Publicly Funded TBED Programs
and New Firm Survival
Fall 2009
White Paper 2009-004
Matthew Hamilton
President
Wellspring Worldwide
Robert A. Lowe
Chief Executive Officer
Wellspring Worldwide
Francisco Veloso
Associate Professor
Carnegie Mellon University
1. Introduction
Figure 1. Public-Private Funding Matrix
Private Financing Strategy
Technology-based Economic Development (TBED) is the
modern cornerstone of virtually every U.S. region’s growth
strategy. TBED programs focus on launching and supporting
high-tech start-ups in a city or state in efforts to increase local
Regional TBED Strategy
employment rates and attractive new financial capital and wealth
to the region. The number and scale of TBED organizations
in the U.S. continue to increase dramatically, culminating in
over $1.3 billion in investments (2004) by states and regions to
support over 400 programs nationally.
The increase in public spending on TBED activities over the
Public-Private
Finance Partnership
Publicly-Funded
Companies
Venture CapitalFinanced
Bootstrapped
previous decade has, on average, been twice the growth rate
of the overall state government expenditures. This scale of
investment is similar to federal commercialization funding, such
as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program
that received ~$2.5 billion in the same period. TBED is also
comparable to private venture capital (VC) which had more than
$20 billion in investments, but only $4 billion was allocated to
•
How do direct investment programs impact start-up
•
What types of TBED programs are most effective in
success in a region?
early-stage, start-up ventures in this period.
regions hit hardest by declines in manufacturing, mining, and
promoting regional growth?
This white paper summarizes research that specifically examines
other industrial sectors, “post-industrial cities.” The State of
firm founding rates and firm success rates according to funding
Pennsylvania allocated nearly $2 billion of Tobacco Settlement
strategy.
TBED Investments have been particularly concentrated in
monies for public venture capital and research in support of a
biotechnology industry in the state. The Illinois Department
Figure 1 illustrates a framework for analyzing firm performance
of Commerce and Economic Opportunity funded the ITEC
as a function of strategy. Each square in the matrix represents one
initiative, setting up publicly supported venture funding centers at
of four possible funding paths for a given technology company.
universities around the state. In 2004, Cleveland-area foundations
The two axes indicate (1) whether a given firm received direct
created a formalized collaboration platform in the Fund for Our
TBED funding (e.g., TBED investment) or programmatic support
Economic Future to coordinate grant-making directly to various
and (2) whether the firm received additional private investment
TBED initiatives. This effort followed the State of Ohio’s Third
capital or not (Bootstrapped).
Frontier initiative, a 10-year initiative targeting over $1.6B in
In this research, we seek to primarily focus on direct TBED
start-up investment.
investments in companies, rather than programmatic initiatives,
At the local level, Pittsburgh maintains more TBED organizations
whereby services are provided rather than an investment in
than any two other cities in the US. State-by-state and city-by-
companies. The y-axis in Figure 1 represents the types of TBED
city, significant investments have become commonplace over the
resources available. Note that TBED Programming implies no
past decade.
direct public investments are available to start-ups in the region,
only incubation assistance, business planning, and other services.
Given the growth, magnitude, and diversity of TBED programs
TBED Investment indicates regions where direct funding is
established in the past decade, the effectiveness of TBED
available, and service programs may also be offered.
program design demands careful understanding of two issues:
In the sections that follow, we first examine the private venture
capital market by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in a
1
selection of post-industrial cities to characterize the scope of
We strongly support the goals of TBED programs; they
investment and entrepreneurship activity in each of twelve areas.
represent engines of the modern innovation economy. Yet, with
This analysis creates a contextual perspective to understand
resources comes responsibility. Resources, both financial and
the relative position of Pittsburgh. It also provides a backdrop
programmatic, offer enormous potential for fostering technology
to compare the funding and start-up activity in three regions,
sectors locally and sustained regional growth, but only if coupled
Pittsburgh, Denver, and Indianapolis in detail. The latter is the
with local community demand. The mix and type of resources
basis for a detailed study of the impact of different approaches to
provided, the (early) investment staging and careful monitoring
TBED support and funding on firm founding and success rates.
of companies’ progress are essential to get right, yet seemingly
Four major insights have emerged from our research:
have not been a critical factor in strategic planning.
