The impact of adopting e-government on reduce administrative corruption: Empirical
evidence from Kuwait’s public sector
Dr.Ahmad AL-Hussaini
Assistant professor
Public authority of applied education and training
Collage of business
[email protected]
Dr.Naser AL-Mutairi
Assistant professor
Public authority of applied education and training
Collage of business
Contact author
Contact number : +(956) 96666514
[email protected]
Dr.Shebiab AL-Shammeri
Assistant professor
Public authority of applied education and training
Collage of business
[email protected]
1
Abstract
The importance of this study comes from the importance of the subject. Many countries, and
especially Kuwait, suffer more or less from the problem of administrative corruption, which
affects different aspects of life in the state’s social, economic and political corruption. It
hinders development and destroys institutions, disrupts development and reduces the chance
of attracting investment into the country. Also, it helps to drain capital from state enterprises
abroad, which disrupts and destroys the state’s plans to become a financial centre. The goal
for the study is to answer the main question of e-government limits on administrative
corruption. The study found that a bias and favouritism for groups and individuals, which are
instrumental in the forefront of the prevalent forms of corruption in government, firmly agree
with the nature of Kuwaiti society. Where previous studies have found that a tribal society
configures the features and patterns of corruption, this study has found that the transition to egovernment places limits on the intervention of individuals. Thus it reduces, if not eliminates,
many kinds of corruption related to individual emotion through favouritism, nepotism and
bribery.
Keywords: corruption, e-government, and data, and accountability, discretion
2
Introduction
Distribution of power is essential to democratic regimes. And the absence of this condition
makes the governmental structure vulnerable to exploitation and an abuse of public power for
personal gain. In this study, we argue that information and communication technology (egovernment) relating to government operations and services are considered tools to reduce
corruption because it is a redistribution of official authority granted to public servants.
However, due to the lack of data that is accurate and targeted to detect the impact of egovernment initiatives on corruption, we hope this will provide research insight into some
aspects of the problem and stimulate international agencies to collect data to yield more
specific results.
Formal students have shown that inefficient economic factors, such as political and social,
can lead to corrupt activities. And that any of these factors provide the basics needed to
complete numerous studies and accurately determine the desired levels, as well as the
circumstances in which corruption occurs. Through this study’s statistical analysis, the
researchers try to understand whether new technologies, such as the Internet, in the form of egovernment portals can reduce the incidence of corruption.
The community has known the problem of corruption for a long time and there has been
much effort to try to stop it. In 1996, Eigen’s study acknowledged the negative effects of
corruption and the efforts taken by the international community (at the time) in an attempt to
reduce them (Eigen, 1996). A study reward by Kaufmann from the World Bank (2006)
showed that nearly $1 trillion USD was paid in bribes, and in some countries such as Nigeria
and Kenya bribes of up to 12 percent of gross domestic product were paid. Therefore, to be
able to find ways to reduce or completely eliminate we need the return of these resources to
the national economies of these countries.
Although we recognize there to be cases of corruption in all types of organizations, this
research focuses exclusively on government corruption due to its adverse effects being more
comprehensive and it being likely to have more influence on society.
In his book institutions and institutional change, and economic performance, Douglas
North(1990) believes that institutions specialize in economic activity. Individuals generally
become involved in activities that generate greater economic returns. Unfortunately, in many
countries the most profitable activities are bribes and illegal commissions are favoured and
benefit the individuals involved, which creates negative distortions in the economy and
undermines citizens’ confidence in state institutions.
Therefore, we must understand corruption because the problem lies in the institutions that do
not provide the right incentives to help reduce the motivation for government employees to
engage in their own self interests. Rather, they should seek public interest when a country
faces high levels of corruption, as these illegal activities lend character to the institution, its
actions, and ultimately become part of the fabric of society. Fadahunsi and Rosa (2002)
reviewed Nigeria as an example, where goods are traded legally and illegally alike through a
3
complex network and corrupt social relations. At first, this might look like illicit activities
create additional jobs and benefit some government officials and merchants. However, such
corruption creates significant additional costs that arise from the uncertainty and tension in
trade relations. Hence, it is not surprising that Fadahunsi and Rosa identified most traders in
Nigeria to be corrupt rather than use the impartial legal system.
