Zoltán Szántó – István János Tóth
Some typical network configurations
of corruption cases in Hungary
Preliminary research results
The Unexpected Link
June 17-18
Center for Network Science, CEU, Budapest
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Topics
 Introduction: Our earlier research on business corruption in
Hungary
 Main results of the earlier research projects (conceptual
framework, interview analysis, media content analysis)
 The idealtypes of corruption transactions (basic model, bribery,
extortion, embezzlement, fraud)
 Network configurations of corruption transactions: interpersonal
and institutional embeddedness of corruption – some typical
corruption cases in Hungary
 Conclusion: The evolution of corruption networks – corruption as
an institutionalized process?
Introduction
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Introduction:
Our earlier research on business corruption in Hungary
Financial supporters
 Transparency International Magyarország
 TEXTREND [NKFP_07_A2-TEXTREND, OM-
0002/2008]
 Corruption Research Center of the Institute of Sociology
and Social Policy at Corvinus University of Budapest
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Introduction:
Our earlier research on business corruption in Hungary

Conceptual and theoretical framework of corruption research
 Misuse of public power for private benefit (J.G.Lambsdorff)
 Principals, agents, and clients

Media representation of suspected corruption cases in Hungary: pilot research
(2007)
Background research studies to the Corruption Risks in the Business Sector
(National Integrity System Country Study – Part Two) Transparency International,
2008 (http://www.transparency.hu/part_two) and
 Business corruption in Hungary: From various angles – Research summary, In:
Szántó Zoltán – Tóth István János (szerk): Korrupciós kockázatok az üzleti
szektorban – kutatási háttértanulmányok (http://www.wargo/crc/index.html )
 Review of the Hungarian research literature on corruption
 Interviews with business leaders (qualitative analysis)
 Media content analysis (2006-2007: 737 articles/news, 176 corruption cases)

Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Introduction:
Our earlier research on business corruption in Hungary
 Corruption Research Center of the Institute of Sociology and Social
Policy at Corvinus University of Budapest (2008)
(Founders: György Lengyel, István János Tóth, Zoltán Szántó)
http://web.uni-corvinus.hu/szoc/intezet_kutatas.php
 Suspected corruption cases in the Hungarian media. Content analysis of
on-line newspapers. Research report by the CRC, 2009
 8 internet news portals and online versions of newspapers between
1 January 2001 and 31 December 2007
 Keywords: „korrupt” (corrupt), „korrupció” (corruption), „csúszópénz”
(slush fund), „kenőpénz” (palm-greasing), „veszteget” (bribe),
„pénzmos (money laundering)
 Total of 3469 articles/news on 444 corruption cases
Main results of the earlier research
projects
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Main results of the earlier research projects:
conceptual framework
 Misuse of public power for private benefit (J.G. Lambsdorff: The
Institutional Economics of Corruption abd Reform. CUP, 2007: 16-20)
 Private benefit: receiving money or valuable assets, increases in power
or status, favors for relatives and friends etc.
 Public power is exercised by bureaucrats (appointed to their office) and
by politicians (elected to their position)
 Public power is exercised in a variety of sectors: judiciary, public
procurement, business regulations, granting of permits, privatization,
foreign exchange, taxes, police, subsidies, public utility, government
services etc.
 Misuse: a behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Interview analysis
The size and scope of business corruption in Hungary
 Widespread in Hungary
 Corruption in the business and government sector cannot easily be
separated, often intertwined
Business corruption trends in Hungary
 Corruption on the rise over the past 5-10 years, but not clear about
exact size of increase
 Increase of corruption between government and business
 Unclear about reason for increase: Penetration of political influence?
Personal experience of interviewees
 Personal cases
Promoters of countering corruption
 Government and politicians seens as primary promoters
 Possibly a bottom-up strategy (small institutions and local government
as initiators)
 Business leaders can have important role
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Media content analysis –
Number of analysed articles by year
Number of analysed articles by year , 2001-2007, (N=3469)
800
676
700
629
602
587
600
500
476
400
275
300
224
200
100
0
2001
2002
2003
Source: BCE Corruption Research Centre, 2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Media content analysis –
Corruption cases by corruption service and bribe types
Suspected corruption cases by advantage and bribe types, 2001-2007
(%, N = 444)
100,0
93,2
89,2
90,0
80,0
70,0
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
9,4
5,1
1,7
1,4
0,0
Money
Source: BCE Corruption Research Centre, 2009
Information, permit, positions, etc.