Base rates of firm survival are similar across cities. The
survival rate of new firms converges to a comparable level
2. TBED Funding Framework
across most cities, regardless of funding sources and industry.
TBED investment programs have existed for over three
decades. However, the vast majority of TBED investment
programs were created following the economic boom of the
late 1990’s. TBED investment programs were recognized
as a mechanism to fill the “funding gap” technology startups are perceived to face, often referred to as the “Valley of
Death”1. This gap is represented in Figure 2, which depicts
a conceptual map of when funding sources for tech startups overlap. The conspicuous gap between R&D budgets
and private investment funding (e.g., venture capital)
represents the gap between money a start-up requires
for development and launching operations and when the
private market is willing to assume investment risk.
Differences in start-ups’ sources of funding affects the rate at
which firms survive or fail early in their lives, but not a firm’s
survival over the medium term (~5 years). This result does not
vary significantly by industrial sectors. Hence, targeting public
funds at specific market sectors or at certain stages of firm
growth appears to have no long-term impact on firm survival.
This suggests that TBED efforts should focus on the regional
environment for starting firms and working with entrepreneurs to
generate a higher number of technology-oriented companies.
Technology hubs (including Pittsburgh) have higher firm
survival rates than smaller, less technology-oriented cities.
Cities that lack a minimum density of technology firms struggle
The Valley exists because available funds to develop a new
idea are limited since the new service or product has moved
beyond the research phase, but remains underdeveloped
with regard to the technology and the value for a potential
client. As a result, funding for commercial exploration
and exploitation at this stage can be prohibitively difficult
to obtain, and the Valley of Death is often cited as the
principal reason for the creation of TBED funding
programs.
to successfully generate surviving technology firms. This finding
may suggest that TBED’s in these regions face unique barriers in
contributing to regional economic development by helping the
growth of local high tech entrepreneurial ventures.
TBED programs studied do not serve as gap funding, nor
increase the chances of firm survival. If they are to evolve, the
goals and monitoring of these programs should shift such that
TBED initiatives directly funding firms are channeled towards
filling the “Valley of Death”.
In practice, TBEDs often do not adhere to this model.
Figure 3 illustrates the timing of TBED investments and
venture capital investments actually made in Pittsburgh
based on age of firm when the investments were made.
Statistically, there is no difference in timing between
venture capital funding and TBED funding. In fact, these
two curves track very closely. On average, TBED’s in our
TBED programs that mix leadership and financial support
from public and private communities are twice as likely to
have a positive economic impact. The most effective regional
programs have publicly funded TBED programs that are initiated
by local community groups (local demand driven). Top-down
programs initiated by public sector and private organizations
(e.g., foundations, corporate-led) experience higher rates of
failure.
2
1. As one of several examples, see L. Branscomb and P. Auerswald (2002). Between Invention and Innovation. Report NIST GCR 02–841
Figure 2. The Funding Gap
Share of total
investment needs
0.25
R&D
0.2
The
Funding
Gap
0.15
Private
Investment
0.1
0.05
0
Prior to
Formation
0
1
2
3
4
5
Years
This observation merits a more
detailed empirical examination
of the nature and impact of these
funding programs. This is especially
important because direct start-up
financing programs are expensive:
across the U.S., expenditures are
more than twice the amount spent by
other types of economic development
programs (e.g., regional promotion,
business incubators). Local and state
governments support the majority of
start-up financing program budgets.
3. Venture Capital
Investments and Firm
Survival
Figure 3. TBED vs. VC funding in Pittsburgh
Share of total
investment
0.25
The availability of Venture Capital
VC
across the US exhibits some features
0.2
that are especially important to regions
such as Pennsylvania and Pittsburgh
0.15
TBED
in particular. Figure 4 illustrates wide
distribution of VC money available
0.1
across the US as TBED programs
were ramping up. This graph depicts
0.05
total private venture capital funds
0
Prior to 0
in a given state (plus the District
Years
1
2
3
4
5
Formation
of Columbia) as reported in by
Venture Expert, normalized by state
population from the 2000 census. Not
study invested only slightly before venture capital early
surprisingly, California, Massachusetts, and the DC area
on and regularly made investments into the third year of a
(Maryland-Virginia-DC) are at the top. Notably, the two
company, similar to later-round venture capital.
