Degrees of Engagement: Using Cultural Worldviews to Explain
Variations in Public Preferences for Engagement in the Policy Process
Sarah Trousset, [email protected]
Kuhika Gupta, [email protected]
Hank Jenkins-Smith, [email protected]
Carol L.Silva, [email protected]
Kerry Herron, [email protected]
Center for Energy, Security, & Society
Department of Political Science
University of Oklahoma
Abstract
Scholars have been studying the concept of public engagement and its role in the policy
process for some time. Scholars have argued that understanding the interests and
motivations of the public and engaging them in the decision making process can lead to
better policy designs and ultimately, better policy outcomes. However, studies of public
engagement often assume that people have a desire to get involved in the policy process.
This paper tests this key assumption using the case of nuclear facility siting in the US to
ask: what factors influence an individual’s stated willingness to want to engage in the
policy process? Using data from a national web survey fielded in 2013, we ask the public
if and to what extent they would likely engage in the siting process if given the
opportunity. Findings indicate that the likelihood of engagement varies rather
substantially across individuals. We find that an individual’s cultural belief system and
existing level of political activity account for some of this variation. These findings
suggest that public engagement programs may vary across groups and communities. In
other words, the prospects of engagement are likely to appeal to some members of the
population and not others.
Keywords: Public Engagement; Cultural Theory; Nuclear Energy; Nuclear Facility
Siting
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1. Introduction
Scholars have been studying the concept of public engagement and its role in the
policy process for some time. At its core, public engagement is about recognizing the
centrality of individuals, groups, and organizations that have a stake in and the potential
to influence policy outcomes. Studies on public engagement have found that beliefs about
inclusiveness and fairness of the policy process are associated with decision favorability
and outcome acceptance (Besley 2010). Furthermore, understanding the interests and
motivations of different stakeholders, including members of the public, and engaging
them in the decision making process, it is argued, can lead to better policy designs and
outcomes. Recently, there has been increased attention to the advantages of an inclusive
and consensual policy process in the applied realm. For example, reports by the National
Research Council and the Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management have
found that policy decisions associated with heightened risk perceptions should
increasingly involve stakeholders in a meaningful way (National Research Council 2008;
The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management
1997). This is pertinent in the nuclear energy subsystem, where public risk perceptions
are typically found to be high and traditional “top-down” efforts to site safe storage and
disposal facilities have historically resulted in intense local opposition (Dunlap, Kraft and
Rosa 1993). The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC), in its
report to the U.S. Secretary of Energy, came to a similar conclusion when it
recommended a consent-based policy process that seeks to engage the affected local
community and build public trust in the siting process (BRC 2012). Doing so, according
to the BRC, can help build public trust in the government and increase the legitimacy of
the siting process.
The notion of public engagement often assumes that people have an inherent
desire to get involved in the policy process. However, if there is little to no desire for
involvement, or if willingness to engage is highly correlated with specific groups of
individuals with particular policy preferences, then attempts to increase public
involvement may have unintended consequences. To explore the dynamics associated
with public engagement, this paper asks: what factors influence individual desires to
engage in the policy process? This is crucial because while there is ongoing research that
aims to gauge the effectiveness and utility of public engagement practices, we must first
understand if and why some members of the public choose to engage in processes of that
kind. Without a more comprehensive understanding of the basis for individual decisions
to engage in the policy process, efforts to design mechanisms of engagement and evaluate
their effectiveness will remain incomplete. As noted above, the widely perceived risks
associated with nuclear energy makes nuclear facility siting policy an ideal candidate for
studying public engagement (Jenkins-Smith & Bassett 1994; Peters & Slovic 1996;
Slovic 1993). For this reason, we use the issue of nuclear waste management in the U.S.
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to study individuals’ desires to engage in the policy process. Using data from a national
survey fielded in 2013 about transportation and interim storage of used nuclear fuel
(UNF) in the U.S., we probe when and to what extent members of the public would
engage in the siting process when given the opportunity.
The literature on mass political behavior has found several factors that may help explain
individual motivations to participate in political activities: the benefits and costs associated
with political participation, individual socio-economic characteristics, their general level of
political activity and the complex social networks that mobilize them to participate (Brady,
Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Downs, 1957; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, &
Brady, 1995). While this research might provide insights into “who” is most likely to
participate, we are still limited in our understanding of “why” individuals participate
(Aldrich 1997). Rational choice models (Riker & Ordeshook 1968; Olson 1965) begin to
explain individual motivations to participate by considering utility functions, in which
individuals weigh the expected benefits and costs of participation. These models suggest
that the collective action problem, derived from the production of non-rivalrous and nonexcludable goods, will result in individual free-riding and therefore limit participation in the
provision of such goods (Weimer and Vining 2010). Other scholars have posited the
existence of “soft incentives” – such as group attachment – as explanations for participation
(Opp 1986; Finkel and Muller 1998). However, little systematic attention has been paid to
the connection between the structure and content of an individual’s underlying belief
system and their decisions to participate in political processes. We attempt to fill this gap by
examining how belief systems further explain individuals’ underlying propensity toward
political engagement. Doing so will allow us to go beyond factors such as individual
resources and capacities, to incorporate attributes of individuals’ underlying political and
social beliefs. To measure individual belief systems, this paper employs Cultural Theory’s
conception of cultural worldviews (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Ellis & Thompson 1997;
Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky 1990; Wildavsky 1987).
We suggest that individuals’ cultural worldviews influence the values they attach
to group decision-making and how these beliefs impact their willingness to participate in
the policymaking process. Cultural worldviews provide a systematic way to organize
deeply held normative beliefs about how the world should be organized, including
opinions about collective decision-making, trust in experts, group participation,
inclusiveness, justice or fairness. In the past, cultural theory has been used to explain risk
perceptions and individual opinions across various policy issues ranging from public
health, national security, economics, and energy policy (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil,
& Slovic 2010; Malkin & Wildavsky 1991; Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, & Herron 2011).
We argue that individuals have beliefs about how social relationships should be
structured, and these beliefs in turn influence the likelihood that they would participate in
public engagement mechanisms.
