Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc
0022-0663/00/$5.00 DOI: 1O.1037//O022-O663.92.4.7O9
Journal of Educational Psychology
2000, Vol. 92, No. 4, 709-717
Theory of Mind and Self-Concept in Preadolescents:
Links With Gender and Language
Sandra Leanne Bosacki
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This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Brock University
The investigation of the ability to attribute mental states to others and to see them as the basis for people's
actions has been referred to as "theory of mind" (ToM) research. This study assessed ToM, or social
understanding, in preadolescents and examined individual differences in the relations among social
understanding, self-concept, and language competence. One hundred twenty-eight preadolescents (64
girls, 64 boys; mean age = 1 1 years, 9 months) completed tasks concerning self-concept and vocabulary
and participated in a story-telling interview that assessed social and self-understanding. There were
positive associations between children's social understanding and (a) self-understanding, (b) selfperceptions of behavioral conduct, and (c) general vocabulary ability. Independent of vocabulary ability,
girls scored higher than boys on both social and self-understanding tasks.
Although the investigation of self-concept and social understanding in preadolescents began over 40 years ago (Bruce, 1958;
Flapan, 1968), researchers remain puzzled as to how preadolescents learn to make meaning from their social experiences. Over
the past decade, developmental psychology has attempted to answer this question by envisioning the child as an interpretative
psychologist who depends on a mentalistic construal of reality to
make sense of the social world (Bennett, 1993). Often referred to
as "theory of mind" (ToM) or "social understanding," this way of
viewing sociocognitive development provides a new framework to
explore how psychological understanding of self and others develops (Astington, 1993; Harter, 1999; Wellman, 1990). In brief, the
ToM approach to social cognition claims that a largely implicit
conceptual framework allows children to understand, explain, and
predict their own and other people's behavior and mental states
(Barresi & Moore, 1996).
The most studied aspect of children's ToM development is their
recognition of false belief (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). At approximately 4 years of age, children understand that people act on their
representation of the world, even in situations where it misrepresents the real situation. That is, at this age, children can represent
and reason from people's first-order beliefs: X believes P. From as
young as age 5 or 6, children are able to represent and reason from
second-order beliefs: X believes that Y believes P. In contrast, the
development of this ability to interpret embedded representations
or recursive statements such as "She thinks that he thinks that..."
has received little attention in the literature. This is surprising
given that much of people's social interaction depends on what
they believe about other people's beliefs (Astington, 1993). The
importance of higher order or recursive reasoning has been shown
in relation to children's ability to understand speech acts such as
lies and jokes (Leekam, 1993) and in their ability to understand
self-representational display rules (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999). This
mentalizing ability, beginning in early childhood, to recognize,
represent, and understand others' thoughts and emotions provides
the sociocognitive foundation for the later development of socioemotional competency (Dunn, 1995). Even so, there exists very
little research to date on how preadolescents' knowledge of the
mental world is linked to their self-perceptions and self-knowledge
(Flavell, 2000).
Self-Concept
Similar to ToM research, research on the self has been riddled
with theoretical and methodological conflict since the field's conception (Bruner, 1996). Given the various conceptual and methodological issues surrounding self-concept (Harter, 1999), for the
purposes of the present study, the "theory" view of self-concept
was chosen. This theory of self-concept assumes that the conceptual self is a multidimensional cognitive representation or theory
that is based on an understanding of one's own beliefs, desires, and
intentions (Epstein, 1973). Although the notion of self-theories is
not new (see Epstein, 1973), most research on self- and person
perception has been conducted by personality and social psychologists, whose main interests often are trait characterizations and
how they relate to psychosocial variables such as temperament,
social competence, and so on. (Flavell & Miller, 1998; Wellman,
1990). Thus, the question of how children's developing ToM
provides the infrastructure for self-conception has not been
addressed.
The data reported in this article form part of a doctoral dissertation
submitted to the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education at the University
of Toronto. Portions of this article were presented at the 28th Annual
Meeting of Jean Piaget Society, Chicago, 1998, and the Biennial Society
for Research in Child Development, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1999. I
thank the students, educators, and parents who participated in this study. I
would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Mary
Louise Arnold, Janet Wilde Astington, David Booth, Anne McKeough,
Jack Miller, and David Olson.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sandra
Leanne Bosacki, Faculty of Education, Brock University, St. Catharines,
Ontario, L2S 3A1 Canada. Electronic mail may be sent to sbosacki®
ed.brocku.ca.
