify
persistence of conventions:
„I shall argue that it [convention – K.K.] is
also, by definition, a socially enforced
norm: one is expected to conform, and
failure to conform tends to evoke
unfavorable responses from others” (p.
99).
3.3. Arguments for 2.3. (norms)
• Lewis gives some examples of the convention
as a norm:
- an exchange of promises→ a conforming
action ought to be done to keep one’s promise
- a social contract→ a conforming action ought
to be done to reciprocate the benefit one get
from conformity
- an understanding between oligopolists→ to
settle prices
3.4. Arguments for 2.4. (rules)
• Conceptual background
Lewis considers so-called ruls, which means that he
operates wide concept of rule. In other words, the class
of phenomena which are encompassed by Lewis’s rules
are very diverse.
•
In order to analyse relationship between convention
and rule Lewis ponders particular cases which are
judged by him as a non-convention:
3.4. Arguments for 2.4. (rules)
1.
2.
3.
Generalizations, laws of nature, mathematical truths – they are not
conventions because these rule may have not nothing to do with
human behavior. Humans may merely benefit by taking into
account them.
Strategic maxims, hypothetical imperatives – people are prone to
obey these rules due to practical determinants, e.g. fear for their
lives.
Threats, warnings – sanctions embedded in this kind of rules could
be so strong that one person would have a decisive reason to obey
even if others did not. It is worth mentioning that one of the crucial
trait of Lewis’s convention is that agent needs have some
preference to concrete behavior.
3.5. Arguments for 2.5. (Conformative
Behavior)
• Because of Professor suggestion I will
leave this section
3.6. Arguments for 2.6. (imitation)
• Conceptual background
Definition of imitation – a conformity to a
regularity due to one’s interest in conforming if
certain others do like this regularity. Agent acts
as he/she does because he/she expects the
others so to act.
Arguments for 2.6. (imitation)
Counterfeits which were indicated by Lewis:
1. Unaware copying each other’s actions; e.g.
mannerisms. This action takes place without agent’s
preference, so it is not a convention.
2. Copying each other’s preferences; e.g. a coffee
drinker put among tea drinkers may somehow come
prefer tea. Lewis states that it is a counterfeit of
convention because such regularity is result of
unconditional preference.
Arguments for 2.6. (imitation)
3. Trusting each other’s practical judgments; e.g. wearing
raincoat because other do. This is only an imitation because
the preference that sustains this behavior is not conditional on
others’ conforming. Recall that convention requires that our
behavior should be somehow founded on expectations of
others.
4. Some sort of equilibrium that sustain but it is not a
coordination equilibrium; e.g. regularity realted to conflict
situations. It is not the convention because in case of
convention each wants to conform if the other do, and each
wants the others to conform if he/she want. On the other
hand, in discussed case each wants his/her opponent’s
defeat.
4. Topics to discuss
1. Means of convention’s origin and perpetuation
2. Question of the arbitrariness of the convention
3. Which other terms should be compared with
convention?
4. Expectations as a crucial aspect of convention