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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
FilibusteringAmong Retiring Senators
L. MarvinOverby
Universityof Missouri
LaurenC. Bell
Randolph-MaconCollege
This papercontributesto the growing empiricalliteratureon filibustersby examiningthe factors that
are associated with individual-levelfilibusteringbehavior.We focus particularlyon the behavior of
senatorsin the latterpartof their careers,using impendingretirementas analyticalleverage to determine whether decisions to engage or not in dilatory parliamentarypractices are driven more by
narrowlydrawnconsiderationsof instrumentalutility or by compliance with institutionalnorms of
deference and cooperation.Using data from 1975 to 1993 and employing multivariatemodels that
allow us to control for other relevant factors, we find only limited support for a narrowlyrational
model of Senate "followership."In the course of our enquiry, we clarify the notion of legislative
norms, integrateour study with recent interdisciplinaryscholarshipon the evolution of cooperative
behaviorand considerhow leadershipcan be exercisedin environmentslargelybereftof formal leadership resources.
In recent years, filibusteringactivity in the U.S. Senate has received considerable attentionfrom various quarters.Textbooksnote the increasingfrequencyof
the practice and the increasingtrivialityof matterssubject to filibusters(Davidson and Oleszek 2002, 256; Sinclair 2001). Senatorsthemselves now appearto
expect filibusterson controversialbills and routinely seek to preemptsuch dilatory tactics by submittingpetitions for cloturein advanceof the menace (Stewart
2001, 364). Media coverage of Senate action often includes discussion of such
efforts to forestallor breakfilibusters,eitherthreatenedor actual.' Congressional
staffers have tried to summarize what we know-and don't know-about filibusters (Beth 1994, 1995). And scholars have attemptedto account for changes
in the nature and extent of the practice over time (see, especially, Binder and
Smith 1997; Binder,Lawrence,and Smith2002). Unfortunately,almost all of this
scrutinyhas been focused on the aggregatelevel, attemptingeitherto make sense
of the developmentof the filibuster(and, concomitantly,efforts to limit its use),
'See, e.g., Dewar and Goldstein (2002) on parliamentarymaneuveringsrelatedto recent attempts
to expand Medicareto include prescriptiondrug coverage.
THEJOURNALOF POLITICS,
Vol.66, No. 3, August2004, Pp. 906-924
? 2004 SouthernPoliticalScience Association
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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
907
to explain variance in its rate of deployment, or to assess its impact on policy.
Relatively little attention has been paid to the individual-level question of
what prompts any given senator to filibuster in some cases, but not in others.
Since filibusteringdecisions are ultimately individualones and since the ability
of each individualsenatorto obstructthe chamber'sbusiness through"extended
debate"lies at the heart of what makes leadershipin the chamberso problematic, this is a significant issue for anyone who wishes to understandhow the
Senate operates.
In this paper, we take a first step towardaddressingthis issue by examining
some of the individualdeterminantsof filibusterbehaviorduringthe 1975-1993
time period. We are especially interestedin the behaviorof one particulargroup
of senators-those on the verge of retirement.Focusing on senatorsfacing retirement will give us unique analytical leverage to examine whether decisions to
engage or not in dilatory parliamentaryactivities are influenced more by considerationsof instrumentalutility or by commitmentto the chamber'snorms of
cooperationand deference. When the shackles of impending considerationsare
removed and senators are released from concerns about future retaliations for
currentactions, do they behave differently?This is a questionthathas significant
implications reaching far beyond our understandingof the dynamics of filibustering to speak, more generally,to how we conceive of political leadershipin the
Senate. In the sparseenvironmentof the Senate,where individuallatitudeis great
and formal leadershipresources severely constrained,leaders' ability to utilize
the schedulingprerogativeto capitalize on their colleagues' instrumentaldesires
concerningthe futurehas been posited as one of the few compelling accounts of
how leadershipmay be exercised effectively.
Ourenquirywill requireus to think criticallyaboutexactly what a norm is and
to be more explicit about exactly what differentiatesa norm-which may well
have roots in rational considerations-from more instrumentaldeterminantsof
humanbehavior.In turn,this will lead us to integrateour study into recent interdisciplinaryscholarshipon the developmentof cooperativebehavior.
Our initial finding that retiringsenatorsare only minimally more prone to filibusterthantheircolleagues-and then only undercertainmodel specificationsindicates that leaders' scheduling prerogatives are probably only of marginal
importanceto the leadershipenterprise,thatconsiderationsof personalutility are
not necessarily dispositive even when the shadow of the futureis foreshortened,
and that legislative behavioris constrainedby internalizednorms even when the
rationalreasons for abiding by these norms has waned.
TimeHorizons,Filibusters,and RationalConsiderations
As Binder,Lawrence,and Smithnote, "[t]imepressures,howevercreated,seem
intricatelylinked to the strategicchoice to filibuster"(2002, 419). Citing Oppenheimer's general observations (1985) about the importanceof legislative time,
Binder and colleagues observe that
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908
L. Marvin Overbyand Lauren C. Bell
[w]hen the Senate schedule provides ample time to consider legislation on the Senate floor,
senatorscalculatingwhetherto launcha filibusterhave little leverage on their colleagues. There
are simply too few incentives for other senatorsto concede to an obstructivesenator.All else
equal, we should see few filibusterswhen legislative time is ample. As time grows scarce, senators, in particularSenate leaders,would have an incentive to yield to filibusteringsenators,so
as to proceed to the rest of the floor agenda. Under such conditions, filibustering should
increase, as it becomes a more effective strategyfor securingone's policy or political demands.
