1
The limits of rational choice:
Localism and city-regionalism in two Swedish city-regions
Version 2011-11-11
Paper for
XX Nordiska kommunforskarkonferensen
Göteborg 24-26 november 2011
Only preliminary so far – please don’t quote!
Anders Lidström
Department of Political Science, Umeå University
SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Tel +46 90 786 61 81, Fax +46 90 786 66 81
E-mail: [email protected]
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In most city-regions in the world, and in particular in the larger metropolitan areas, the structure of
local government is typically politically fragmented. There are often a large number of municipalities,
each providing public services for their inhabitants (Heinelt and Kübler 2005, Sellers and HoffmannMartinot 2009). Due to underlying processes of segregation and sorting, these municipalities can
vary considerably with regard to the wealth of their citizens, which is also reflected in their ethnical
and social composition. Attempts to establish governments for the city-regions as a whole have not
been successful (Sancton 2008, Lefèvre 2010, Kantor and Savitch 2010). These would address needs
that are common for the citizens in the city-region as a whole and perhaps even redistribute or share
public resources and reduce differences in tax levels between municipalities.
Proponents for continuing fragmentation claim that the conditions of polycentrism that characterize
most metropolitan areas are beneficial for efficiency, effectiveness and democracy. The localist (or
defensive localist) position emphasizes far-reaching municipal autonomy. Each municipality should
handle its own affairs with as little intervention as possible from outside, and redistribution between
them should be minimized (Barron and Frug 2005). In the metropolitan setting where citizens
typically are mobile, localities will compete for citizens and resources. When public services are paid
by those that use them, through locally generated taxes and fees, and when the units for democratic
decision-making is as small as possible, conditions for efficiency and accountability are optimal.
At the other end of the scale, the city-regionalist (or just the regionalist) position claims that many
problems in the city-region are common for the citizens in the whole region, that there are spillover
problems created by the separate decisions taken by each municipality and that extensive
differences in wealth between municipalities create social tensions and weaken citizens’ sense of
responsibility for the city-region as a whole (Howell-Moroney 2008). Regionalists argue that this calls
for a joint sharing of the responsibilities throughout the whole city-region. Differences between
municipalities should be reduced through financial equalization and/or systems of governance for
the entire city-region. This is likely to be a disadvantage for the wealthiest parts of the city-region, as
these would have to make contributions that exceed their gains. However, it would benefit those
that are worst off. Although directly elected units of self-governments for city-regions as a whole are
rare, there is a tendency, particularly in European countries, to establish units of inter-municipal
cooperation in the city-regions (Heinelt and Kübler 2005, Otgaar et al 2008). However, these tend to
be weak as they often require consensus among all member municipalities. They also lack the
democratic legitimacy that directly elected units enjoy.
The localism – city-regionalism dimension represents a major attitudinal cleavage in contemporary
urban politics (Briffault 2000). Indeed an important reason for the lack of success for city-regionalism
is that localist values have very strong adherents. When citizens, and their local politicians, are
mainly concerned with the welfare of their own community, and are unwilling to accept a
responsibility for the city-region as a whole, this effectively undermines aspirations to set up directly
or indirectly elected levels of city-regional governance (Owens 2010). There is a common
understanding in the literature that wealthy citizens and those living in the most privileged parts of
the city-regions, as a matter of self-interest, are most likely to hold localist views (Cashin 2000).
Empirical studies are rare, but those that have been carried out tend to support this assumption
(Reed 2001, Steinacker 2004, Owens 2010). However, most of them are limited to American
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metropolitan areas, where individualism, self-sufficiency and anti-government values tend to be
stronger (Downding, John and Briggs 1994, Norris 2001).
Although this pattern may also be found in some European countries (on Switzerland, see Kübler
2005), it remains to be investigated whether it is also relevant in the Nordic welfare states. Indeed,
these are the countries that are most likely to divert from the pattern found elsewhere. Their
distinctive welfare systems (Esping-Andersen 1990, Huber and Stephens 2001, Sellers and Lidström
2007, Lidström 2011a) are based on values of equality and universalism. Indeed, in these countries
there is strong and stable popular support for policies that reduce differences in wealth between
individuals (Edlund 2007). Therefore, we would expect that territorial redistribution to a larger extent
is accepted in the Nordic metropolitan areas than in countries with other types of welfare systems.
Not only would regionalism be the dominant view, we will also expect the connection between selfinterest and localist attitudes to be weaker.
