Marine and Safety (Maritime Incidents) Regulations 2007
INVESTIGATION INTO A “CLOSE QUARTERS”
SITUATION BETWEEN THE HIGH SPEED
PASSENGER VESSELS
‘ATTITUDE’ AND ‘SILVER GULL’
IN THE VICINITY OF BLACK HEAD NEAR CAPE PILLAR ON
THE SOUTH EAST COAST OF TASMANIA
3rd MARCH 2012
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
page
3
SUMMARY
page
4
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
page
5
THE VESSEL ‘ATTITUDE’
page
6
THE VESSEL ‘SILVER GULL’
page
7
NARRATIVE
page
8
COMMENTS
page
9 & 10
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
page
11 & 12
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FOREWORD
Investigations into maritime incidents occurring within the jurisdiction of Marine and Safety
Tasmania (MAST) are conducted in accordance with Part 3 of the Marine and Safety
(Maritime Incidents) Regulations 2007.
Investigation reports are endorsed by the Board of MAST prior to publication. It is MAST
policy to publish investigation reports to increase awareness of maritime incidents and
improve safety at sea.
Copies of this report can be obtained from:
Marine and Safety Tasmania
5 Franklin Wharf
Hobart 7000
www.mast.tas.gov.au (Publications)
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SUMMARY
On Saturday the 3rd of March 2012 the high speed passenger vessel ‘Attitude’ was navigating
to pass between a small island and Black Head when, it is alleged, a similar type of vessel
named ‘Silver Gull’ overtook the ‘Attitude’ on her starboard side and then altered course in
front of her and reduced speed. This action by ‘Silver Gull’ caused the skipper of ‘Attitude’
to alter course to port in order to prevent a collision. There were 23 passengers on board
‘Attitude’ and 13 passengers on board ‘Silver Gull’.
Once ‘Attitude’ had completed her trip, it was the decision of the skipper to complete a
Marine and Safety Tasmania (MaST) incident report as, in his opinion, a “close quarters”
situation had occurred between ‘Attitude’ and ‘Silver Gull’.
There was no damage to either vessel and no passengers suffered injury during the incident.
Once the incident report was received by MaST it was decided that the alleged “close
quarters” incident should be formally investigated and an investigator was appointed.
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SOURCES OF INFORMATION
•
Incident Report from the Skipper of ‘Attitude’.
•
Personal interviews with:
The Skipper of ‘Attitude’ on 22nd March 2012.
The crew person of ‘Attitude’ on 12th April 2012
The Skipper of ‘Silver Gull’ on 17th April 2012
The crew person of ‘Silver Gull’ on 16th April 2012
The owner of ‘Silver Gull’ on 20th March 2012
•
Phone interviews with:
5 passengers onboard ‘Attitude’ at the time of the incident.
3 passengers onboard ‘Silver Gull’ at the time of the incident.
•
Safety Management Plans for ‘Attitude’ & ‘Silver Gull’.
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DETAILS OF HIGH SPEED PASSENGER VESSEL “ATTITUDE”
Make/design:
Length:
Beam:
Draft:
Engines:
Hull materials:
Superstructure:
Year built:
Naiad 14
13.44m
4.2m
1.8m
Four 350hp Yamaha petrol outboards.
Aluminium monohull with rubberised inflatable side pontoons.
Aluminium framing covered with waterproof vinyl “roofing”.
2009
Survey status:
1C for 48 passengers and 2 crew up to 30 nautical miles offshore.
Crew qualification requirements:
Skipper:
Master 5 and Marine Engine Driver 3.
Crew:
Valid ‘Elements of Shipboard Safety’ and Senior First Aid certificates.
The vessel layout is a single deck with raised passenger seats in the after part. The helm
position is approximately two thirds of the way aft and helming is carried out from a standing
position.
Instrumentation consists of:
Four individual engine control levers, magnetic compass, echo sounder, G.P.S. linked to a
chart plotter with a ‘daylight’ screen giving position and course and speed over the ground.