states that invested the most monies in TBED activity over
This data for Pittsburgh raises the question of whether
the past 5 years, Pennsylvania and Ohio, follow closely
public funding might simply be pairing private venture
behind in VC dollars per capita.
funding, rather than seeking to fund the earliest investments
as a bridge between R&D spending and private markets
Perhaps more interesting, states that had experienced
(green line in Figure 2). Such perspective is at odds with
significant industrial decline were net importers of venture
this idea of TBEDs as playing an important role in funding
capital during the early 2000’s. Figure 5 illustrates the
the gap. Yet, it would support another argument for TBED
net flow of venture capital in and out of each state (i.e.,
investment, which is that TBED funding is necessary to
total funds invested in a given state by VC funds located
attract venture capital to the region that would otherwise
in other states minus funds based in the state and invested
never be invested.
elsewhere).
Several states with considerable financial wealth, such as
3
New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and Illinois have large venture capital
investments, but were net exporters of funds.
In the top ten by rank, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and Michigan saw far more VC dollars
flowing in than out in spite of local concerns
over lack of regional venture capital sources
during this period. Surprisingly, states
heralded for their economic growth over the
past decade, such as Arizona and Minnesota,
were actually behind Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and Michigan in net VC inflows at the start
of the TBED growth cycle. Minnesota was
comparable to these states in VC spend per
capita, while Arizona lagged far behind.
To understand financing at a more detailed
level, we reviewed the 561 VC investments
into technology-oriented firms in 12
cities reported in from 1990 to 20072. We
specifically chose cities that experienced
declines in manufacturing, mining, and
other traditional industrial sectors during
the 1970’s and 1980’s3. Figure 6 illustrates
the density of venture capital-backed startups in each of the 12 cities by the year of
formation. That is, of all VC-backed firms
in each city between 1990-2007, each graph
shows the share of when the firms were
founded. Not surprisingly, there is a cluster
of firms formed around 1999-2001, at the
height of the technology bubble.
Figure 4. Average VC Investment, 2001-2003
Figure 5. Net flow of VC funding (2001-2003)
more than 60 VC investment in technology-based firms in
the study period – which includes Pittsburgh) and small
cap cities (i.e., less than 30 VC investments). Figure 7
illustrates survival of firms with 95% confidence intervals.
The survival rate of venture-backed firms across cities
provides some important perspectives. Survival rates in our
analysis are examined using Kaplan-Meier curves, which
allow us to estimate the true distribution of firm failures
over time while accounting for censored data4. The sample
starts with 100% of firms surviving on day 1 and each time
a firm fails it is dropped from the sample, such that the
estimated rate of surviving firms declines. The x-axis is
measured in days since founding of a firm.
2. Note that the data from Pittsburgh’s and Indianapolis’s venture capital investments only starts in 1995, rather than 1990. In regression models and survival
estimates, this does not have an impact on the analysis.
3. Note that Youngstown, Ohio, Flint, Michigan, and Erie, Pennsylvania were
initially included in this list but did not have any venture capital investments to
technology firms as defined by our research criteria.
4. Censored data in this study represents firms that have not failed, but for which
we do not have sufficient time to observe the firms. For example, the graphs
represent over a decade of firms and a firm founded in early 2005 could only be
observed for 4 years in our analysis and thus is censored data in the fifth year.
Within these 12 cities, we see a marked difference in firm
performance among “large cap” cities (i.e., those with
4
Figure 6. Density of VC-backed Start-ups by Year
Denver
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Nashville
Oklahoma City
Pittsburgh
Rochester
St. Louis
Toledo
.3
.2
.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
0
Density
.4
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Cleveland
This rate is similar to those found by other
examinations of venture firm survival on a
national basis. A recent research paper that
looked at start-ups from 1987 to 2000 found
a failure rate of 9% among venture capital
investments5. In a previous publication
by Lowe, we found that start-ups at the
University of California, the majority of
which were VC-funded, had a >80% chance
of survival over ten years6.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
We now turn to a detailed examination
of start-up activity and funding sources
in three cities, Pittsburgh, Denver, and
Indianapolis. These cities represent considerably different
approaches to Technology-Based Economic Development,
although each city was motivated to respond to industrial
declines, namely in steel and glass, mining, and
manufacturing, respectively.