This paper aims at investigating patterns of localist – city-regionalist attitudes among citizens in
Swedish city-regions. This includes both how common the different types of attitudes are and how
variation along the scale may be accounted for. The empirical investigations are carried out in two
city-regions, the Göteborg region and the Umeå region 1. Both of these consist of a core municipality
and the municipalities included in the commuting hinterland.
In the next section, the theoretical assumptions about how localist – city-regionalist attitudes may
vary are developed. This is followed by an introduction to the two cases of city-regions and the
material used in the study. The subsequent empirical analysis is carried out through a combination of
bivariate and multivariate analyses. The paper ends with a summary of the main conclusions and the
implications they have for our understanding of metropolitan governance in a Nordic setting.
Accounting for variation: Rational choice vs institutional theories
The rational choice explanations for whether citizens hold localist or city-regionalist attitudes refer to
the self-interest of the individual. Of particular importance has been the seminal article written by
Charles Tiebout (1956), emphasizing that municipalities in a polycentric metropolitan setting
compete for citizens and that these citizens select a municipality of residence that corresponds to the
level of taxes they are willing to pay and the range and quality of services they would like to receive
(cp also Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961). The article was the starting-point for a rich literature
that has generated empirical tests of its assumptions as well as further theoretical development.
Several of the notions of the Tiebout theory have been corroborated by empirical research
(Downding, John and Briggs 1994, Percy, Hawkins and Maier 1995) although the empirical support is
mainly confined to an American context.
According to the rational choice understanding, localist values are likely to be held by people who are
wealthy, as these would restrain from paying for services for those that are less well-off. As claimed
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The research presented in this paper has been carried out within the research project ”Swedish city-regions:
Democracy, local citizenship and political institutions”, financed by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond 2009-2011. The
author is grateful for valuable comments on a previous version of the paper, presented at the XVI Nordic
Political Science Association conference, Vasa 9-12 August 2011.
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by Tiebout, the rich “may band together … [to] avoid pay taxes for the poor” (Tiebout 1964: 94). Cityregionalist values, on the other hand, would most likely be held by those that are worse off, and who
would benefit from the redistribution that is a key element in regionalism. However, if the rational
choice assumptions are correct, we would also expect that there are differences in attitudes between
residents living in communities with different amounts of wealth. Independently of their own
economic conditions, those living in rich municipalities would be less willing to share the resources
held by their municipality with those living in areas with more severe social problems and less
amounts of resources (Cashin 2000).
The Tiebout-inspired literature can also provide support for assumptions about the importance of
jurisdictional size for localist – city-regionalist attitudes. It is claimed that competition between
municipalities is stronger if the number of municipalities is large (Tiebout 1956, Downding, John and
Biggs 1994). This is likely to be the case if municipalities are small and the metropolitan area is large.
Hence, we would assume that small municipalities and large metropolitan areas trigger a stronger
sense of localism among the citizens.
Finally, the rational choice theories of collective action (Ostrom 1998, cp Rothstein 2005) claim that
citizens are more likely to act in their self interest if they have low trust in their fellow citizens.
Indeed, building interpersonal trust has been suggested as a way of overcoming the tragedy of the
commons. This line of reasoning would imply that citizens with extensive interpersonal trust would
be more likely to hold city-regionalist values.
Although the distinctions are less than clearcut, an alternative approach for understanding why
citizens’ take different positions on the localist – city-regionalist scale is institutional theory. This
theory would argue that actors are severely constrained by institutions such as dominating norms
and values. As suggested by normative institutionalism, they follow a “logic of appropriateness”
rather than considering the benefits and advantages of different actions in terms of their selfinterest. This may result in choices that are not optimal in terms of enhancing the individual’s selfinterest, but may comply with what is socially expected in a given situation (March and Olsen 1989,
Peters 2005). Institutions that provide incentives for actions that may not enhance individual’s selfinterest can be common for larger communities such as countries, but can also be restricted to more
limited social circumstances such as people that share common values or similar experiences.
It has already been emphasized that it is expected that the type of welfare state norms that
dominate in a society will have repercussions for whether citizens will hold localist or city-regionalist
views. Norms of self-interest may well be strong in western liberal and conservative societies but in
societies dominated by more Social democratic values, it is likely that redistribution between the rich
and the less well off is more acceptable. Such norms may counteract self-interests and promote a
broader understanding for other people’s needs or perhaps even a common good (Lewin and Lavery
1991). Hence, institutional theory would claim that there may be norms and values in a society that
make people act in a way that may not conform to their immediate material self-interests.