In general, corruption undermines the basis for countries’ governments and increases poverty,
unemployment, and low rates of investment due to inefficiencies in the delivery of public
services. However, because of confidential, suspicious transactions it is difficult to determine
the impact of corruption on a country’s economy, and to show the effects of corruption on
communities which ultimately face a scarcity of resources (Perry, 1997). Also, due to these
difficulties we find a lot of shortcomings when addressing the issue of corruption in many
studies. Corruption, in general, can be described as the illegal market where strength lies for
cargo owners who rely on individuals and believe the legal system to be more expensive. Can
information and communication technology in the form of e-government initiatives and
strategies help reduce the market value of this force by dispersal through another group of
suppliers? Thus preventing items being sold this way and making the processes more
transparent to reduce the discretionary power of government officials.
We have found that corruption in government lies in the formulation of policies and in the
legislative process, as well as in the implementation of policies and laws by public officials.
Studies have found that government corruption occurs due to arbitrary use of power and the
ability of elected (and non-elected) officials’ access to resources or to power. This could
affect the ICT in how to exercise power through re-transforming the decision making process
of public officials and how the government can intervene.
Factors that contribute to corruption in government
The economic analysis was adopted for corruption on the principal and the agent model,
where highlights of corruption when the principal, due to asymmetric information, is unable
to control the activities of the agent. The agent finds it profitable to participate in corruption
and take advantage of this problem of information in order to achieve the greatest benefit to
himself.
In his book, Klitgaard (1991) that illicit behavior flourishes when agents [public servants] have a
monopoly power over clients [citizens], when agents have great discretion, and when
accountability of agents to the principal is weak‖ (p. 75). To illustrate this concept, the authors
use the following formula:
Corruption = Monopoly + discretion – accountability"
Klitgaard did not elaborate on his discussions with case studies and policy recommendations.
However, selecting other scientists identified the same factors that agents follow to contribute
to corruption. Paul’s (1997) study on corruption in the public sector finds that government
monopoly, discretion, and lack of accountability are among the key factors in corruption.
4
Monopoly power
Monopoly power can be defined in the context of the state having control or access to
material or human resources, as well as control procedures that allow third parties to fulfil the
mandate of the government. Zemanovicova (2002) indicates that a large monopoly occurs
when there is an imbalance in supply and demand for services and exclusivity of access to
information. One can minimize this kind of control through the decentralization of tasks or
automated transformation. This definition is consistent with the research carried out by
Emerson (2006), which states that the agent who controls the government to obtain the
necessary permits to enter sigma has a personal interest in claiming a larger bribe at the end
of the number of companies. Just as in the development of a market, when the state monopoly
limits access to the market, this in turn creates an incentive for owners of strength in the
market (producers) to engage in corrupt activities to require larger bribe payments for their
goods (power).
When selecting scientists who are interested in the corruption and monopoly of power, it is
also to make recommendations to alleviate the problem. In addition to punitive measures, it
calls for transparency of rules and processes, and access to government information
(Zemanovicova, 2002). Thus, e-government can be used as a tool to enhance transparency and
provide information access.
Discretionary power
Public officials exercise discretion in their daily work, and their role allows them the
possibility to supervise the use of public goods, and communicate with citizens about policy
decisions. However, discretion can be used improperly and may become a source of
corruption. Whenever a discretion is expanded for public official, there is a greater likelihood
of this person being corrupt. Garamfalvi (1998) refers to the most common source of
corruption on public spending as an abuse of discretion and resisting temptation; the writer
suggests that discretionary power should not be given to public servants because this can
cripple public administration.
Corruption appears on the surface, even when individuals are forced with high transaction
costs when dealing with public service officials. Public sector employees have the discretion
to reduce these costs for individuals who are willing to pay for services through the illegal
parallel market. Corruption is often like this, when the system contains an excessive series of
complex procedures and long processes, and then citizens decide to take short cuts, seek
support from the inside and pay the appropriate fees to expedite the process. Some steps to
combat the (Guriev, 2003) presence of discretion and corruption can be through dramatic
through breathtaking action resulting in a more effective and efficient, such as reducing the
number of permits (Kaufmann, 1997).
The presence of e-government can be seen as one of the tools that can help reduce the
discretion of government officials, where technology enables e-government to make
operations more transparent and simpler to not require the intervention of government
officials in the process (Martinez-Vazquez, et al., 2007).