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: the literature on stakeholder
engagement and mass political participation is reviewed, followed by a discussion of our
theoretical framework and hypotheses about the influence of cultural worldviews on
individual desires to engage. We then investigate variation in individual stated
willingness to engage in the policy process, which is our dependent variable, as well as
introduce our independent variables. We then present the analysis and discuss the
findings. Finally, the implications of our findings and directions for future research are
discussed.
2. Existing Research on Public Engagement and Political Participation
Research on public engagement to date has focused on three main facets of the
concept: the normative virtues of public engagement, the various mechanisms through
which it can be implemented, and its potential impact on the quality of the decisionmaking process (Abelson et al. 2003; Adams 2004; Besley 2010; van Ingen & Bekkers
2013). With reference to the normative virtues of public engagement and the notion of
citizen deliberation and its role in the democratic process, there is a general agreement in
the literature that “public deliberation is essential to democracy” (Page, 1996, p. 1).
Touted as a critical element of modern day representative government, some have argued
that public engagement can lead to more legitimized and consensual decision-making
(Kraft 1988; 2000). The virtues of engaging the public in the policy process have been
highlighted at several levels. At the macro level, asserting that citizen involvement in
politics lies at the heart of democracy is not new; although exploring the mechanisms of
engagement and its impact on the policy process has grown tremendously in the last two
decades (Bachrach 1967; Thompson 1970). Also, scholars have noted the possibility that
increased public involvement in socio-political decision-making can help foster social
capital and build civic capacity; public involvement and the values it engenders are seen
as part of a dynamic that serves to overcome the dilemma posed by collective action in
pursuit of public goods (Opp 1986; Finkel and Muller 1998). This in turn, can help to
improve the quality of governance, particularly through collaborative policymaking and
consensual problem solving (Abelson et al. 2003; Putnam 1994). At the micro level,
individual self-expression is a notion valued by citizens in most countries, and the ability
to voice one’s opinions about different public policy issues (through existing public
engagement venues) plays a significant role in their perceived quality of life (Inglehart
2008). A lack of public engagement opportunities, then, may leave citizens feeling
unsatisfied and unable to contribute to important policy decisions, thereby exacerbating
the problems for collective action highlighted by rational choice models (Olson 1965).
Among the various mechanisms of public engagement, the literature describes
options that range from top-down information dissemination to extensive public input for
making policy decisions. Information dissemination mechanisms include activities like
public hearings and expert panels, where the primary goal is to share knowledge about
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the policy issue. These mechanisms have been widely employed for a long time, with
more extensive engagement measures being incorporated slowly and informally in recent
years (Klauenberg & Vermulen 1994). For instance, policymaking for highly technical
issues such as nuclear energy has been conducted largely in a technocratic manner, where
technical information disseminated through experts is of utmost importance
(McCutcheon 2002). The other end of the engagement spectrum includes mechanisms
such as citizen juries, community deliberation meetings, public advisory committees, and
public referendums (Rowe & Frewer 2000). These mechanisms are qualitatively different
than information dissemination measures because they aim to solicit public opinion,
engage in reciprocal communication among citizens, experts and policy makers, and
provide citizens with real influence in the policymaking process.
Given that there are numerous options available to engage the public in the policy
process, asking how these engagement options impact policymaking and which of them
are the most effective are important questions (Rosener 1978). To answer these questions,
scholars have studied different outcomes of public engagement measures, ranging from
increased levels of perceived fairness of the decision-making process, increased
acceptance of the policy, and better policy outcomes overall (Crosby, Kelly, & Schaefer
1986; Fiorino 1990; Lynn & Busenberg 1995; Smith, Nell, & Prystupa 1997; Webler,
1995). The first two effectiveness criteria measure procedural impacts of the engagement
measures, whereas the last criterion measures the substantive policy implications
(Middendorf & Busch 1997). The majority of research to date has focused on procedural
impacts—studying whether engagement mechanisms contribute to increasing the quality
of the process rather than its outcomes. The important thing to keep in mind is that there
is no “one size fits all” model of engagement that is successful for all policy contexts.
Furthermore, what counts as “successful” and the benchmarks on which the mechanisms
should be evaluated is not uniform across groups.
Despite research on this topic, relatively little research has been dedicated to
answering an intrinsic question: what motivates people to participate in public
engagement programs? Are some members of the public more likely to want to engage in
policymaking programs than others? Mainstream political science and American politics
research has long studied patterns of mass political participation and the factors that
influence individual participation in politics through acts such as voting in national and
local elections, as well as engaging in various campaign activities (Olson 1965; Conway
1989; Crotty 1991; Ferejohn & Fiorina 1974; Leighley 1995; Riker & Ordeshook 1968).
Scholars have identified several determinants of political participation, including an
individual’s educational attainment, household income, political knowledge and interest
in politics, and access to social networks. Individual demographics such as race, gender
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and ethnicity, on the other hand, do not seem to have a direct impact on levels of
participation (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995).1
Furthermore, inspired by the rational choice model of individual decision-making,
scholars studying mass political participation have also argued that individuals are more
likely to participate in a political activity if the benefits of voting outweigh the costs
associated with voting. For example, individuals are more likely to vote if both the
instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome and the probability of the individual
playing a decisive role that secures their preferred outcome is greater than the costs
associated with becoming informed on relevant issues and making the effort to participate
(Blais 2000; Downs 1957; Riker & Ordeshook 1968; Tullock 1967). When individuals
consider the act of voting, the costs associated with voting are often greater than the
benefits; which suggests that it is irrational for individuals to vote. We know from
practical experience, however, that people do vote. To account for this anomaly, scholars
have looked towards other intangible benefits that may explain individual decisions to
vote such as civic duty (Riker & Ordeshook 1968), “soft incentives” (Opp 1986; Finkel
and Muller 1998), or ethical obligations (Feddersen & Sandroni 2006). The rational
decision-making model also highlights the role of other indicators of individual selfinterest. For example, some individuals are motivated to vote based on social
considerations, as opposed to purely instrumental benefits (Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan
2007; Funk 2007; Kinder & Kiewiet 1979). Evidence shows that some members of the
public tend to make decisions about voting based on the expected benefits to their group
and the nation. Other scholars have asserted the need to consider policy or issue specific
opinions held by an individual and how that might motivate them to vote (Aldrich 1997;
Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida 1989; Carmines & Stimson 1980).