Another type of norms that may reduce the tendency to comply with self-interest is basic political
beliefs. Indeed, the view on redistribution is one of the defining components of the left-right political
scale (Benoit and Laver 2006). As political parties to the left are traditionally much more in support of
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redistribution of wealth, we would expect that citizens with more leftist views are more likely to hold
city-regionalist attitudes.
Self-interest may also be modified by whether citizens are connected to a particular municipality or
to the city-region as a whole. This connectedness may concern actions as well as mental orientations.
Actions can include the extent to which citizens regularly spend time in other municipalities in the
city-region than where they live. They may commute on a daily basis or do most of their shopping
elsewhere. Alternatively, they may spend most of their time in their home municipality and may even
have lived in the same municipality during their whole lives. Such citizens are more likely to hold
localist views. However, connectedness can also be of a mental kind. Citizens that feel at home in the
city-region as a whole are likely to be more city-regional in their attitudes.
Finally, if it can be assumed that city-regionalism is a form of more extrovert orientation, citizens
with a higher level of education and those who are interested and active in politics will be expected
to have a stronger sense of city-regionalism than others. Also, as the male role traditionally has been
more extrovert we will expect men to be more city-regionally oriented than women.
Method, material and operationalization
The assumptions outlined in the previous section will be tested on data collected through citizen
surveys in two Swedish city-regions. City-regions may be conceptualised as one or a few major cities
with a surrounding hinterland that is functionally linked to the cities as joint labour and housing
markets. Daily commuting, regular shopping and the use of leisure facilities typically take place
across municipal borders in city-regions. However, as city-regions are not formal jurisdictions, they
lack fixed borders. Hence, there is no obvious basis on which to select city-regions for empirical
studies.
A common way of delineating city-regions is through the extent of daily commuting that takes place
between the municipalities (OECD 2002, Karlsson & Olsson 2006). However, there are no commonly
agreed criteria for the level of commuting between municipalities that is required for a certain area
to be considered to be a city-region. In addition, commuting patterns vary over time and larger
commuting areas tend to expand (Sancton 2008). A less fluid alternative that is used in this study is
to define the city-region as the area around the city in which the municipalities regularly cooperate
with each other about city-regional functions. These areas tend to correspond fairly well to
commuting areas, but are less likely to change from one year to another.
The data used in this study was collected from two city-regions of different sizes. The larger of these
is the Göteborg city-region on Sweden’s west coast, around the second largest city in Sweden. The
city-region consists of 13 municipalities with a total of 920 000 inhabitants. The municipalities
cooperate within the framework of the Göteborg Region. The other is Umeå city-region, located on
the country’s northern east coast. It consists of six municipalities that cooperate in the Umeå Region
and has a total population of 140 000.
Both these city-regions had been subject to investigations in a previous research project on cityregionalism, carried out in 2002 (Lidström 2006, 2010). As the local conditions were well-known for
the researchers when developing the citizen questionnaires, it was hoped that this would make
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questions more valid and result in higher response rates. Nevertheless, one should be cautious about
drawing conclusions about conditions in city-regions generally in Sweden on the basis of these two
cases. They cannot capture the full variation among Swedish city-regions. In particular, we lack
information from Greater Stockholm, which is the largest metropolitan area in Sweden, but also from
many other smaller city-regions in the country. Nevertheless, our study still provides valuable
insights into this phenomena, that has not been previously investigated in a Swedish setting.
In each city-region, samples of citizens between the ages of 18 and 84 were randomly selected and
mailed a survey with questions covering various issues about citizenship in city-regions. The
questionnaire was designed to take into account the specific conditions in the two city-regions, and
different versions were provided for respondents in the core cities and in the surrounding
municipalities. The survey was sent to 6000 citizens. A total of 3200 persons (60 per cent) completed
the questionnaire. The analysis of non-respondents indicates that women, middle-aged and people
who vote in general elections are slightly over-represented. In the analysis, the data has been
weighted to correspond to the real population sizes in the Göteborg and Umeå regions.
The dependent variable, i.e. the localism – city-regionalism scale, is an index of the mean response
on seven questions. These concerned citizens’ opinions on various aspects of whether taxes, services
and responsibilities should differ between municipalities or if instead municipal services should be
available for all in the city-region and differences in terms of taxes and services should be reduced.