Graphs by Region
We find that small and large cities alike experience equally
impressive survival rates during the first 10 years of firm
life. However, firms experience markedly different survival
after 10 years, when small city firms tend to decline
steadily and the survival rate of large city firms persists.
Among these firms, we also witness considerable
differences in technology field in of the rate of survival.
Figure 8 displays start-up survival by three general classes
of industry with 95% confidence intervals: Biomedical,
Software, and General (Other). Biomedical firms
experience far more persistent survival over the first 10
years (significantly so), and the small number of firms in
our sample for 15 years experienced higher survival rates
than other technology classes. To be clear, this does not
necessitate that biomedical start-ups are more successful.
Indeed, the considerable capital many such firms launch
with, combined with the long product development and
sales cycles, means a decade is a often too early for
pharmaceutical development and biotechnology firms to
measure their success. Eventually venture funded firms in
all technology classes reaches a survival rate of 80% (only
20% of the firms went out of business).
Our three cities started with similar industrial bases,
population sizes, and parallel sets of economic crises in
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Denver faced the severe
decline of mining, metals, and energy industries in the
early 1980’s and subsequently the bankruptcy of Storage
Technology (large IBM spinout), a devastating loss to
the technology community. Pittsburgh and Indianapolis
struggled with declining competitiveness in manufacturing
and, for Pittsburgh, the movement of steel and glass to
Asia. This resulted in statewide unemployment peaks of
over 12% in the early 1980s. All the regions faced similar
economic recessions in the early 1990s and the “dot-com”
boom of the later 1990s and bust in the early 2000s. Yet,
with these parallel histories, the creation and evolution of
TBED programs in the three regions were notably different,
providing three innovation systems to study the catalyst,
evolution, and eventual success or failure of various TBED
initiatives.
5. Cochrane, John H. “The Risk And Return Of Venture Capital,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 2005, v75: 3-52.
6. Lowe, Robert A. “Who Develops a University Invention? The Impact of Tacit
Knowledge and Licensing Policies” Journal of Technology Transfer. 2006, v
:415-429.
4. Funding Sources and Firm
Survival
In contrast to the other states in this study, Colorado had an
earlier transition to a technology-oriented economy. This
5
helped to dampen the impact of successive
recessions in specific industry sectors and
resulted in a skilled workforce and strong
bottom-up leadership from the community
and from experienced entrepreneurs. A
number of TBED organizations were
created in the periods of economic strife;
yet, these initiatives tended to support the
growth of existing technology firms and
support entrepreneurs through incubation
centers rather then by directly funding new
businesses. None of the TBED programs
in Denver provided direct funding that was
significant in scope and funding amounts
when compared to states like Indiana and
Pennsylvania.
Figure 7. Firm survival by city size
Indiana’s response to the economic crisis
Figure 8. Firm survival by industry class
of the early 1980s was similar to that
adopted by other states facing industrial
decline: the aggressively pursuit of new
firms and exploration of new technologyoriented economic development programs.
However, the conservative culture and
governorship transition that occurred in the
late 1980s led to many TBED programs
gradually becoming more focused on
small business and manufacturing product
development, as opposed to emerging
technologies or new firm creation.
However, this changed in 1997 due to the
threat of firm relocation and the emergence
of the ‘dot-com’ economy, along with the
growing disparity between Indiana and
other states’ TBED investments. This state
high-technology employment in the late 1980s helped
TBED investment program, the 21st Century Fund, was
spur continued interest and belief in TBED organizations.
started in 1999 and has remained through three transitions
Pittsburgh, like Indiana and Denver, experienced an
in the governorship.
upswing in TBED organization formation during the “dotcom” boom. The number of TBED organizations doubled
Pittsburgh has been a laboratory for TBED organizations
and funding from state and foundations increased by more
for several decades and has continued to make large, direct
than three times its previous level.
investments into new technology firms. The region has
generated a series of TBED organizations starting in the
early 1980s that is unparalleled by other regions of the
U.S. A brief but dramatic rise in the venture funds and
Based on a variety of economic and political conditions,
different types of TBED organization emerged. Moreover,
6
for both Indianapolis and Pittsburgh we have information
on both venture capital funded and TBED funded firms. But
for Denver we only observe venture capital investments,
which will limit our analysis of this city. Figure 9 shows the
overall venture funding amounts normalized to populations.
