Dual Use Research,
Bioweapons and Biosecurity
Iris Hunger
Research Group for Biological Arms Control
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research
University of Hamburg, Germany
International Forum on Biosecurity, Amman, 27-29 October 2008
Dual Use
Technology, equipment, material, or
knowledge that can be used for:
Peaceful or hostile
Legitimate or illegitimate
Beneficial or destructive
purposes without, or only minor, modification.
Dual Use Activities of Concern
Dual use activities whose misuse would result
in particularly grave consequences.
Two approaches:
Based on the agents involved.
Based on the results planned or achieved.
Dual Use Activities of Concern
Agent Based
Anthrax, hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola etc.),
plague, smallpox, tularemia.
1918 influenza?
SARS?
Genetically enhanced measles?
Dual Use Activities of Concern
Result Based
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Rendering a vaccine ineffective
Creating resistance to therapeutics
Enhancing the virulence of a pathogen
Rendering a nonpathogen virulent
Increasing transmissibility of a pathogen
Altering the host range of a pathogen
Enabling the evasion of diagnosis/detection
Enabling the weaponization of a biological
agent or toxin
Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, U.S. National Research Council, 2004.
Dual Use Activities of Concern
in Biodefence Programmes
Creating agents with improved bioweapons
characteristics
Engineering anthrax to be vaccine resistant
Increasing the lethality of pox viruses
Creating people knowledgable about
bioweapons relevant agents
Giving rise to suspicions of bioweapons
development
Dual Use Activities of Concern
Governance
Thorough risk assessment before work is
started
Maximum transparency including full
publication
Should not be carried out in the framework of
biodefence/biosecurity