5
Accountability
Lack of accountability is another indication of the corruption that can be addressed through
information and communication technology. Accountability over how public officials make
decisions and the actions they take. This accountability can be divided into three important
components: a) the participation of citizens in the political process and governance, b)
effective bureaucracy, and c) the implementation of the rule of law.
There are many studies on the effects of effective democracy on corruption, where
democratic elections are an indirect method to hold politicians accountable for their
behaviour. When citizens find out that one of the politicians or the government as a whole
corrupted, they can easily exclude them by election. Montinola and Jackman (2002) point out
that competition in the political process is a key factor to help reduce corruption. Also,
Fording, Miller and Patton (2003) found that a reduction of corruption can succeed in
societies where there is strong political competition, and ethics reform can curb corruption. In
emerging democracies where political participation has failed to reduce or eliminate the
abuse of power, it is often reflected in shortcomings in the political system and the work of
the government.
While few official studies measure the impact of e-government to government services and
corruption, there is a general perception about the benefits of this type of project. The World
Bank, through the electronic program development, involving workshops and seminars,
highlighted the benefits of e-government improving governance. In 2006, there was a
workshop to increase efficiency and accountability through e-government where participants
found that good planning for e-government strategies can contribute to building a more
transparent government which is efficient and accountable (World Bank, 2006).
E-government applications
The application of e-government can help reduce corruption because of the positive impact
on the three elements of corruption that have been mentioned previously in this paper:
government monopoly, the discretion of state employees, and accountability.
Klitgaard (1991) remarked that the removal of corrupt government officials would not
necessarily eliminate corruption. But, changes in the organization and its operations would
make it possible to reduce corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). This is particularly true in
Dininio and Orttung (2005) research, where serious corruption cases increased with an
increase in the number of bureaucrats. Though these institutions reduce or limit the incentive
that encourage individuals to engage in corrupt activities, implementing measures to make
procedures more transparent or to limit the discretion exercised by bureaucrats is warranted.
The automated system and the decentralization of the provision of public services will help to
reduce the control of government officials on operations, which then helps to reduce the
potential monopoly power of any one employee in government. For example, information
and communication technologies allow public institutions to outsource operations to pay for
their services, which can prevent public officials direct access to the money. The use of the
Internet or e-government applications and electronic payments can help to eliminate the need
6
for participation of government officials, which thus results in a reduction in the need to pay
bribes in order to speed up transactions and access to services. As mentioned by Bhatnagar
(2003), the benefits of an e-government system are the convenience and short waiting
periods, greater transparency and reduced corruption.
The adoption of automated administrative processes through information and communication
technologies helps to reduce the discretionary power of using algorithms to track and monitor
different processes. For example, the difficulty of slowing down any process with workflow
systems or electronic case management is in controlling all the steps of a process, allowing
citizens to become aware of the government’s decision to force public officials to explain the
reasons for any delay.
The second way to reduce the discretionary power of public servants is by reducing direct
contact with citizens. Through Web applications, where you can create sites electronically,
which enables citizens (or companies) to obtain the information/ services they need. This
wills enable customers to control the process of developing applications and payment, and
tracking and providing public services on the Internet. The payment of fees and purchases are
some examples of the general processes that can eliminate human mediation to reduce
corruption.
Transparency in government operations is a key element of accountability, which in turn
depends on the flow of information between citizens and public institutions. According to
Heeks (1998), greater transparency can be achieved through information and communication
technologies. For example, data on public expenditures from many locations can be collected,
processed by specific actions, formatted in a friendly manner, and put on the Internet for
customers. Information and communication technologies help facilitate the flow of
information through tools such as the Internet, which allows citizens to demand certain
standards and to monitor the quality of service, which limits the arbitrariness of officials
taking bribes. Some data suggest that improving citizens’ access to information and giving
them the right to the performance of work can help to reduce corruption (Svensson, 2005, p.
35).
Kuwait’s efforts in combating corruption
The efforts of the State of Kuwait in the recent anti-corruption efforts were hesitant. The
legislation, whether national, international or regional, contained important indicators of the
determination of the country and society against corruption, favouritism and discrimination,
and to promote transparency, accountability and integrity.
We will review the efforts of the State of Kuwait, highlighting the most important actors and
legislation to fight corruption.