The respondents could choose from five response alternatives – from very good to very bad (and also
a no opinion alternative). Intercorrelations between the questions were high, varying from rxy .204
to .696. The questions and their positions with regard to localism and city-regionalism are
summarized in Table 1. The questions and the response alternatives are presented in Appendix 1.
Table 1
Questions included in the localism – city-regionalism index
Proposition
Localist
position
City-regionalist
position
The level of the municipal services should be the same in the
whole city-region
Disagree
Agree
There should be differences in tax levels between the
municipalities
Agree
Disagree
It should be possible to choose a provider of care for the elderly
in the whole city-region
Disagree
Agree
One should only be allowed to choose a school within one’s own
municipality
Agree
Disagree
The municipalities in the city-region should share the
responsibility for the socially disadvantaged
Disagree
Agree
The municipalities in the city-region should share the
responsibility to attract businesses
Disagree
Agree
The municipalities in the city-region should share the
responsibility for refugees
Disagree
Agree
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There are limitations in using this set of questions to map opinions on localism and city-regionalism.
Most questions have a positive wording, as seen from a city-regionalist perspective. There are no
questions that emphasize the negative aspects of redistribution, i.e. that one have to pay for others.
Also, citizens are asked about their views and we know very little about how they would act in
practice. Nevertheless, we would still expect the questions to capture a variation in opinions among
citizens. One test of whether these questions actually can capture views on the localism – cityregionalism dimension is whether the results are reasonable, in comparison with results from studies
carried out in other contexts. We will return to this later.
The independent variables consist of both individual level variables and contextual variables as
outlined in the theory section. Their operationalization is listed in Appendix 1. Bivariate analysis is
mainly used as a way of testing the relevance of some of the assumptions generated from public
choice theory. However, the major analysis is carried out with OLS regression analyses. Although the
dependent variable is based on ordinal scales, the total number of positions in the index is 48, which
makes it more relevant to use a multivariate technique based on assumptions that the dependent
variable is continuous.
Localism and city-regionalism in the Göteborg and Umeå city-regions
As Figure 1 illustrates, the citizens of the two city-regions lean more towards city-regionalism than
localism. Indeed, only about 11 percent of them hold attitudes from the middle of the scale and
downwards. Urban citizens in a Swedish setting seem to be committed to the norms of redistribution
that is central to the Nordic welfare system. Hence, at least in this respect, citizens are not as focused
on their self-interest as suggested by rational choice theory.
Figure 1
Distribution of localism - city-regionalism attitudes in the Göteborg and Umeå cityregions. Percentages
Localism
Note: Mean 2.7791, median 2.8571, N: 3143
City-regionalism
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Nevertheless, an overwhelming support for city-regionalism would not falsify the rational choice
argument, if these citizens are the ones that are worse off, and therefore would benefit from
redistribution. The next step in the analysis is to examine whether these claims made by rational
choice theory is valid in a Swedish setting. Table 2 summarizes the results from bivariate analyses
between variables representing household and municipal wealth and the localism – city-regionalism
scale.
Table 2
Wealth and localism – city-regionalism
Variable
Household income (SKR)
Mean income in the
municipalities
200 000 or less
Index
mean
2.785
Eta
F sig
N
201 000 – 400 000
2.756
900
401 000 – 600 000
2.787
783
601 000 or more
2.794
249 999 or less
2.673
250 000 – 274 999
2.834
275 000 or more
2.724
499
.028
.506
813
584
1848
.119
.000
712
Contrary to what was predicted by rational choice theory, there is no connection between the wealth
of the household and localist – city-regionalist attitudes in the two Swedish city-regions. Hence,
localism is not driven by wealthy inhabitants that want to protect their privileges. Neither is
redistribution primarily supported by those in poor conditions who want a bigger share of the cake.
This is an important finding that runs contrary to the results from previous studies carried out in
other contexts. Attitudes to localism and city-regionalism are different in a Nordic welfare state
setting.
An investigation of the relationship at municipal level show a significant relationship, but this tends
to be curvilinear. Those living in the poorest municipalities are the most localist and those in the
middle group have the strongest city-regionalist attitudes. A closer examination of these
relationships, separate for the Göteborg and Umeå regions, are shown in Figure 2
Figure 2
Municipal mean income and average localism – city-regionalism attitudes in the
municipalities
Note: Each dot represents a municipality
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There is a tendency to curvlinearity that is obvious in the case of the Göteborg region but in the
Umeå region there is instead a strong positive relationship between wealth and city-regionalism,
which contradicts the assumptions in rational choice theory but also surprises with regard to the
institutional explanation that refers to underling norms in the Nordic welfare system. There is no
obvious reason why communities with more wealthy citizens would be more in favour of shared
responsibility for the whole city-region. We will need to return to this matter later and examine
whether there are other underlying explanations that may account for this relationship.