709
710
BOSACKI
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ToM and Self-Concept
According to ToM, people's understanding of themselves partakes of, and is limited by, their knowledge and beliefs about the
mental world (Wellman, 1990), although there is little research
relating self-concept to ToM understanding. Although the domain
of self-research shares many conceptual similarities to that of
ToM, self-concept has been studied mainly within the domain of
social-cognitive psychology (Flavell & Miller, 1998). The few
ToM studies that have explored the self-other differentiation and
social emotional development have largely dealt with preschool
children or young school-aged children (e.g., Astington & Jenkins,
1999; Homer & Astington, 1995; Hughes & Dunn, 1999). When
this article was written, there existed only one study of links
between aspects of self-understanding and ToM (Banerjee & Yuill,
1999). In that study, a positive link was found between young
children's understanding of self-presentational display rules and
second-order representation (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999).
Preadolescent ToM: A Case for Complexity
Research on preadolescent social cognition includes studies on
attribution and perspective or role taking (both of self and other;
e.g., Damon & Hart, 1988; Selman, 1980), person perception (e.g.,
Yuill, 1992), and empathetic sensitivity (e.g., Ferguson, Stegge, &
Damhuis, 1991). There are some conflicting findings and links
between sociocognitive ability and self-concept. Some studies
report positive links between psychological understanding of self
and others (Hatcher, Hatcher, Berlin, Okla, & Richards, 1990),
whereas others report negative relations between mentalizing abilities and self-esteem (Veith, 1980). In some studies, sociocognitive
abilities and self-worth have been found to be independent (Matthews & Keating, 1995; Schultz & Selman, 1989), whereas other
studies have found a positive link between cognitive abilities and
self-concept. For instance, positive associations have been found
between attentional resources and self-complexity (Conway &
White-Dysart, 1999), and performance on the Embedded Figures
Tasks and self-esteem (Bosacki, Innerd, & Towson, 1997). Thus,
such findings motivate additional examination of socioemotional
correlates of ToM in preadolescents (Hatcher & Hatcher, 1997).
Gender Issues
The process of learning to understand self and other within a
social context may be contingent on how a child's gender interacts
with his or her environment (Edwards, 1993; Maccoby, 1998).
According to the gender intensification hypothesis (Hill & Lynch,
1983), during preadolescence, gender differences increase among
girls and boys as a result of the increased pressure to conform to
traditional gender role stereotypes. For example, during preadolescence, traditional gender role behavior and ascription (i.e., femininity = sociality, submissiveness; masculinity = autonomy, aggression) becomes intensified (Hill & Lynch, 1983; Tavris, 1992).
At approximately age 11, some girls (in comparison with boys)
experience the following shifts in social cognition: a significant
drop in feelings and thoughts of self-worth (e.g., Edwards, 1993;
Silverstein & Perlick, 1995), an increase in self-consciousness
(e.g., Eder, 1989; Simmons, Rosenberg, & Rosenberg, 1973), and
an increasingly negative sense of self-worth despite high academic
achievement (particularly among "gifted girls"; e.g., Matthews &
Smyth, 1997). Boys score higher than girls on nonsocial spatial
perspective-taking tasks (Coie & Dorval, 1973), whereas girls
score higher than boys on social perspective taking, empathy, and
person perception (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Honess, 1981). Similarly, there are gender-related differences between sociomoral
reasoning and classroom behavior. In middle-school-aged children, there are relations between sociomoral reasoning and classroom behavioral conduct among boys only (Bear, 1989; Bear &
Rys, 1994). More specifically, Bear (1989) found a positive link
between boys' social moral reasoning and conventional classroom
behavior. That is, compared with girls, boys who displayed relatively sophisticated sociomoral reasoning were rated by their
teachers as more well-behaved.
Despite the conceptual similarities between sociocognitive reasoning and ToM abilities, the exploration of gender-related differences in ToM understanding has just begun. Of the few ToM
studies that test for gender effects, most report nonsignificant
results (e.g., Jenkins & Astington, 1996), although in two more
recent investigations, girls and women scored significantly higher
on ToM-type tasks compared with boys and men (Baron-Cohen,
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Hughes & Dunn, 1999).
The Present Study
On the basis of the possibility that ToM provides the infrastructure for self-concept (Wellman, 1990), I explored whether preadolescents' ToM may promote a better understanding of the two
main tasks of early adolescence: (a) the intrapersonal task of
constructing a coherent sense of self (Damon & Hart, 1988) and
(b) the interpersonal task of understanding multiple and contradictory intentions of others (Chandler, 1987). Thus, the present study
explores the links among three constructs important to ultra- and
interpersonal competence: (a) self-concept as defined as the ability
to judge one's competence in various domains (physical appearance, academics, athletics, sociability, and behavioral conduct) as
well as to describe and justify one's perceived worth as a person
(global self-worth); (b) social understanding or ToM as defined by
the ability to understand multiple perspectives (conceptual role
taking or perspective taking), recognize and understand emotional
states (empathetic sensitivity) and understand the concept of a
person as a psychological being with stable personality characteristics (person perception; see Chandler, 1987, for further discussion of this framework for a preadolescent ToM); and (c) general
language competence as defined by receptive vocabulary ability.