Building upon much of the above-mentioned previous research on mass political
participation, we derive several initial hypotheses for explaining what motivates
individuals to engage in the policy process. First, building upon the rational choice model
and the issue voting arguments, we can expect that individuals who hold strong opinions
about nuclear energy may be more likely to participate in public engagement activities.
Individuals holding higher perceptions of risks and benefits of nuclear energy may
inherently have a higher motivation or sense of responsibility to bear the costs associated
with participating in public engagement activities in order to secure their preferred
collective outcome. Based upon this model, we hypothesize that individuals with higher
perceptions of risks or benefits associated with nuclear energy would be more likely to
1
In addition to resources and mobilization as motivating factors, several scholars have
studied other explanatory variables such as fear, apathy and discrimination (Salamon &
Van Evera 1973); social networks characterized by greater levels of political
disagreement (Mutz 2002); and group consciousness (Miller, Gurin, Gurin & Malanchuk
1981).
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express a willingness to participate in public engagement activities for siting nuclear
facilities (H1).
Second, in addition to individual rationality, the literature on mass political
behavior has also used the “standard socio-economic model” as a base model for political
participation (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1964; Huckfeldt
1979; Murray & Vedlitz 1977). Simply put, this model argues that individual’s socioeconomic status (SES) helps predict their level of involvement in political activities.
Income and education, according to this model, are positively related to individual
participation in politics. To test the influence of socio-economic characteristics on an
individual’s likely engagement, we hypothesize that individuals with higher levels of
income and educational attainment will be more likely to express a willingness to
participate in public engagement activities (H2) in the process for siting nuclear
facilities.
Finally, previous research has suggested that levels of political interest and
activity in traditional venues such as voting and involvement in election campaigns may
influence engagement through non-traditional venues such as Facebook and other new
media outlets (Carlisle & Patton 2013; see also Blais 2000). Building upon this research,
this paper explores the link between existing levels of political activity (measured
through various indicators of voting behavior) and the likelihood that individuals will
take part in stakeholder engagement and public deliberation opportunities. To test this
argument, we hypothesize that individuals who have an interest and are active in politics,
as evidenced by voting, are more likely to express a willingness to participate in public
engagement activities (H3). The next section outlines the theoretical framework we use in
testing our primary hypotheses, before moving on to discuss our data and variables.
3. Theoretical Framework: Using Cultural Worldviews to Explain Public Desires to
Engage in the Policy Process
In addition to basic SES factors and levels of political activity, we argue that
individuals’ cultural orientations play an important role in explaining a tendency of an
individual to engage politically. In particular, we suggest that cultural theory’s
conception of cultural worldviews (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Ellis and Thompson
1997; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky 1990; Wildavsky 1987) provides a unique
perspective on how an individual’s general attitudes about social relationships and beliefs
about the way society should be organized, will explain both variations in perceived risks
and benefits of nuclear energy, and an individual’s propensity to participate in
engagement activities. Cultural theory scholars provide substantial evidence suggesting
that cultural orientations are fundamental to understanding beliefs and attitudes about
public policy, the role of government, and collective decision-making (Thompson, Ellis
& Wildavsky 1990). The dimensions of cultural theory help to characterize individuals
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based on how they value group participation and what they think about power
inequalities, justice, fairness and trust-attributes that are the focus of several studies
examining different public engagement mechanisms (Besley 2010; Crosby, Kelly &
Shaefer 1986; Fiorino 1990; Lynn & Busenberg 1995; Smith, Nell & Prystupa 1997;
Webler 1995). Cultural theory also gives us an explanation for why some individuals
might care more than others about the social benefits to the group, which has been shown
to be an important determinant in rational choice models of voting (Edlin, Gelman and
Kaplan 2007). This paper builds upon this research by investigating how cultural
worldviews influence the values people attach to group decision-making and how these
values influence their willingness to participate in the policymaking process.
Cultural theory contends that individuals orient themselves or arrange their social
interactions in four broad categories along two conceptual dimensions, dubbed group and
grid (Dake 1991; 1992; Douglas 1966; 1970; Douglas et al. 1998; Douglas & Wildavsky
1982; Wildavsky & Dake 1990; 1991). The group dimension defines the extent to which
an individual identifies with a social group (high group) or the extent to which they prefer
to remain outside group boundaries (low group). Based upon their cultural orientation, an
individual may prefer group interactions or may be more individual-oriented. The grid
dimension defines the extent to which an individual believes that society needs externally
imposed rules in order to control behavior. Some individuals prefer very limited societal
rules (low grid) versus others who believe a high level of externally imposed rules and
guidance is necessary for society (high grid). Based on these configurations of group and
grid, cultural theory identifies four “ideal” (or polar) cultural types: fatalists (high grid,
low group); individualists (low grid, low group); hierarchs (high grid, high group); and
egalitarians (low grid, high group). Affinities to these cultural orientations serve as an
heuristic to guide individual responses to the various situations they face. Each of these
four worldviews provides a set of presumptions about an individual’s preferences for
group interaction and collective decision-making. Building upon this theoretical
framework, this paper presents a test of how cultural theory can help explain why some
members of the public are more likely to want to engage in the policy process than
others.
Given the centrality of group-oriented interactions in the process of public
engagement, we argue that the group dimension of cultural theory, in particular, provides
insight into understanding an individual’s affinity for public engagement activities. Both
the traits of hierarchism and egalitarianism tend toward high group. However, because
hierarchs tend to prefer maintenance of the status quo, they are more likely to place trust
in experts to make decisions in support of the welfare of the group and believe that
individuals should comply with what those in authority have determined is best for the
group. Hierarchs tend to have clear understandings of which members are outside of the
group, and therefore are less likely to welcome a broad inclusion of participants in
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decision-making. Although egalitarians are also group-oriented, they differ from
hierarchs on the grid dimension. Egalitarians also have strong group identities, but are
more likely to insist on equality of status among all participants. In contrast to hierarchs,
egalitarians are concerned with power inequalities and think that society should not
impose many rules or standards that constrain members within groups. Accordingly,
egalitarians have a preference for diversity and inclusiveness, and advocate for
participatory decision-making (Dake 1991; 1992; Leiserowitz 2006; Slovic & Peters
1998).