Parliament
Available for the Kuwait elected legislative authority is the National Assembly (since 1963),
which is based on the constitution promulgated in 1962 and take the role of regulatory and
account for power of the government. It has broad powers such as dismissing ministers and
isolating the prime minister.
7
Audit Bureau
Based on the constitution, the government issued Law No. 30 of 1964 to establish the Audit
Bureau (amended by Decree Law No. 4 of 1977, as amended). Under this law, the Court of
Auditors is responsible for examining and auditing all state revenues and expenditures, and
reserves and investments. It then needs to each of the Princes, the prime minister and the
Council of the Nation with
Legislation
- Law No.24 of 1993 on the protection of public funds; this law was issued after the scandal
broke about the national oil tanker company.
- Law No. 37 of 1964 on public tenders (as amended), set up the Central Tenders Committee
chaired by the minister of specialists and members were appointed by Emiri decree.
I have made the Kuwait Transparency Society proposal to be re-coined by Act No. 37 of
1964.
Press and Civil Society
In addition to this legislation and official institutions, there are efforts by the press and NGOs
to strengthen legislation and institutions, policies, and practices to combat corruption and
promote integrity.
The Kuwaiti press is considered to be the oldest, most established and most influential press
compared to other GCC countries. The press in Kuwait has played an active role in unveiling many
cases of corruption, some of which referred to the Attorney General.
The main civil society organizations, which play an important role in the national effort to
combat corruption and promote integrity, were established by a decision of the Council of
Ministers, and is the oldest association committed to transparency in the Gulf region, and one
of the most prominent associations of transparency in the Arab world.
Kuwait Fighting Against Corruption
Despite Kuwait’s track record, its existing public and private institutions, and the legislation in force
in the fight against corruption, in 2010 the country was ranked at number 54 in the world, and at 7 and
6 among the Arab and the GCC countries respectively. The Kuwait Corruption Perceptions Index was
4.1 in 2009, and this increased to 4.5 in 2010. Hence, there is a need for more effort to be exerted on
this road since Kuwait has limited sources of income, most of which comes from oil, of which the
state controls the disbursement of revenue, and this is associated with cases of corruption and
favoritism.
8
Study procedures
Study Methodology
To detect the impact of the adoption of e-government in reducing administrative corruption
following researchers’ descriptive analytical methods.
The study population and sample
The Kuwaiti public sector consists of ministries, government bodies and companies where the state
owns 25% or more of its shares. The public sector was represented through a random sample of
citizens who deal with these entities. 500 copies of the questionnaire were distributed and 300
respondents returned the questionnaire. After an initial screening of the returned questionnaires, 35
were not properly completed and were excluded from further analysis. Thus, the usable number of
questionnaires was reduced to 265, resulting in a 53% useable response rate.
Study Tool
The researcher prepared the study tool, a questionnaire, to collect the necessary data on the
subject of the study. The questionnaire was formed of 35 questions where individuals would
respond to statements through a five-point grading system: from "agree" with five degrees to
"do not agree" and gives a score
Testing the Validity
To ensure the veracity of the questionnaire it was presented to a group of administrators and
PhD legal professionals at the Public Authority for Applied Education (Business Studies).
The researcher then took to modify some of the language until the questionnaire became
finalized.
Stability of the questionnaire
Questionnaire stability was calculated by a reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha), where the
reliability coefficient (93.5%) confirms the validity of the tool being used.
The study sample consisted of 147 males (55.5%) and 118 females (44.5%). It is evident that
there are more males than females, which results in the male point of view being more
dominant in answering the questionnaire (this appears in the tables).
Table 1-5
Sample Distribution According to Gender
Gender Frequency Percent
Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
147
55.5
55.5
55.5
Female 118
44.5
44.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Male
Total
265
9
Nationality: The number of Kuwaitis in the sample was 202 (76.2%), while the number of
non-Kuwaitis was 63 (23.8%). This indicates that the participants will truly reflect Kuwaiti
society and the extent to which they accept the use of technology in the public sector.
Table 2
Sample Distribution According to Nationality
Nationality
Frequency Percent
Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Kuwaiti
202
76.2
76.2
76.2
23.8
23.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Non-Kuwaiti 63
Total
265
Qualification: The result of the analysis showed that 9 (3.4%) of the participants have a
secondary qualification or less, 127 (47.9%) hold a diploma, 90 (34%) hold a university
degree, 39 (14.7%) hold either MA or PhD.
