Persona Non Grata: China
Persona Non Grata offers unique insight into China’s security imperatives and threat assessments
of her dissidents.
I tried to escape for the weekend from a life of constant crisis.
At
STRATFOR that is always difficult. As we like to say, terrorists don’t take
weekends or holidays. At STRATFOR, a geopolitical intelligence company, our
strength is in forecasting and identifying crises. And, there is always a crisis. As
for myself, drawn to revolutions and revolutionary impulses, particularly in Asia,
my days are never dull. But, I was hoping to spend a lazy weekend watching the
waves crash on the Southern California coast and the seagulls, unperturbed by
world events, dipping into the ocean looking for dinner.
I made it about a full twenty-four hours before I received a frantic
message from China, asking that I cease and desist from all further
communication with our “boots on the ground.” Now, I ask you, is that not just
an invitation for further communication?
What happened?
Was anyone in
danger? Trained in the intelligence business, I knew that seeking immediate
answers could do more harm than good. But, over the years and through many
crises, we had formed a friendship that transcended the business.
I did not have to wait long for the speculation and conjecture to start
flowing. Shortly after this missive, two of our own made a quick get-away after a
sympathetic former Public Security Bureau official suggested they head for the
nearest international airport. We’ll never fully know what happened, but our
Chinese security sources ensure us that the Ministry of State Security was
investigating us for espionage. Apparently, I was the ringleader.
Having spent the last twenty years trying to understand the Chinese
mindset, I was deflated, but not shocked. The Chinese Communist Party has
always been wary of foreign influences. In 1949 after they came into power, all
of the “running dogs of capitalism” were rooted out and sent packing, if they were
lucky enough to hold a foreign passport. If not, they almost certainly fell victim
to a new regime that was turning inward, breaking all ties with any foreign
elements save a few fair-weather allies.
In 1949, the Cold War emerged as the predominant theme shaping
geopolitics. The United States was the enemy. This feeling became ever more
entrenched in Beijing as the young Chinese Communist Party, after consolidating
its power over the country, quickly had to turn its troops to the Korean border,
fearful of an advancing US army.
Not long thereafter, China was similarly
threatened by the US’ containment policy manifested in the Vietnam War on its
southern border.
In Mao Zedong’s attempt to cleanse the society of all western and other
bourgeois influences, he moved quickly to enforce his vision of egalitarianism
that eventually led the country into frenzy. Citizens eager to show their “redness”
broke most ties to the past. Land was communalized. Private possessions divided
or destroyed. Intellectuals were harassed and locked up or killed. Army green
“Mao” suits were donned and individuality scorned. This fervor saturated all
levels of society and the CCP under Mao Zedong quickly pitted neighbors against
neighbors and even children against parents, especially evident in the Cultural
Revolution.
Social trust was never strong in Chinese culture. Confucian principles
often worked to isolate families from establishing strong social networks. With
distrust already a foundation within Chinese society, it was easy for Mao to
further break down societal networks.
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping began to slowly reverse this trend as he opened
up China to foreign influences and trade. Despite massive economic growth that
has captured headlines for years, this foundation of fear was never far from the
surface and outsiders have been viewed with an odd mixture of awe and distrust.
Recently, however, as China’s economic growth looks sure to slow, the fears
instilled in the Mao era of the “outsiders” has been bubbling back up to the
surface, along with a renewal of “red” culture.
Although Deng Xiaoping was able to shepherd China away from the
excesses of the Mao era, these fears of outside invasion – whether actual
territorial conquest or economic dominance – remained latent concerns. Deng’s
intent was to learn from the west, and to gain technology for advancement at
almost any cost – learn, borrow or steal. However, in this market opening there
was never the intent to loosen political authority.
