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Journal of Management Studies 51:2 March 2014
doi: 10.1111/joms.12072
The Discursive Construction of Strategists’
Subjectivities: Towards a Paradox Lens on Strategy
Stéphanie Dameron and Christophe Torset
Université Paris-Dauphine; Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers
ABSTRACT Until recently, the field of strategy has neglected the question of what it means to
be a strategist. Based on an analysis of 68 interviews with strategy practitioners, our results
highlight four main tensions that emerge from strategists’ discourses on strategizing work:
the social tension, the cognitive tension, the focus tension, and the time tension. This
tension-based representation of strategy enables us to differentiate between three forms of
strategists’ subjectivities, i.e. the ways by which strategists discursively cope with tensions as a
means of constituting their identity and legitimacy: the mythicizing subjectivity, the
concretizing subjectivity, and the dialogizing subjectivity. Such results shed light on what a
strategist is, suggesting that strategizing can be conceptualized as the art of balancing tensions
and that multiple strategists’ subjectivities within a paradox lens on strategy may in fact
co-exist.
Keywords: discourse, paradox, strategist, strategizing, subjectivity, tension
INTRODUCTION
Master managers develop the capacity to use several contradictory logics simultaneously. (Quinn, 1988, p. 14)
An increasing number of voices are calling for a renewed understanding of strategic
management as the capability to manage contradictions, oppositions and tensions
(Bouchikhi, 1998; Clegg et al., 2002; Quinn, 1988; Smith and Lewis, 2011; Poole and
Van de Ven, 1989). Researches on alliances (de Rond and Bouchiki, 2004), innovation
processes (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009), and top-management teams (Smith and
Tushman, 2005) have demonstrated that contradictions abound within organizations.
Now more than ever, firms are pressed to be efficient and effective, visionary and critical,
to innovate and to build routines, and to integrate and differentiate. As a consequence,
Address for reprints: Stéphanie Dameron, PSL, Université Paris-Dauphine, DRM UMR 7088, Paris F-75016,
France ([email protected]).
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S. Dameron and C. Torset
those who participate in strategic processes – namely strategists – are urged to develop
the cognitive capabilities necessary for simultaneously embracing multiple tensions,
which consist of managing paradoxes instead of ignoring or resolving oppositions
(Barnard, 1938; Quinn, 1988). To paraphrase the seminal work of Chester Barnard
(1938), the management of paradoxes is now more than ever the function and duty of
strategy practitioners (Smith and Tushman, 2005).
Surprisingly, the field of strategy has until recently neglected the question of what it
means to be a strategist. Even if one considers Andrews’ (1971), Barnard’s (1938),
Mintzberg’s (1973), or Quinn’s (1988) early admonitions, there has been little concern
for what a strategist is in the wake of the Porterian tradition of strategic analysis (Mantere
and Whittington, 2008; Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013). Subsequently, this paper adopts
a strategy-as-practice perspective, which can be understood as a plea for serious analysis
of the individual and social levels of the practice of strategy (Whittington, 1996, 2003).
More specifically, this stream of research has recently developed a discursive perspective
for understanding the identity construction and the social agency of strategists, which
Knights and Morgan (1991) have called their subjectivity. It stands, however, that
empirical studies focusing on the discursive construction of strategist subjectivity remain
scarce in this area (Knights and Morgan, 1991; Laine and Vaara, 2007).
In this paper, we propose a paradox perspective for examining the ways in which
strategists’ subjectivities manifest themselves in discourses related to strategizing work.
Following the work of Grant et al. (2004) and Laine and Vaara (2007), we maintain that
while strategy-related discourse holds power over individuals by producing positions of
subjectivity, it is also mobilized by these individuals for their own purposes, precisely to
protect and enhance their identity and agency. More specifically, people may use a
discursive representation of strategy and strategizing in order to position themselves as
important actors in the strategic process. As such, our argument here is that strategists
build their social agency and identity by positioning themselves in relation to specific
tensions through their discourse on strategizing work.
We examine these discourses via 68 semi-structured interviews that were conducted with
strategists from different organizations and with different positions, namely leaders (mainly
CEOs), experts, and managers. In our empirical analysis, we focus on the following two
questions: What conceptions of strategy are constituted through strategists’ discourses about
strategizing work? How do strategists position themselves as subjects through these discursive
constructions? In doing so, we analyse the concepts that emerge from strategists’ discourse on
strategy and strategizing. Through the identification of four tensions that constitute
strategizing work in strategists’ discourse, we propose that these concepts can be seen via a
paradox lens: these tensions are part of a paradox that brings together a transcendent view of
strategy (based on analytical tools and plans) and an immanent perspective on strategy
(grounded in local engagement, daily activities, intuition, and opportunities) (Chia and Holt,
2006). This tension-based representation of strategy that emerges from strategists’ discourse
enables us to differentiate between three forms of strategists’ subjectivities, which depend on
the way that each strategist discursively copes with tensions: the mythicizing subjectivity
(referring mainly to the immanent perspective on strategy), the concretizing subjectivity
(stressing a transcendent view of strategy), and the dialogizing subjectivity (embracing both of
these perspectives simultaneously).
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In our view, this analysis makes three contributions to the strategy-as-practice literature. First, the discourse-based representation of strategizing work highlights a paradox
lens on strategy, calling for a more integrative perspective on the nature of strategy work.
Second, this research extends previous work on strategists’ subjectivities by introducing
tensions as discursive resources through which strategists build their social agency and
identity. Third, our results suggest multiple forms of strategists’ subjectivities, beyond
their role position.
PARADOX, DISCOURSE, AND SUBJECTIVITY
In this first section, we analyse the paradoxical nature of strategizing work. As paradoxes
are constructed through communicative actions, it is from the analysis of strategists’
discourse that a paradox lens on strategizing can highlight what drives strategists’
subjectivities.
Oppositions and Dichotomies in Strategy: In Search of a Paradox Lens
Quite recently, strategy as an academic field has seen numerous evolutions, including the
leader-focused approach (Selznick, 1957), the decision-focused perspective criticized by
Langley et al. (1995), and the process-content debate (Pettigrew, 1990; Porter, 1996). In
this field of thriving research, strategy formation has been linked to decision-making
(Andrews, 1971), strategic analysis (Porter, 1996), individual cognitive processes (Calori
et al., 1994), or political/social organizational processes (Pettigrew, 1985). Moreover,
recent developments have promoted a practice turn on strategy by focusing on social
practices constituting strategizing (e.g., Jarzabkowski, 2005; Mantere and Vaara, 2008;
Whittington, 1996, 2003). In these cases, strategy is constructed via micro-practices and
performed by various individuals (called strategy practitioners) positioned inside or
outside of the organization.
The field of strategy research is rich with ideas, and has accordingly given rise to
multiple distinctions such as process versus content foci (Bourgeois, 1980), emergent
versus deliberate approaches to strategy making (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985), micro
versus macro levels of strategic activity (Langley, 1999), inductive versus deductive
strategy making (Regnér, 2003), and collective versus individual foci in strategy work
(Chakravarthy and White, 2002). These processual, emergent, micro, collective-based
and other alternative approaches are often distinguished from (or even opposed to) a
perspective on strategy that emphasizes rational intent, top management leadership, and
the macro-causal factors determining strategic success (Chia and Holt, 2006; Grandy
and Mills, 2004). All of these distinctions have brought much to our understanding of the
organizational mystery of strategy formation. Nonetheless, these different perspectives
are difficult to combine as they are often opposed or presented as dichotomies in the field
of strategy (Elfring and Volberda, 2001).
Following Quinn’s (1988, p. xiv) argument that ‘master managers develop the capacity
to use several contradictory logics simultaneously’, and Poole and Van de Ven’s (1989)
claim that we need to pay more attention to the opportunities offered by the tensions,
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S. Dameron and C. Torset
oppositions, and contradictions that exist among the explanations of a single phenomenon, we hold that a paradox lens on strategy is needed for exploring the opposing
pressures that strategists face.