From rational choice theory we also generated additional hypotheses – on the importance of
population sizes of the municipalities and the city-region and on the relationship between
interpersonal trust and localist – city-regionalist attitudes. The bivariate relationships are presented
in Table 3.
Table 3
Population size, interpersonal trust and localism – city-regionalism
Variable
Municipal size
City-regional size
Interpersonal trust
40 000 inhabitants or less
Index
mean
2.648
Eta
F sig
N
40 001 – 100 000 inhabitants
2.729
100 001 or more inhabitants
2.849
Small (Umeå city-region)
2.728
Large (Göteborg city-region)
2.787
Low trust (0-3)
2.692
312
Median trust (4-6)
2.710
827
High trust (7-10)
2.827
787
515
.153
.000
1841
.036
.045
2716
427
.105
.000
1930
Although the rational choice assumption of the importance of self-interest lacks empirical support in
a Swedish context, three of the other hypotheses are supported by the data. Citizens living in small
municipalities and the smaller city-region are more localist than those living in the larger ones. Those
that distrust their fellow citizens tend to be localist whereas those with high amounts of
interpersonal trust are city-regionalists. As these assumptions were generated from a theory of
individual self-interest, which has turned out to be irrelevant in the Swedish cases, there has to be
other explanations to this pattern. Perhaps this indicates a pattern of parochialism rather than selfinterest. We will discuss this question further later in the analysis.
Another set of explanations focus on the basic political values of citizens. It was expected that those
to the left on the political scale would be more likely to hold city-regionalist attitudes. As illustrated
in Table 4, this is clearly the case. Indeed, this emphasizes values and norms, rather than self-interest
(although of course indirectly one’s political position may be a function of one’s self-interests).
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Table 4
Left-right position and localism – city-regionalism
Variable
Left-right-position
Clearly to the left
Index
mean
2.960
Eta
F sig
N
311
Slightly to the left
2.850
655
Neither left, nor right
2.822
566
Slightly to the right
2.759
773
Clearly towards the right
2.680
.141
.000
411
It was also hypothesized that citizens’ connections to either one’s home municipality or to the cityregion as a whole would be related to the position on the localism – city-regionalism scale.
Connections have been seen as consisting of both an action and a mental component. Two indicators
have been used that represent actions, namely whether or not one is commuting on a daily basis and
if one has lived in the municipality the whole life or not. The mental component has been
operationalized as the extent to which one feels at home in the municipality and in the city-region.
The results are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5
Connectedness and localism – city-regionalism
Variable
Daily commuting to other
municipality in the city-region
Length of residence in one’s
municipality
Feel at home in one’s
municipality
Feel at home in one’s city-region
Eta
Yes
Index
mean
2.717
F sig
N
No
2.794
.057
.002
2375
.013
.485
1015
693
Moved to the municipality
2.772
Resistent practically whole life
2.788
2031
Not at all
2.768
74
Partly
2.750
689
Fully
2.799
.037
.140
2181
Not at all
2.627
139
Partly
2.748
1056
Fully
2.828
.092
.000
1742
It is obvious that citizens’ connectedness has little to do with whether they hold localist or cityregionalist attitudes. Only one of the indicators provide significant results in the expected direction,
namely to feel at home in the city-region. A bit surprisingly, the daily commuters, who were expected
to develop a city-regional orientation, are more localist than those that do not commute. Length of
residence and feeling at home in one’s municipality is not significant at all.
Finally, we assumed that a general extrovert orientation would be advantageous for city-regionalist
attitudes. Such an orientation has been operationalized as interest in politics, political activism, high
level of education and male gender. Table 6 suggests that these assumptions are supported by the
empirical evidence, but with one important exception. Interestingly, women turned out to be more
city-regionalists than men. Perhaps it is time to reconsider previous stereotypes and acknowledge
that women, nowadays, are more extrovertly oriented than men.
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Table 6
Introvert-extrovert orientation and localism – city-regionalism
Variable
Interest in politics generally
Political participation
Level of education
Gender
Eta
F sig
Not at all/nor particularly
Index
mean
2.729
Very/fairly interested
2.838
.098
.000
No means
2.572
432
1-2 means
2.739
663
3-4 means
2.781
5 or more means
2.883
Compulsory school, etc.