Communication is by V.H.F. radio and mobile phone.
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DETAILS OF HIGH SPEED PASSENGER VESSEL “SILVER
GULL”
Make/design:
Length:
Beam:
Draft:
Engines:
Hull materials:
Superstructure:
Year built:
Naiad 12.5
11.99m
4.0m
1.2m
Two 205kw petrol outboards.
Aluminium monohull with rubberised inflatable side pontoons.
Aluminium framing covered with semi-rigid “roofing”.
2007
Survey status:
1C (Restricted) for 45 passengers and 2 crew up to 15 nautical miles
offshore.
Crew qualification requirements:
Skipper:
Crew:
Full Coxswain.
Valid ‘Elements of Shipboard Safety’ and Senior First Aid certificates.
The vessel layout is a single deck with raised passenger seats in the after part. The helm
position is approximately two thirds of the way aft and helming is carried out from a standing
position.
Instrumentation consists of:
Individual engine control levers, magnetic compass, echo sounder, G.P.S. linked to a chart
plotter with a ‘daylight’ screen giving position and course and speed over the ground.
Communication is by V.H.F. radio and mobile phone.
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NARRATIVE
On Saturday the 3rd of March 2012 the high speed passenger vessels ‘Attitude’ and ‘Silver
Gull’ departed from the public jetty at Pirates Bay on the lower east coast of Tasmania. The
time was approximately 1000 hrs and the length of each vessel’s cruise was approximately 3
hours. There were 23 passengers on board ‘Attitude’ and 13 passengers on board ‘Silver
Gull’, in addition, each vessel carried a skipper and one deckhand.
While each vessel has its own designated tourist cruise, they each visit approximately the
same points of interest and may often be in sight of each other during the cruise period. At
approximately 1214, the ‘Attitude’ was travelling in a north-westerly direction in order to
pass between Black Head and a small off-lying island when her course converged with that of
the ‘Silver Gull’ which was on her starboard side. The ‘Silver Gull’ passed ahead of the
‘Attitude’ and transited the passage first. The incident report by the skipper of the ‘Attitude’
read as follows:
“MV Attitude was heading 315 deg T (approx) at 22-24 knots. We were about to pass behind
an island off Black Head when we were overtaken on starboard side. The ‘Silver Gull’ was
travelling at close to 30 knots and passed between us and the cliffs to get through the gap of
the island first. ‘Silver Gull’ then once in front of us turned sharply to starboard causing
‘Attitude’ to take evasive action to port to avoid a collision.”
Note: In the report, a similar vessel ‘Shearwater’, owned by the same company, was named
as the overtaking vessel, however it was agreed by both parties that it was in fact the ‘Silver
Gull’ and the above incident report has been changed to reflect this.
Following the incident, both vessels continued with their planned cruise.
As stated in the Summary, no passengers suffered any injury during this incident and there
was no damage to either vessel.
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COMMENTS
There are 9 high speed craft similar to ‘Attitude’ and ‘Silver Gull’ operating in the coastal
waters of south eastern Tasmania. All operations are approximately the same whereby
passengers are taken to view interesting areas and wildlife and passages between these areas
is usually carried out at reasonably high speeds averaging around 25 knots. In all cases the
skipper has to hold a certificate of competency as required under the MAST issued ‘Manning
Determination’ for the vessel. In addition the crew person also has to have completed an
‘Elements of Shipboard Safety’ course and hold a current Workplace Level 2 First Aid
certificate.
Marine and Safety Tasmania requires all operators of passenger carrying vessels to comply
with a Safety Management Plan (SMP). These plans require the assessment of risks relating
to the particular vessel, its operations and also the training and qualifications of the crew. In
fact, most SMPs for vessels of this size will usually be a document of some 20 pages.
(Example SMPs are available from MAST if required)
With regard to the SMP requirements for ‘Attitude’ and ‘Silver Gull’, the crew qualifications
and safety requirements for the day in question were complied with and the SMP certificates
of compliance were current, as were the certificates of survey for each vessel.