Following the work of Smith and Lewis (2011, p. 382), we define tensions as ‘elements
that seem logical individually but inconsistent and even absurd when juxtaposed’. Smith
and Lewis (2011) distinguish three kinds of oppositions that are central to our purposes,
each of which depends on the way that it can be cognitively resolved: the dilemma, the
dialectic, and the paradox. The dilemma illustrates competing choices involving weighing pros and cons and eventually choosing one pole of the tension. In contrast, a dialectic
denotes contradictory elements that are resolved through integration and synthesis.
Paradox is different from dilemma and dialectic, as it is composed of ‘contradictory yet
interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time’ (Smith and Lewis,
2011, p. 382). A paradox is therefore characterized by underlying tensions that may be
embraced simultaneously. More specifically, within a paradox the two poles of the same
tension are a duality, as they are in opposition to one another yet simultaneously
synergetic and interrelated within a larger system (Clegg et al., 2002). In extending the
work of Poole and Van de Ven (1989), Smith and Lewis (2011) define two main responses
to tensions: acceptance, which encourages actors to embrace tensions simultaneously
(paradox); and resolution, which implies either separation (dilemma) or synthesis (dialectic). A theory of paradox emphasizes the former response, i.e. acceptance, as a means
of fostering creativity and change (Beech et al., 2004; Smith and Lewis, 2011; Smith and
Tushman, 2005).
Accordingly, a paradox is a cognitive and a social phenomenon that is enacted in daily
discourse (Lüscher et al., 2006): it can be seen as a part of a system of meaning that actors
use in order to give sense to their social world and to make it possible to interact in
specific contexts. In this view, strategy practitioners discursively use paradoxes to give
sense to their actions when strategizing. As such, the concept of paradox can be integrated into the realm of discourse theories.
Building Subjectivities Through Tensions: The Reflexive Discourse of
Strategists on Strategizing
In drawing on the work of Knights and Morgan (1991) and Laine and Vaara (2007) on
discourse and subjectivity, we view tensions and paradoxes as discursive resources
through which practitioners build their agency and identity. In their seminal work,
Knights and Morgan (1991) examine strategy as a discursive social construct that produces subjective self-discipline. More notably for our purposes, they argue that strategy
discourse may transform people into ‘subjects who secure their sense of purpose and
reality’ (Knights and Morgan, 1991, p. 352).
Recently, scholars have paid an increasing amount of attention to the role that
discourse plays in driving specific conceptions of strategy, power issues, and subjectivities
(Hardy and Philips, 1997; Oswick et al., 2000; Samra-Fredericks, 2005). More specifically, several such works demonstrate how strategists as subjects give sense to their
strategizing activities through discourse: it is through language, and more specifically
through discourse on strategy, that strategists constitute themselves as distinct
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subjectivities, i.e. as particular categories of actors with a series of distinct ambitions
regarding their activities (Ezzamel and Willmott, 2008; Knights and Morgan, 1991;
Laine and Vaara, 2007), and legitimize specific conceptions of strategy work (Mantere
and Vaara, 2008; Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013). These analyses emphasize the role
played by language, and therefore discourses, in the construction ‘of social and
organizational reality through its effects on actors’ thoughts, interpretations, and actions’
(Heracleous and Barrett, 2001, p. 757).
More specifically, different aspects of ‘reality’ are constructed via discourse. Hardy
and Philips (1997, 2004) propose a threefold analytical distinction between concepts,
objects, and subjects. This categorization enables us to understand how people discursively represent themselves as subjects of their own activities, thereby constructing their
own legitimacy (Oswick et al., 2000). Concepts are theories through which individuals
give sense to phenomena and relate to each other. Consistent with this approach,
strategists’ reflexive discourse on their practices (re-)constitutes the very concept of
strategy. Whereas concepts exist in the realm of ideas, objects are part of the practical
order – they naturalize concepts and are inextricably linked to the subjectivity of the
actors involved. For our purposes, the discursive objects are the strategizing activities
described by strategists. Strategists give sense to these objects through the concept(s) of
strategy that they employ in their discourse on strategizing, subsequently constructing
strategists’ subjectivities.
In their work on discursive struggle on subjectivity in strategy discourse, Laine and
Vaara (2007) specify the questions related to the subjectivity of actors involved in
discourses: ‘these include their right and opportunities to engage in organizational
decision-making, their autonomy as organizational actors, and ultimately their identity
as respected and important organizational members’ (p. 36). They also provide an
empirical investigation on such struggle over subjectivity and show how different practitioners – namely corporate management, middle management, and project engineers –
within the same organization may initiate discourse of their own to gain control and
maintain a viable identity.
We therefore define discourses on strategy work as communicative actions where
strategists give sense to the very concept of strategy, their strategizing activities, and
reflexively to themselves as subjects. As a result, these reflexive discourses participate in
the building of power position and legitimacy.
As such, based on a paradox perspective on strategy and strategizing, we argue that
strategists mobilize tensions and oppositions when depicting strategizing work, and in
doing so construct subjectivities for themselves and for others. This leads us to formulate
the following two empirical research questions: What conceptions of strategy are constituted through strategists’ discourses on their strategizing work? How do strategists
position themselves as subjects through these discursive constructions?
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Research Context and Design
As strategists’ reflexive discourse on strategy has paradoxically been less studied than
strategy discourse itself or organizational discourse, we aim to analyse what conceptions
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of strategy are built through the reflexive discourse of strategists and the implications that
these specific conceptions of strategy have on subjectivities, and more specifically on the
legitimacy of specific actors. Consistent with this approach, individual discourses are
analysed following the grounded theory techniques so that recurrent and shared themes
emerge. These shared units of analysis can be used to develop a representation of strategy
before highlighting differences in strategists’ conceptions of strategy as discursive
resources in the construction of their own identity and legitimacy.
Our assumption here is that discourses about strategy work are sense giving activities
that reflect different meanings held by different persons or groups, produce a sense of
truth, and eventually participate in the construction of specific subjectivities. Accordingly, our research design is consistent with a dualist view of discourse (Mantere and
Vaara, 2008), in which discourses are both influenced by social conditions and also
construct social reality.
Consistent with this perspective and the strategy-as-practice stream, we rely on
in-depth interviews with individuals from different private corporations who experience
strategizing activities, even if they do not have a formal strategic role.
Research Sample and Data Collection
Referring to Mintzberg’s typology of the five parts of an organization (Mintzberg, 1983),
we identify three types of formal roles related to strategy activities: the leader, the expert,
and the manager. The former is located in the ‘strategic apex’ and the latter (the
manager) comes from the middle line or the operating core and took part in one or more
strategic processes. Managers are characterized by their dependency to leaders for
decision-making. The expert is involved in strategizing through his/her specific technical
competencies (market analysis or financial engineering for example), often directed
towards the standardization of the strategy work. He/she may be the head of the strategy
department, an external consultant, or an investment banker. He/she is located outside
of the organization or in the technostructure (Mintzberg, 1983). This characterization is
coherent with many empirical works on strategizing, which demonstrated the importance of top (Lyles and Schwenck, 1992), middle (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997), and
operating managers (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1997).
Drawing from this categorization, we aimed at collecting data on the discourse about
strategy from a wide range of strategists. We follow Jarzabkowski et al. (2007) in considering that ‘through a broader definition of who is a strategist, incorporating lower-level
employees and external actors as well as top managers, we may be able to discern a wider
range of practices’ (p. 13). Based on variation sampling within the three types of strategists (Patton, 2002), the data collection relied on standardized open-ended interviews
with 84 strategists coming from 75 different firms and organizations. A first analysis led
us to retain 68 out of the 84 interviews conducted, as some of the interviewees mainly
focused their discourse on the strategy of their organization and not their own role in
strategic processes. These 68 interviews can be broken down in the following way: 33
leaders (49 per cent), 16 experts (24 per cent), and 19 managers (27 per cent). The
distribution between the 64 different firms is balanced, as it features a sample that
represents a variety of companies in terms of size and sector, ranging from small
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businesses of less than 100 employees (26 interviewees), to large companies of more than
2000 employees, such as Orange, Air France-KLM, L’Oreal, McKinsey, Carrefour, and
IKEA (18 interviewees). Twenty-four of the interviewees came from the industrial sector,
37 from the service sector, and seven from non-profit organizations.