2.699
570
Upper secondary school, etc.
2.710
909
Post-upper secondary studies
2.851
689
University degree
2.839
Woman
2.880
Man
2.659
N
1541
1526
861
.178
.000
1138
.122
.000
934
.193
.000
1410
1720
To summarize the results from the analysis so far, we may conclude that most, but not all of the
assumptions generated from rational choice theory have turned out to be irrelevant as explanations
to why citizens vary with regard to localist – city-regionalist attitudes. In particular, the assumption
that these attitudes are linked to the self-interest of the individual, which in other studies has turned
out to be a consistent result, has been rejected. The norms of equality and redistribution that is
inherent in the Nordic welfare system leave little room for self-interest. Indeed, in the Umeå cityregion, there is even a positive relationship between municipal wealth and city-regionalist attitudes.
The general tendency is that the institutional explanations are more successful than those generated
from rational choice theory.
As the bivariate relationships are not taking into account how the different variables interact, a set of
multivariate analyses have been carried out, using the variables that have turned out to be linearly
related to the dependent variable. The first model presented in Table 7 consists of all remaining
variables. The total explanatory power of the model is limited which suggests that there are other
explanations that have not been included in the model. Nevertheless, as six variables are significant,
the model is still relevant. The variation in four of the variables that were significant in the bivariate
analysis has been captured by other variables. The second model is limited to the remaining six
variables, which slightly increases R square. In the third model, household income has been added as
a way of controlling that individual self-interest remains irrelevant in a multivariate context. Models
four and five illustrate the relative importance of the individual level variables in relation to the
contextual. Although the coefficients may change slightly, the overall results from the analysis
remain stable.
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Table 7
OLS regression analysis: Accounting for variation in localism – city-regionalism
attitudes
Dependent variable: The localism – city-regionalism index
Independent variables:
1
2
Household income
Interpersonal trust
3
4
5
.011
.031
Left-right position
-.057***
-.058***
-.060***
-.057***
Daily commuter
-.001
.067***
.062***
.085***
.066***
.066***
.070***
-.206***
-.211***
-.206***
-.220***
Municipal size
.093***
.098***
.098***
.106***
City-regional size
.112***
.114***
.111***
.090**
2.482***
2.551***
2.534***
Feel at home in city-region
.058**
General interest in politics
.011
Political participation
.054***
Level of education
.010
Gender
Constant
2.950***
2.364***
R square
.106
.112
.110
.088
.026
Adj R square
.102
.109
.107
.086
.026
N
2395
2528
2457
2528
3142
Note: The coefficients are b coefficients. ** Significant at the 0.01-level, *** Significant at the 0.001 level. There are no
problems of multicollinearity (lowest tolerance is 0.835, highest VIF 1.198). In addition, correlations between the
independent variables are low (Appendix 2).
The results from the regression analyses indicate that localist values are mainily to be found among
men who do not feel at home in the city-region as a whole, are located to the right on the political
scale and are politically inactive. They live primarily in small municipalities and in the Umeå cityregion. Those holding city-regionalist values tend to be female, feel at home in the city-region as a
whole, are located to the left in politics and are politically active. They mostly live in the largest
municipalities and particularly in the Göteborg city-region.
A conclusion from these results must be that localism vs city-regionalism in a Swedish setting is not
about self-interest but rather concerns the combination of political values and whether one has an
introvert or an extrovert orientation. There is a strong touch of parochialism among those that hold
localist attitudes: they tend to have a more narrow focus and feel at home in small communities. The
importance of municipal size that was originally generated as a hypothesis on the basis of rational
choice theory can now be understood from a different perspective. Rather than being an expression
of the competitive situation in a city-regional setting, small is now seen as favourable for
parochialism.
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In previous studies on these matters, carried out in other countries, conservatism and parochialism
stand out as important drivers for localist attitudes. For example, a study by Owen (2010) of such
attitudes in metropolitan areas in Georgia showed that men, homeowners and Republicans stood
out as less supportive for regionalism. Also, this suggests that our measure of localism – cityregionalism is valid. However, a key difference between those studies and the Swedish cases is that
the pure rational choice assumption that citizens aim at enhancing their material self-interest has
been rejected in the Swedish setting. Instead different types of norms tend to be important. Some of
these are societal, such as the ones inherent in the Nordic welfare system, but others concerns basic
political values and individual orientations. Although some of these may also be given a meaning in
terms of rational behaviour, they are more easily understood within the frame of institutional theory.