In the incident report, it was stated that the weather on the day was a light north-easterly wind
with calm seas and good visibility.
Following the initial investigations of this incident, the Safety Management Plans for the
vessels have been carefully reviewed and it is considered that some changes may need to be
made in order to try and prevent a similar type of incident occurring in the future.
During the various interviews, the following points and information were forthcoming:
•
‘Attitude’ passenger information and comments – the 23 passengers were in 11 groups
of 1, 2 or 3 persons and of the 11 groups, 6 provided phone contact details. Of these 6
phone numbers 5 were able to be contacted; without exception all the passengers
talked to by the investigator remembered the incident and all expressed some concern
about the action of the ‘Silver Gull’. Comments such as: “unusual action”,
“aggressive”, “a bit close”, “smart alec” “out of line”, “unwise manoeuvre”, “trying to
race us”, were made. However none of the passengers thought they were in danger
during the incident.
Possibly the greatest and most useful piece of information provided to the investigator
was a short piece of video which showed almost the whole incident and was taken by
a passenger seated in one of the front seats of the ‘Attitude’.
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•
Crew person on ‘Attitude’ – this person commented that he noticed a lot of the
passengers looked enquiringly towards himself or the skipper during the incident and
he commented that the ‘Attitude’ was affected by the wash of the ‘Silver Gull’ as she
passed ahead of ‘Attitude’ and this is borne out by the video. He also stated that the
skipper altered course to port once the transit between the small island and the
headland had been completed and leaving the ‘Silver Gull’ on their starboard side.
•
‘Silver Gull’ passenger information and comments – the 13 passengers were in 7
groups of 1, 2 or 3 persons and of the 7 groups, 4 had provided phone numbers. Of
these 4 phone numbers, three were able to be contacted. One contact could not
remember the incident at all and the other two felt that the distance between the two
vessels was sufficiently safe and of no concern.
•
Crew person on ‘Silver Gull’ - this person stated that he could not recall a “close
quarters” situation with the ‘Attitude’ and that it was general practice for the two
boats to avoid being in the same area as one another whenever possible.
•
Skipper of ‘Silver Gull’ comments- he stated that he was on passage along the
shoreline towards the gap between the small island and the shore when he noticed the
‘Attitude’ heading from offshore towards the same passage. He confirmed that he
transited the passage ahead of ‘Attitude’ and initially altered to port and then sharply
to starboard and at the same time reducing speed. He stated that, in his opinion, he
was not overtaking but maintaining his course and speed while following the inshore
coastline.
•
VHF Radio Communications – During interviews with the skippers and crew persons
on both vessels it became evident that, for some reason, it is normal practice not to
communicate intentions by radio or, in fact, to communicate at all.
The collision regulation relating to overtaking vessels reads as follows:
Rule 13 (Overtaking) of the ‘International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea’
(Colregs) states:
(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules of Part B, Sections I and II, any
vessel overtaking any other shall keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken.
(b) A vessel shall be deemed to be overtaking when coming up with another vessel from
a direction more than 22.5 degrees abaft her beam, that is, in such a position with
reference to the vessel she is overtaking, that at night she would be able to see only
the stern light of that vessel but neither of her sidelights.
(c) When a vessel is in doubt as to whether she is overtaking another, she shall assume
that this is the case and act accordingly.
(d) Any subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two vessels shall not make the
overtaking vessel a crossing vessel within the meaning of these Rules or relieve her of
the duty of keeping clear of the overtaken vessel until she is finally past and clear.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The high speed vessels ‘Attitude’ and ‘Silver Gull’ their purpose and operation.