But the ensuing openness nevertheless allowed some political space for
those interested in more thorough reforms to experiment. Since the beginning of
the opening and reform era (gaige kaifeng) of the late 70s peasants began to
experiment with land reforms that allowed them to operate somewhat
autonomously. Intellectuals slowly and still quietly started to test out these new
freedoms, discussing how China could implement political reform. These new
ideas slowly culminated into increasing tensions as they bumped up against a
“red” ceiling. Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, prominent leaders who were both
slated to run the country after Deng retired, pushed the envelope. There was hope
that economic reforms were to be translated into political reforms. When both
Zhao and Hu were dethroned, there was growing disillusionment. It was Hu’s
death that was the spark that led to the Tian’anmen Square incident in 1989.
Although the country weathered this crisis, the legitimacy of the
Communist Party had been damaged.
The recovery came with the massive
growth that has underlined the past ten years. As Beijing was able to promote a
rising standard of living, its legitimacy was transferred from one of communist
ideology to growth. Against this backdrop Beijing was able to quiet dissent with
impressive economic performance. However, as the disparities between the coast
and inland provinces and between the haves and the have-nots have grown,
questions of legitimacy have once again started to emerge.
Exacerbating this, China’s economic miracle is starting to lose its luster.
As dissidents recognize the growing weaknesses that plague the CCP, the fear that
they could hijack the state has once again kept policy-makers awake at night.
Add to this the rising voices of the disenfranchised that have not profited from
China’s meteoric economic growth, and the fear is further compounded. From
Beijing’s perspective, the dissidents are being unreasonable and their objections
to the state considered dangerous. Especially if they are able to harness the
growing discontent to form a coherent opposition to Beijing’s authority.
Dissidents who give voice to alternative centers of power or suggestions
of political reform also open the door for foreign influences to permeate society
that could hasten to a decline in the state. With these considerations in mind and
given the history of the CCP, dissidents have become a threat that Beijing can no
longer ignore. In response to these threats, China has embarked on a massive
campaign to quiet all dissention, including the very public detention of
international figures like Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei.
A “red” campaign
hearkening back to the days of egalitarianism has also swept the nation, and with
it there is evidence of a growing nationalism that pits China against the “outside”.
In addition to the public arrests of famous dissidents, this fear has been
revealed in a series of events including the detainment of the Australian Stern Hu.
Engaged in heated debates over the price of iron ore, Stern Hu a Chinese born
Australian employed in Shanghai with the iron-ore giant Rio Tinto, was detained
on charges of bribery. Was he guilty? Probably, yes. However, bribery is
common in China and in most instances ensconced, but unspoken, in almost any
business operation.
Stern Hu’s detainment underlined a growing fear in Beijing that foreign
companies in China were operating as fronts for corporate and government
espionage. The fear of the “outside” and the belief that western corporations and
governments were set on containing China and her rise, have become more
intense in the past few years.
The fear of foreign corporations and organizations operating in China
under the influence of foreign intelligence agencies is not misplaced.
US
intelligence is supporting dissident movements worldwide and often funding for
such campaigns can be traced back to the US. In the “Arab Spring”, Google
executives in Egypt were involved in the demonstrations against the government,
as were US intelligence organizations. Furthermore, Google is aligned with the
US government in its attempts to press for freedom of communication throughout
the world. Its relationship with the US government has resulted in its difficulty
breaking into the Chinese market where Beijing has actively supported
homegrown Internet companies at the expense of Google and other Internet
heavyweights.
In the Arab world, the US certainly regarded many of these
dissidents as serving their interests, even if US intelligence organizations did not
directly control them.
Although the US government and media talks of the need to cooperate
with China and to develop friendly relations, the US tacitly would be delighted to
see China reeling from internal dissent. The recent challenges China presents in
the South China Sea threaten the US’ predominant foreign policy of maintaining
open and free ocean transport to encourage trade and maintain the supremacy of
the US Navy globally. A weakened China would assuage these concerns and the
concerns of a China that many assume will become the largest economy within
the next decade.
China’s fear of the outside can be exaggerated given its cultural and
historical perspectives, but the recent “Jasmine Protests” that were initiated by
dissidents overseas have only bolstered their perception of western meddling,
hardening them to dissident movements and even enflaming nationalism. These
concerns have started to affect its relationships with foreign companies and
governments as well as its own internal social management.