Conclusions
The localist – city-regional dimension captures a major attitudinal cleavage in urban politics. Those
favouring localism want to have strong and autonomous municipalities, locally financed municipal
services and shun redistribution between municipalities. Local responsibility is seen as enhancing
efficiency, effectiveness and democracy. At the other end of the scale, city-regionalism claims that
many problems in the metropolitan areas are common for several municipalities, that citizens are
becoming less connected to their home municipality in their daily activities and that a shared
responsibility for those with most extensive social needs is beneficial for the city-region as a whole.
There is a common understanding in the literature that citizens’ position on this scale to a large
extent may be explained from the point of view of their material self-interests. In particular, this is
claimed by adherents to rational choice theory. Apart from that there is also a tendency that those to
the right of the political scale and people with a parochial orientation will hold localist attitudes. The
few empirical studies that have been carried out have mainly investigated conditions in American
city-regions. In this paper, these assumptions are taken as a starting-point for an investigation of
whether they are accurate also in a Swedish context, more specifically in the two Swedish cityregions of Göteborg and Umeå.
The findings comply with the conclusion that conservatism and parochialism enhance a localist
position, but find no evidence in favour of the rational choice assumption. There is no significant
connection between household wealth or average municipal wealth on the one hand and localist –
city-regionalist attitude on the other. The only exception is the Umeå city-region where it turns out
that those in the wealthiest municipalities are the most city-regionalist.
The theoretical implications from this conclusion are that the rational choice assumption of individual
self-interest is not a universal driving force but has to be understood within specific institutional
contexts. Norms of self-interest are strong in western liberal and conservative societies but in a
system such as the Swedish, where there is considerable popular support for redistribution between
the wealthy and those that are less well off, a redistributive norm seems to takes priority over the
norm of self-interest in certain situations.
There are no studies available about citizens’ views on these matters in the largest of the Swedish
metropolitan areas, i.e. Greater Stockholm. Hence, we do not know whether these results are valid in
this setting. There is no reason to believe that support for the Swedish welfare system in weaker in
14
the Stockholm area, but additional factors may suggest that self-interest is stronger. First, the sheer
size and more extensive differences in wealth and social problems between different municipalities
create a more competitive situation than in other city-regions. Second, the effects of the national
system of municipal tax equalization have different effects on the different municipalities in Greater
Stockholm. The rich municipalities are net contributors to the system and the poor ones net
recipients. In the Göteborg region, on the other hand, all municipalities are net recipients (Lidström
and Sellers 2011). Indeed, in the wealthier areas of Greater Stockholm there is an opinion claiming
that it is unfair that they have to pay for services in other municipalities (Jonsson 2003). This seems
to suggest that values of self-interest may be stronger in the Stockholm metropolitan area than
elsewhere in the country.
A practical consequence of these findings could be that it would be easier to establish democratically
legitimate city-regional governments in many city-regions in the Nordic countries than elsewhere. To
some extent there are joint arrangements between the municipalities in both Göteborg and Umeå.
The Göteborg Region coordinates several municipal services within the metropolitan area and is also
responsible for the regional development plan (Lidström and Sellers 2011). The Umeå Region has a
weaker position with fewer coordinated functions (Eklund 2011). In the largest metropolitan area in
Sweden, the Stockholm County Council is a directly elected second tier local authority with
responsibility for metropolitan planning, public transport and health care. However, it only covers a
part of the commuting area around Stockholm. There is also an extensive system of fiscal
equalization among the municipalities in Sweden.
However, none of these units comply with the notion of democratically legitimate city-regional levels
of government. They are either only indirectly elected or too small to cover the entire commuting
area. Despite the positive attitudes among the citizens for city-regionalism, no such units exist in
Sweden. How can this seemingly paradox be explained?
It is noteworthy that the question of establishing directly elected city-regions is not even on the
Swedish public policy agenda. Indeed, there are no strong actors in favour of such solutions. The
traditionally powerful Swedish municipalities are not interested in giving up powers and functions to
new city-regional bodies and the debate on regionalism in Sweden is at the moment more concerned
with amalgamations of county council into larger regions, rather than focusing on city-regions
(Lidström 2011b). In addition, as Andrew Sancton (2008) has observed, there are logical difficulties in
establishing directly elected units for city-regions (cp also Bennet 1997). Not only is there a lack of
common agreement on where the city-regional borders should be drawn, these also tend to be
unstable as commuting patterns constantly change. Although there is popular support for cityregionalism in the two cases under investigation, the prospects for introducing directly elected cityregional governments in Sweden are bleak.