In contrast, the traits of individualism and fatalism tend toward low group.
Individualists value personal liberties, self-regulation and don’t need to identify
themselves according to group membership. Because they are also low-grid,
individualists strongly dislike threats to free market relationships and prefer few
regulations. Given their low-group orientation and being more individually oriented, we
can expect that individualists are less likely to be involved in collective decision-making.
However, they may be inclined to participate in decision-making if they perceive
potential threats to market relationships (Dake 1991). Finally, fatalists are low group and
high grid. Fatalists believe that society has excluded them from group inclusion and that
there are high levels of rules constraining society. Fatalists believe they do not have
control over their lives and that their destinies are largely subject to fate. Therefore,
because they believe outcomes are a matter of chance and not choice, fatalists are less
likely to participate in social processes and collective decision-making.
Drawing upon this theoretical framework, we derive the following hypotheses
concerning how an individual’s affinity for cultural orientations might help explain their
desire to engage in political activities. Given their shared high group traits, hierarchs
and egalitarians are both more likely to want to participate in public engagement
activities (H4 & H5). Hierarchs will want to engage in these activities in order to advance
the solutions prescribed by sanctioned experts and to block potential disruptions of the
social order. Egalitarians will want to engage in decision-making processes to ensure that
a wide diversity of interests is represented and that outcomes reflect the interests of the
less powerful members of society. In contrast, given their shared low group traits,
individualists and fatalists are less likely to want to participate in public engagement
activities (H6 & H7). Fatalists are less likely to desire participating in public engagement
activities because they believe they have little political efficacy and therefore no real
ability to influence policy outcomes. Individualists will be less likely to participate
because they often prefer acting alone and tend to prefer self-regulation. However, there
are some instances where they may desire to participate in public engagement activities,
especially if they think outcomes of those policies have the potential to impact free
market relationships.
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In summary, based on our discussion of the theoretical framework and previous
research on the topic of political participation, several hypotheses will be tested to
ascertain the role that risk and benefit perceptions (H1), SES factors (H2), level of
political activity (H3), and cultural worldviews (H4-H7) play in an individual’s
likelihood to engage in the policy process.
4. Variation in Public Desires to Engage in the Policy Process: Data on Likely
Engagement
Before we move on to test these hypotheses, we begin by investigating the
variability in people’s intent to engage. There has been a recent push towards greater
public involvement—both in the academic and applied spheres. Scholars have studied the
normative virtues of engagement as well as the various mechanisms through which the
public can be involved in the policy process (Abelson et al. 2003; Adams 2004; Besley
2010; van Ingen & Bekkers 2013). This has also resonated in the applied policy world
where governments and regulatory agencies are increasingly speaking to the crucial role
of public engagement and consent-based decision-making (National Research Council
2008; The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management 1997; BRC 2012). However, this trend depends in part on an important
assumption, i.e., if given the opportunity, most people wish to engage in the decision
making process.
To test the assumption that most people desire to engage in decision making, we
employ data from a nationwide survey on preferences of US residents concerning the
environment and energy sources, completed by the Center for Energy, Security & Society
at the University of Oklahoma in 2013. The survey was implemented using a web-based
questionnaire, and was completed by 1,995 respondents using an Internet sample that
matches the demographic characteristics of the US population. The survey posed a set of
questions to the respondents about their likelihood to engage in several activities during
two different processes connected to nuclear facility siting. About half of the respondents
received questions regarding the siting of an Interim Storage Facility (ISF) within 50
miles of their homes. The second half of respondents received questions about the
transportation of Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) within 50 miles of their homes.
With reference to engagement in an ISF siting process, half the respondents first received
the following background information:
Public engagement in the process of developing interim storage sites will be
critical. We want to know how likely it is that you would actively participate in
the debate and policy process if construction of an interim storage site for used
nuclear fuel was proposed within 50 miles of your residence in [respondent’s
state]. We understand that you cannot be sure about your precise level of
involvement, but please be as realistic as possible when responding to the
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following questions using a scale from one to seven, where one means not at all
likely, and seven means extremely likely.
The other half received the following background information about transportation of
USF within 50 miles of their home:
Public engagement in the process of developing interim storage sites will be
critical. We want to know how likely it is that you would actively participate in
the debate and policy process if a highway, railway, or waterway within 50 miles
of your residence was to be used for transporting used nuclear fuel to an interim
storage site in [respondent’s state]. We understand that you cannot be sure about
your precise level of involvement, but please be as realistic as possible when
responding to the following questions using a scale from one to seven, where one
means not at all likely, and seven means extremely likely.
Survey respondents were then asked to indicate their likelihood of participating in a range
of kinds of engagement activities, presented in a randomly ordered list:







Attend informational meetings held by authorities
Write or phone your elected representatives
Express your opinion using social media
Serve on a citizens’ advisory committee
Help organize public support
Help organize public opposition
Speak at a public hearing in your area
It is important to note that public responses about likelihood for engagement in either
phase of the siting process were largely similar. In other words, respondents were as
likely to engage in processes for siting a transportation route as they were for siting an
ISF.2 However, there exists variations across respondents—not all respondents were
equally likely to engage in the siting process. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the
responses about how likely individuals were to engage in the different activities.
2
A t-test analysis revealed no statistically significant difference between responses to
likely engagement in the two experimental tracks.
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Table 4.1: Public Responses to Likely Engagement in the Siting Process
Likely to Engage in…
(% with score above scale mid-point)
Attend informational meetings held by
authorities
Write or phone your elected representatives
Express your opinion using social media
Serve on a citizens’ advisory committee
Speak at a public hearing in your area
Help organize public support
Help organize public opposition
Interim
Storage
Transportation
Route
51%
49%
47%
43%
37%
21%
47%
46%
40%
24%
22%
21%
21%
21%
As evident in the table above, only about half of the respondents said they would
likely attend public information meetings. Slightly less than half said that they would
contact their elected representatives or express their view using social media. The
percentage of respondents who said they would consider the remainder of the options is
lower still—37 to 40 percent said that they would serve on a citizens’ advisory
committee, 21 to 24 percent said they would speak at a public hearing, and about 20
percent said they would help organize public support for or opposition to a proposed
facility or transportation route. Approximately 14 percent of individuals said they are not
at all likely to participate in any of these activities (average score of <2 across all
activities), and about 6 percent score on the highest end of the participation scale
participate in all activities (average score of >6 across all activities). What makes some
individuals more likely than others to want to engage in these different activities? The
next section of the paper presents the theoretical framework we propose, as well as some
key testable hypotheses.