Advantage
Bribe
Both
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Media content analysis –
Institutions involved in corruption
Suspected corruption cases by the institutions involved, 2001-2007,
(multiple response, %, N = 444)
40,0
35,0
34,5
32,2
30,0
25,0
18,7
20,0
15,0
11,0
10,0
3,8
5,0
7,0
6,5
Local
institutions
Other
institutions
5,2
0,0
Police
Courts
Local
governments
Source: BCE Corruption Research Centre, 2009
Ministries
/national
authorities
Tax office
Customs and
financial guard
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Media content analysis –
Procedures involved in corruption
Suspected corruption cases by the procedures involved, 2001-2007
(%, N = 444)
Inspections
44,0
Public, procurements
20,0
Licences, permits
15,2
State subventions
1,4
Other
19,3
0,0
5,0
Source: BCE Corruption Research Centre, 2009
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
35,0
40,0
45,0
50,0
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Media content analysis –
Share of multiplayer (networked) corruption cases
Share of multiplayer corruption cases, 2001-2007 (%, N=444)
70,0
60,0
60,0
55,0
51,6
50,0
40,0
30,0
36,6
28,8
25,0
23,6
20,0
10,0
0,0
2001
2002
Source: BCE Corruption Research Centre, 2009
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Main results of the earlier research projects:
summary
 Corruption is widespread and increasing in Hungary
 Earlier research results only show perception and judgement but
not actual mechanisms and motivations
 Corruption has been developed to a systemic – regular,
predictable, quasi-institutionalised – transaction
 The ratio of multi-player, chain-like, networked corruption is
increasing year by year
Idealtypes of corruption
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
 Principal-agent-client triad (Lambsdorff 2007: 18-19)
 The agent is entrusted with power by her superior (the principal):
The principal delegates a task to the subordinate (the agent), sets
up the formal rules as to how this task is to be fulfilled, and pays
salary to her/him
 The agent is supposed to serve the client in accordance to these
rules
 Different forms of corrupt behavior: the agent defects some ways
from her/his rule bound behavior – the principal’s rules are
trespassed and his/her interests are hurt
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: basic model
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Bribery
 The client acts as a briber, and makes a payment
(bribes) to the agent (the bribee)
 In return the client obtains an advantage (such as a
service or a license) (s)he is not entitled to obtain (for
example a tax rebate or a public contract)
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Bribery
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Bribery
Principal
Agent
Bribe:
Advantage:
Briber
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Bribery
Principal
Bribee
Bribe:
Advantage:
Briber
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Extortion
 The agent (as an extorter) uses her/his power to
extract money (or other benefit) from the client (the
extortee)
 The client (the extortee) may have to pay for a
service, although (s)he is legally entitled to obtain it
without such payment
 The agent (the extortee) uses coercion, violence, or
threats to obtain this payment
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Extortion
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Extortion
Principal
Extorter
Money:
Extortion:
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Extortion
Principal
Extorter
Money:
Extortion:
Extortee
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Embezzlement
 Theft of public resources by the agent (the embezzler)
 The disloyal agent (the embezzler) steals from the
principal (the embezzlee)
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Embezzlement
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Embezzlement
Principal
Embezzler
Resources:
Disloyalty:
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Embezzlement
Embezzlee
Embezzler
Resources:
Disloyalty:
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Fraud
 Information asymmetry: the agent is commomly better
informed about details of her/his daily tasks and her/his
efforts devoted to their fulfillment
 (S)he can benefit from informational advantages
(hidden information, hidden action, moral hazard)
 The agent can also actively conceal information from
the principal (swindle, trickery, manipulation of
information, facts etc.) - fraud
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Fraud
Principal
Agent
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Fraud
Principal
Agent
Resources:
Manipulation:
Client
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
The idealtypes of corruption: Fraud
Principal
Agent
Resources:
Manipulation:
Client
Network configurations & cases
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Network configurations of corruption transactions:
interpersonal and institutional embeddedness of
corruption – some typical corruption cases in Hungary
 Relations:
Personal relationship: actor
Business relations: actor
Ownership relation: owner
Bribe:
agent
Advantage:
agent
False service:
„seller”
False price
„seller”
 Actors
P1: (real) principal
P2: (hidden) principal
A: agent
C: client
B1, B2 : brokers
actor
actor
owned
client
client
„buyer”
„buyer”
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.1. Simple model, two actors, non regular corruption
1. case:
bribery of police
officer in the highway
Budapest -Miskolc
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.1. Simple model, two actors, non regular corruption
1. case:
bribery of police
officer in the highway
Budapest -Miskolc
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.1. Simple model, two actors, non regular corruption
1. case:
bribery of police
officer in the highway
Budapest -Miskolc
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.1. Simple model, two actors, non regular corruption
1. case:
bribery of police
officer in the highway
Budapest -Miskolc
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.2. Simple model, two actors with personal
relationship, regular transaction
2. case:
bribery of custom
officers at the
Hungarian –
Rumanian border
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.2. Simple model, two actors with personal
relationship, regular transaction
2. case:
bribery of custom
officers at the
Hungarian –
Rumanian border