The interviews commenced with a collection of information on strategists’ general
background and career path before addressing the following subjects: the formal role of
the interviewee; the activities related to his/her position and which among them are
strategic; the definition of strategizing activities; and the use of tools or heuristic models
for these activities. The informants were eventually asked to detail two or three processes
that they had experienced as strategic within their organization, focusing on the role they
played in the processes (see the Appendix for the interviewer’s guide). On average,
interviews lasted an hour and a half. They were recorded and transcribed in their
original language (mostly in French, others in English and Spanish).
Coding Process: The Emergence of Tensions
We began the analysis of the 68 interviews by following grounded theory techniques
based on constant comparison (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
An open coding of interviews was done in order to identify recurrent themes in the
actors’ discourse concerning their strategizing activities. The resulting categories were
refined as we progressed in our analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). According to
interpretative principles, our categorization was thus directly rooted in the discourse of
the interviewees. One of us began to code three interviews: one of a leader, one of an
expert, and one of a manager. The emerging categories were used by the second author
to double-code three other interviews. We then reviewed the points of disagreement and
discussed them until an agreement was reached. Nine codes emerged from this analysis:
the nature of strategy and strategizing; the solitude of the decision-making; the sharing of
strategic intelligence; the exogenous logic of strategizing (e.g., dependence on the environment); the place of endogenous issues in strategizing (e.g., prevalence of
organizational capabilities); the analytical dimension of strategizing; the intuitive dimension of strategizing; the thought process of strategizing; and the place of action and
experimentation in the strategic process.
Once the codes were identified, we coded the interviews. While we did not measure
the level of each code in each interview (for example, how much an individual uses
intuition in strategizing), we used a principle of shared concepts. For the first step of
analysis, we kept only the codes that were present in at least 80 per cent of the interviews.
The interviewees sometimes made precise references to a code (for example: ‘strategizing
is action’ (CEO, online retail)) or were less specific but still suggested a strong relationship
to a code (action, for example: ‘I have never worked in an office. I want to be on the field,
in shops, with clients or suppliers. That is where you think up strategies’ (CEO, retail)).
Of the nine codes, eight of the codes that emerged from the inductive content analysis
of the interviews were gathered into paradoxical pairs: solitude vs. sharing, exogenous vs.
endogenous-focused strategic activities, analysis vs. intuition, and thinking vs. action.
The ninth code refers to the explicit definition of strategy and strategizing proposed by
interviewees. These pairs constitute what we consider to be the ‘tensions’ that structure
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strategizing activities. The term ‘tension’ emerged from the empirical analysis: it is the
analysis of individual discourses that showed that interviewees used a tension-based
approach to define their strategizing activities. This term is congruent with the theory of
paradox proposed by Smith and Lewis (2011, p. 382).
In a second step, we refined our analysis by studying how strategists discursively
respond to these tensions. We specifically tried to locate resolution/acceptance modes of
response to tensions (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Smith and Lewis, 2011). This meant
that we sought verbatims in strategists’ discourses that clearly express a response to a
tension, using a dual categorization: acceptance or resolution. For example, if an individual said, ‘Strategy is action. I don’t have time to spend in meetings and committees to
discuss each theoretical possibility, I prefer action over discussion’ (CEO, telecommunications), we considered that this strategist was emphasizing action in the thinking–action
tension and using a resolution mode to cope with the tension. We were accordingly able
to propose a tension-based view of strategizing activities through which strategists position themselves and discursively build their legitimacy and their positions of power.
DISCURSIVE CONCEPTIONS OF STRATEGY AND STRATEGIZING
Two interrelated empirical questions drive this research: What conceptions of strategy
and strategizing emerge from strategists’ discourse, and how do strategists position
themselves in their discursive representation of strategizing? To address these questions,
we first conceptualized the structuring dimensions of strategizing that emerged from
strategists’ discourse. From an analytical distinction (transcendent vs. immanent modes
of strategizing) corresponding to a shift in interviewees’ definition of strategy, we argue
that strategizing can be conceptualized as the art of balancing four main tensions in
strategists’ discourse: the social tension, the focus tension, the cognitive tension, and the
time tension. Strategists position themselves by responding to these tensions, choosing
one side or both (resolution or acceptance of the paradox). Tensions are then viewed as
discursive resources for building identity and the positions of power. Table I details the
discursive response to tensions and provides illustrative quotes for each of these discursive
coping strategies.
In this section, we first present the discursive perspective on strategy, which emerges
from strategists’ discourse and intertwines two seemingly opposed conceptions of strategy: a ‘transcendent’ view and an ‘immanent’ view. We then highlight the discursive
construction of a tension based-view of strategizing activities and how strategists discursively mobilize contradictory pressures in constructing specific subjectivities.
A Discursive Construction of a Paradoxical Perspective on Strategy
When defining strategy, strategists seem to balance between two perspectives: what we
call a ‘transcendent’ view of strategy – based on analytical tools, competencies, and
deliberate intentions – and an ‘immanent’ view of strategy – grounded in daily activities,
speculation, opportunities, and the emergence of ‘unintended order’ (Chia and Holt,
2006, p. 636). The immanent view on strategy considers strategy as being constituted
through the flow of the experiences that are lived in daily activities, i.e. ‘practical coping’,
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Table I. Strategists’ discursive response to tensions
Tensions
Response mode
to tension
Dominant pole of the tension
Illustrative quotes
Social tension
Resolution
Solitude (transcendence)
‘There are some things that only a boss can take full responsibility for,
notably when there are risks to be taken’ (CEO, online retail)
‘The worst thing is when you are sure that you have the good idea but
the good people and your shareholders don’t accept your proposal.
You are alone in front of them’ (CEO, gadgets production)
‘There is no formal process, but I listen to every idea, wherever it
comes. I take time to speak with everyone in the firm. It is because
people are used to speaking with one another that good ideas can
emerge’ (CEO, medical material supply)
‘I could say that decisions are collective, but that it is not really true. I
generally think on my own, at night, or during holidays . . . To make
a good decision, you listen to people: collaborators, clients,
competitors, and even consultants!’ (Former CEO, telecom industry)
Sharing (immanence)
Focus tension
Acceptance
Both solitude/
sharing (paradox)
Resolution
Exogenous (transcendence)
Endogenous (immanence)
Cognitive
tension
Acceptance
Both exogenous/
endogenous (paradox)
Resolution
Analysis (transcendence)
Intuition (immanence)
Time tension
Acceptance
Both analysis/ intuition
(paradox)
Resolution
Thinking (transcendence)
Action (immanence)
Acceptance
Both thinking/ acting
(paradox)
‘The analysis of the environment is the first step in strategizing.
Understanding the environment is the first skill for a strategist, far
before knowing your organization’ (Commercial VP, banking)
‘In my position, I tend to focus on internal issues, because I know that
I have to find sponsors inside to get my ideas implemented’ (Internal
Consultant, car distribution)
‘That’s not enough to have the great idea. I know that the top
management feels concerned by clients first, but strategy is made by
people inside the organization and if you don’t understand that, you
can’t be a strategist. For me, strategizing starts with available
resources in the firm’ (Project Manager, aeronautics)
‘The approach consists of building a market around a product: you
need to know how to bring out the best in the product, how to
attract clients, how to give them the desire to touch, to smell’ (CEO,
cosmetics distribution)
‘We use many measure tools daily. Strategy is based on good ideas, but
these ideas must impact the performance of the firm. We mainly use
quantitative tools which allow comparisons of performance with our
competitors and market evolutions’ (Strategic Planning Officer,
retail)
‘There is little theory in strategizing for me. There is little theory, but I
use many qualitative and quantitative studies to make my opinion,
especially when the decision is about the new positioning of a
product or the launching of a new one. If I think a product is
interesting, I need to know what can be its potential on the market,
and for that, I need studies’ (Marketing Manager, cosmetics)
‘The main characteristic of a strategist is his ability to feel the business,
to be intuitive in the business’ (CEO, seniors housing)
‘It is not with technical skills that we succeed. Technical skills can be
learnt or bought. To be a good strategist, you need intuition,
distance, common sense’ (CEO, real estate investment)
‘With experience, one uses fewer and fewer methods and acts using
their gut’ ’ (Partnership Director, airline industry)
‘Strategizing needs time and thinking. We use tools, we meet people,
we read studies, and all of this takes time. Even if it can be long, we
try to lower the risks by thinking before acting’ (Associate Director,
consulting company)
‘Consultants often explain that you shouldn’t engage too soon in
action, they claim for status quo. I prefer action, even if I am wrong.