The next set of survival curves (Figure 11) illustrates
survival rates across cities by funding sources (label = 1
when source is present). The survival curves for TBEDfunded, bootstrapped, and venture-backed were statistically
the same across the cities. Only firms that received both
VC investment and TBED investment (see Figure 3)
exhibited slightly higher survival rates. However, the firms
in this category are notably fewer in number, and statistical
differences are not clear given the relatively small sample
size.
In each of these regions we examined firm survival based
on the type of funding received from 1990 to 2007. Firm
funding can come in one of four forms:
1. Bootstrapped (1403 firms)
2. Venture capital (207 firms)
3. TBED organizations (108 firms)
4. Venture capital and TBED (29 firms)
Pittsburgh represents the most robust TBED investment
community among the three cities profiled. Figure 12
compares survival of start-ups founded in the Pittsburgh
MSA by funding source. Figure 12 reveals perhaps the
most fascinating aspect in this research: Pittsburgh firms
demonstrated the same survival rate after ~5.5 years (2000
days) among each type of funding source. TBED-funded
companies (no VC) tend to be more likely to survive early
when bootstrapped and VC-backed firms tend to decline,
but eventually survive at the same base rate as other firms.
In contrast, VC-funded tend to exit early, as investors pull
monies from failing companies, and stabilize to a base
survival rate quickly. Firms that receive both VC and
TBED support appear to have a survival rate slightly above
the rest, but this set includes a relatively small number of
observations; more data is needed to confirm or refute these
survival differences as statistically significant.
Purely venture capital investments were rare in the
Pittsburgh market, but common in other markets with fewer
resources supporting TBED initiatives.
In Figure 10, we see the baseline survival rates of
bootstrapped firms in each of the three markets across time
(in days). Remarkably, all three markets have statistically
the same survival rate for bootstrapped firms during the first
five years of firm life. This is a fairly high survival rate, as
well, exceeding 80%. After five years, we find a significant
divergence between each, whereby Indianapolis first
decline rapidly. Denver firms appear to perform marginally
better than Pittsburgh, though these two curves converge to
a common survival rate in the long run .
The significance of this finding cannot
be overstated. This data suggests there is
a natural survival rate and the source of
investment capital a company starts with
merely dictates when the firm will be most
likely to exit, but not the overall likelihood.
Moreover, the area between the solely
TBED-funded companies (red line) and
solely VC-funded companies (green line)
is the effective resource cost to the local
economy: funding used by TBED’s to
prolong start-up firm that on average will
result in the same likelihood of survival.
Figure 9. Number of Firms (per million residents) receiving VC funding
These survival rates in Pittsburgh place in
context our earlier observation that TBED
7
investment, on average, pairs closely with
venture capital investment. Those firms
that receive both TBED and VC funding
appear to have sufficient monies to survival
for extended periods. Yet, the data cannot
demonstrate that TBED funding necessarily
improved survival for the firms supported.
Alternatively, it may only indicate that these
firms were well funded by multiple sources
since they had clear signals of future
success that were observed by funding
organizations.
Section 5. The Cooperative Role
of Institutional Change in TBED
Systems
Figure 10. Survival curve for bootstrapped companies across cities
Figure 11. Survival by funding source
The previous research addressed efficiencies
in specific TBED investments. In a related
analysis, we examine the role of how
multiple TBED organizations and programs
coordinate or compete within a region. As
part of this analysis, we are able to identify
the most effective coordination levels
among TBED organizations operating in the
same ecosystem.
This work examined the evolution of
TBED programs primarily in three regions,
Pittsburgh, Denver, and Indianapolis, over
the past 25 years. Histories and data from
programs in a wide range of other regions
were incorporated to supplement the examination of
three
target regions. We applied a set of 6 heuristic measures of
TBED program performance to capture success in a range
of potential outcomes and program goals.