(2002, 410)
Employing a Poisson regression model and using a time series of data from the
eight decades afterthe adoptionof Rule XXII in 1917 (when cloture firstbecame
possible in the Senate), Binder and her colleagues (2002, 415) find empirical
support for this proposition, showing that filibusters were significantly more
likely to be launchedin the last session of a Congress than in the first.2
An analogy may be drawnhere to the individuallevel. While the Senate faces
the institutionalconstraintof the end of a biennial Congress (after which, of
course, all pending legislation dies, at least until it might be resurrectedwhen the
subsequent Congress convenes), individual senators face other, personal time
horizons that might affect their privatecalculationsregardingthe costs and benefits of engaging in filibusters.Perhapsforemostamongthese is retirement.While
every six years senatorsendurethe uncertainprospectof facing the voters, a large
majorityof incumbentsenatorswho seek reelection are successful, in some years
outstrippingeven the storiedreturnrates of House members.3Retirementis considerablymore certain.Unlike their colleagues who will either certainlyor very
probablybe returningto the chamberin the next Congress, retiringsenatorsface
a decidedly differentcalculationwhen deciding whetheror not to engage in a filibuster. Rather than being infinite, or indefinite, their time horizons shorten,
approachingthe immediate.
In theory,at least, this should make filibusteringmore attractive,since a shortening time horizon should decrease the perceived costs involved. While, to the
best of our knowledge, no one has yet explored this in much detail, Binder and
Smith do touch on it, at least obliquely. In a section of their book titled "Why
Are There Not More (Trivial) Filibusters?,"they speculate that an individual
senator'sdecision whether or not to filibuster "likely stems from self interest"
(1997, 111). As they put it, "[f]or individualsenators,opportunitycosts, the loss
of political capital, fear of retribution,and reputationaleffects may counterbalance the incentives to filibuster"(1997, 111-12). While retirementshould not,
ipsofacto, affect opportunitycosts, it shouldinfluencethe others.Concernsabout
2On the other hand, these authors find no evidence that, ceteris paribus, filibusters were more
common duringthe 1917-1935 period, when an automaticadjournmentdate of March4th in oddnumberedyears should have increasedend-of-Congresstime pressures.
3The averagerate of victory for senatorsseeking re-election duringthe 50-year period 1950-2000
was over 80% (see Davidson and Oleszek 2002, 62); in 1960, 1982, and 1992, Senatereelection rates
exceeded those of incumbentHouse members.
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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
909
political capital, fear of political reprisals,and considerationof one's reputation
in the chambershould all diminish as retirementgrows nearer.After all, once a
senator has left the chamber,he probablyhas far less reason to fret about the
futureutility of his prestige on the Hill, fewer opportunitiesto use his accumulated political capital, and greatly diminishedworriesregardingany sort of retaliation.4The point here about individual retirements is very similar to the
observationthat Binder,Lawrence,and Smith make at the aggregatelevel about
institutionaladjournmentdates:
[t]he incentive to filibusterwhen the last day is known is consistent with the differing game
theoretic results for finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of repeated games....
Although it is possible to sustain cooperationin repeatedgames with infinite horizons, once
the horizon is fixed, the incentives for defecting on the last play of the game increase. (2002,
419)
Krehbiel (1986) has explored and explicated some of the logic of such a
"repeatedgame" perspective on the Senate. Citing Axelrod's pioneering works
(1981, 1984), Krehbielarguesthat leadershipis possible in an increasinglyindividualistic Senate because party leadersuse their schedulingprerogativesto capitalize on the iterative nature of the legislative process.' While any individual
senatorhas the right to object to any bill and to mire the chamberdown until his
individual concerns are completely cared for, every senator also has legislation
somewhere in the pipeline that he prefers to pass. Modeling the process as an
iteratedprisoner'sdilemmagame, Krehbielshows thatmost senatorscan be made
to acquiesce to unanimous consent agreements (UCAs6) that they would not
otherwise favor for fear that if they obstruct the progress of legislation they
oppose, they open themselves to subsequent retaliation from colleagues who
oppose their bills. In game-theoretic terms, despite short-term incentives to
"defect"today (and seek to obstructany bill they dislike from coming to a vote),
4 That should certainlybe true of those senatorswho retire
fully from politics when they leave the
Senate and is likely true-to a somewhat lesser degree--even for those senatorswho remain active
in politics (e.g., as lobbyists,executive-branchappointees,or candidatesfor otherelective office) after
they departthe Senate.
'
This perspectiveis broadlyconsistentwith recentworkon the historicaldevelopmentof the Senate
that has stressed the importanceof agenda control gained by Senate leaders in the early decades of
the twentiethcentury(see Gamm and Smith 2002).
6
Unanimous consent agreements function much like special orders in the House of Representatives, supersedingthe standingrules of the Senate and establishingthe guidelines underwhich a bill
will be considered on the floor. UCAs outline the rules for debate, control of the allotted time, the
sequence of bills and amendmentsto be taken up, germanenessrestrictions(if any), and time limits
for considerationof bills and amendments.Unlike rules in the House, however,UCAs are negotiated
informallyby Senate leaders with all senators who have any significant interest in the bill at hand.
This is necessary because, as the name suggests, any individualsenator can object to a unanimous
consent agreementand impede the progressof legislation on the floor,perhapsup to the point of initiating a filibuster.
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L. Marvin Overbyand LaurenC. Bell
senators agree to "cooperate"because they fear "tit-for-tat"retaliationon bills
they care about tomorrow.7
While Krehbiel'smodel offers a solution to the "theoreticalpuzzle" (Stewart
200 1) of why senatorsoften forgo the opportunityto block bills they oppose, and
while it provides a rare and compelling account of how leadershipcan be exercised in an environmentvirtuallybereft of institutionalleadershipresources,it is
offered with very little in the way of empiricalsupport.Krehbieloffers only two
case studies in evidence8and notes that a "directand large N test of the theory"
would be difficult, largely because negotiation of UCAs cannot be observed
directly.