5. Variables and Measurement
5.1. Dependent Variable: Likely Public Engagement
In order to develop a measure of an individual’s self-reported willingness to
participate in the policy process, we created an additive index of the seven different
public engagement activities described above (for ease of interpretation we chose to
retain the original 1-7 scale). The results of an initial reliability and item factor analysis
for the seven items produced acceptable overall reliabilities, indicating that the items are
measuring an individual’s underlying proclivity to participate in public engagement
activities (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89). Furthermore, an exploratory factor analysis was
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conducted, using principle axis factoring with orthogonal “varimax” rotation, revealing
that the seven items fall into one distinct factor (scale alphas were above 0.6, see
APPENDIX A). The distribution was roughly normal and the average score was just
above mid-point (mean= 3.7; s = 1.5), indicating that the average respondent is somewhat
likely to participate in public engagement activities in regard to nuclear facility siting (see
Table 5.1).
5.2. Independent Variables
5.2.1. Perceptions of Risk and Benefits of Nuclear Energy
Building upon the rational choice model, we posited that individuals who express
strong perceptions of the risks and benefits of nuclear energy are more likely to have a
higher motivation to participate in public engagement activities. To measure an
individual’s underlying perceptions of risks of nuclear energy, we created an index that
combined individual responses to four questions (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92), on a scale
where zero means “no risk” to 10 which means “extreme risk.” First, what is the risk of
occurrence of an event at a U.S. nuclear power plant within the next 20 years that results
in the release of large amounts of radioactivity? Second, what is the risk of an event
during the transportation or storage of used nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants in the
U.S. within the next 20 years that results in the release of large amounts of radioactivity?
Third, what is the risk of a terrorist attack at a U.S. nuclear power plant within the next
20 years that results in the release of large amounts of radioactivity? Finally, what is the
risk of the diversion of nuclear fuel from a nuclear power plant in the U.S. within the next
20 years for the purpose of building a nuclear weapon? For ease of interpretation, after
combining responses to these four questions, we took the average to retain the original 010 scale.
Similarly, to measure an individual’s underlying perceptions of the benefits of
nuclear energy, we created an index that combined individual responses to four questions
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86), on a scale where 0 means “not at all beneficial” to 10 which
means “extremely beneficial.” First, individuals were asked to rate the benefit of fewer
overall greenhouse gas emissions because nuclear energy production does not create
greenhouse gases. Second, individuals were asked to rate the benefit of reliable power
because nuclear energy generates large amounts of electricity and is not affected by
weather conditions, such as low rainfall or no wind. Third, individuals were asked to rate
the benefit of greater U.S. energy independence because nuclear energy production does
not require oil or gas from foreign sources. Finally, individuals were asked to rate the
benefit of reduced environmental damage because of less need for mining coal or
extracting oil and gas. Similar to the risk index, we took the average of the four indicators
in order to retain the original 0-10 scale.
13
5.2.2. Socio-economic Characteristics
The empirical examination of mass political participation has focused primarily
upon the influence of standard SES factors and an individual’s level of political interest
and activism. To create this independent variable, we use standard measures of income
and education. Respondents were asked to estimate their annual household income for
2012, on a scale ranging from less than $10,000 (coded as 1) upward to over $200,000
(coded as 21). The average household income of respondents was between $50,000 and
$60,000 (mean= 6.2). Respondents were asked to specify their highest level of
completed education, on a scale of 1 (elementary or high school) to 7 (doctorate degree).
The average level of education for respondents ranged between some college/vocational
school to being a college graduate (mean=3.5).
5.2.3 Level of Political Activity
To measure an individual’s level of political activity, we use standard measures of
voting behavior (Leighley 1990; 1995; Woodward & Roper 1950). Individuals were
asked whether they are registered to vote, whether they voted in the 2012 presidential
election, and whether they usually vote in local elections, such as county supervisors,
mayor, city council, school board, etc. For each of the three questions, if respondents said
yes, they received a code of 1. If they responded no, they received a code of 0. An
additive index was constructed from the three questions, ranging from 0 to 3. The results
of an initial reliability analysis for the three items produced acceptable overall
reliabilities, indicating that the items are measuring an individual’s underlying political
activeness (Cronbach’s alpha = .78).
5.2.4. Cultural Worldviews
We argue that belief systems may also affect an individual’s willingness to
participate in public engagement activities. In particular, we measure these basic beliefs
through indicators of an individual’s dominant cultural orientation. To measure
individual’s disposition toward a cultural type, respondents were asked to indicate how
much they agreed (scale of 0=”Not at all” to 10= “Completely”) with each of the
following four groups of statements:
1. “I am more comfortable when I know who is, and who is not, a part of my
group, and loyalty to the group is important to me. I prefer to know who is in
charge and to have clear rules and procedures; those who are in charge should
punish those who break the rules. I like to have my responsibilities clearly
defined, and I believe people should be rewarded based on the position they
hold and their competence. Most of the time, I trust those with authority and
expertise to do what is right for society.”
14
2. “Much of society today is unfair and corrupt, and my most important
contributions are made as a member of a group that promotes justice and
equality. Within my group, everyone should play an equal role without
differences in rank or authority. It is easy to lose track of what is important, so
I have to keep a close eye on the actions of my group. It is not enough to
provide equal opportunities; we also have to try to make outcomes more
equal.”
3. “Groups are not all that important to me. I prefer to make my own way in life
without having to follow other people’s rules. Rewards in life should be based
on initiative, skill, and hard work, even if that results in inequality. I respect
people based on what they do, not the positions or titles they hold. I like
relationships that are based on negotiated “give and take” rather than on
status. Everyone benefits when individuals are allowed to compete.”
4. “Life is unpredictable and I have very little control. I tend not to join groups,
and I try not to get involved because I can't make much difference anyway.
Most of the time other people make all the rules; I just abide by them. Getting
along in life is largely a matter of doing the best I can with what comes my
way, so I just try to take care of myself and the people closest to me. It's best
to just go with the flow, because whatever will be will be.”