To do so, I developed a task to assess ToM or mental-state
understanding in preadolescence and used the task to examine the
relations among ToM, self-concept, and vocabulary ability, and
whether relations varied with gender.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-eight 6th-grade children, drawn from six elementary schools in a mainly middle-class area, participated in this study (mean
age = 1 1 years, 9 months; range = 10 years, 9 months to 13 years, 2
months). There were 64 girls (mean age = 1 1 , 9 ; range = 10, 9 to 12, 5)
and 64 boys (mean age = 11, 9; range = 11, 3 to 13, 2). The ethnic
THEORY OF MIND AND SELF IN PREADOLESCENTS
composition of the sample was 98% white Euro-Canadian, with 97% of the
participating sample reporting English as their first language.
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Procedures
The study consisted of two parts. The first stage consisted of an in-class
group administration of two standardized measures (a self-concept questionnaire and a vocabulary task). The second stage took place during the
same week as group administration and included the withdrawal of individual children from their classrooms to participate in a 20- to 30-min
interview. The first part of the interview consisted of two brief vignettes
that were read to the participants (order of stories was counterbalanced). To
assess understanding of the story characters' mental states and feelings,
each vignette was followed by a combination of forced-choice and openended questions (see Bosacki & Astington, 1999, for examples). The
second part of the interview assessed participants' understanding of their
answers on the previously completed Self-Perception Profile for Children
(SPPC; Harter, 1985). Thus, on the basis of their answers on the SPPC, the
participants were asked six questions, each pertaining to a specific domain
of the SPPC (see the Appendix). On average, the interview lasted 20 to 25
min. The entire interview was recorded on audiotape for subsequent
transcriptions and analyses consisting of two ambiguous social narratives
followed by questions to assess social and self-understanding. Thus, children completed the following measures (each measure is described in detail
in the following section): (a) group-administered SPPC (Harter, 1985); (b)
group-administered Gates-MacGinitie Vocabulary Test (MacGinitie &
MacGinitie, 1994); (c) individually administered Social UnderstandingSocial Narratives (developed for this study by Bosacki, 1998); (d) individually administered Self-Understanding Interview (questions based on responses to Harter's SPPC).
Measures
Social understanding or ToM. To assess a preadolescent's ToM (his or
her understanding of mental states and emotions), two brief vignettes
consisting of an ambiguous social situation (one story involves three
boys—the Kenny/Mark/Tom story—and one involves three girls—the
Nancy/Margie/new girl story) were created. Borrowing from (a) theoretical
work that views ToM as a vehicle or instrument that is used to coconstruct
or narrate one's social reality (Astington, 1993; Bruner, 1996) and (b) the
few studies that have attempted to investigate an advanced ToM through
the use of narratives (Charman & Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Fox, 1991; Happe\
1994), this task aimed to assess the ToM or mentalizing ability involved in
interpreting social meaning from ambiguous stories. The stories were
socially ambiguous on the basis of past research claims that interpretations
of ambiguous social situations are an effective method of eliciting children's ToM (Levinson, 1995). Each story was followed by four groups of
questions (sections A-D) that represent the constructs of conceptual perspective taking or the understanding of higher order mental states, empathetic sensitivity, person perception, and alternative thinking (see Bosacki,
1998, for complete protocol; see Chandler, 1987, for an analysis of perspective taking in these terms). Two comprehension questions were asked
before the main questions to control for memory and comprehension
effects. If the comprehension questions were answered incorrectly, the
researcher reread the story to the child.
To illustrate, the following story (Kenny/Mark/Tom) was read to the
child:
Kenny and Mark are co-captains of the soccer team. They have one
person left to choose for the team. Without saying anything, Mark
winks at Kenny and looks at Tom who is one of the remaining
children left to be chosen for the team. Mark looks back at Kenny and
smiles. Kenny nods and chooses Tom to be on their team. Tom sees
Mark and Kenny winking and smiling at each other. Tom, who is
711
usually one of the last to be picked for team sports, wonders why
Kenny wants him to be on his team.
Following correct responses to the comprehension questions, children
were asked the following questions to assess their ability to understand
higher order mental states in others, including the ability to understand
multiple perspectives (conceptual role taking): "Why did Mark smile at
Kenny?" "Why did Kenny nod?" "Why did Kenny choose Tom to be on
the team? How do you know this?" "Do you think that Tom has any idea
of why Kenny chose him to be on the team? How do you know this?" To
assess their ability to recognize and understand emotional states (empathetic sensitivity), children were asked, "How do you think Tom feels?