Behavior
Norms,Filibusters,and Internalized
An alternative to the individually based, instrumentally oriented, utilitymaximizing perspective outlined above posits that it is informal, even inchoate,
norms of behaviorthat accountfor senators'willingness to forego dilatoryaction
on measures they oppose. Fromandescribes the "informalpressures"that lead
senators to abide by the chamber's"loose formal rules" (1967, 118). Similarly,
in a history of UCAs, Keith argues that they must be considered within the
context of "the [Senate's]longstandingpractice of mutualrespect and consideration" (1977, 151). And Baker (1995) contends that the conventionalwisdom
regardingthe ardentlyindividualisticbehaviorof senatorshas been exaggerated,
noting that even in recent years the norms of collegiality, deference, and reciprocity are importantin the Senate "club."' As one senator put it, "[t]hereis a
great pressureto conform in the Senate. It's like living in a small town" (quoted
in Matthews 1973, 92). This view holds that senators' behavior is not simply
determined by instrumentalcalculations of individual personal advantages or
costs, but ratheris mediatedby experience in the institutionand concern for its
smooth operationand embeddedin a history of interactionwith colleagues.
It has become commonplace to consider these two perspectives as offering
competingrationaleson filibustering.Afternoting thata senator'sindividualdeci7In his recent autobiography,SenatorOrrinHatch makes the same point from his perspectiveas a
participantin the legislative trenches."[M]ost membershave learned to use the tactic [of filibustering] sparingly.... It is well understoodthat what you do to anothermember'slegislative prioritycan
be done to you" (Hatch 2002, 27).
of these cases come from the fall of 1983 and involved MajorityLeaderHowardBaker (R8 Both
TN). One concerns the sequencing of votes on S. 1529 (which dealt with allotment issues in the
federal dairy and tobacco programs)and subsequentagriculturalcommodityprice targets,which was
used to leverage the cooperation of senators from dairy and tobacco producing states. The other
involved the sequencing of votes on a bill to make the Rev. MartinLutherKing's birthdaya national
holiday and a subsequentvote on the Dairy and TobaccoAct, which was used to gain the cooperation of SenatorJesse Helms (R-NC).
9Speaking specifically to the reciprocitynorm, former SenatorFred Harrisagrees: "The reciprocity normhas been weakenedin the Senate.But it is not dead. Senatorscan still go too farwith obstructionism, and those who do lose respect"(Harris 1993, 119-20).
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RationalBehavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
911
sion regardinga filibuster "likely stems from self interest,"Binder and Smith
arguethat "[a]nalternativeexplanationis that adherenceto Senate norms, rather
than calculatedself-interest,accounts for the absence of truly ubiquitousfilibustering" (1997, 111, 113). Similarly,Stewartcontraststhe view of "[t]raditional
scholars and observers of Congress [who] have attributedthe lack of objection
to a 'norm' of consensus"to the perspective of "[m]odernstudents of congress
[who] tend to explain the observed lack of objection ... throughthe lens of individual utility maximization"(2001, 357).
Unfortunately,while the political science literatureis rich with descriptionsof
legislative norms,10the term remains a slippery one, lacking clarity and specificity of usage. As Grafsteinhas pointedlynoticed: "it is by no means clear what
norms are.... In regressionanalysis, after all, a norm would be called the residual" (1999, 138). Most political science treatments of norms offer only the
vaguest of definitions.Asher, for instance, defines a norm merely as "a rule or
standardof conduct appropriateto a person in a specified situation within a
group"(1973, 500). Similarly,Baker cites a definitionfrom the Dictionary of the
Social Sciences (Gould and Kolb 1964): "'a standardsharedby the members of
a social group to which the members are expected to conform, and conformity
to which is enforced by positive and negative sanctions'"(1999, 54).
The problemwith such elastic definitionsis thatthey can be invokedto explain
virtually any patternof behavior (Barry 1970). What is more, such definitions
make it difficult to draw analytical distinctions between behavior that is motivated by accession to norms and behaviorthat is driven purely by self interest.
Indeed, in his work on the Senate, Krehbiel argues that there is no real distinction to be made. "[N]orms,"he says, "arenot merely collective and regularstandardsof conduct;more specifically,they are productsof individualand variable
strategicdecisions. Congressmenhave reasons for choosing to conformto norms
and neithermore nor less selfish reasons for choosing to deviate"(1986, 562)."
The conflation of these concepts in the political science literatureis unfortunate and misleading. Scholars in the law and economics traditionhave long distinguished between the two, noting that while norms may have their roots in
appraisalsof individualinstrumentality,they are more than simply the aggregate
'0Fora classic account of institutionalnorms in the pre-reformera Senate, see Matthews(1973);
for an update on norms in the modem era see Baker (1999).
" Similar
argumentshave been made in the sociology and economics literatures.See, for instance,
Granovetterwho argues for an "embedded"understandingof rationality:"Whatlooks to the analyst
like nonrationalbehavior may be quite sensible when situational constraints, especially those of
embeddedness,are fully appreciated.... Thatsuch behavioris rationalor instrumentalis more readily
seen, moreover,if we note that it aims not only at economic goals but also at sociability, approval,
status, and power. [But e]conomists rarelysee such goals as rational ...." (1985, xx). In economics,
see especially works by Kuran(1995, 1998) that distinguish among "intrinsicutility" (which refers
to direct, instrumentaloutcomes), "reputationalutility" (which refers to how one's actions are
regardedby others), and "expressiveutility" (which refers to satisfaction received from following
one's personal preferenceswithout regardto outcomes).
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L. Marvin Overbyand Lauren C. Bell
manifestationsof personalutility. In particular,it is improperto speak of a real
norm until patternsof behaviorhave become internalized,so that they survive to
influence conduct even when considerationsof individualutility are no longer
operative.Cooter, for instance, puts the point bluntly:"a social norm is ineffective in a communityand does not exist unless people internalizeit" (1996, 1665).
