Reforming the Electoral System
Jack Vowles
Political Science and International Relations
Victoria University of Wellington
The Issues
• Dual candidacy and the list ‘lifeboat’ for
some defeated MPs
• The thresholds for representation and
the problem of ‘devious’ party strategies
• Party-Hopping/waka jumping
• The number of list MPs and
proportionality
• Open lists
Dual Candidacy
2011
2008
2005
2002
1999
1996
0
20
40
60
80
100
Labour % dual candidates of total
2011
2008
2005
2002
1999
1996
0
20
40
60
80
National % dual candidates of total
100
• Is the prevailing
norm for the
National and
Labour Parties
• Has increased
since MMP was
introduced
• Has stabilised at
high levels
Immediately after an election, should
MPs defeated in their electorates be
allowed to return to Parliament on their
party’s list?
All
Don't Know
MMP Voters
Don't Know
26
No
46
Yes
10
20
30
Source: 2011 NZES
No
33
Yes
28
0
27
40
50
40
0
10
20
30
40
50
Legislative Turnover 19462011
Average
(1946-1984)
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
Defeated
8.6
6.2
22.7
16.5
17.2
13.3
15.0
17.5
11.6
8.2
Stood
Down
10.2
11.3
16.5
3.1
12.1
12.5
10.0
6.7
13.2
13.9
Total
18.8
17.5
39.2
19.6
29.3
25.8
25.0
24.2
24.7
22.1
Comparing Defeats
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
A: %
B: %
Electorate
Electorate
MPs defeated
MPs
and not
defeated
securing list but returned
seat
Via List
12.5
5.8
4.3
0.8
1.4
10.8
7.2
4.3
1.4
2.9
(A+B):
Defeat
Rate
Electorate
MPs
18.3
5.1
12.2
11.5
4.3
% List MPs
defeated
17.0
29.4
39.2
17.6
17.3
The List as Lifeboat:
Survivals
Resigned/did
not contest
next
Defeated next
electorate
Defeated at
candidate
next (dual
only
candidate)
Hughes*** ^ Fairbrother
Samuels***
Simich**
Hartley*
Pillay
Sutton^
Yates (2)
Pettis
Bradford
Haseler
*
**
***
****
^
^^
Simcock*
Peters
Vernon
Chadwick
Remained
after one
Tactical Voting term
Recaptured
electorate next
election
Worth***
Parker**
Fitzsimmons Barker^^
Prebble**** Ririnui^^
Carter
O’Connor*
Yates (1)
Evidence of continued local personal support
Current Dual candidacy token or earlier electorate victory unexpected
Resignation forced or influenced by lack of party support
Boundary changes
Resigned well before end of next term
Gone after two terms as list MP
Party-Hopping and Forced
Exits/Resignation Post2005
Change of Party
L Gordon Copeland, 2007-2008, from United Future New Zealand to The Kiwi Party
E Taito Phillip Field, 2007-2008, from Labour to New Zealand Pacific Party**
E Chris Carter, 2010-11, from Labour to Independent**
E Hone Harawera, 2011, from Maori Party to Mana Party*
L Brendan Horan, 2012, from New Zealand First to Independent**
Left Parliament
L Richard Worth 2009, National**
E Pansy Wong 2010, National
L David Garrett, 2010, Act**
L Darren Hughes, 2011, Labour**.
E=Electorate MP
L=List MP
*By-election held under new banner
**Explicitly pressured by party to resign, or expelled
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
What Does Experience Tell
us?
The average of list MPs standing down across the MMP Parliaments –
11.8% compared to electorate MPs 9%.
List MPs are more likely to be defeated or be obliged or pressured to
resign for impropriety than are electorate MPs – does not this make
them more accountable than electorate MPs?
2011 NZES: 69 per cent agreed that ‘A good electoral system should
make it easy to vote MPs out’
The most secure and therefore less accountable MPs are those whose
electorate seats are invulnerable to even the strongest electoral surge
against their party.
Dual candidacy should encourage incumbent list MPs to be more
attentive to grass roots public opinion - is this a bad thing?
Why would we prevent new candidates from ‘going dual’?
One could prevent dual candidacy for incumbent electorate MPs, but
the evidence suggests the arguments for doing so are not as strong as
many might think.