Strategists should always be acting’ (CEO, online retail)
‘It is difficult to distinguish between thinking and acting. In our sector,
things go on very fast. You just cannot seat and think while
competitors gain 5% of marketshare. Action and thinking are
intertwined, we think while acting’ (Technology Manager,
telecommunications industry)
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a view that is consistent with the strategy-as-practice stream. This labelling is inspired by
the work of Chia and Holt (2006) concerning the immanent nature of strategic intent.
The ‘transcendent’ discourse. Interviewees, independently from their formal role in the
organization, often propose a definition of strategy based on a SWOT-like approach:
Strategizing consists in identifying our problems, our weaknesses and our strengths for
different levels. It is an attempt to understand our opportunities. Then, we need to step
back to see what else we can do. Strategy is the art of development. (CEO, jewellery firm)
They may refer to some managerial literature (Peters, Sun Tsu, Kotler):
Defining strategy is a complex exercise. I think that the basis remains in Philip Kotler’s
definition of the 3 C’s rule: costs, customers and competitions. Strategic thinking is a
profession which consists in collecting the largest data on these three elements to
deduce which way the firm should go. (CEO, strategic consulting firm)
The organization/environment fit perspective on strategy is present in their discourse, but
what make choices strategic for them remains the potential consequences on the organization:
Important decisions are strategic. I think that decisions are strategic when failure is
catastrophic. (CEO, online florist)
In strategists’ discourse, strategy is linked to the ability to develop a vision of the future
environment and of the firm’s future positioning:
Strategizing consists in answering the following questions: considering what we are,
considering the environment, where should we go and where should we be in 20
years? (Innovation and Marketing VP, milk producer)
These three dimensions (a SWOT-like perspective, a large scope and vision) are the
foundations of discourse on strategy for most strategists. They implicitly or explicitly refer
to managerial literature on strategy, which keeps a large audience and explains in a
simple way many of the issues strategists deal with.
The ‘immanent’ discourse. Strategists also propose a different view of strategy, denying the
distinction between formulation and implementation:
Classical definitions lack the implementing part of strategy; I think strategy is an art of
execution. Moreover, strategy must be demystified. The butcher at the corner has a
strategy because he observes people in the neighbourhood, . . . and he adjusts his
choice of meats, the quality level, prices. Doing so, he thinks strategically, he does
strategy. We have to admit that strategizing is not an exercise you can afford to do only
once in 5 or 10 years. It is a daily exercise because the environment always changes.
(CEO, strategic consulting firm)
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Strategizing is thus described as an ongoing process through which the strategist continually adapts his/her choices and the organization to reach his/her vision:
Strategy is like impressionist painting: there are many little paint touches, and suddenly you can see the whole thing. The strategist is always painting and the big picture
comes afterwards. (CEO, cosmetics)
Strategy is presented as being hazardous and complex, depending on evolutions that
cannot be anticipated:
You can do strategic plans for three years, but you must know they will probably be
changed . . . Strategy nowadays is a daily work, a succession of tactical choices.
(Marketing VP, global services Europe)
The link between tactics and strategy is at the heart of strategists’ discourse about their
work, and many of them recognize that strategy is often written afterwards:
Do you know what strategy is? This is a tactic that succeeded. Afterwards, you just
claim that you had a good strategy. (Former CEO, cosmetics)
Preliminary discussion: transcendent versus immanent perspectives on strategy. Specific conceptions
of strategy emerged from the discourse of strategists who tended to propose their own
broad definitions of strategy. While these conceptions were both experienced on the
ground, they nonetheless gave way to two opposing perspectives on strategy that we can
relate to the two poles of a meta-tension that itself defines the concept of strategy. One,
namely the ‘transcendent perspective’, supposes that strategies can be found through
analytical competencies, tools, and deliberate intention. As for the other, called the
‘immanent perspective’, strategies are not discovered through analytical processes, but
rather are built through speculation and the emergence of unintended order. While the
transcendent perspective is based on analysis, long-term vision, and may be found in the
work of Porter or Ansoff, the immanent side of strategizing corresponds to a radically
different perspective. Consistent with the work of Mintzberg, Cyert, or March, this
perspective highlights the ongoing strategizing processes that are difficult to anticipate
and are continuously being adapted. While the former is analytical and transferable (as
decision precedes action), the latter is non-transmissible, constituted out of experience,
opportunistic, and related to local engagement.
As strategists define strategy with a tension between transcendent and immanent
approaches, the analysis of the discourses on strategizing activities permits us to go
further into this ‘meta tension’.
A Discursive Construction of a Tension-Based View of
Strategizing Activities
The analysis of discourse shows that strategizing is at the heart of four main tensions that
drive strategists’ discourse on their experience: the social tension, the focus tension, the
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cognitive tension, and the time tension. Strategists position themselves in choosing how
to discursively respond to tensions, either by explicitly focusing on one pole or by
simultaneously embracing two polar opposites.
The social tension: solitude vs. sharing in strategizing. When analysing the discourse on strategy
process, we discovered two themes that build an opposition: sharing versus solitude in
strategizing. We named the tension between sharing and solitude in strategizing ‘social
tension’ because it refers to the social relations that strategists develop (or not) in the
strategic process. This tension is closely related to the collective–individual debate, or the
relational–individual debate in strategy research (Chakravarthy and White, 2002;
Mantere and Whittington, 2008). Some strategists express that they experience solitude
in the strategy-making process: they think on their own, make decisions for the organization, and have to defend their choices in front of other organizational actors and
stakeholders. At the same time, interactions with other individuals and groups are
mentioned as a fundamental dimension of the process. Strategists share ideas and
practices, exchange points of view, challenge ideas, and consider that strategizing is a
collective activity. This sharing pole refers to a distributed and relational leadership on
strategizing and is congruent with an immanent perspective that promotes a relational
intelligence on strategizing.
Transcendent perspective: the solitude of decision-making. If sharing ideas, challenging
plans, and gathering data implies constant interaction with others, some strategists
remain alone when it comes to the consequences of strategic decisions:
In front of decision-making, you are alone in the world. (President, professional
broadcasting material)
This solitude is not strictly linked to the ability of making decisions for the organization.
Some managers in charge of strategic orientations express it as well:
I do not make decisions. That’s the strategic committee which decides. But I know that
if there were a problem afterwards, I would be identified as responsible for it. Even if
you don’t decide, you are seen as the strategist, especially when it goes wrong.