In a recent articulationof this point in the political science literature,Chong
(2000) contrastsdispositions(which are individuallyinternalizedthroughsocialization processes) with incentives (which are rooted in rational calculations of
utility). The classic example from economics involves tipping for restaurant
service. Americanshave rationalreasons for tippingthe wait staff in local restaurants they plan on revisiting; a good tip today may lead to good service tomorrow. However,for most Americansthis behaviorhas become internalizedto the
extent thatthey routinelytip waitersin restaurantsthey have no intentionof revisiting even thoughthere is no rational,instrumentalreason for doing so (see Azar,
forthcoming,for an excellent overview of the economic literatureon tipping).12
This distinction is importantfor the currentresearch since the differentperspectives imply that we should have differentexpectationsof senators'behavior
depending upon whether we are more favorablypredisposed toward a narrow,
instrumentalview of individualrationalityor a broader,more inclusive perspective that may well be grounded in rational considerationsbut that operates via
personally internalizedinstitutionalnorms. As Chong has noticed, in reality it is
often difficultto distinguishbetween dispositions and incentives:"[I]f these dispositions are formedoriginallyto adaptto the environment... ,then they contain
a built-in instrumentalrationality,and the habitualresponse is indistinguishable
from the consciously calculated choice, so long as the environmentremains
unchanged"(2000, 63). At the end of a Senate career,however,the environment
changes; expectations of on-going professional relationshipscollapse and concerns about future cooperationdiminish. To use Chong's terminology,this "end
game" providesthe analyticalleverage necessary to examine the relative importance of dispositions versus incentives, by capitalizing on the changes in individual senators'political environmentsbroughton by impendingretirement.If,
on the one hand and as Krehbielsuggests, senators'individualfilibusteringdecisions are rooted in narrowly based, individual assessments of rationality,we
would expect to see filibusteringactivity increaseas retirementlooms. When the
last play of an individualsenator'scareerappearsover the time horizon,the logic
outlined above suggests that the shadow of the futureshortens,a senator should
employ much higher discount parametersfor possible future gains, and incentives to "defect" increase significantly,which should lead such individuals to
exercise their parliamentaryrights more fully, seeking to delay, alter, or kill
nonpreferredlegislation.
On the other hand,if senatorialbehavioris fundamentallyembeddedin internalized norms of cooperationand consent, we would not necessarily expect to
12 Grafsteinhas humorouslynoted thateven "mostrationalchoice theoriststip at restaurants"
(1999,
140).
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RationalBehavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
913
see more dilatoriousbehaviorfrom retiringsenators.In fact, there are reasons to
suspectthatwe might see less confrontationalbehavior.Since internalizationdoes
not happen immediately,but takes time to develop,13 more senior senators are
more likely to have thoroughly internalizedSenate norms such as cooperation
and, therefore,be less likely to engage in obstreperousparliamentarytactics. It
is worth observing in this regardthat a common finding in the literatureof management science is that older workersare more loyal to their employersand the
corporateethos of theirplace of employmentthan are youngerworkers(see, e.g.,
AmericanAssociation of RetiredPersons 1995; AmericanAssociation of Retired
Personsand Society of HumanResourceManagers 1993; Barth,McNaught,and
Rizzi 1993; Hassell and Perrewe 1995; Hogarthand Barth 1991; McNaughtand
Barth1992).14
As noted above, the highly personalnatureof the Senate and the concomitant
fact thatmuch business is transactedamongst senatorsin privatemakes a precise
test of Krehbiel'sargumentregardingobjectionsto UCAs virtuallyunachievable.
It is possible, however,to gain some greaterpurchaseon Krehbiel'sconclusions
by examining filibusterbehavior.Since filibusteringis the logical conclusion of
objecting to a UCA, the "end game" logic should be the same; since filibustering is an activity undertakenin public on the Senate floor, it is observable and
amenableto empirical analysis. Observing the filibusteringbehavior of retiring
senators,then, should allow us not only to examine some of the individual-level
factors that motivatethis parliamentarytactic, but also give us additionalinsight
into the dynamics of leadership(and "followership")in the Senate.
In the sections that follow, we first outline the data we will use to examine
these competing perspectives, then present our findings concerning the filibusteringbehaviorof senatorsbetween 1975 and 1993. Finallywe discuss the implicationsthese findingshold for ourunderstandingof both parliamentaryprocedure
and leadershipin the Senate, as well as for our broaderunderstandingof cooperative humanbehavior.
Dataand Methods
To examine the relative filibusteringpropensityof retiringsenators,we began
by compilinga list of all senatorswho served in the U.S. Senate duringthe period
13 McAdams argues that rationalconcern for the esteem of colleagues comes first to produce the
norm and "internalizationoperatesas a later reinforcingmechanism"(1997, 380).
14While retiringsenators are not necessarily older or more experienced,in practice they usually
are. Forinstance,of the 58 senatorswho retiredbetween 1976 and 1992, the averagelength of service
in the Senate was 15.6 years. That average goes up to over 16 years if we exclude the five senators
who were appointedto fill unexpiredterms, who served less than a full six-year term, or who did not
seek election to a full term(i.e., NorrisCotton[R-NH], MurielHumphrey[D-MN], KaneasterHodges
[D-SC], Nicholas Brady [R-NJ], and Jocelyn Burdick[D-ND]). This is considerablygreaterthan the
average tenure in the Senate during this time period, which was 8.67 years (Ornstein, Mann, and
Malbin, 1998, 21).