Table 3
Sample Distribution According to Academic Qualifications
Academic Qualifications
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Secondary
9
3.4
3.4
3.4
Diploma
127
47.9
47.9
51.3
Bachelor
90
34.0
34.0
85.3
MA & PhD
39
14.7
14.7
100.0
Total
265
100.0
100.0
Experience: As far as the participants’ experience is concerned, the analysis showed that 40
(15.1%) have less than 5 years’ work experience, 119 (44.9%) have 5-9 years, 76 (28.7%) 1014 years, and 30 (11.3%) have more than 15 years’ experience.
Table 4
Sample Distribution According to Years of Experience
Years of Experience
Frequency Percent
10
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Less than 5 years
40
15.1
15.1
15.1
5-9 years
119
44.9
44.9
60.0
10-14 years
76
28.7
28.7
88.7
More than 15 years 30
11.3
11.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
265
Place of Work: The result of the questionnaire analysis showed that the majority of the
sample 220 (83%) work for the public sector and 45 (17%) work for the private sector; as
appears in Table 5.
Table 5
Sample Distribution According to Place of Work
Place of Work
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Public Sector
220
83.0
83.0
83.0
Private Sector
45
17.0
17.0
100.0
Total
265
100.0
100.0
Analysis of Areas of Study
Patterns of Corruption
This section of the questionnaire was used to identify the most widespread patterns of
corruption in the government sector of Kuwait. The means, standard deviations, and
percentages for each pattern were calculated and presented in Table 6. The results are as
follows.
1. 98.9% of the sample strongly agreed that bias and favouritism for groups and
individuals is the most widespread pattern of corruption in the government sector; the
mean of this pattern reached 4.85.
2. 98.8% of participants indicated that using personal relations at the expense of
efficiency is the second pattern of corruption that is widespread in the public sector of
Kuwait. This reality has been reflected in the mean distribution that reached 4.82.
3. 95.5% of respondents indicated that the use of the position to achieve personal
interests is another widespread pattern of administrative corruption in government
departments; this had a mean value of 4.53.
11
4. 85.3% of participants revealed that accepting gifts and presents in return for personal
interest is another pattern of corruption widespread in government circles; the mean
reached 4.30.
5. There was a consensus among the participants (84.7%) that taking commission in
return for personal deals and contracts is another pattern of administrative corruption
widespread in the government sector; this had a 4.3 mean of distribution.
6. 87.5% of participants disclosed that violating laws and regulations is another pattern
of administrative corruption widespread in the government sector; it had a 4.22 mean
of distribution.
7. 78.5% of respondents agreed that using a position in public office to make illegal
gains is another pattern of administrative government circles; this had a mean of 4.17.
8. Despite the fact that 59.6% of participants agreed that blackmailing the users of public
sector services is widespread in government circles, the pattern ranked last with a 3.83
mean of distribution.
It is clear from the above summary that the majority of the sample (86.6%) agreed that
various patterns of corruption are widespread in the government sector of the State of
Kuwait, with 4.37 mean of distribution.
Table 6
Distribution and Relative Means and Standard Deviations for the Most Widespread
Patterns of Corruption in the Government Sector of Kuwait (n = 265)
Patterns of Corruption
Strongly Disagree No Agre Strongly Mea Standar
Disagree
View e
Agree
n
d
Deviatio Direction
No.
No.
No. No. No.
n
%
%
%
%
%
Accepting commissions in 9
return for personal deals
3.4
and contracts.
18
1.1
89
146
6.8
21
33.
6
51.1
Accepting gifts and 0
favours from the users of
0
government services.
18
7.9
89
137
6.8
86
33.
6
51.7
Blackmailing users of 0
public sector services.
21
32.
5
75
83
0
7.9
36
28.
3
12
31.3
4.3
0
1.026
Strongly
Agree
4.3
0
.883
Strongly
Agree
3.8
3
.964
Agree
Using the position in 0
public office to make
illegal gains.
0
21
13.
6
86
7.9
3
32.
5
46.0
Using the position in 0
public office to achieve
personal interests.
0
9
1.1
92
161
3.4
33
34.
7
60.8
Violating
laws
regulations.
0
12.