Why?" To assess the ability to understand the concept of a person as a
psychological being with stable personality characteristics (person perception), children were asked to choose a character in the story and describe
him. They were asked, "What kinds of things can you think of to describe
him? What kind of a person do you think he is?" Finally, to assess their
ability to imagine multiple perspectives and alternatives, children were
asked, "Is there another way that you can think about this story? If so,
how?" Similar questions were asked for the Nancy/Margie/new girl story.
The stories were read to the children in counterbalanced order.
Coding of social understanding stories. A coding scheme based on
interview transcripts was developed to obtain a total ToM score (see
Bosacki & Astington, 1999, for further coding and psychometric details of
this measure). Responses were coded on the basis of various coding
schemes gleaned from both social-cognitive (e.g., Damon & Hart, 1988;
Hatcher et al., 1990; Selman, 1980) and ToM literature (Happe\ 1994;
Yuill, 1992) and represented the level of ToM understanding based on the
increasing conceptual complexity of the responses. Thus, the coding of the
responses reflected the child's ability to understand others' psychological
worlds, moving from simple, obvious ("surface") characteristics to the
integration of multiple and paradoxical perspectives. In particular, 0 points
were given for "I don't know" (or no answer) or tangential responses, 1
point for responses that included behavioral or situational descriptions, 2
points for responses that included mental states or acts of communication
or perception, and 3 points for responses that included an integration of two
or more mental states and related them to each other in a coherent manner
(e.g., moral judgments or recursive psychological statements). Only one
score was given per response so that participants were given credit for their
best answer. Thus, the total score represented a best estimate of the
participants' ability to understand social situations. The items of each story
were summed, resulting in the maximum total score of 21 for each story,
with a high score representing a more sophisticated understanding of
mental states and feelings (i.e., a more complex ToM). Interrater reliability
(calculated with 38% of the transcripts) was high, with Cohen's kappa at
.98 (range = .90 to 1.00) for the Nancy/Margie/new girl story and .99
(range .95 to 1.00) for the Kenny/Mark/Tom story. Internal consistency
was lower, with Cronbach's alphas for the Nancy/Margie/new girl story
and the Kenny/MarkAbm story at .67 and .69, respectively. A total ToM
score was calculated from the sum of the two story totals (maximum total
score of 42).
Self-concept. On the basis of its conceptual similarity to ToM (i.e.,
cognitive representation of one's mental states directed toward oneself),
and drawing on Damon and Hart's (1988) and Harter's (1985) theory that
self-concept consists of a cognitive component (self-understanding) and an
affective component (self-esteem), the present study assessed both aspects
of the self-concept. Self-esteem was measured with Harter's (1985) SPPC.
The SPPC is a 36-item self-report questionnaire divided into six subscales,
including scholastic competence, social acceptance, athletic competence,
physical appearance, behavioral conduct, and global self-worth. For example, to assess self-perceived scholastic competence, children were asked to
first choose which of the following sentences sounded more like them:
"Some kids feel that they are very good at their school work" or "Other
kids worry about whether they can do the school work assigned to them."
After the children had decided which sentence sounded more like them-
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712
BOSACKI
selves, they were then asked to judge whether the statement was "really
true for me" or "sort of true for me." All questions followed the same
format. The SPPC is frequently used in social-cognitive research among
preadolescents (e.g., Evans, Brody, & Noam, 1995), with internal consistency reliabilities (Cronbach's alphas) for all subscales ranging between
.71 and .86 (Harter, 1985); test-retest reliability ranges from .69 to .87,
varying with subscale.
Self-understanding. To assess the children's particular theories or understanding of competence in a given domain, children were given a brief,
six-question semistructured interview (one question per domain). That is,
children were asked to provide a justification for six of their SPPC
self-statements. The six items were chosen by Harter (1985) to each best
represent one of the self-concept domains from the SPPC. Thus, for each
of the six SPPC items, the participants were asked the following key
question: "What is the main reason for why it's really true/sort of true that
[item content]?" For example, to assess one's understanding of his or her
academic competence, if the participant chose that the statement "Some
kids feel that they are very good at their school work" is really true for him
or her, the researcher asked, "What is the main reason for why it is really
true that you do very well in your school work" (see the Appendix)? Thus,
these justifications of self-beliefs may provide a more accurate picture of
how children understand their own theories about their social selves,
academic selves, physical selves, and so on. (Harter, 1985; 1999).