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.2. Simple model, two actors with personal
relationship, regular transaction
2. case:
bribery of custom
officers at the
Hungarian –
Rumanian border
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.2. Simple model, two actors with personal
relationship, regular transaction
2. case:
bribery of custom
officers at the
Hungarian –
Rumanian border
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.2. Simple model, two actors with personal
relationship, regular transaction
2. case:
bribery of custom
officers at the
Hungarian –
Rumanian border
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.3. Simple model, two actors, resource conversion
3. case:
the „Hunvald’s model”
- real estate selling of
local government
(Budapest, VII. district)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.3. Simple model, two actors, resource conversion
3. case:
the „Hunvald’s model”
- real estate selling of
local government
(Budapest, VII. district)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.3. Simple model, two actors, resource conversion
3. case:
the „Hunvald’s model”
- real estate selling of
local government
(Budapest, VII. district)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.3. Simple model, two actors, resource conversion
3. case:
the „Hunvald’s model”
- real estate selling of
local government
(Budapest, VII. district)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
resource
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.3. Simple model, two actors, resource conversion
3. case:
the „Hunvald’s model”
- real estate selling of
local government
(Budapest, VII. district)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
false price ( < market price)
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.4. Simple model, two actors, two principals
4. case:
political party
financing with simple
transaction: the
Zuschlag-model
(HSP)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.4. Simple model, two actors, two principals
4. case:
political party
financing with simple
transaction: the
Zuschlag-model
(HSP)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.4. Simple model, two actors, two principals
4. case:
political party
financing with simple
transaction: the
Zuschlag-model
(HSP)
P1
disloyalty
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.4. Simple model, two actors, two principals
4. case:
political party
financing with simple
transaction: the
Zuschlag-model
(HSP)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.4. Simple model, two actors, two principals
4. case:
political party
financing with simple
transaction: the
Zuschlag-model
(HSP)
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.5. Simple model, two actors, two principals, resource
conversion
5. case:
political party
financing with
resource conversion
– buying a real estate
by local government
(Békés county)
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.5. Simple model, two actors, two principals, resource
conversion
5. case:
political party
financing with
resource conversion
– buying a real estate
by local government
(Békés county)
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.5. Simple model, two actors, two principals, resource
conversion
5. case:
political party
financing with
resource conversion
– buying a real estate
by local government
(Békés county)
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.5. Simple model, two actors, two principals, resource
conversion
5. case:
political party
financing with
resource conversion
– buying a real estate
by local government
(Békés county)
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.5. Simple model, two actors, two principals, resource
conversion
5. case:
political party
financing with
resource conversion
– buying a real estate
by local government
(Békés county)
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
resource
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
1.5. Simple model, two actors, two principals, resource
conversion
5. case:
political party
financing with
resource conversion
– buying a real estate
by local government
(Békés county)
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
false price ( > market price)
C
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
false service
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical
P1
A
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
C
false service
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical
P1
A
C
payoff
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
false service
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
2.1. Three actors, one broker with A, ownership and
business relations
6. case:
Reconstuction of a
building – feasibility
study - bribery of
local government
offical: „countryside
case”
P1
A
C
payoff
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
B1
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
B2
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
B2
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
B2
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
[P2]
C
B2
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
C
[P2]
B2
bribe = service (advertisement)
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
C
false price >
market price
false price <
market price
[P2]
B2
bribe = service (advertisement)
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
A
C
false price >
market price
false price <
market price
[P2]
B2
bribe = service (advertisement)
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
3.1. Three actors, one broker with C, business relations
7. case:
Political party
financing – a complex
model
C = media agency
B2 = TV channel
P1 = ministry
P2 = political party
Personal:
Business:
Ownership:
Bribe:
Advantage:
P1
false price ( > market price)
A
C
false price >
market price
false price <
market price
[P2]
B2
bribe = service (advertisement)
Conclusions
Topics  Introduction  Earlier results  Idealtypes  Networks  Conclusions
Conclusion: The evolution of corruption networks –
corruption as an institutionalized process?
 The evolution of corruption networks in terms of
 the number of actors
 the comlexity of network configurations
 the level of interpersonal and institutional embeddedness
 the multiplicity of relationships
 Corruption as an institutionalized process in terms of
 stability
 mixing the reciprocity, redistribution and market forms of
economic integration
Thank you for your attention!