5
140
92
and 0
122
4.1
7
.943
Agree
.691
Strongly
Agree
4.2
2
.651
Strongly
Agree
4.8
2
.414
Strongly
Agree
.386
Strongly
Agree
4.5
3
0
0
3
52.
8
34.7
Using personal relations 0
at the expense of
efficiency in recruitment 0
and promotions.
0
1.1
42
220
0
3
15.
8
83.0
Bias and favouritism for 0
groups and individuals.
0
0
1.1
33
229
86.4
4.8
5
188
12.
5
1190
4.3
8
Patterns
Administrative
Corruption
0
of
9
87
646
.57209
Strongl
y Agree
The Effect of Using E-Government on Corruption
This section of the questionnaire was used to identify the impact of the adoption of the
concept of e-government on corruption, in the government sector of Kuwait. The results of
the analysis are offered in Table 9. A summary of the results presented in the table are below.
1. The majority of the participants agreed (96.6%) that they benefited from the egovernment site when understanding the various types of transactions and how to
process them, with a 4.6 mean value.
2. 86.6% of participants indicated that the use of e-government has helped to complete
and accomplish transactions from anywhere and at any time, with a mean value of
4.57.
13
3. 93.2% agreed that the use of technology helps in identifying responsibility and
increases the effectiveness of the controlling process, with a mean value of 4.56.
4. 93.2% of participants revealed that the use of e-government restricts employee
intervention in processing transactions and assists in speeding up the completion of
these transactions, with a mean value of 4.48
5. 89.8% of participants prefer to process their transactions through the website of the egovernment, with a mean value of 4.46.
6. 93.2% of participants believe that identifying roles in using technology helps to
identify errors and assist in correcting them, with a mean value of 4.43.
7. 83% of participants demonstrated that clarity and simplicity in processing egovernment transactions reduced mediations, with a mean value of 4.38.
8. 86.4% of participants felt that a shift to e-government helps to protect public money,
with a mean value of 4.32.
9. 89.8% of participants confirmed that e-government reduces functional independence,
with a mean value of 4.32.
10. Despite the confirmation of 76.2% of participants to the proposal that e-government
has helped to speed up the decision making process, this proposal was ranked last in
the scale, with a mean value of 4.14.
Overall, it is found that 88.7% of participants indicated that e-government contributes to help
reduce administrative corruption in the government sector in the State of Kuwait.
Table 7
Distribution and Relative Means and Standard Deviations for the Impact of Egovernment on Reducing Corruption in the Government Sector of Kuwait (n = 265)
E-government
Strongly Disagree No Agre Strongly Mea Standar
Disagree
View e
Agree
n
d
Deviatio Directio
No.
No.
No. No. No.
n
n
%
%
%
%
%
Benefited from the e-government site
in understanding the various types of
transactions and how to process them.
9
80
176
3.4
30.
2
66.4
Identifying the roles in using
technology will help to identify the
errors and assist in correcting them.
9
9
107
140
3.4
3.4
40.
4
52.8
9
83
164
The use of e-government restricted 9
14
4.6
0
.668
Strong
ly
Agree
4.4
3
.720
Strong
ly
Agree
4.4
.853
Strong
employee intervention in processing 3.4
transactions and assisted in speedy
completion of these transactions.
3.4
31.
3
61.9
8
4.4
6
.852
Strong
ly
Agree
4.3
8
.922
Strong
ly
Agree
4.5
7
.809
Strong
ly
Agree
4.1
4
1.038
Agree
4.3
2
.702
Strong
ly
Agree
4.3
2
.835
Strong
ly
Agree
4.5
6
.620
Prefer processing their transactions
through the website of e-government.
18
9
71
167
6.8
3.4
26.
8
63.0
Clarity and simplicity in processing egovernment transactions reduced
mediations.
18
27
57
163
6.8
10.
2
21.
5
61.5
E-government has helped in
completing
and
accomplishing
transactions from anywhere and at
any time.
9
27
33
196
3.4
10.
2
12.
5
74.0
E-government has helped in speeding 9
up the decision making process.
3.4
9
45
74
128
3.4
17.
0
27.
9
48.3
36
107
122
13.
6
40.
4
46.0
18
9
107
131
6.8
3.4
40.
4
49.4
18
81
166
6.8
30.
6
62.6
Helps to protect public money.
E-government
independence.
reduces
functional
The use of technology helps to
identify responsibility and increases
the effectiveness of the controlling
process.