The first group of statements was designed to measure prototypical hierarchical
orientation; the second a prototypical egalitarian orientation; the third a prototypical
individualist orientation; and finally the fourth, a prototypical fatalist orientation.
Although these measures depart from the traditional 12 statement indices used in
previous cultural theory research (for example, Jenkins-Smith & Smith 1994; JenkinsSmith et al. 1994; Wildavsky & Dake 1990), we have several reasons to be confident in
their reliability and validity. First, we can assess the validity of these measures by
considering their correlations (see Appendix B). A correlation matrix shows that the
correlations between each of the four cultural types are generally low (r ranges between 0.12 to 0.22; p< .001), giving an indication that these variables are distinct concepts.
Second, recent research analyzing national, cross-sectional data, compares the convergent
and predictive validity between these new measures and the traditional 12 statement
indices and have found that they are empirically reliable and valid indicators of cultural
theory’s conception of cultural worldviews (Ripberger 2012).
15
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Mean Std.
Min.
Max.
Alpha
Dependent Variable
Public Engagement Index
3.7
1.5
1
7
.89
Independent Variables
Risk Index
Benefit Index
Income
Education
Political Activeness Index
Hierarchism
Egalitarianism
Individualism
Fatalism
Age
Gender
Ethnicity
6.6
7.0
6.2
3.5
2.4
5.6
6.0
5.4
4.5
44.3
0.5
0.3
2.5
2.0
4.2
1.3
1.0
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.9
16.1
0.5
0.4
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
10
10
21
8
3
10
10
10
10
86
1
1
.92
.86
--.78
--------
5.3. Control Variables
We also include three different control measures—age, gender, and ethnicity.
These are important variables to control for because we want to ensure that our estimates
of the effects of our primary independent variables are robust. When controlling for age,
gender, and ethnicity, do cultural orientations still explain why some individuals are more
likely to participate in the policy process than others? Respondents’ ages ranged from 18
to 86 (mean=46). Gender is measured as a dummy variable, in which males are coded as
1 and females are coded as 0. Approximately half of the respondents were male (48.6%).
Finally, respondents were asked to self-identify their racial and ethnic background. For
the purposes of our analysis, we have measured race and ethnicity as a dummy variable,
in which respondents who identify as Hispanics, African Americans, and Native
Americans received a score of 1, and everyone else received a score of 0. Univariate
statistics for our variables are listed in Table 5.1. Correlations between all the
independent variables and the dependent variable are in APPENDIX C.
6. Analytical Procedure and Findings
To test our hypotheses, we analyze our independent variables in four steps. We
begin by examining the influence of individuals’ perceptions of the risk and benefits of
nuclear energy (Model 1), SES characteristics (Model 2), political activeness (Model 3),
then cultural worldviews (Model 4), and finally, a full model including all of the
16
explanatory variables (Model 5). Each of these hypotheses is tested using an ordinary
least squares (OLS) model, with an emphasis on the significance and explanatory power
of each set of independent variables. Given the presence of competing explanations, by
including our independent variables sequentially, we can rule out possible colinearity and
employ a modeling strategy that shows the contribution of each set of independent
variables on the overall model fit.
The results of the first four models analyzing various factors that explain why
individuals may be more or less likely to participate in public engagement activities are
shown in Table 6.1. The first column contains the estimated OLS coefficients evaluating
the relationship between individual perceptions of risk and benefits associated with
nuclear energy and desire to engage in the policy process. The second column contains
estimated OLS coefficients for individuals’ SES characteristics. The third column
contains estimated OLS coefficients evaluating the influence of individuals’ prior
political and community activeness. Finally, the fourth column shows estimated OLS
coefficients for individuals’ cultural orientations. In Table 6.2, we present a full model
that tests the relationship between all of these individual characteristics and individuals’
reported likelihood to engage in the siting process. Both tables also include indicators of
statistical significance and model fit.
The first OLS regression, Model 1, as shown in Table 6.1, estimates the
relationship between an individual’s perceptions of the risk and benefits of nuclear
energy and their willingness to participate in the siting process. Building upon the
rational choice model, we hypothesize that individuals who hold higher perceptions of
risk and higher perceptions of benefits toward nuclear energy may inherently have a
higher motivation to participate in public engagement activities in order to secure their
preferred outcome. The regression analysis yields support for this hypothesis. As an
individual’s perception of the risks associated with nuclear energy increases, the
likelihood that they would participate in the siting process also increases (p<.001).
Similarly, as an individual’s perception of the benefits of nuclear energy increase, the
likelihood that they would participate also increases (p<.001). Based upon the model
results, perceptions of risks have a stronger influence (almost three times) on
participation than perceptions of benefits. In addition, with respect to our control
variables, age has a negative and statistically significant relationship with the dependent
variable. Older individuals are less likely to report prospective engagement in the policy
process (p< .001). With reference to race, our data indicate that white, non-Hispanic
respondents are less inclined to engage in the decision-making process than other racial
and ethnic minorities. Finally, we did not find that gender plays a significant role in
predicting likelihood of individual engagement in the policy process.
17
Table 6.1: OLS Estimates For Likely Engagement in the Policy Process
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Risk and Benefit Perceptions
Risk Index
0.143***
(0.014)
Benefit Index
0.068***
(0.017)
Socio-economic Characteristics
Income
0.027**
--(0.008)
Education
0.091**
--(0.028)
Political Activity
Political Activity Index
-0.422***
-(0.036)
Cultural Worldviews
Hierarchism
--0.068***
(0.013)
Egalitarianism
--0.091***
(0.012)
Individualism
--0.003
(0.012)
Fatalism
---0.088***
(0.011)
Control Variables
Age
-0.006**
-0.010***
-0.015***
-0.009***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
**
Gender (1=Male)
0.218
0.072
0.070
0.119†
(0.070)
(0.069)
(0.067)
(0.066)
***
***
***
Race/Ethnicity (1=Minority)
0.328
0.499
0.424
0.328***
(0.078)
(0.079)
(0.076)
(0.077)
***
***
***
2.382
3.507
3.193
3.472***
Intercept
(0.191)
(0.140)
(0.121)
(0.160)
2
Adjusted R
0.10
0.05
0.11
0.12
AIC
6369.41
6599.52
6474.14
6627.67
N
1804
1843
1843
1879
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10
Model 2 estimates an OLS regression model to test the relationship between
individuals’ SES characteristics, measured as household income and level of educational
18
attainment, and their reported likelihood to engage in the siting process. In keeping with
previous research and our proposed hypothesis, the analysis reveals a positive and
statistically significant relationship between SES characteristics and reported likelihood
to engage in the policy process (p< .01) (H1). As levels of income and education
increase, individuals become more likely to engage in the policy process. Age and
ethnicity continue to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent
variable, although standard SES characteristics and demographic control variables only
account for a small fraction of the variation in individuals’ likelihood to engage in the
policy process (Adj. R2= .05).