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914
L. Marvin Overbyand Lauren C. Bell
under investigation, 1975-1993. We limit our analysis to this period for two
reasons. First, the last major change in Senate rules regardingfilibusters was
made in 1975,'5after which several studies have documenteda dramaticincrease
in filibusters (see Binder and Smith 1997; Binder, Lawrence, and Smith 2002;
Monroe 2001). And, second, a definitive list of identifiablefilibustersexists only
through 1993 (Beth 1994; Binder and Smith 1997).16
Using the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774Present,'7we gathereddata on the 227 senatorswho served in the Senate during
this period, in particularidentifying the 58 senatorswho retiredvoluntarilyfrom
the chamber.18
Examiningall 58 retireesfromthis periodhas both advantagesand
disadvantages.The principaladvantageis that it increases the numberof cases
for analysis. The principaldisadvantageis that it complicates the comparisonof
careerfilibusteraverageswith end-of-careerfilibusterbehavior.Many of the 227
senatorsduringthis periodhad served for years (even decades) before the beginning of our time-series. For those who retired at or near the beginning of the
series, our computationsof careerfilibusterbehaviorand end-of-tenurefilibuster
behaviorare either identical or very similar.For this reason, we supplementour
analysis of all 58 retireesby also examining the behaviorof the sixteen senators
who retiredaftercompletingtheir entireSenate service between 1975 and 1993.19
We collected data on filibusters during this period using various issues of
Congressional QuarterlyWeeklyReports. For each filibuster identified by Beth
(1994), we attemptedto locate a specific mention in CQ WeeklyReports. In a
large majorityof cases (149 of 173), we could clearly identify a leader or set of
leaders with this source, althoughin 24 cases no senator/scould be identifiedas
the leader/s. Throughsubsequentexaminationof various issues of CQ Almanac
and variousCongressionalResearchService reports,we were able to identify the
leadersof five additionalfilibusters.Thus, of the 173 filibustersidentifiedby Beth
15In 1975, the number of senators needed to invoke cloture was reduced from two-thirds of
senatorspresentand voting to three-fifthsof the entire membership.
16We should note that while filibustersare easy to define, they are not so easy to identify.Burdette
points out that insurmountabledifficulties confront an attemptto compile a complete and unchallengeable list of instances in which the Senate of the United States has been subjectedto the tactics
of delay. With motives hidden in the give and take of parliamentarybattle, who can say whether a
prolonged speech is a concealed design for obstructionor a sincere effort to impart information,
whether garrulousnessis more cunning than it seems? Undoubtedly,there will be filibusterswhich
will forevergo unrecognized.(1965, vii).
CongressionalResearchService (CRS) legislative politics specialist RichardS. Beth adds that"the
first thing we don't know about filibustersis how many there are" (Beth 1995, 8).
17This source is availableat http://www.senate.gov/learning/bioguide_intro.html.
"
We include as retirees those who voluntarilydepartedto pursue other office, but exclude those
who were defeated in either primaryor general elections, or who were expelled from the Senate.
9 In chronologicalorderof retirement,these are SenatorsHayakawa,Tsongas, Hart,Laxalt,Evans,
Quayle,Trible,Armstrong,Humphrey,Wilson, Adams, Garn,Gore, Rudman,Symms, and Wirth.We
exclude SenatorJocelyn Burdickwho served for less than a year, filling a "widow's mandate,"and
Senators KaneasterHodges and Nicholas Brady,who also served appointmentsof less than a full
Congress.
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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
915
(1994), we are able to examine the individualbehaviorof filibusterleadersin 154
cases (89%) over the 19-yearperiod.
We crafted our dependent variables using these data, calculating for each
senator in the data set a variablerecordingthe numberof filibustershe led per
Congress. Since the numberof filibustersper Congress per senatorvaried from
0 to 7, we use orderedlogistic regression as our estimationtechnique.20
Our independentvariable of greatest theoretical interest taps retirement.For
each of the 58 senatorswho retiredduringthe time period of the study,we code
the Congress immediatelyprior to retirement1; all other Congresses are coded
0. If senators'cooperativebehavior is fundamentallybased upon narrowcalculations of personal utility (and, by extension, Senate leadershipis rooted in the
scheduling prerogative to capitalize on repeated iterations of the legislative
game), we would expect to see senatorssubstantiallyincreasetheir filibusterparticipation in the preretirementCongress, all other factors held constant. If this
variablegenerates an insignificantcoefficient (or one with a negative sign) that
would be evidence thatinternalizednorms dampenfilibusterbehavior,even when
the shackles of rationalconsiderationsare loosened.
Filibusters,of course, do not occur in a vacuum;in the real world, considerations beyond impendingretirementare certainto influencethe filibusteringdecisions of individualsenators.Unfortunately,since previousresearchon filibusters
has focused exclusively on the aggregateratherthan the individuallevel, there is
little in the literatureto guide our selection of control variables to include on
the right hand side of our equations. Utilizing our own instincts and judgment,
however,we believe there are at least three factorsthat might significantlyinfluence individualfilibusterbehavior.First, by definitionfilibustersare undertaken
by minoritiesin orderto derailthe preferencesof a legislative majority.We code
each senatoras to whetherhe was a memberof the majorityparty in the Senate
for each Congress we examine. Those in the majorityparty are coded 0, those in
the minority 1; as a result, we expect this variableto generatea positively signed
coefficient.
Second, even casual examination of the raw data reveals that senators with
more ideologically extreme reputationstended to filibuster more than did their
moderatecolleagues duringthis period. Therefore,we generateda "folded"ideological extremismmeasure, calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between each senator'smean Americans for DemocraticAction (ADA)
score and the ADA midpoint of 50. Senators with more ideologically extreme
voting patterns-be they liberal or conservative--generate largervalues on this
measure, with moderatesenatorsscoring closer to 0. Ceteris paribus,we expect
this variableto produce a positively signed coefficient, indicatinga greaterwillingness to filibusterby ideological extremists.
20We also ran each of the models using a variety of other MLE estimatorsand in OLS. The findings were generally robust, with the choice of estimatormaking little difference in terms of either
statistical or substantivesignificance, or overall model fit.
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L. Marvin Overbyand Lauren C. Bell
Third,following the work of Lee (1998) and Lee and Oppenheimer(1999) on
"the unequal consequences of equal representation,"we suspect that senators
from small states might take greater advantage of filibuster opportunitiesto
achieve in the Senate what small delegation size often precludes in the House.