(Technology Manager, telecommunications)
The immanent perspective: the sharing of strategic intelligence. Simultaneously, strategists say that strategizing is not a lonesome activity. From data gathering to strategy
formulation, frequent contact is made with organizational members as well as with
outside actors in developing strategic thinking. Functional and middle-managers are at
the heart of this sharing practice:
Division managers have a deep knowledge of their activity, so they logically inform me
on the main evolutions in their sector, on emerging ideas. Good strategies come with
this intelligence sharing. (CEO, medical material supply)
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Most strategists refer to informal data gathering and discussions, and may tend to
minimize the role of formal processes on their choices, instead stressing informal contacts
inside and outside the organization:
It is much more important to know what your new or your old friend has to say about
your ideas than to present it to consultants: your old friend will challenge you, the
consulting firm will try to understand just in order to say that you have the good
intuition, but with complex and costly concepts. (CEO, food design)
Moreover, leaders explain that the relevant information often comes from lower-level
employees, who are deeply in contact with the external environment, particularly the
clients:
To make decisions when you are at the top, you need to know what is going on the
field. Every two weeks, sellers in our shops have to write a short note in which they
detail their results, with comments on competitors, on clients’ expectations, on what
they heard. For many years, I have read them all. . .. In our sector, the true strategic
treasury is the sellers: they know what works, why, and what the clients want. (CEO,
cosmetics)
Leaders may recognize that they do not know everything and that they need to work with
people who can fulfil their shortcomings:
I am not good with technology. My domains are the market and the clients. I have
always tried to hire people who could teach me something and I hope I taught them
a few things as well. A top manager, a strategist, cannot be on his own. One quality for
being a strategist is to surround oneself with the right people. (CEO, energy
production)
Managers also tend to emphasize social relations in strategizing, thereby promoting their
role in the strategy process:
Our company has been growing very rapidly. In these conditions, we need everyone
for strategizing: people from marketing, legal and technology departments. Managers
discuss, share ideas, nobody can say: ‘I had the good idea’. . . (Project Manager,
telecommunications)
A paradoxical perspective on the social tension. Strategists may also simultaneously
express being alone and sharing strategic intelligence. For instance, leaders may listen to
others and need to share information, but they may simultaneously feel solely responsible
for strategic orientations. In such cases, they discursively express a paradoxical perspective on social tension. Some strategists do not try to resolve this tension, as they view
strategizing as both a collective and a lonesome activity, based notably on the ability to
convince and negotiate:
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Making strategic decisions is essentially a matter of discussion and conviction. I discuss
with my colleagues and subordinates to think strategically, and I have to convince the
board that our ideas are the best. (Branch Manager, postal services)
Preliminary discussion: strategists’ responses to social tension. The social dimension of
strategic processes remains central to characterize and discriminate practitioners’ practices. In the process, leaders may simultaneously express solitude as well as the need to
work with others in order to make good choices. When managers express that they share
strategic thinking, they clearly highlight their social role and value their contribution to
the process. Experts may also stress this social tension, mainly through the necessity to
convince others. One explanation may lie in their position within the organization. Their
role is to help the one who pays them to take strategic decision, and as such, they are
intrinsically dedicated to other individuals.
The focus tension: exogenous vs. endogenous strategizing. As the distinction between inside and
outside organization issues in strategic thinking remains a means of structuring for
strategists, discourses on strategizing highlight a tension between an exogenous-based
view of strategy (in which competitors, clients, and market structure are dominant) and
an endogenous-based view of strategy (which emphasizes routines and values in strategy
decision making). We named this opposition between exogenous and endogenous
focuses the ‘focus tension’ in the strategy process, as it refers to the nature of dominant
elements that influence practitioners when describing their understanding of the
decision-making processes. The endogenous pole is close to the immanent perspective, as
it considers strategizing as being driven by internal values, organizational history, and
internal power issues. By contrast, the exogenous pole considers strategizing as being
constrained principally by external factors and the fit with organizational resources.
The transcendent perspective: the exogenous logic of strategizing. All three types of
strategists consider that the analysis of exogenous pressures and opportunities, such as
those driven by the market, are the heart of their activity. They must understand its
evolutions, clients’ needs, and competitors’ strategy:
Strategy relies on the analysis of the environment. A good strategist is one who
perfectly knows his customers and clients. (Production Manager, press)
This focus on the external environment in strategizing is present in most of the interviews, independently from the size of the firm, its sector, or the position of the strategist.
Three components of the external environment emerge from the analysis of verbatim.
At a micro-level, clients come first and their needs and wills are the foundations of
strategic thinking for many strategists:
Strategy consists in anticipating the clients’ needs. You have to be there for them.
(CEO, banking)
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The understanding of competitors’ strategy is the other important dimension of this
market-screening activity. Many strategists rely on benchmarking tools to adapt their
strategy and to position themselves in the competition:
Strategic thinking is based on benchmarking, the analysis of the environmental
context and of the competitors’ actions. (Commercial VP, banking)
At a macro-level, strategists try to anticipate the macro evolutions in the environment:
My goal as a strategist is to decide what we want to do and how we can do. You need
to have a good understanding of your environment and to be able to anticipate its
evolutions. (CEO, insurance)
The understanding of environmental trends must also balance long-term and short-term
issues and goals:
The first work in strategizing is to understand market trends. We adapt our strategy
and try to coordinate our long-term vision with short-term disturbances. (Strategy and
Competitive Intelligence VP, energy)
The immanent perspective: the place of endogenous issues in strategizing. When defining strategy, most strategists consider organization to be a central dimension of strategy.
What differentiates strategists is the stress they put on exogenous and/or endogenous
factors when making strategic decision.
However, some often consider that organizational dimensions of strategizing are
secondary in the process:
Strategizing is the art of making good choices. You need to measure the technological
environment, the market, the competitors. Then you look at financial and human
implications. (CEO, adhesive production)
This does not mean that organization is not important in strategizing, but in this
discourse, structure naturally follows strategy. Managers and experts may be more likely
to evoke organizational issues. This orientation of the strategizing process can be
explained by the necessity to integrate organizational characteristics to improve their
legitimacy and power in the process:
You can’t think the strategy without knowing exactly your environment and the way
your organization works. In my position, I tend to focus on internal issues, because I
know that I have to find sponsors inside to get my ideas implemented. (Internal
Consultant, car distribution)
The paradoxical perspective on the focus tension. Strategists may highlight the iterative
nature of the exogenous and endogenous focus. Similarly, some strategists stress the need
to build strategic flexibility and to continuously balance external pressures and internal
constraints:
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It’s of course a fragile equilibrium between what the company may be able to do and
what competitors do. (Marketing Director, office equipment)
They move beyond a mere synthesis (e.g., SWOT) in that they argue for being both
proactive and aligned with the market, thereby enhancing both internal resources and
external pressures:
The ways by which we consume are changing every day: we connect not only with
what is popular – we are also trend-setters. (General Consul, consumer goods)
Preliminary discussion: strategists’ responses to focus tension. Exogenous pressures and
opportunities are fundamental for all strategists; however, endogenous elements such as
organizational values are also emphasized. When managers and experts promote an
endogenous focus on strategizing, the former value their own activities and the scarcity
of internal resources as the main factors in the decision-making process, whereas the
latter search for an organizational legitimacy in order to push forward their ideas, as they
are not dedicated to and legitimated by the operational activities of the firm. In contrast,
when strategists’ discourse stresses external issues, their knowledge of the market and
clients may highlight and reinforce their control of the process.
The cognitive tension: analysis vs. intuition in strategizing. Education and research in strategic
management mainly focus on analytical approaches and tools. Strategists, and more
specifically leaders, oppose this rational and analytical perspective on strategy to intuition. Analysis refers to the use of analytical tools, financial models, and formalized
processes. On the contrary, intuition refers to the use of analogical reasoning, experience,
and feeling to make strategic choices. We labelled the tension between analysis and
intuition in strategizing as ‘cognitive’ due to the fact that it refers to the main cognitive
orientation that strategists evoke when they explain how they think strategically.
The transcendent perspective: analytical tools as a means of controlling and making
strategic decisions. Managers and experts claim that quantitative indicators, such as
turnover, profit margin, or profitability, are essential to strategic thinking. Some indicators are more oriented towards the specific business of the firm, and strategists may create
their own tools to control their competitive positioning. In claiming this, they promote
their internal strategic competencies:
We use many control and measure tools, especially the CSI for Customer Satisfaction
Index. Every 6 months, we ask 500 to 600 customers to fill in a questionnaire with
nearly 50 questions. This helps us to position ourselves in terms of services, products
and image. (Branch Manager, furniture production and distribution)
Moreover, some analytical approaches and strategic concepts are widely used by managers and experts, such as business modelling, SWOT analysis, value creation, or BCG
matrices. Benchmark is at the heart of the analytical side of strategic thinking:
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We define our goals after an in-depth analysis of our competitors: costs, technology,
quality. It is this benchmark that drives our strategy. (Production Manager, press)
For expert strategists, an analytical approach is central to defending the strategic orientations they recommend:
The basic principle in strategic consulting is to be irreproachable in your analysis.