Next, we test the relationship between reported levels of political activity and
likelihood of engaging in the siting process. As expected, Model 3 results indicate a
positive and statistically significant relationship between political activity and likely
engagement in the policy process (p< .001)(H2). In other words, individuals who are
more politically active (measured through voter registration, voting in national and local
elections, and involvement in election campaigns) are more likely to engage in the siting
process. Furthermore, an individual’s age and ethnicity continues to have a statistically
significant relationship with stated likelihood of engagement (p< .001).
We can now turn to Model 4, which tests a set of hypotheses about how an
individual’s dominant cultural orientation influences their stated willingness to
participate in public engagement mechanisms. We hypothesize that there will be a
positive and significant relationship between hierarchism and egalitarianism and whether
a respondent stated they were likely to engage (H4 & H5). We also hypothesize a
negative and significant relationship between individualism and fatalism and likely
engagement (H6 & H7). As shown in Table 6.1, OLS coefficient estimates support three
of our four hypotheses. With reference to H4 and H5, both hierarchs and egalitarians
share a positive and statistically significant relationship with likely engagement (p<
.001). However, the partial regression coefficients indicate that egalitarianism has a
stronger impact on willingness to engage than hierarchism. With reference to H6 and H7,
we only find support for one of them. Fatalists have a negative and statistically
significant relationship with likely engagement in the policy process (p< .001). However,
individualism is not systematically related to the likelihood of engagement. One reason
for this could be that individualists may be conflicted about whether or not to engage.
Being low-group, they prefer self-regulation and acting alone. However, they may desire
to participate in collective decision-making if they think outcomes have the potential to
impact market interactions. Similar to the previous models, our control measures for age
and ethnicity continue to have a statistically significant relationship with likelihood of
engagement (p< .001). In total, an individual’s cultural orientation and demographic
control variables account for 12% of the variation in our dependent variable (Adj. R2=
0.12).
19
Table 6.2: OLS Estimates For Likely Engagement in the Policy Process- Full Model
Model 5
Risk and Benefit Perceptions
Risk Index
Benefit Index
Socio-economic Status
Income
Education
Political Activity
Political Activity Index
Cultural Worldviews
Hierarchism
Egalitarianism
Individualism
Fatalism
0.143***
(0.014)
0.046**
(0.016)
0.021**
(0.008)
0.046†
(0.025)
0.380***
0.033
0.043***
(0.013)
0.062***
(0.012)
0.002
(0.011)
-0.072***
(0.011)
Control Variables
Age
-0.012***
(0.002)
Gender (1=Male)
0.188**
(0.066)
Race/Ethnicity (1=Minority)
0.239**
(0.075)
1.370***
Intercept
(0.221)
2
Adjusted R
0.2247
AIC
5875.72
N
1732
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05;† p < 0.10
20
Finally, Model 5, as shown in Table 6.2, estimates a combined OLS regression
model to test the relationship between cultural worldviews and an individuals’ selfreported likelihood to engage in the policy process while controlling for SES factors,
political activeness, and demographics. An overall increase in the adjusted R2 and a
decline in the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) indicate that the full model provides a
significant improvement in model fit as compared to the other models described above.
Results from this model highlight strong support for our hypotheses about perceptions of
risk (p<.001) and benefits (p<.01) of nuclear energy, political activity (p<.001) and
cultural worldviews (p< .001). The SES characteristics of income (p<.01) and education
(p<.10) continue to yield positive and statistically significant results with a one-tailed
test.
Figure 6.1: Cultural Orientations and Public Engagement
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
Engagement Index
4.2
Hierarchy
Individualism
Egalitarianism
Fatalism
0
2
4
6
8
10
Cultural Orientations
A key contribution of this analysis is the role of individual cultural orientations in
shaping the inclination of individuals to want to engage in the policy process.3
3
We also disaggregated our dependent variable and explored any possible differences
with regards to an individual’s dominant cultural orientation and their desire to
participate in specific modes of engagement. We found uniform positive relationships
21
Furthermore, the expected directions of the relationships between hierarchs, egalitarians,
and fatalists and the dependent variable remain consistent in the full model. The trait of
individualism, similar to the results in model 4, does not appear to be influential in
explaining the likelihood to engage in decision-making. Similar to the previous models,
demographic characteristics also continue to have similar impacts on an individual’s
stated willingness to engage. As individuals get older, their expressed desire to engage in
the policy process decreases (p< .001). The data also indicate that minority respondents
(Hispanics, African Americans, and Native Americans) are more inclined to want to
engage in the decision-making process than non-minorities (p< .01). Finally, we find that
gender plays a significant role in predicting the likelihood of individual engagement in
the policy process, with males being more likely than females to participate (p<.01).
7. Conclusions and Future Research
The goal of this paper was to explore a critical underlying question regarding
public engagement in the policy process—given the opportunity; do all people wish to be
a part of the policymaking process? Why or why not? The findings presented offer
methodological, theoretical, and topical contributions to the public policy and political
participation literature. Methodologically, the paper presents a systematic way to measure
levels of individual engagement in the policy process. The engagement index used as the
dependent variable consists of seven venues through which individual participation can
be measured. This is a valuable addition to the existing methods for gauging levels of
public engagement, which have primarily (but not exclusively) focused on qualitative
methods such as observation, interviews, and focus groups. In future research, we plan to
experiment with new measures and different dimensions of public engagement in the
policy process.