While there are numerousways in which to operationalize"small state size," we
chose a dichotomousmeasurein which we coded senatorsfrom the 19 least populous states as 1 and all othersas 0.2'Again, our expectationsare straightforward;
if senatorsfrom smallerstatesare systematicallymore likely to initiatefilibusters,
this variable should generate a positively signed, statistically significant
coefficient.
Results
Simple descriptiveanalysis of the datatells some of the story.These data show
that 36 of the 58 retiring senators (62%) did not lead a filibuster at any time
duringthe period of our analysis, indicatingthata majorityof filibustersarebeing
led by a minority of members. Of the 22 retiringsenatorswho led at least one
filibuster during the 1975-1993 period, fully half (n = 11) did not lead one in
the final Congress of their careers. In other words, only 11 of 58 retiringsenators (less than one-fifth) can be identified as leading filibustersduring the final
two years of service in the Senate,22a figurethat does not provideoverwhelming
prima facie evidence that retiringsenators are behaving in the strategic,utilitymaximizing manner some have suggested. Of the 40 total filibusters waged
between 1975 and 1993 that we identify as having been led by senators who
retiredduringthis period,only about38% (n = 15) were launchedduringthe final
Congress of the leader'stenure in the Senate.23
21
We take this from Table 1 in Lee where he calculates a representationindex based on "a ratio of
the state'sactual populationto 1/50th of the nation'spopulation."As Lee explains, '[w]hen the ratio
is equal to one, the state is neitherover- nor underrepresentedby referenceto a one-person,one vote
standard;when it is less than one, the state is overrepresented;when it is greaterthan one, the state
is underrepresented"(1998, 37-38). We chose the cut-off of an index score of .50, differentiating
substantiallyoverrepresentedstates from others.
22
Furthermore,only four of these retiringsenators(Abourezk[D-SD], Mathias[R-MD], Evans [RWA], and Wirth [D-CO]) engaged in more than one filibusterin their last Congress.
23 It is possible that failureto filibusterduringthe last Congress of a Senate careermay not be evidence of norm-basedbehavior but ratherpart and parcel of a broaderpatternof shirking of duties
prior to retirement.We do see some evidence of shirkingamong the retiringsenatorsin our sample
(e.g., in earlierCongresses, our retireesparticipatedin an averageof 89.86% of all votes, compared
to just 85.26% duringthe Congress immediatelypriorto their retirements,a differencethat is statistically significantat the .01 level). However,filibusteringdoes not appearto be relatedto such shirking. Specifically, last Congress voting participationrates for filibuster leaders (85.91%) are not
significantlydifferentfrom that of nonfilibusterers(85.11%). Moreover,when a voting participation
rate variableis added into our multivariateequations, it neither achieves statistical significance nor
materiallyimpacts the performanceof the other independentvariables. It is also possible that our
observedresults flow from the fact that, as a matterof chance and happenstance,retiringsenatorsdid
not need to filibustermuch in their last Congress because the issues that would motivate them to
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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
917
TABLE1
Filibuster
OrderedLogisticalRegression Models of Individual-Level
Behavior.1975-1993
Variable
All Senators
Retirees
Minority Party
.511***
(.167)
.022***
(.006)
-.080
(.172)
-.002
(.350)
.02
1012
2.384
(.223)
3.900
(.260)
5.312
(.361)
5.858
(.436)
7.120
(.740)
7.815
(1.024)
.634*
(.394)
.006
(.014)
.344
(.398)
.367
(.411)
.03
218
2.472
(.487)
4.180
(.599)
Ideological Extremism
Small State
RetirementCongress
Pseudo-R2
n
cut 1
cut 2
cut 3
cut 4
cut 5
cut 6
***p
.01; **p
?
Complete Career
.700
(.599)
-.043*
(.023)
1.061*
(.612)
1.200*
(.661)
.11
75
.809
(.805)
3.159
(.957)
.05; *p < .10.
Gaining additionalpurchaseon these figures requiresemploying multivariate
equations,which we reportin Table 1. This table shows results for three sets of
senators:all senatorswho served during the 19-yearperiod of our study; those
who retiredduringthe period; and those senatorswho retiredafter serving their
entire tenurein the Senate between 1975 and 1993. We run these analyses separately because we expect them to give us differentperspectives on the individual-level factors influencing filibusters. The equation examining all senators
should give us the broadestview of those factors associated with filibusteringat
the level of the individualsenator.However,since a large majorityof the senators who served duringthis period did not retire,the effects of retirementmight
be artificiallymuted in this model since the retirementvariablewill actually be
a constantfor most of the senatorsconsidered.The model examining the behavfilibustersimply did not arise duringthat time period, possibly because they had successfully killed
such measures in previous years. While we think the natureof our longitudinalanalysis make such
possibilities highly unlikely, it would requiredetailed,"thickanalysis"of each senator'spreferences
and behaviorto definitively rule this out; such analysis, however,lies well outside the scope of this
paper.
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918
L. Marvin Overbyand Lauren C. Bell
ior of all those senatorswho retiredduringthe 1975-1993 period has the advantage of showing variationin the retirementvariablefor all senatorsin the model.
However, as noted above, the cut-off dates for the time period we review complicate the analysis for those senatorswho retiredearly in the time series and risk
obfuscating the impact of any retirementeffect. Finally, the model examining
only that small subset of senatorswho voluntarilyretiredafterserving theirentire
Senate careers during the 1975-1993 period allows us the best opportunityto
isolate a retirementeffect, althoughthe small numberof cases and the (possibly
idiosyncratic)nature of those senators who opt for short careers may strainthe
reliability of the model as well as its generalizability.