Is party-hopping/waka-jumping since 2005 a significant problem?
The Threshold
Would you say that in the New Zealand Parliament
after the 2011 election there are too many political
parties, about the right number of parties, or not
enough parties?
All
Don't know
MMP voters
Don't know
13
Not enough
Not enough
2
About right number
Too many
20
30
40
50
54
Too many
47
10
2
About right number
38
0
10
60
34
0
10
20
30
40
In the 2011 Parliament there are 8 parties, 3 of which are
represented by only 1 MP.
Source: 2011 NZES
50
60
MMP Review
• The one electorate seat threshold for the allocation of list seats
should be abolished.
• The party vote threshold should be lowered from 5% to 4%.
• If the one electorate seat threshold is abolished, the provision for
overhang seats should be abolished.
– Rationale: election of Independents and ‘less than 5%’ party MPs could
increase overhangs considerably
– For example, the Maori party in 2008 – won 5 electorates, met
threshold, and got 2.4% of party vote, giving it a 3-seat entitlement.
– Therefore there were only 2 overhang seats - but without the electorate
threshold this would have meant 5 overhang seats
– An alternative could have been to use the current mechanism to
minimise overhang where parties have more seats than the party vote
would have allocated, but to stop using it to allocate further list MP
seats.
The result of the recommendation if carried through: Independents and
electorate MPs for ‘less than 5%’ parties will take seats at the expense
of list MPs and proportionality.
Why abolish the electorate seat
threshold?
increases the stakes for … strategic behaviour by political parties. It
is questionable whether such behaviour is in the interests of voters and it
may have the effect of reducing the credibility and legitimacy of the
electoral system’ NZES Report to the Electoral Commission, Electoral
System Opinion and the Evolution of MMP, July 2000.
‘MMP
•
•
•
•
•
•
Wellington Central 1996, Coromandel 1999: Tacit signals by
National/Labour for strategic votes for Act/Green.
1999: National did not run a candidate against Peter Dunne in Ohariu.
Epsom 2008, 2011: Tacit signaling to National party voters to vote ACT
in the electorate. Act possibly won the seat on its own merits in 2005.
Party-driven strategic voting is distinct from voter-motivated strategic
voting, although the two can overlap.
Abolishing the electorate seat threshold will reduce the incentives for
party-driven ‘devious strategy’ but not entirely remove them.
Nothing in the Electoral Act prevents a party from endorsing allied
Independent or small party candidate(s) in an electorate or electorates,
going as far as not running its own candidate or candidates, and
encouraging vote-splitting in order to boost their combined seats at the
expense of proportionality.
Proportionality
All
Don’t Know
While keeping the
overall number of
MPs at 120, do
you think that the
number of list
MPs should be
increased, kept at
present, be
reduced, or
eliminated
entirely?
20
Eliminate List MPs
16
Reduce List MPs
39
Keep number as now
24
Increase List MPs
1
0
20
30
40
50
MMP
Don’t Know
18
Eliminate List MPs
5
Reduce List MPs
39
Keep number as now
37
Increase List MPs
Source: 2011 NZES
10
2
0
10
20
30
40
50
Proportionality
Woman MPs
Don’t Know
9
Depends on…
Yet most people
wish to keep at
least the current
level of womens’
representation,
and have
proportional
representation -
Less
35
5
Same as Now
26
More
27
0
10
20
30
Proportionality
Don't Know
15
One-party
government, no PR
37
PR
Source: 2011 NZES
40
48
0
20
40
60
MMP Review
Consideration should be given to fixing the ratio of electorate seats to
list seats at 60:40 (72-48) to help maintain the diversity of
representation and proportionality in Parliament obtained through the
list seats.
• With 120 seats fixed and a requirement for 16 South
Island electorates, the number of electorate seats
expands at the expense of list seats – a shift of 5 since
1996 (to 70-50)
• A 75:25 (90-30) ratio could have caused problems at
the 2002 election, and would significantly reduce
womens’ and minority representation
• EC Final Report – would mean increases in the size of
Parliament
• Recommended this issue be considered without delay
in time for the 2014 election
• Currently within the terms of reference of the
constitutional review
Reforming the Electoral System
Jack Vowles
Political Science and International Relations
Victoria University of Wellington