Theoretically, the analysis helps us understand what factors influence an
individuals’ desire to be a part of any policy process. As summarized earlier, a majority
of the research on political participation tends to focus on socio-economic factors
(individual resources), individual rationality, their civic-mindedness, and mobilizing
networks. These variables, although useful predictors of participation, do not provide a
deeper understanding of an individual’s stated willingness to take part in political
activities. Individual cultural dispositions, as argued in this paper, can help provide a
with regards to hierarchism and egalitarianism across all modes of engagement. We also
found consistent negative relationships between fatalism and the desire to engage, across
all the different modes of engagement except one—organizing support in favor of siting a
nuclear facility. Finally, individualism did not predict an individual’s proclivity to
engage, except in participating via social media and organizing opposition (negative and
statistically significant relationships). However, individualism was not statistically
significant when controlling for all the other factors in our model.
22
deeper understanding of why some members of the public might be more willing to
participate in political activities than others. To this end, we find that cultural worldviews
account for some of this variation. In particular, our data reveal that individuals with
different cultural worldviews approach participation in the siting process differently.
Hierarchs and egalitarians express a greater likelihood of participating in different
engagement programs during the siting process. Fatalists on the other hand, are less likely
to want to take any initiative to be a part of the policymaking process. Finally, we find
that individualist tendencies do not seem to have a significant impact on initiatives to
engage in the process. In addition to cultural worldviews, we also find that risk-benefit
perceptions, socio-economic characteristics, and prior level of political activity influence
likely engagement in the policymaking process.
Finally, the research and findings presented here have empirical and issue specific
lessons. We find that desired engagement varies rather substantially across individuals.
This is an important finding for the nuclear energy domain, where increasing attention is
being paid to the virtues of stakeholder engagement. To be clear, these findings do not
discount the possible advantages and normative values of engaging the public in the
siting process. The trends shown here highlight the variability in public desires to be a
part of the siting process, indicating perhaps that the opportunity to engage in the policy
process is likely appeal to some members of the population more than others. This, once
again, has implications for implementing public engagement initiatives—public
preferences regarding willingness to participate in the policy process (as indicated by
their stated willingness to participate) vary across cultural belief systems as well as key
demographic characteristics. In future research, we plan to investigate the characteristics
that define these members of the public, and what it means for the design and
implementation of an effective public engagement program. Furthermore, we plan to test
whether these implications hold true not only for the nuclear energy domain, but also for
other complex policy issues that deal with heightened risk perceptions.
With these findings and the implications in mind, we would like to highlight a
few caveats of our study, which pose important avenues for future research. First, the
findings presented are based on the expressed willingness of respondents to participate in
the siting process. Although no consensus has been reached about the relationship
between expressed and actual behavior, some research in psychology has revealed a
positive and statistically significant link between the two (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
Accordingly, we are confident that our results speak to important dynamics of public
engagement and how cultural worldviews impact individual willingness to participate in
the policy process. In future research, we will investigate further the link between
intended and actual behavior in policy issues involving heightened risk perceptions such
as nuclear energy and nuclear waste management.
23
A second caveat involves the importance of the physical, social and institutional
context surrounding the issue such as physical proximity of the proposed action, the
presence and nature of (potentially competing) narratives explaining the event, the role of
leadership, and the presence of crisis events. While we argue that cultural worldviews
influence an individual’s willingness to participate in the policy process, there may be
other dynamics that influence individual decisions to engage in the policy process. Some
of these dynamics might interact with cultural worldviews. For instance, when
considering nuclear facility siting, levels of potential engagement might differ depending
on considerations of self-interest such as proximity of the facility to the individuals’
primary residence. Are some cultural types more likely to factor in distance of their
residence from a proposed facility when deciding whether or not to participate? We plan
to explore these kinds of relationships in future research using survey experiments where
respondents are assigned a random distance from the proposed facility and then asked
whether they would want to engage in the policy process or not. For the purposes of this
study however, the distance of 50 miles assumed for all respondents is a way of holding
an important self-interest variable (proximity) constant, allowing us to examine the
factors we analyze without varying self-interest related to proximity.
Similarly, focusing events within a policy subsystem (such as the Fukushima
accident in Japan for the nuclear energy subsystem) can affect individuals’ perceptions
about the issue and influence their willingness to participate in the decision-making
process. A country’s broad institutional and political structure can also affect
participation through the creation of new value definitions, social identities, economic
incentives and increased or stifled mobilization opportunities (Skocpol, 2004;
Vráblíková, 2014). Our point is that there are often competing forces that are likely
influence an individual’s propensity to engage in the policy process.
Nevertheless, our analysis has demonstrated that cultural theory provides a useful
way to characterize the patterns by which people think about the world around them and
make decisions about how to act to influence that world. Our emphasis has been on how
cultural orientations can shape propensities to participate across an array of means to
influence public policy, adding to our understanding of the variation in behavior across
individuals and groups in policy engagement. We therefore recommend that scholars and
practitioners of public engagement consider the integration of cultural orientations into
explanations of participation behavior and the design of mechanisms to foster public
engagement in public policy processes.
24
APPENDIX A: Factor Loadings
Variable
Factor 1
Public Engagement Index
Attend
Speak
Social Media
Contact Representatives
Organize Opposition
Organize Support
Citizen Committee
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
Political Activity Index
Registered to Vote
Voted in 2012
Votes in Local Elections
0.8
0.9
0.6
SS Loading
Proportion Var.
3.8
0.6
1.8
0.6
25
APPENDIX B: Correlations Among Cultural Types
Variables
Hierarch
Hierarchism
Individualist
Egalitarian
Fatalism
--
Individualism
-0.12***
--
Egalitarianism
0.22***
-0.02
--
Fatalism
0.13***
0.09 ***
0.08***
--
Significance Levels: *** p< .001; ** p< .01; *p< .05
APPENDIX C: Correlations Between Variables
DV: Public Engagement (1-7 scale)
Risk Index
0.25***
Benefit Index
0.10***
Income
0.091***
Education
0.086***
Political Activity
0.250***
Hierarchism
0.164***
Individualism
-0.049*
Egalitarianism
0.217***
Fatalism
-0.127***
Gender
0.655**
Ethnicity
0.168***
Age
-0.124***
Significance Levels: *** p< .001; ** p< .01; *p< .05
26
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