The results for all senatorswho served duringthe 1975-1993 period are found
in the left column of Table 1. As expected, ideological extremismand membership in the minorityparty emerge as highly robustpredictorsof filibusterbehavior, both significant well beyond the .01 threshold. State size and retirement
status, however, fare poorly in this model. The coefficient for neither variable
even approachesthe size of its associated standarderrorand in both cases the
coefficients carry unanticipatednegative signs. Clearly,when examiningall senators,it is those who are ideologically extremeand membersof the minorityparty
who are more likely to engage in more filibusters.This is intuitive, since such
members are likely to favor defeat of majority-preferredlegislation and have the
most to gain by exercising dilatory tactics. On the other hand, it is worth noting
that the pseudo-R2for the model is a modest .02, indicatingthat even the relatively powerful effects of ideology and partisanshipaccount for only a fraction
of the variationobserved in filibusterrates.24
The middle column of Table 1 displays the results for those senators who
retiredfrom the chamberduringthe period of our study.Again, the model results
are somewhat disappointing,generatingan overall pseudo-R2of only .03. State
size and retirementremainstatisticallyinsignificantin this specification(although
each carries the anticipated positive sign), and ideological extremism, too,
appears unrelatedto filibuster behavior among this group of retiring senators.
Only membership in the chamber'sminority party seems to have a consistent
effect on the filibusterdecisions of this subset of senators, and then only if we
are inclined to accept a liberal .10 thresholdof statistical significance.25
24 Suspecting the possibility that the retirementeffect might operate in a nonadditivefashion for
only some types of senators(e.g., that ideological extremistson the verge of retirementmight be even
more likely to filibuster),we crafted variablesinteractingretirementwith the other three independent variablesand ran various iterationsof this and the following models with these interactiveterms,
both sequentiallyand collectively. In no instances did these interactiveterms contributeto improved
model fit.
25 End of career filibustersare also likely to be influencedby several other factors, including age
(essentially a surrogatefor infirmity)and perhapspost-Senateemploymentplans (those senatorsplanning on post-retirementcareersthat include on-going interactionwith their formercolleagues might
still see entirely instrumentalreasons for not alienating them with obstructionist behavior). We
modeled these factors in an equation (not reported,but available from the authors), in which we
createda dichotomousdependentvariable,coded 1 for those retireeswho led a filibusterduringtheir
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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
919
Finally,the right side column of Table 1 summarizesthe results for the smallest subset of senators in our study, those who completed their entire Senate
service duringthe 1975-1993 period and left the chambervoluntarily.As noted
above, while this dropsthe numberof cases significantly(to 16 senatorsand 75
total observations),it gives us the best purchaseon the effects of retirementsince
we have a group of senatorsfor whom we can observe complete careers,without
the censoring effects inherentin employing the 1975 and 1993 cut-off dates. The
results from this model show that, at least for this group of senators,impending
retirementdoes appearto increase somewhattheir willingness to engage in filibusters. The positive sign on the retirementvariableindicates that after controlling for the effects of partisanship, ideology, and state size, senators who
completed their entire Senate service during the 1975-1993 period were more
likely to undertakefilibustersin the last Congress of theirtenure,but the strength
of this association is marginaland statistically significant only if we accept the
.10 threshold(p < .07).26
It also bears mentioningthat while among this group of senatorsmembers of
the minorityparty were no more likely than members of the majorityto engage
in filibusters,those from small states were at least modestly more likely to do so
(p < .083), the only evidence in our study that state size affects filibustering
behavior.Interestingly,the ideological extremismvariablealso generatesa modestly significant and negatively signed coefficient, indicative of greater filibustering activity among moderatesthan among extremists.While this is certainly
counter-intuitive,it may be driven at least somewhatby the natureof the senators who opted for short careers in the late 1980s and early 1990s (14 of our 16
cases retiredin 1986 or later). There was a markedincrease in ideological and
partisanpolarizationin the Senate duringthis time period (Binder 1996), which
made the institution a markedly less hospitable environmentfor moderates of
both parties (see Cohen 1996).27 This seems to be reflectednot just in high rates
of retirementsamong moderatesduringthis period,but also frustrationsleading
toward high rates of filibusters among moderates (such as Gary Hart, Daniel
Evans, and GordonHumphrey)who would not ordinarilybe expected to engage
in such dilatorytactics.
It is possible thatthe observedpreretirementincreasein filibustersfor members
of this group and their reputationfor being moderateare somewhat connected.
last Congress, 0 otherwise. After controlling for state size, ideological extremism,and membership
in the minority party,neither age nor post-retirementemploymentpatternsemerged as statistically
significant.
26This finding is confirmedthroughdifference of means tests. Duringthe earlierportions of their
careers in the Senate, these 16 senators led a total of eleven filibusters, for a per-Congressaverage
of .20. During their final Congresses, however,they waged eight filibusters,doubling the averageto
.56. Again, this is a statisticallysignificant difference (p < .056) if consideredunder a more liberal
statisticalthreshold.
27 See also the Senate farewell speeches collected in Ornstein and Guttman.As the editors note,
"manyof [the retiringsenators]lament the increasinglevel of vituperationand partisanshipthat has
permeatedthe atmosphereand debate in the Senate"(1997, xi).
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920
L. Marvin Overbyand Lauren C. Bell
McAdams (1997) suggests there is a fundamentaldifference between what he
calls "abstractnorms" and "concretenorms."28The distinction is an important
one because abstractnorms are not only more generallyaccepted,29but are also
likely to develop well before concrete norms do.30Our findings are consistent
with this interpretation,highlightingas they do a groupof moderatesenatorswith
relativelyshorttenuresin the chamberwho appearto have more thoroughlyinternalized the institution'sabstractnorms of restraintand cooperationthan the concrete behavioralnorm of forgoing filibusteropportunities.
Discussionand Conclusions
In this study, we have expanded our understandingof filibusters in the U.S.