Coding of Self-Understanding Interview
Similar to the social understanding stories, the coding of the selfunderstanding responses also reflected the child's ability to understand
people's psychological worlds, moving from simple, obvious ("surface")
characteristics to the interaction of several different abstract psychological
concepts and the integration of multiple and paradoxical perspectives. To
assess the complexity of a child's understanding of his or her self-theory
(Harter, 1985), each of the six self-understanding statements were scored
(on the basis of past research; e.g., Hatcher et al., 1990; Selman, 1980) on
a scale ranging from 0 to 3. A score of zero was given if the child was
unable to answer or replied "I don't know." Responses were scored as 1 if
they contained a self-description such as "I have lots of friends" or "I do
what the teacher says" but did not give any explanation or interpretation of
the description. Responses were scored as 2 if they contained a selfdescription followed by simple explanations such as "I have lots of friends
because I'm easy to get along with" or "I do well at school because I study
hard." Finally, responses were scored as 3 if they included a combination
of thoughts and feelings and/or an integration of psychological aspects of
both self and other. For example, "I'm smart because I've never gotten
under a C. I try my hardest, that's the most important, that I try my hardest
to make my parents proud." A total score was obtained (6 items X 3
responses), resulting in the maximum total score of 18 for each interview,
with a high score representing a more sophisticated self-understanding (i.e.,
a more complex theory of self). Thirty-eight percent of the transcripts were
coded by a second, independent coder. Interrater reliability was high, with
an average Cohen's kappa of .96 (range = .91 to 1.00 for the six individual
items). All discrepancies were resolved by consultation between the coders. Internal consistency was acceptable, with an alpha of .72.
Skills, r = .80, and the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills, r = .73
(MacGinitie & MacGinitie, 1994).
Results
Gender-Related Differences
There was a significant multivariate main effect for gender on
the SPPC scales (Wilks's A = .88), F(l, 127) = 2.80, p < .001. In
follow-up univariate analysis of variance for each of the selfconcept subscales, there were significant main effects for gender
for behavioral conduct only (see Table 1), F(l, 127) = 5.49, p <
.05. Compared with boys, girls scored significantly higher on
behavioral conduct. That is, girls perceived themselves as more
well-behaved. Boys scored higher than girls on physical appearance, F(l, 127) = 4.24, p < .05. Such results are congruent with
Hatter's (1985) original findings. However, my results are not
consistent with Harter's previous finding that boys scored significantly higher than girls on athletic competence and global selfworth. Finally, girls and boys did not differ in their scores on the
Gates-MacGinite Vocabulary Test (see Table 1), F(l, 127) =
0.66, ns.
With respect to the social stories, there was a main effect for
gender in a multivariate analysis of variance (Wilks's A = 0.81),
F(l, 127) = 7.04, p < .001, followed by significant univariate
gender main effects. To control for the possible confounding
variable of language ability, a multivariate analysis of covariance
was performed in which the means of girls and boys on the social
stories were examined, with their Gates-MacGinitie Vocabulary
Test score acting as the covariate (see Table 1). Independent of
vocabulary ability, girls scored significantly higher than boys
on both the total self- and social understanding score, F(l,
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Gender
Effects for Main Variables
Group
Variable
Girls
(n = 64)
Boys
(« = 64)
Language
SPPC (possible range = 6-24)
Behavioral conduct
Academic competence
Social acceptance
Athletic competence
Physical appearance
Global self-worth
SELF (possible range = 0-18)"
TOMTOT (possible range = 0-42) b
GMAT (possible range = 0-45)
18.98(1.84)
17.89 (4.46)
18.63(4.13)
18.13 (4.20)
17.39 (4.55)
19.81 (3.72)
13.00(2.51)
30.25 (4.64)
29.52 (7.10)
17.36 (4.00)*
17.78 (3.75)
17.52 (5.30)
18.75 (4.08)
18.51 (4.08)*
19.41 (3.39)
11.77(2.36)**
26.00(6.21)**
30.38 (7.67)
ToM and self-concept measures are linked to both receptive and expressive language ability (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Happg, 1994;
Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Matthews & Keating, 1995). Hence, the
Gates-MacGinitie Vocabulary Test, Level D 5/6 (MacGinitie & MacGinitie, 1994) was used to assess general receptive vocabulary competency. This test is a valid and reliable measure of language proficiency,
with a Kuder—Richardson Formula 20 reliability coefficient of .91 and
strong correlations with other reading tests such as the Iowa Tests of Basic
Note. Mean scores are shown, with standard deviations in parentheses.
SPPC = Self-Perception Profile for Children (Harter, 1985); SELF = total
self-understanding score; TOMTOT = total social understanding score;
GMAT = total score from the Gates-MacGinitie Vocabulary Test
(MacGinitie & MacGinitie, 1994).
" Scores derived from self-understanding scores. The higher the scores, the
greater the self-understanding. b Scores derived from social understanding stories. The higher the scores, the greater the social understanding.
* p < .05. **p < .01.