The four categories include Top down programs. These
are for example initiatives like Indiana’s 21st Century
funds, which were created and funded by economic
development leadership and state legislation. Bottom up
initiatives include Colorado’s Techstars program that was
formed by local entrepreneurs in Boulder, CO to assist
emerging business ideas and was designed and funded by
a community of innovators. The key insight is the role of
synchronicity between regional leadership funding a TBED
program and the technology community implementing the
program. We also observe many TBED programs that are
“coupled” in that they effectively pair local parties either
Four distinct roles are critical in each region. These are
illustrated in Table 1, which also provides a summary of
the analysis. There is a unique role for TBED program
originators (those initiating the program) versus financial
supporters. The further division between the innovation
community and economic development community
captures the different perspectives and incentives various
parties face.
8
as originators or funders with parties outside
the local community in a complementary
role. For example, programs demanded by
local entrepreneurs, professors, or innovative
companies could be funded by state agencies.
Alternatively, coupled programs could also be
publicly supported (thus, initiated) by elected
officials might be funded by small businesses
and local entrepreneurs.
Figure 12. Survival by funding source, Pittsburgh
Table 1 reports the universe of relevant
combinations for the program as well as their
success. This was measured using six-factor
heuristic model developed for the analysis
of the various case studies. As shown,
TBED programs that combine resources,
regardless of whether the TBED was initiated
by the economic development leadership
or the innovation community, experienced successful
outcomes at about twice the rate of programs where the
government or community acted alone. On average,
unsuccessful programs were those instituted “top-down,”
where the program originated and was funded by the state
or major foundations, or “bottom-up,” where individual
entrepreneurs, researchers, or local businesses both initiated
the program and provided the funding. Top-down programs
struggle to identify and execute programs that are most
relevant to the region. Bottom-up programs often lacked
the legitimacy and/or (financial) resources to be effective.
Indeed, we find that which role (e.g., originator or funder)
arises locally is less relevant than the active inclusion of
local and non-local parties.
These conclusions on the role of program formations are
of critical importance and have a notable link to program
outcomes. Initiatives that are not coupled, in particular
the prevalent top-down programs, lead to strategies that
are on average less effective and appear to be a significant
reason that TBED investment profiles that do not address
the funding gap, as discussed in Section 3. As a result, these
TBED’s contributions to regional economic development
fail to meet their full potential.
Table 1. Success Rates of Originators and Supporters of TBED Organizations
9
Section 6. Concluding Remarks
TBED programs promise economic growth for regions
across the U.S. Increased awareness of the success and
impact of technology start-ups, perhaps best exemplified
by spin-outs from universities and research labs, has
sparked a perceived opportunity for investment in earlystage, high-reward technology companies7. Thus, it is not
surprising that elected officials, universities, state agencies,
and philanthropic organizations have collaborated to
support hundreds of new TBED programs over the past two
decades.
Yet with such promise, several trends have emerged that
may raise considerable social costs with no economic
development to show for it: (1) a prevalence of top-down
programs, often led by the state government, without
enough coupling with local community; (2) a similar profile
of funding timing for TBED’s and VC’s, rather than having
TBEDs emphasizing financial support for the “valley of
death” and (3) delayed failure rates for failing companies
supported solely by TBED monies.
To repeat a previous sentiment, we strongly support the
goals of TBED programs nationally and locally. This paper
summarizes the first in-depth examination of the rise of
TBED’s over the past 15 years. Our concluding remarks
caution that with greater resources comes responsibility:
TBED program design becomes ever more critical. The
type of resources provided, (early) staging or timing
of investment in start-ups, and careful monitoring of
companies’ progress are essential. National and state
resources prudently coupled with local community demand
and TBED investments promise enormous potential for
sustained regional growth.
7. E. Roberts and C. Eesley (2009) Entrepreneurial Impact: The Role of MIT.
Kauffman Foundation.
10
Appendix A. Data Sources
Data presented in this paper was collected from a variety
of sources, including: Guidestar; the Pittsburgh Technology
Council; Venture Expert; Venture One; business filings on
record at the State of Colorado, Indiana, and Pennsylvania;
legislation and budget bills in each U.S. state; and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. These data
were supplemented with secondary research, including
numerous newspaper, magazine, and internet articles.
We are also grateful for interviews and data provided by
many TBED organizations in Denver, Indianapolis, Kansas
City, and Pittsburgh.