Overall, the operation of the vessels is for the entertainment of tourists in order to show the
uniqueness of the Tasmanian environment, in this case the south-east coast and also provide a
‘thrill’ factor of travelling at relatively high speeds. However, it is the responsibility of the
operators, skippers and crew to ensure that the requirements of the Safety Management Plans
are followed and adhered to and that the safe navigation of the vessel is planned and carried
out at all times. Furthermore, the safety and comfort of all passengers on the vessels is of
paramount importance.
In this particular incident, it is the opinion of the investigator, after considering all the
available information, in particular the close perusal of the video of the incident, that the
action of the skipper of the ‘Silver Gull’ was imprudent and entirely avoidable. This opinion
is based on the video which shows that the speed of the ‘Silver Gull’ was greater than the
‘Attitude’ as the distance between the two vessels obviously increased as the ‘Silver Gull’
passed and drew ahead of ‘Attitude’ and passed between the island and the main shoreline. It
should, however, be borne in mind that if the skipper of ‘Attitude’ was concerned about the
situation, he should have taken the precaution of reducing speed to avoid any ‘close quarters’
situation. Also, the skipper of the ‘Attitude’, in his incident report, suggests that the action of
the skipper of ‘Silver Gull’ necessitated him to take evasive action to port to avoid a
collision. However, the video shows that the alteration to port was primarily necessary for
navigational reasons and at the time of the course alteration the ‘Silver Gull’ was altering
course to starboard and reducing speed.
While it is not possible to directly determine if an overtaking situation occurred within the
meaning of the ‘Colregs’, to navigate a vessel at high speed in close proximity to another
vessel and whilst also being close to shore hazards, shows disregard for the safety of all
concerned and was unnecessary. A more prudent action, by either skipper, should have been
to reduce speed and to communicate by VHF radio in an effort to agree which vessel would
transit first and for the other to maintain a safe distance.
Recommendations:
1. OPERATIONAL CO-OPERATION - Notwithstanding the obvious commercial
competition between the operators of the two vessels in question, the commercial
operations manager for Marine and Safety Tasmania is to communicate with the
senior managers of both operations. The purpose of this communication being to
reach agreement whereby operational schedules can be drawn up so each vessel is not
visiting the same points of interest at the same time. This type of agreement is in
operation in the port of Strahan and is commercially viable for each operator in that
port.
If such an agreement cannot be reached, then a separation distance of at least 200
metres should be required when these types of vessels are operating at high speed.
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2. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS – The Safety Management Plans (SMPs) be amended
for both vessels, requiring that, in instances where similar types of high speed vessel
are operating in close proximity to one another then VHF radio communications be
established, on an agreed channel, in order to avoid ‘close quarters’ situations. This
recommendation to also be discussed between MaST and the operators and a suitable
addition made to the Safety Management Plans.
3. RECORDING OF PASSENGER CONTACT INFORMATION - From the passenger
information provided to the investigator, only a little over 50% recorded contact
telephone numbers. While it is acknowledged that many visitors are from overseas
and Australian phone numbers may not be available, it is considered that both
operators should review their processes in regard to the recording of passenger contact
information.
4. OPERATIONAL SAFETY ‘SILVER GULL’ and ‘ATTITUDE’ – As mentioned
earlier in this report, it is not possible for the investigator to categorically determine
that a breach of Rule 13 of the ‘Colregs’ occurred. It is therefore recommended that
the operators of both the ‘Silver Gull’ and ‘Attitude’ meet with their seagoing staff
and discuss the findings of this report. These discussions to be used in an effort to
determine a satisfactory outcome with regard to operational safety and how to prevent
a similar incident occurring in the future. The outcomes and decisions of these
meetings to be documented and forwarded to the Commercial Manager of Marine and
Safety Tasmania for attachment to the Safety Management Plan of the vessels.
5. PROMULGATION OF THIS REPORT – As stated earlier, there are nine vessels of
this type being operated by five companies in south-east Tasmania. It is recommended
that Marine and Safety Tasmania communicate with these companies in order to draw
their attention to the circumstances of this particular incident and the need for due
diligence when vessels are operating at high speed.
*********************
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