713
THEORY OF MIND AND SELF IN PREADOLESCENTS
127) = 7.00, p < .01, and F(l, 127) = 23.58, p < .01,
respectively.
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Vocabulary, ToM, and Self-Concept Correlations
Regarding links with language and self-perceptions, Table 2
includes a significant positive association between perceived behavioral conduct for boys, but not for girls (i.e., rs = .37 and —.03,
respectively), z = 2.33, p < .05. As boys' language scores increased, their scores on self-perceived behavioral conduct also
increased. Table 2 also contains a significant negative correlation
between vocabulary ability and self-perceived athletic competence
for boys (r = — .32, p < .05; as boys' language scores increased,
their self-perceptions of athletic competence decreased). The corresponding correlations for girls was not significant and was in the
other direction (i.e., r = .21, p < .10). The difference between the
girls' and boys' correlations was significant, z = -5.40, p < .01.
There was a significant positive correlation between vocabulary
ability and self-understanding (r = .31, p < .05) for the boys. As
boys' scores on the self-understanding scores increased, so did
their general language ability (see Table 2). The corresponding
correlation for the girls was not significant, r = .04, ns.
ToM and Self-Concept
To test the relation between ToM and self-concept, Pearson
correlations were calculated between the total social stories score
Table 2
Pearson Correlations Among Social Understanding, SelfUnderstanding, and Language Ability
(TOMTOT) and the six subscales of the SPPC (see Table 2). The
correlation between the TOMTOT and behavioral conduct was
significant for boys, r(62) = .30, p < .05, but not for girls, r(62) =
.09, ns.
As predicted, there were significant positive correlations between the total social stories score (TOMTOT) and the total
Self-Understanding Interview score for both boys (r = .61, p <
.01) and girls (r = .46, p < .01). That is, children who provided
more sophisticated justifications for their self-statements also
scored higher on the social stories. Given the link between the
general language ability and the social and self-understanding
scores, partial correlations were conducted with Gates-MacGinitie
Vocabulary Test scores held constant. The correlations between
social understanding and self-understanding remained independent
of vocabulary ability, partial r = .60 for boys and partial r = .45
for girls; both ps < .05. Thus, independent of general language
ability, children with higher self-understanding scores also
achieved higher social story scores.
Self-Concept (Self-Esteem and Self-Understanding)
To investigate the various dimensions of the self-system (cognitive and affective), correlations were calculated between the total
Self-Understanding Interview score (cognitive component) and the
SPPC subscales (affective component). As summarized in Table 2,
the only significant link existed between self-understanding and
perceived behavioral conduct in boys, r = .37, p < .01: Boys who
rated themselves as relatively well-behaved on the SPPC also
provided relatively sophisticated responses in the SelfUnderstanding Interview.
Discussion
Variable
SELF
TOMTOT
GMAT
.09
.03
-.02
.01
.01
-.03
.46***
—
.07
.13
.02
.21 +
.04
.04
.04
.45***
Girls (n = 64)
SPPC
Behavioral conduct
Academic competence
Social acceptance
Athletic competence
Physical appearance
Global self-worth
SELF
TOMTOT
-.03
-.09
.10
.21 +
.18
-.09
—
—
Boys (n = 64)
SPPC
Behavioral conduct
Academic competence
Social acceptance
Athletic competence
Physical appearance
Global self-worth
SELF
TOMTOT
.37**
.08
-.06
.03
-.13
-.05
—
—
.30**
.14
.02
.14
.07
.09
.61***
—
.32**
.14
-.06
-.32**
.17
.17
.31**
.29*
Note. Correlations remained significant (p < .05) when vocabulary ability was partialled out. SELF = total self-understanding score; TOMTOT =
total social understanding score; GMAT = total score from the GatesMacGinitie Vocabulary Test (MacGinitie & MacGinitie, 1994); SPPC =
Self-Perception Profile for Children (Harter, 1985).
t/> < .10 (marginally significant). *p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <
.001.
The hypothesis that preadolescents' ability to understand the
mental states of others would be related to their self-concept and
language competence was partially supported. First, independent
of vocabulary ability, ToM was linked to self-understanding. However, ToM was related to only self-perceived behavioral conduct.
Also, few links were found between self-esteem and selfunderstanding. Second, vocabulary ability was related to both
ToM and self-understanding, but it was only weakly related to
self-perceptions. Third, significant gender differences were found
in (a) individual differences for ToM and self-concept and (b) links
among ToM, self-concept, and vocabulary ability. Each of these
three main findings is discussed in turn.