E-government
18
90
189
15
800
1553
4.4
3
ly
Agree
.57884
Strong
ly
Agree
Strong
ly
Agree
Testing the Hypotheses
To identify the extent of differences in participants’ views about the patterns of corruption in
the public sector of Kuwait and the causes of administrative corruption due to a variation in
demographic factors, the Kruscal Wallis test was executed and presented in Table 10.
Table 8
Kruscal Wallis Test
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
36.422
1
.000
9.308
1
.002
53.892
3
.000
23.951
3
.000
2.424
1
.119
Gender
Patterns of Corruption
Nationality
Patterns of Corruption
Academic Qualifications
Patterns of Corruption
Years of Experience
Patterns of Corruption
Age
Patterns of Corruption
It is evident from the table that there is no statistically significant difference at the level of
significance (which equals 0.05) on the impact of gender, nationality, or qualification.
Experience variables on the views of participants about the patterns and causes of
administrative in the public sector of the State of Kuwait are also considered. However,
significant differences in participants’ views appeared due to age differences.
16
Results and Recommendations
Results
This study does not seek to identify whether there is corruption in the government sector of
the State of Kuwait, but to identify the most prevalent patterns of corruption in the
government sector. The findings of this study are summarized as follows.
- The majority of participants agreed that bias and favouritism for groups and
individuals are in the patterns of corruption widely spread in the government sector of
the State of Kuwait. This is due to strong social ties among Kuwaitis that encourage
bias and favouritism.
- The majority of participants agreed that the use of technology limits the intervention
of individuals and thus reduces, if not eliminates, many kinds and forms of corruption
related to individuals such as favouritism, nepotism and bribery. These forms of
corruption are related to individuals and the extent of their interference in the conduct
of business, allowing them to exercise pressure on and to blackmail citizens.
- No statistical differences were found in the identification of patterns and causes of
corruption due to demographic variables such as gender, nationality, qualification and
experience. However, there were statistical differences on the identification of
patterns and reasons behind widespread corruption in the government due to
participants’ age.
Recommendations
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that corruption is related to individuals driven by
different motives. Some of them are harmless and simple and may not go beyond the fact of
avoiding simple regulations and procedures, such as standing in the queue. Other corruption
cases may have a devastating impact on the country and include fraud and bribery.
It has been established by previous studies and in the answers to the questionnaire that
corruption may spread and become worse due to the absence of effective control and a lack of
deterrent accountability. The majority of participants believe that giving responsibility to
people without adopting an effective system of monitoring and identifying deviations in
performance is corruption itself. Hence, it is unlikely to eliminate corruption since it is linked
to human nature, the complexity of its causes and the fact that it varies from one person to
another. However, it is possible through the use of technology (electronic government) and
some procedures and deterrent regulations to significantly limit corruption in the government
sector. To be successful, these measures should reduce the interference of individuals as
much as possible, especially in light of developments in technological communications. This
should be integrated by a system that monitors individuals’ action and has a reliance on
electronic systems in the provision of services to individuals in order to assist them in making
methodological decisions. Thus, the following recommendations may assist in achieving
these objectives.
17
1. Transferring to electronic government and reducing the overall paperwork. This will
help reduce the efforts and time used to accomplish a transaction, and help to track the
transactions, find out stages of accomplishment, and restrict individual involvement in
processing the transaction.
2. Installing a controlling system that relies on a computer system to follow up the work
of individuals, to help reduce nepotism and bribery. Once individuals know that a
system is following all their activities, and any abuse will be discovered at any time
and one can refer to the system when needed or demanded, individuals will be
discouraged from overriding the system.
3. Activating decentralization in decision-making through relying on electronic systems
in decision-making. This will help in unifying procedures and thus consolidate
decisions, particularly routine and systematic ones. This will also help to reduce
exceptions and evade regulations and laws, and eliminate fluctuations of individuals’
mood at work.
4. Dividing work and identifying it accurately in order to ensure easy transfer to
electronic systems and facilitate in the decision making process.
As a result of massive development in computer programs and communications technology,
there will be no need for direct contact between employees and those who seek the service.
Modern and advanced means of communication can be used to monitor friction and
document it. This will assist in eliminating changes in individual moods when dealing with
citizens and possible abuse. It will also help to locate areas of deficiencies and address them.
18
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