15
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18
Appendix 1: Variables included in the analysis
Variable
Question/variable construction
Variable values
Indicator of the dependent variable
Localism – cityregionalism index
Additive index, representing the mean response on the
following questions:
Scale 0 – 4
(0 = consistent localism, 4 =
consistent city-regionalism)
- The level of the municipal services should be the same in the
whole city-region*
- There should be differences in tax levels between the
municipalities
- It should be possible to choose a provider of care for the
elderly in the whole city-region*
- One should only be allowed to choose a school within one’s
own municipality
- The municipalities in the city-region should share the
responsibility for the socially disadvantaged*
- The municipalities in the city-region should share the
responsibility to attract businesses*
- The municipalities in the city-region should share the
responsibility for refugees*
The response alternatives were: Very good proposition, fairly
good proposition, neither a good nor a bad proposition, fairly
bad proposition and very bad proposition.
* Coding reversed before added into an index
Indicators of the independent variables
Individual level variables
Household income
Approximately how much in total do the persons in your
household earn before tax? (SKR)
Interpersonal trust
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted?
Left-Right-position
Replies on a scale from 0 (most people cannot be trusted) to
10 (most people can be trusted)
Where would you position yourself on a left-right political
scale?
Daily commuting to
other municipality in
the city-region
Length of residence
in one’s municipality
Do you commute on a daily basis for work or studies to
another municipality?
Feel at home in one’s
municipality
To what extend to you feel at home in your own municipality?
[a 7-grade scale, from not home at all to very much at home]
How long have you lived in the municipality where you
presently reside?
1: 200 000 or less
2: 201 000 – 400 000
3: 401 000 – 600 000
4: 601 000 or more
1: Low trust (0-3)
2: Median trust (4-6)
3: High trust (7-10)
1: Clearly to the left
2: Slightly to the left
3: Neither left, nor right
4: Slightly to the right
5: Clearly towards the right
1: No
2: Yes
1: Moved to the municipality
2: Resident practically the
whole life
1: Not at all
2: Partly
19
Feel at home in one’s
city-region
Interest in politics
generally
Political participation
Level of education
To what extend to you feel at home in the Göteborg
Region/the Umeå Region? [(Names specific for each cityregion) [a 7-grade scale, from not home at all to very much at
home]
How interested are you in political issues generally?
[A list of 14 different ways of influencing political decisions is
presented to the respondent]
Have you, during the last year, used any of the following
means to influence political decisions?
What is your highest level of education?
Gender
3: Fully
1: Not at all
2: Partly
3: Fully
1: Not at all/not particularly
2: Very/fairly
0: No means
1: 1-2 means
2: 3-4 means
3: 5 or more means
1: Compulsory school, etc.
2: Upper secondary school, etc.
3: Post-upper secondary studies
4: University degree
1: Woman
2: Man
Contextual variables
Mean income
The mean income of the citizens of 20 years and older in own
municipality (SKR)
Municipal size
Population size of own municipality
City-regional size
The city-region
1: 249 999 or less
2: 250 000 – 274 999
3: 275 000 or more
1: 40 000 inhabitants or less
2: 40 001 – 100 000 inhabitants
3: 100 001 or more inhabitants
1: Small (Umeå city-region)
2: Large (Göteborg city-region)
20
Interpersonal trust
.236***
Left-right position
.191***
-.031
Daily commuter
.186***
-.035
Feel at home in cityregion
.101***
.086***
.068***
General interest in
politics
.028
.111***
-.067***
Political participation
.157***
.220***
-.132***
Level of education
.340***
.231***
.049**
.069***
-.007
.181***
Gender
.072***
-.013
.055**
.062***
-.045*
.089***
-.105***
.018
-.054**
-.269***
Municipal size
City-regional size
.056**
-.057***
Municipal size
Gender
Level of education
Political
participation
General interest in
politics
Feel at home in cityregion
Daily commuter
Left-right position
Interpersonal trust
Correlations between the independent variables in regression analyses
Household income
Appendix 2
.034
.126***
.032
-.049**
.020
.132***
.041
.051**
.363***
.123***
.089***
.027
.026
.330***
-.009
.052**
-.027
-.059***
.104***
-.056***
.016
-.009
-.113***