ToM and Self-Concept
A robust positive relation was found between ToM and selfunderstanding, or the cognitive aspect of self-concept (Damon &
Hart, 1988). The ability to articulate one's ToM of other people is
related to one's ability to articulate one's "theory of self." This
finding is consistent with positive connections between self- and
other understanding (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999; Hatcher et al., 1990;
Homer & Astington, 1995; Wimmer & Haiti, 1991) and with the
"theory-theory" explanation of social understanding: One's organizing principles of how people think, feel, and behave stem from
social-cognitive reasoning or "theory-making" capacities (e.g.,
Wellman, 1990). According to this view, the ability to mentally
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714
BOSACKI
represent and understand multiple perspectives operates similarly
for both self and other in that it helps to create theories for both self
and other. Thus, the relation between preadolescents' theories of
self and others may have been due to both theories stemming from
a common underlying cognitive framework.
Alternatively, the relation between the ToM measure and the
self-understanding measure can be explained in terms of the more
recent sociocultural narrative ToM (e.g., Astington, 1993; Bruner,
1996). According to this view, the concepts of other and self are
actually one and the same. Both phenomena are considered processes in which self is created through interactions with other
(Bruner & Kalmar, 1997; Fivush & Buckner, 1997). Thus, people's sense of self is created from their social experience, including
their perceptions and understandings of others as psychological
beings. In either case, the correlation between self- and other
understanding in this study suggests that preadolescents' understanding of self and other are intricately intertwined, constantly
building on each other's experience.
Self-Perceptions and Self-Understanding
Although no specific prediction was made, this study explored
the different aspects of self-concept by assessing both the affective
(self-perceived competence or self-esteem) and cognitive (selfunderstanding) self-concepts. Consistent with the view that the
conceptual self is multidimensional and complex (e.g., Bruner &
Kalmar, 1997; Harter, 1999), in general, self-esteem scores were
not related to self-understanding scores. Perceived behavioral conduct was the only subscale significantly associated with selfunderstanding. In general, the lack of relation between selfconcept (SPPC) and the self-understanding measure supports the
view that self-concept is not only multidimensional with respect to
content (e.g., Harter, 1999) but also has qualitatively different
affective and cognitive components (Damon & Hart, 1988). Thus,
how individuals view themselves may not be related to how they
feel about themselves. For example, in the present study, a child
could have scored high on the self-understanding interview (i.e.,
possess a sophisticated or complex self-theory) but may have
reported negative feelings about himself or herself in particular
areas (i.e., scored low on the SPPC). Hence, similar to the multidimensional notion of ToM, the concept of self may also consist of
an intricate network of separate but connected representations
(e.g., Markus & Nurius, 1986).
Role of Language in Understanding Mental States in Self
and Other
The finding of links between ToM and self-understanding is
consistent with previous outcomes (Astington & Jenkins, 1999;
Cutting & Dunn, 1999; de Villiers, 1999; Happ6, 1995; Jenkins &
Astington, 1996) and thus suggests that language plays an important role in preadolescents' ToM and self-understanding, although
the relation in this study between self-understanding and language
was very weak for girls. General vocabulary ability seemed not to
be related to girls' ability to articulate their self-theories.
Gender Issues
The gender-related differences found in the present study illustrate the complex role gender plays in social cognition. Indepen-
dent of vocabulary ability, girls performed significantly higher on
the social and self-understanding tasks, consistent with Hatcher et
al.'s (1990) findings that girls scored higher than boys on both
social and self-understanding tasks. This gender difference is consistent with previous demonstrations that girls score higher than
boys in psychological understanding tasks such as conceptual
perspective taking, empathetic sensitivity, and person perception
(e.g., Hatcher et al., 1990; Honess, 1981). Specifically with respect
to ToM research, the present study adds to the growing evidence
of superiority among girls in the area of mental state attribution or
psychological mindedness (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Hughes &
Dunn, 1999).
Why did girls, compared with boys, score relatively high on
both the social and self-understanding tasks? Perhaps children are
subjected to societal voice and ear training that teaches them how
to interact socially and to behave according to social convention
(e.g., Tavris, 1992). Gradually, children are said to internalize
these traditional social role expectations, which are said to increase
during preadolescence (Hill & Lynch, 1983). Thus, on the basis of
the gender role stereotype of understanding thoughts and feelings
of others as a "feminine" ability (Unger & Crawford, 1992), girls
may actually acquire more training in this ToM ability.
The finding that girls scored significantly higher than boys on
perceived behavioral conduct is consistent with girls' perceptions
of themselves as more well-behaved and compliant than boys
(Harter, 1985). In contrast, the present results contrast with past
findings of girls perceiving themselves more negatively and being
more likely to suffer from related self-concept disorders such as
depression and disordered eating (Brown & Gilligan, 1992;
Edwards, 1993; Pipher, 1994). The only self-concept subscale that
provided some support for low self-worth in girls was the physical
appearance subscale. Boys scored significantly higher than girls on
physical appearance and perceived themselves as more physically
attractive and happier with their physical appearance than girls,
consistent with other reports about preadolescent body image:
Girls are more negative and sensitive than boys about their physical appearance (e.g., Johnson, Roberts & Worell, 1999).