Senate by examining, for the first time, the factors that contributeto individual
senators' decisions to lead "extended debates." In general, our multivariate
models tend to confirm intuitionand conventionalwisdom regardingthe forces
that motivate filibusteringbehavior.Ceteris paribus, senators who are ideologically more extreme and those who are members of the minority party in the
chambertend to lead disproportionatenumbersof filibuster.
Ourfindingsregardingthe effects of impendingretirementare somewhatmore
ambiguous. The fact that fewer than 20% of senators opt to lead filibustersin
their last Congress strikesus as underwhelmingand indicates, at very least, that
retiring senatorsdo not entirely and en masse disregardthe chamber'snorms of
comity and cooperationin order to pursue narrowlypersonal legislative goals.
This dynamic is visible in our first two multivariatemodels (i.e., those for all the
senatorswho served duringthis time period and for retirees), where the coefficients associated with the retirementCongress variableare insignificantin both
cases. The unwillingness of most retiringsenators(who were, on average, older
and more senior than others in the chamber)to take advantageof the full range
of obstreperousparliamentarytactics even when they no longer had to fear future
sanctionsfrom theircolleagues speaksto the powerful,lastingeffects of the internalization of group norms. This is somewhat at odds with a model (see, especially, Krehbiel 1986) that stylizes senatorsas simple utility maximizersengaged
in an iterated,prisoners'dilemma game. To the extent that norms seem to matter
(at least for some senators)the model needs to be amended.
The rational choice model receives greater (if still less than overwhelming)
supportwhen we focus on only those senatorswhose entire careers are encompassed within our time series. For these senators, as the shadow of the future
shortensand retirementnears,incentivesto cooperateappearto lessen and incen28McAdams gives "be a good neighbor"as an example of an abstractsocietal norm, and "don't
litter"or "clean up after your dog" as examples of more concrete norms (1997, 383).
29 "Many people internalize
obligationslike 'do one's share'or 'be respectfulof others,'but not the
specific behaviorsnecessary to fulfill these obligations"(McAdams 1997, 384).
30"The point here is one of timing: If internationalizationoccurs at all, it is likely to occur first at
the abstractlevel and only later at a concrete level" (McAdams 1997, 383).
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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation?
921
tives to defect appearto increase,renderingthis groupof senatorssomewhatmore
likely to engage in dilatory behavior, even after controlling for other relevant
factors.We account for this deviationfrom our generalfindingby delineatingthe
unusual natureof this group of senators,arguingthat while they appearto have
embracedcertainabstractinstitutionalnorms,theirrelativelyshortterms in office
did not allow them to fully internalize concrete norms related to the filibuster.
Nevertheless, the example of these 16 senators provides the best evidence we
have of strategic "followership"behavior, although clearly more research is
needed to broadenthe scope of the investigation,expandingboth the length of
time and the numberof senatorsunder consideration.
To the extent that these findings are valid, they have implications that reach
beyond our understandingof filibustersto speak, more generally,to our appreciation of how Senate leadership operates. Surveying the daunting task facing
Senate leaders and inventoryingthe diminishingly small array of institutional
resources at their disposal, Krehbiel (1986; see also Stewart2001) has provided
one of the few compelling accounts of how leaders can systematically compel
their notoriouslyindividualisticcolleagues to cooperateby utilizing their scheduling prerogativesto capitalizeon the iterativefeaturesof the legislative process.
Taking advantage of the "end game" properties of this process, our analysis
extends the limited, anecdotal evidence that Krehbiel first offered in supportof
his model. The fact that we do see at least some systematic evidence of strategic
increases in filibusteringon the part of some retiringsenatorsmakes the elegant
theoreticalmodel rathermore appealing. However,the fact that these increases
are both statisticallyand substantivelymarginalindicates, in our judgment, that
there is still plenty of room for the amorphousconcepts of personal skill and
institutionalnorms in any explanation for the workings of Senate leadership.
These findings suggest that contemporarystudents of the Congress may have
underestimatedthe importance of norms such as cooperation and reciprocity.
While there is little doubt that--in a relative sense-there has been erosion of
these norms over the past 50 years, it would be a gross exaggerationto conclude
that they no longer matter.Indeed, our findings are consistent with an interpretation that they mattera great deal and serve as significant constraintson individual incentives that could be quite detrimentalto the welfare of the institution.
Even more generally,our analysis speaks to other,larger,issues, extending as
they do the growing literaturein law and economics regardinghow informal
social norms can help overcome pervasive collective action problems. Since the
pioneering work of Ellickson (1991), scholars in this traditionhave recognized
that there can be "orderwithout law,"at least if a group is closely knit and interactions among individualswithin the group are iterativeso as to make cooperation and accommodation individually rational. Our findings relative to the
behavior of U.S. senatorsimplies that while norms of cooperationmay well be
rooted in essentially rational evaluations of personal utility, as these norms
become internalized over a long period they outlive the expiration of purely
rational considerationsand continue to exercise an influence on behavior even
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922
L. Marvin Overbyand Lauren C. Bell
when individualutility concernsmay dictateotherwise.Models of humanbehavior will be richer and more illuminatingwhen the roots and limits of norms are
more fully incorporatedinto the rationalchoice perspective.
Acknowledgments
We wish to acknowledgethe assistance and counsel of many individuals,without
whom this projectwould not have been possible. We are particularlygrateful for
the supportof RichardBeth at the CongressionalResearchService, and the very
wise comments of David Rohde and Scott Ainsworth on an earlier draft of
this project, which was presented at the 2002 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association. Finally, we are indebted to the several anonymous reviewers whose comments contributedimmeasurablyto the quality of
this research. We alone are responsible for any remaining errors of fact or
interpretation.
ManuscriptsubmittedOctober 7, 2002
Final manuscriptreceived July 31, 2003
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L. Marvin Overby is associate professor of political science, University of
Missouri,Columbia,MO 65211 ([email protected]).LaurenC. Bell is assistantprofessorof political science, Randolph-MaconCollege, Ashland,VA 23005
([email protected]).
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