(Consultant, consulting company)
The main strategic concepts have been widely disseminated into the managerial culture
and create a kind of strategic literacy that may enable managers to speak the same
language:
The firm needs to follow an efficient and realistic business model, which is based on
the structure of costs, on cost-effectiveness, and the perfect understanding of value
creation in each step of the production process. This is thanks to these analyses that
strategic decisions can be made, for a new activity launching, as well as for the
delocalization of CRM supports. (Subsidiary Manager, insurance)
The immanent perspective: the importance of intuition in strategic thinking. In contrast,
some strategists, notably leaders, evoke intuition as a mode of strategic thinking, opposing it to a rational perspective:
I like numbers, I like mathematics and finance, but I prefer working with feeling. You
have to trust in what you feel, that is very important. (CEO, web industry)
Leaders claim that they rely on experience, networking, and intuition to complete their
competitors’ profile and market trends, and most of them consider that analytical
approaches or consulting firms are not necessary to be a strategist and to take strategic
decisions:
I don’t need McKinsey or BCG to learn what I already know. (CEO, insurance)
Moreover, they often deny any use of analytical tools to highlight other sources of
strategic thinking:
I never use any particular tool. You just need 80% of common sense, a little bit of
vision and much conviction. . . . Strategizing is feeling. (CEO, internet retail)
Experience, learning, curiosity, and open-mindedness are some of the ingredients of the
recipe for developing strategizing capabilities:
You need to be interested in the sector, the job. You need to learn, and reading helps.
There are specialized diplomas, but it is not necessarily at school that you will learn the
most useful things for this job. The most useful things are travel, anecdotes, what you
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read, what you hear, what you catch, the knowledge you construct, your experience
. . . All of this comes from real life, not from books, and it requires some important
skills you can’t learn at school: altruism, to be in touch with others. (CEO, leisure
industry)
The paradoxical perspective on the cognitive tension. Some strategists do not separate
intuition from analysis, but rather intertwine the two, claiming that this enables them to
understand and to ‘see’ the big picture:
We need to have an accurate and wide-ranging eye. A strategist is someone who has
a very large capacity to catch and store data, and then to present the most magical
synthesis possible. This is what a good strategist looks like. . . . A good strategist has
synthesis, analysis, vision and forecast abilities. (Subsidiary Manager, insurance)
Intuition and analysis are intimately rooted in each other:
One needs to assimilate theory to feel how to act with a partner. (Partnerships
Director, airline industry)
Preliminary discussion: strategists’ responses to cognitive tension. Strategists who
emphasize analysis promote a professional perspective on strategy; strategizing activities
therefore rely on technical competences that one learns with time. By contrast, others,
notably leaders, clearly promote a discourse on intuition, positioning themselves in the
opposite pole of the cognitive tension. When firmly promoting an immanent perspective
on strategy, leaders mystify the strategizing process that cannot be precisely described in
a rational way. A ‘happy few’ are then able to share these strategic competencies of being
intuitive. Accordingly, a good strategist is not the one who explains strategic decisions,
but rather, the one who convinces.
The time tension: thinking vs. action. This tension describes the way strategists conceive the
balance between action and thinking. This tension focuses on the way strategists take (or
not) their time to deliberate when making a strategic decision and implementing it. We
named the opposition in strategists’ discourse between thinking and acting ‘time tension’,
as time is the variable that adjusts and constraints action phases and thinking phases in
the strategy process. In other words, time tension refers to the way strategists deal with
the urgency. Thinking is here defined in a global way – it includes all cognitive, social,
and analytical activities, from the identification of the issue to the deployment of the
strategy. Moreover, it is defined as time during which strategists think, deliberate, and
listen to others, discuss, bargain, learn, and read – it is the ‘free-for-strategy’ cognitive
activity. Action refers to the daily practices, the tests, and experimentations through
which strategy can be created and implemented. The interviewees oppose thinking to
action, and the main issue is the time sequence between these two sides of strategizing.
The transcendent perspective: thinking as a social time, prerequisite for action. Some
strategists consider that thinking phases are fundamental during the strategizing process.
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Thinking requires empathy, notably with the clients and more broadly with the
market. The ability to observe is another way to develop a better understanding of the
environment:
You take notes; you observe what is happening, how people work. (CEO, leisure
industry)
Thinking also means introspection: strategists think, often on their own, trying to be as
much objective as possible:
You must question yourself, you must stand back a bit, be critic. (CEO, online retail)
The immanent perspective: action, time hurrying, and experimentation in
strategizing. If strategists do not deny the importance of thinking, discussing, and formulating the strategic orientations, most of them claim that action is a fundamental
phase of strategizing:
There is no good strategy without execution. . . Strategies can’t be disconnected from
execution. (Subsidiary Manager, insurance)
Moreover, even if a clear vision is a necessity, strategists must continuously readjust their
actions and be very reactive to fit in:
Action is not only implementation. Action is not just the logical ending of the strategy
process, it constitutes strategizing, there is no good idea that has not been confronted
to reality. Our world has been constantly changing and a good idea one day may
become a very bad idea the day after. (CEO, retail)
Action is linked to change and evolution in strategists’ discourse. They often compare or
merge strategic action and change:
Strategy is change. The execution of strategy always generates changes, from small
operational changes to the complete reorientation of everything. (Investment VP, wine
retail)
Some strategists even emphasize action as the core of the strategist’s activity:
I act first, I think afterwards. I don’t like too much thinking. (CEO, online retail)
They may claim a philosophy of action:
I have a philosophy of action. When you have a choice to make, the worst is to not
decide. Making a bad decision can have consequences but most of the time you can
readjust. The worst thing is to stand back and wait. The worst decision is the one you
regret not to have made. (CEO, online printing)
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The paradoxical perspective on the time tension. Some strategists promote activities of
thinking while acting, or testify to a more complex iterative relationship between thinking
and acting:
One should not think for a long time. Actually, what is important is to think fast and
to take decision fast . . . Once one makes up his mind, one has to think how to make
and give sense to it so that this decision will be acceptable and accepted. (Chief
Information Officer, construction industry)
For strategists who deal with time tension in a paradoxical way, it is essential to combine
thinking and action, the ability to take risks, and the acceptance of uncertainty:
By nature, a firm is at the same time a vision, subject to its own execution and to luck.
(CEO, online banking)
Preliminary discussion: strategists’ responses to time tension. The time tension through
the arbitration between action and thinking is a fundamental issue for strategists. A
strategy-by-doing approach is consistent with the immanent perspective, and highlights
the role played by decision makers, essentially leaders. In contrast with this, when
strategists emphasize thinking, they legitimate the time spent before going into the
action. In these cases, those who provide support and advice for decision makers may be
central to the strategizing process.
DISCUSSION: STRATEGISTS’ SUBJECTIVITY THROUGH TENSIONS
Our results show that strategists position themselves by discursively constructing tensions
through the depiction of their strategizing work. Some of them choose one side over the
other, while others position themselves in both, thereby creating a paradox perspective
on strategizing that embraces both a ‘transcendent’ and an ‘immanent’ perspective on
strategy. This tension-based representation of strategy promotes an integrative perspective on strategy by simultaneously embracing traditional distinctions in this field. Moreover, such results highlight multiple strategists’ subjectivities within a paradox lens on
strategy as well as the underlying role of social prestige in strategists’ discourse on
strategy.
Strategizing: The Art of Balancing Tensions
Four tensions emerged from strategists’ discourse: the tension between ‘action’ and
‘thinking’ (time tension); the tension between ‘endogenous-focus’ and ‘exogenous-focus’
(focus tension); the tension between ‘intuition’ and ‘analysis’ (cognitive tension); and the
tension between ‘solitude’ and ‘sharing’ (social tension). These tensions may at times lead
to a paradox lens on strategy and strategizing, as one strategist may develop two poles of
a singular tension. This conceptualization combines a transcendent perspective on strategy work with an immanent approach to strategizing. While the former defines strategy
as a structured process where decision precedes action, the latter considers that strategy
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SHARING
EXOGENOUS
FOCUS
ACTION
ANALYSIS
INTUITION
ENDOGENOUS
FOCUS
THINKING
SOLITUDE
Social tension
Time tension
CogniƟve tension
Focus tension
Transcendent perspecƟve
Immanent perspecƟve
Figure 1. A paradox lens on strategy.
is built through speculative activities that are rationalized retrospectively. Figure 1,
inspired by Smith and Lewis (2011) using the ‘yin yang’ metaphor to represent a
paradox, details how strategists describe their strategizing activities through a paradox
lens of strategizing.