Persona Non Grata extends unique insight into Beijing’s threat
assessments and its security operations and responses. With this setting, Persona
Non Grata offers the untold stories of dissidents that fled persecution from the
state. From Tian’anmen dissidents to religious dissidents, this book will weave
the stories of individuals that sought refuge overseas into the overall picture of
Beijing’s perceived security threats and how dissident movements are disrupting
China’s balance of power.
However, merely telling the “war” stories of those persecuted by the state
offers an incomplete picture. The book will also explore the unseen hand of
foreign influence in driving dissident movements.
Not all dissidents are
influenced by foreign intelligence organizations. Some are brave. Some are
ambitious. Some are intellectual paragons with an intense love of country and a
vision.
Some are also corrupt.
And often the dissidents themselves have
conflicting motives that leads to incoherency and chaos that diminishes their
ability to organize.
Persona Non Grata in telling the stories of those who have left the country
seeking alternatives to the rein of the Chinese Communist Party. And it digs
deeper to examine the influences that operate on the fringe of these movements to
better understand the threat to Beijing.
The threat is real.
Beijing is not
delusional, but what is the extent of the threat and how does Chinese security
react to these threats?
In addition to sharing the individual stories of Chinese dissidents, the
threat as viewed from the state will also be explored. Beijing does not act
irrationally, if sometimes brutally. It has developed a threat matrix to preserve the
rule of the CCP – its main objective. In what ways does it see the dissidents as
behaving irresponsibly and how can it address these concerns while maintaining
its primary objective?
The fear of the outside is ingrained in a country famed for building the
Great Wall and more recently the Great Internet Firewall. These concerns are
inherent in its system and as such it will always seek to block any movement that
threatens the center’s hold on power. Now facing a growing economic crisis the
threat has intensified and the seeming brutality of upholding this objective has
become more visible.
In the forward of Persona Non Grata, George Friedman lays out the
geopolitical parameters that hem in China. These are the immutable boundaries
that dictate how China interacts with the world. China’s geopolitical imperatives
assume that within its current geographical boundaries, Beijing must maintain its
vast buffer regions to protect its heartland between the Yangtze and Yellow
Rivers.
With such massive geographic boundaries and very little natural
transportation infrastructure to connect disparate regions, Beijing must maintain
the threat of force in order to ensure compliance.
While governments may
change, this truth is static as long as these geographic boundaries remain.
With these geopolitical imperatives in mind, the introduction of Persona
Non Grata begins with a security assessment, outlining Beijing’s objectives and
fears. In order to do so, it is necessary to parse out China’s geopolitical economic
boundaries. This mapping highlights what geographic regions pose the greatest
threats and why.
Within this framework we can analyze China’s security
initiatives and imperatives across the country.
The following chapters tell the story, starting first with the voices from
China’s government. Their explanation of the dissident threat provides a more
objective understanding to their reaction to dissidents and their intent to quell
dissent in their attempt to foster development and continued growth.
After outlining Beijing’s perspective and objective, we begin with the
voices of Tian’anmen. Each individual story will highlight how a person or
movement threatened the state’s geopolitical imperatives and the resulting
security response. The chapters will be separated into the voices of the political
and economic dissidents and their impact on the state and then will turn to
religious and ethnic dissidents.
Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Yunnan are all part of China’s buffer
zones and within each, distinct ethnicities and religious groups await
opportunities to shake the state’s hold on these regions. The stories of Tibetan,
Uighur, Inner Mongolian and various ethnic personages in Yunnan and other
provinces in China’s hinterland, that have all sought refuge overseas will be
considered, providing a more nuanced understanding of how they threaten the
state and the state’s subsequent reactions.
In the concluding chapters we will return to the issue of foreign influences
and espionage and how all of these threats combined have fomented a growing
and more visibly aggressive China – both domestically and internationally. As
the fears within Beijing grow we have seen the country revert to images of a “red”
society in an attempt to insulate it from the outside, and prepare to defend its set
geopolitical imperatives.