The finding that perceived behavioral conduct was related to
both self- and social understanding only among boys is consistent
with boys having higher levels of moral reasoning related to higher
levels of rule-conforming classroom behavior (Bear & Rys, 1994).
Why did boys who scored relatively high on the ToM task also
perceive themselves as more well-behaved, and furthermore, why
was this effect not found among the girls? These gender differences can be explained in terms of stereotypical social role expectations. Traditional gender role stereotypes perpetuate the view
that girls are more likely to follow convention and passively obey
authority, whereas boys have been viewed as unconventional
and are encouraged to question or rebel against the status quo
(Smetana, 1993).
Alternatively, the lack of correlations among the girls could
have been due to the lack of variability in the girls' scores.
Although this accounts largely for the low correlation among girls,
it does not explain why girls with varying degrees of social
understanding showed similar ratings of perceived behavioral conduct. As suggested by Bear and Rys (1994), perhaps due to
socialization, conventional behavior may be more scriptdetermined, and thus habitual, among girls than among boys,
requiring little social-cognitive processing.
THEORY OF MIND AND SELF IN PREADOLESCENTS
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Educational Implications and Future Directions
This study sought to chart new territory in ToM ability among
preadolescent girls and boys. The illustration of gender patterns
among sociocognitive reasoning and language ability highlights
the necessity for future social cognitive research to include gender
and language as contributing factors. The present study also highlights the crucial role that language plays in the mental life of the
preadolescent. The finding that, for girls, vocabulary ability was
linked to social understanding but not self-understanding suggests
that language may help girls to gain insight into the minds of
others but not their own. That is, although language may provide
a vehicle through which the theories of others' minds and feelings
are created (e.g., Bruner & Kalmar, 1997), among preadolescent
girls, language may be of greater use in the creation of theoriesof-others than theories-of-self. Consequently, ToM researchers
need to draw from psycholinguistic literature (e.g., Levinson,
1995; Tannen, 1994) and begin to integrate language tasks (receptive and expressive).
In agreement with Bruner (1996), this study emphasized the
critical role the self-concept plays in preadolescent children's
school experiences and helps to remind educators that preadolescence is a pivotal time in self-development. Educators need to be
cognizant that early adolescence is a time when girls and boys
experience increased social consciousness and social pressures to
conform to gender-stereotypic norms. This study may help to
increase educators' awareness of how gender-stereotypic beliefs
may affect preadolescents' social cognition. I interpret these findings to mean that educators should minimize the extent to which
they use gender-stereotypic language and behavior within the
classroom.
Given the limitations of the present study (e.g., correlational
design, lack of memory and expressive language tasks, ethnically
and economically homogeneous sample), interpretations of the
present findings are made with caution. This study does raise the
possibility, however, that mental world knowledge may differ for
girls and boys (Byrne & Shavelson, 1996). The measure developed
for this study is potentially an important tool to study mindreading
ability in preadolescents.
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717
THEORY OF MIND AND SELF IN PREADOLESCENTS
Appendix
Self-Understanding Interview
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This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Further Assessment of Self-Concept
(Justification of Self-Beliefs)
To attain a deeper understanding of the child's self-concept and the
reasons for his or her self-judgments, following the administration of the
SPPC (Harter, 1985), each child is asked six questions based on the child's
responses on the SPPC (one question on each domain; SPPC Items 25, 8,3,
34, 17, and 30). Each question is framed in the following manner: "What
is the main reason for why it is really true/sort of true that you are
[item content; e.g., good at your school work, don't have many friends,
etc.]?"
1. What is the main reason for why it is really true/sort of true that you:
do very well at your classwork OR don't do very well at your classwork?
(SPPC Item 25)
2. What is the main reason for why it is really true/sort of true that you:
have a lot of friends OR don't have very many friends? (SPPC Item 8)
3. What is the main reason for why it is really true/sort of true that you:
do very well at all kinds of sports OR don't feel that you are very good
when it comes to sports? (SPPC Item 3)
4. What is the main reason for why it is really true/sort of true that you:
think that you are good looking OR think that you are not very good
looking? (SPPC Item 34)
5. What is the mainreasonfor why it is really true/sort of true that you:
usually act the way you know you are supposed to OR often don't act the
way you are supposed to? (SPPC Item 17)
6. What is the mainreasonfor why it is really true/sort of true that you:
are very happy being the way you are OR wish you were different? (SPPC
Item 30)
Received December 29, 1999
Revision received May 15, 2000
Accepted May 15, 2000 •
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