This representation of strategy built from strategists’ discourse on their strategizing
activities emerged from the empirical analysis.
Whilst none of these four tensions is new to strategy research (e.g., Bouchiki, 1998;
Bruch and Ghoshal, 2004; Mantere and Whittington, 2008), our main contribution here
is our empirical categorization (based on strategists’ discourses on strategizing work) of
the four tensions, which accounts for a paradox lens on strategy as well as the responses
that strategists offer to said tensions, i.e. strategizing as the art of balancing tensions.
While previous studies concerning strategy processes have opposed the two sides of
strategy processes (e.g., Chia and Holt, 2006), analysed a shift in the evolution of strategy
practices (e.g., Whittington et al., 2011), or distinguished between practices by considering the role played by different parts of the organization during strategic processes (e.g.,
Regnér, 2003), our argument is that the distinctions between the immanent and transcendent perspectives may be handled jointly. Further, these two strategizing approaches
may mutually constitute one another through a dualistic relationship, i.e. paradox (Smith
and Lewis, 2011). Following this perspective, transcendent and immanent views of
strategy are not mutually exclusive opposites, nor is one preferable to the other; rather,
they are two sides of the same coin. This dualistic nature has great potential to nurture
new theoretical developments and specific streams of research such as strategy-as© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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practice, which may seek to go beyond this dichotomy by adopting a multi-level and
empirically-based new paradigm on strategizing.
This contribution is consistent with the claim for sharpening a paradox lens on
organizing and strategizing to face complexity (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008; Poole and Van
de Ven, 1989; Quinn, 1988; Smith and Lewis, 2011). This research reveals that the
paradoxical nature of strategizing can be traced in the discourse of individuals who may
simultaneously evoke the different poles of the paradox. Each strategist may in turn
initiate a discourse of his/her own by promoting specific responses to different tensions.
The Mythicizing, Concretizing, and Dialogizing Subjectivities:
From Tensions to Social Positions in the Practice of Strategy
We analyse strategists’ subjectivity through the discursive resources they use to cope with
the tensions they face in their strategizing activities. Theoretically speaking, the tensionbased representation of strategizing leads to an infinite number of coping strategies,
depending on the ways that strategists embrace each tension simultaneously or position
themselves on the continuum connecting the two poles of each tension (see Figure 1).
These coping strategies may not only depend on the role structure, but may also rely on
other dimensions such as the type of strategic processes, the type of strategic decisions
managers have to make, their professional background, and so on. While previous
studies of strategists’ subjectivity have tended to link a particular kind of subjectivity to a
specific role group – such as top management teams (Laine and Vaara, 2007; Menz,
2012), strategic directors (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013), or middle management
(Balogun, 2003; Laine and Vaara, 2007; Mantere, 2008) – a tension-based representation of strategizing activities suggests that multiple discursive coping strategies for dealing
with tensions may co-exist.
Nonetheless, a discursive perspective allows us to highlight the specific conceptions of
strategy work that strengthen the identity and power of strategists, depending on their
role within the organization. Through their discourse concerning their own strategizing
activities, strategists may reinforce the representation of their role and power in the
strategy process (Laine and Vaara, 2007). Here, we discuss the specific response modes
(positioned mainly through the immanent or the transcendent pole of strategizing, or
embracing both) and their impact on strategists’ subjectivities, namely mythicizing
subjectivities, concretizing subjectivities, and dialogizing subjectivities.
Table I cross-tabulates the three subjectivities with the three roles distinguished in the
data collection process (leaders, experts, managers). This table highlights the link
between the position amongst tensions as well as the social valorization in the strategizing
process. The grey zones emphasize strategists’ subjectivities, which empower a specific
role group in strategizing activities.
A mythicizing subjectivity develops when the dominant poles of tensions in strategists’
discourse refer mainly to the immanent perspective (notably action, intuition, and endogenous). In this, strategists discursively describe their practice through words and concepts
such as ‘great idea’, ‘to feel the business’, or ‘common sense’; they depict strategizing as
an informal activity, driven by their experience and their intuition. By doing so, strategists highlight non-analytical, non-transmissible, and subjective dimensions of strategy.
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By denying the transcendental dimensions of strategy, strategists emphasize their personal characteristics in depicting their strategizing activities, through their ability to be
empathic and to develop transgressive and disruptive thinking based on intuition. Their
ability to strategize is therefore entirely personal, as it cannot be broken down into
different qualities or characteristics and then transferred. They do not rely on tools and
models, but rather promote a ‘strategy-by-doing’ way of strategizing that cannot be
transferred nor precisely explained. As such, this subjectivity mythicizes the strategist as
an actor with innate and non-transferable competencies. When developed by leaders, the
mythicizing subjectivity promotes action and intuitive side of the strategic process. As
strategizing activities cannot be disconnected from their personal essence, the rules and
practices of strategizing do not need to be transparent or concrete. By combining an
intimate understanding of the situation with their decision-making power, leaders glorify
themselves in developing this subjectivity. In accordance with the work of Mantere and
Vaara (2008) on participation in strategy, this mythicizing subjectivity developed by
leaders may be related to what the authors label as ‘mystification’ strategic discourse (in
which strategy is ‘preached’ to others) or even to ‘disciplining’ strategic discourse (in
which the role of other actors is to follow the guidelines and orders coming from the top).
As such, this subjectivity is particularly consistent with the valorization of the social
position of leaders. Nonetheless, experts and managers may also develop this subjectivity
for their own. In such cases, they promote their ability to influence the decision maker,
their visionary competence, and their novel ways of thinking; they may even play a role
close to that of a guru.
Conversely, some strategists may stress the transcendental perspective on strategy
(solitude, thinking, analysis, and exogenous focus), in which their expertise cannot be
denied. Words and phrases such as ‘tools’, ‘long time’, ‘thinking’, and ‘skill’ may then be
used when strategists depict their activities. Through this specific discursive coping
strategy, they develop a concretizing subjectivity, in which the mastering of specific techniques and analytical activities such as external and internal diagnosis, SWOT analysis,
and financial performance measures are deemed crucial. As such, this subjectivity makes
the strategizing activities concrete, giving tangible form to strategy processes through
techniques, models, and tools. As a consequence, the concretizing subjectivity highlights
strategists that are able to master the strategic tools and methods of analysis, enabling
them to provide a precise understanding of a competitive situation and to thereby give
input about the definition and control of a strategy policy. Hence, the concretizing
subjectivity is particularly congruent with the social valorization of the expert. When
experts describe the strategizing process as being founded on studies, figures, quantitative
data, or specific tools, they indirectly defend their professional competencies in
strategizing activities – their expert power – and as such, their own legitimacy as
strategists. These experts use models, analysis, and quantitative tools in order to stress a
logical argumentation that enables the decision maker to choose between different
strategic options. By developing this subjectivity, experts present themselves as key
figures in the strategic process. Referring to the work of Jarzabkowski (2008) and
Mantere and Vaara (2008), this subjectivity is likely to be developed by experts when
strategic processes are founded on centralized systems that detail a set of rules to be
followed. Leaders and managers may also develop a technical dimension of their
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S. Dameron and C. Torset
subjectification tendencies. In our empirical analysis, leaders may build a concretizing
subjectivity in highlighting their ability to structure a formal strategic decision process,
long-term planning, reporting systems, and their own knowledge of the competitive
environment and products. Furthermore, strategists develop a concretizing subjectivity
when they promote their fine-tuned knowledge of clients and customers as being crucial
to making strategic decisions.
A dialogizing subjectivity is developed when the immanent and transcendent view of
strategizing work are simultaneously embraced in strategists’ discourse. In such cases,
strategists’ subjectification tendency is based on paradoxical dimensions. In our analysis,
some strategists’ reflexive discourse highlights the bargaining abilities they use to convince other actors (combining solitude and sharing), the iterative nature of the process
between endogenous and exogenous focuses, ‘thinking while acting’ activities, and intuition rooted in analysis. These strategists depict strategizing as an iterative and
co-constructed process that enables the wide participation of managers, using phrases
and verbs such as ‘difficult to distinguish’, ‘build around’, and coordinating conjunctions
that permit them to think of the two poles of a same tension simultaneously. As such,
managers who develop a dialogizing subjectivity particularly enhance their role in the
collective parts of the strategizing process, highlighting their boundary-spanning position
(Regnér, 2003) and their ability to champion strategic processes (Floyd and Wooldridge,
1997; Nonaka, 1988). A ‘self-actualized’ and ‘dialogization’ discourse within the organization (Mantere and Vaara, 2008), which makes strategizing a bargained process, will be
consistent with managers’ construction of a dialogizing subjectivity. Conversely, strategic
discourses within an organization that impedes participation in strategy for these same
managers may generate conflict regarding subjectivity with other key actors in the
strategic processes (Laine and Vaara, 2007). In such cases, managers developing a
dialogizing subjectivity may tend to produce alternative strategic discourses that enhance
their self-identity (Laine and Vaara, 2007) as well as to promote an active engagement in
the strategy process (Mantere and Vaara, 2008). Leaders and experts may also develop
a dialogizing subjectivity, therefore enhancing their ability to build and lead networks of
informative actors (leaders) and to find sponsors to develop their ideas (experts).
These three subjectification tendencies (mythicizing, concretizing, dialogizing) must
be understood as discursive constructions. They may be developed by different strategic
actors, even if each subjectivity is more congruent with the position of power and
legitimacy of a specific role group (see the bold type in Table II).
Similarly, our study contributes to the debate concerning strategists’ subjectivities by
proposing a lens that permits the coexistence of multiple forms of subjectivities, depending on the discursive coping strategies used in response to tensions. Strategists may
‘mobilize’ tensions by paradoxically and simultaneously embracing the two poles of
a specific tension, or they may ‘position’ themselves on a continuum linking the two
poles of tension without necessarily expressing the whole paradox (the mythicizing and
the concretizing subjectivities being at the two opposite sides of the tensions). Figure 1
can be seen then as a tool for positioning strategists depending on their present discursive
coping strategies for each tension. As such, this positioning may change depending on
many variables, such as the specific strategic context, the experience, or the type of
decision.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
Resolution by the
promotion of the immanent
side of strategizing
Resolution by the
promotion of the
transcendent side of
strategizing
Acceptance by the
representation of
strategizing as a paradoxical
activity
Mythicizing
subjectivity
Concretizing
subjectivity
Dialogizing
subjectivity
Managers see themselves
as influential actors able
to convince sponsors of
their ideas
Managers promote their
fine-tuned knowledge of
clients and customers as
being necessary for
decision making
Managers put stress
on the social process
that enables us to
champion strategies
Experts promote
themselves as gurus
influencing strategic
decision makers
Experts put stress on
mastering tools and
techniques in order to
provide a unique
analysis of a situation
Experts insists on their
relational ability to
mobilize networks
Leaders put stress on
their personal
essence and their
visionary ability in
strategizing
Leaders insist on the
necessity of gaining an
understanding of the
environment and
top-down decision
processes
Leaders promote their
roles as arbitrators and
animators of strategic
processes
Informal activity, driven
by experience, intuition,
action, and ability to
influence
Founded on expertise,
adaptation to external
constraints, and
technologies
Complex and systemic
activity based on social
relations
The manager as strategic actor
The expert as strategic actor
The leader as strategic actor
General view of strategizing
Note: Bold type indicates a high level of congruency of the subjectivity with the position of power and legitimacy of a specific role group.
Main responses to tensions
Subjectivity
Table II. Strategists’ subjectivities through specific discursive responses to tensions
Towards a Paradox Lens on Strategy
315
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S. Dameron and C. Torset
Switching from the analysis of the discourse of strategy to the study of the reflexive
discourse on strategizing activities, this research extends the work of Knights and Morgan
(1991) and more recent research on participation in strategy (Laine and Vaara, 2007;
Mantere and Vaara, 2008) by highlighting the role played by tensions and paradoxes as
discursive resources that enable practitioners to enhance their specific social agency.
Contributions and Implications for Research
Research on strategy has raised many distinctions, oppositions, and disjunctions, and
embracing these oppositions will be a major challenge if we wish to deal with complexity
(Quinn, 1988; Smith and Lewis, 2011). In this paper, we frame a paradox lens on
strategy and strategizing as the art of balancing tensions, and tensions as resources that
strategists mobilize in gaining legitimacy and building subjectivity.
Our contribution in this paper is therefore threefold. First, by exploring what strategists say about their strategy work, we propose a paradox lens on strategy that embraces
two opposing views on strategic processes. This allowed us to move past the dichotomies
and oppositions, thereby closing a gap in the literature on strategy. In doing so, we
effectively considered the complexity of strategy work and subsequently call for a more
integrative perspective on the nature of strategy work. This contribution may be
extended to strategy education by promoting education in which participants are evaluated by their ability to cope with paradoxical tensions (Mantere and Whittington, 2008).
Second, this research draws both on the seminal work of Knights and Morgan (1991) and
on more recent research concerning strategists’ subjectivity (e.g., Laine and Vaara, 2007;
Mantere and Vaara, 2008; Samra-Fredericks, 2005), extending such work by introducing oppositions and paradoxes as discursive resources through which different strategists
initiate discourse of their own in order to enhance their specific identity. Third, while
previous studies tend to characterize the discourse of different types of strategists as they
carry out strategic practices, this research provides a theoretical lens that highlights
multiple coping strategies used to deal with tensions and build strategists’ social agency.
This contribution is consistent with the promotion of the analysis of individual strategists’
potential agency, beyond their role position.
The findings from this study offer opportunities for future research. We adopted an
inductive and interpretative approach in order to analyse strategists’ discourse. In doing
so, we proposed an alternative perspective on discourse that is not entirely embedded in
the organizational discourse studies tradition and that does not correspond to an
organizational discourse analysis, as Grant and Iedema (2005) have distinguished. We
hold that in order to characterize contemporary strategizing, it is necessary to go further
and to analyse how individual discourses from different strategists (and different organizations) may construct a discourse of strategy that is in fact a body of knowledge. The
four dimensions of strategy discourse highlighted by Paroutis and Heracleous (2013) –
functional, contextual, identity, and metaphorical – may enable further research to
elaborate our tension-based view of strategy. A further limitation resides in the
contextualization of the data: we analysed interviews from a large sample of strategists
and could therefore not take contextual data into account, due to editorial limitations.
That said, we can reasonably assume that analyses of the sector, firm size, and personal
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
Towards a Paradox Lens on Strategy
317
characteristics such as experience or education would largely refine our results on
subjectivity. This contextualization may even be extended to consider how strategists’
use of different discursive resources to articulate their activities is contingent on their
audience. Further research might address this issue by taking a contingent approach to
how strategists position themselves in relation to tensions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the associate editor, Joep Cornelissen, the guest editors, especially Saku Mantere, as
well as the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback, which was critical in this paper’s
development. We are equally grateful to students and colleagues for their help and comments, particularly
Duncan Angwin, Lionel Garreau, Amaury Grimand, Laura d’Hont, Marc Kohlbry, Ann Langley, and
Philippe Mouricou, who each provided us with valuable input at different stages of this paper’s evolution. We
would also like to thank the seminar participants at Paris Dauphine University, at the AIMS conference, and
at the SMS conference for their insight. A previous version of this paper was a finalist for the 2009 SMS Best
Paper Award for Practical Implications. An earlier and less-rendered version of this paper was published in
French in Revue Française de Gestion, under the title ‘Les stratèges face à la stratégie: tensions et pratiques’
(Dameron and Torset, 2012).
APPENDIX: INTERVIEWER’S GUIDE
1. Interviewee’s background:
• Academic background
• Professional experience
2. Interviewee’s present situation:
• Presentation of the organization
• Function and responsibilities
3. Interviewee’s definition of strategy
4. Interviewee’s activities as a strategist
5. Examples of strategic activities performed
6. Interviewee’s relations with others as a strategist
7. Description of the strategic process
8. Tools used for strategizing
9. Qualities needed to be a good strategist
10. Agenda of a strategist
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