Planning for Failure: a framework evaluation of Nova Scotia’s
environmental emergency management capacity in the context
of tailings dam failure
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the undergraduate honours to
College of Sustainability, Dalhousie University
by
Sheena Parris
Environment, Society and Sustainability & International Development Studies
Supervised by Dr. Peter Tyedmers
School for Resource and Environmental Studies
Abstract
Societies have faced the challenge of understanding and responding to events that
threaten life and property for eons, long before any attempts to formalize, study, and
institutionalize emergency planning. This research explores the emergency management and the
task of evaluating emergency planning documents in the context of environmental emergencies,
specifically the hazard posed by tailings dams. This critical document analysis adapts a general
emergency management framework evaluation tool designed by Hestra (2010) for this purpose
and applies it to key program elements that make up Nova Scotia’s emergency management
system. Discussion of the evaluation results indicate the high quality aspects/successes of Nova
Scotia’s emergency management system as well as the low quality aspects/gaps, explores the
limits of the Hestra framework as an evaluation tool, and the extent to which the system
addresses a specific environmental emergency. This research adds a Canadian case example to
the relatively new field of environmental emergency management scholarship, and also explores
the link between emergency planning and sustainable community development.
Key Words: Emergency management, environmental emergencies, tailings dams, hazardous
materials spill, sustainability, program evaluation, community development, Nova Scotia
1
Acknowledgements
First and foremost I have to extend a huge thank you to my supervisor Peter Tyedmers for his
incredible support, compassion, and encouragement. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity
to explore this topic under your guidance and for having faith in my abilities.
Thank you to the honours teaching team at the College of Sustainability, Susan Tirone, Tetjana
Ross, and Andrew Begel, for nurturing our ideas, providing critique, and creating a safe,
supportive space to engage with our fellow honours students.
To my family, friends – and especially my roommate Caitlyn – thank you for your endless
encouragement, support and patience with me through this process, for indulging my stressinduced late-night musical theatre renditions, and for much needed baking parties.
Lastly, thank you to the individuals at the Government of Nova Scotia’s Emergency
Management Office and Nova Scotia Environment who allowed me access to internal documents
to complete my research
2
Table of Contents
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 4
1.1 Problem ................................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 Research Purpose .................................................................................................................. 6
1.3 Limitations and Delimitations............................................................................................... 7
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 7
2.1 Emergency Management ...................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Challenges for Emergency Management Planners ............................................................. 11
2.3 Planning for Hazard-Specific Emergencies: Tailings Dam Failures .................................. 12
2.4 Evaluating Emergency Management Systems .................................................................... 14
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS ................................................................................................. 16
3.1 Searching for an Evaluation Framework ............................................................................ 16
3.2 Data Collection ................................................................................................................... 16
3.3 Analysis............................................................................................................................... 17
CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION & RESULTS ...................................................................... 17
4.1 The Hestra Frame ............................................................................................................... 17
4.3 Evaluation Results .............................................................................................................. 19
4.4 Hestra Results Summary ..................................................................................................... 26
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 28
5.1 Nova Scotia’s Emergency Management Landscape ........................................................... 28
5.2 System Successes and Gaps ................................................................................................ 32
5.3 Environmental Emergency Preparedness ........................................................................... 34
5.4 Limits of the Hestra Framework ......................................................................................... 35
5.5 Opportunities for Future Research ...................................................................................... 37
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 38
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 40
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................. 44
Appendix 1: Hestra Framework (2010) .................................................................................... 44
Appendix 2: Hestra Criteria descriptions .................................................................................. 45
3
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem
Minerals mining industry is a massive contributor to Canada’ economic and social wellbeing (Natural Resoures Canada, 2014), and the products of Canadian minerals mining
operations like gold, copper, uranium, and nickel are key components to consumer products that
are in increasingly high demand. Most recent estimates place a $44 billion price tag on the value
of Canada’s mines, not including as of yet untapped deposits, up from $35.7 billion in 2010 with
a massive increase in the productiveness of metals mines from $8.3 billion in 2010 to $23.2
billion in 2013 (Natural Resoures Canada, 2014) (Stothard, 2011). The recent relatively high
prices for metals like gold, nickel, and copper reflect increasing scarcity of these elements as
well as their essential nature in modern goods like cellphones, computer screens, batteries and
vehicles (Stothard, 2011). The modern profitability of minerals mines and new exploratory
technology have led both public and private sector decision-makers to re-examine possibilities of
expansion in areas of Canada, like Nova Scotia, where such development had previously been
deemed impracticable in order to meet growing demand and contribute to economic growth
(Beswick, 2012). As a result, policy makers are increasingly concerned with balancing the
facilitation of minerals mining development with growing environmental concerns with the goal
of fostering a ‘sustainable’ mining sector (Ivany, et al. 2014). Professional mining associations
and several levels of government work together to govern this massive industry and to impose
standards of practice for the health and safety of the environment, the population and the
workers.
Minerals mining has a massive impact on the local environment, and the operation of
these industrial sites involves substantial effort be put into hazard mitigation, environmental
impact assessment and monitoring. Inherent to minerals mining operations are large amounts of
chemicals and water that are used to separate the valuable ore from ‘waste rock’. This effluent
can be treated to remove or dilute the chemicals and reused until it must be deposited in
containment infrastructure such as a tailings dam or containment tower. The effluent these
facilities contain are highly toxic containing elements like mercury and arsenic which upon
release, either through accidental spill or infrastructure failure, have the potential to cause
massive damage to the local environment and to pose significant risk to human health. When
4
these events occur, a well-coordinated, effective emergency management plan is required.
Emergency management is a complex public policy undertaking that is often under-funded and
given little consideration by officials until it is ‘too late’ (Schneider, 2003). Traditionally,
emergency management procedures refer more often specifically to response in cases of natural
disasters or acts of terror, and it has been only recently that the idea of a specific ‘environmental
emergency management’ strategy has entered into the discussion. Increasingly, emergency
management is seen as an integral part of a more comprehensive community decision-making by
recognizing that communities must both perceive and manage the risks that surround them.
(Schneider, 2003)
The recent massive tailings pond failing at the Imperial Metals gold mine on August 4,
2014 brought a spotlight onto discussions of environmental emergency management. The tailings
pond at the Mount Polley gold mine was breached after a period of extensive rainfall, resulting
in the release of approximately five million cubic meters of effluent containing, among other
material, arsenic, sulphur and mercury, into the local watershed (Baker, 2014), an environmental
emergency response was required to deal with the implications on both human health and the
surrounding nature. In the case of Imperial Metals, the provincial government stepped in as the
key agency responsible for orchestrating a response in cooperation with several departments, the
local municipality of Likely and NGOs to declare a water ban and pollution abatement order at
the Mount Polley site (Baker, 2014). Currently, the extent of the environmental damage and fate
of Imperial Metals’ operations at that mine are unknown.
Today, public and private discourse around the continued pursuit of minerals mining is
occurring in the context of sustainable development. Economic assessments like the One Nova
Scotia report (Ivany, et. al, 2014), legislative and regulatory objectives put forth by the Canadian
Department of Natural Resources, and industry associations like the Mining Association of
Canada have all explicitly identified ‘responsible’ mining as a goal. Pursuing responsible mining
operations necessitates a life-cycle approach that addresses all aspects including from project
siting to remediation and recognizes the risks associated with each ‘stage’ of a mine’s life,
including contingency planning for if and when something goes wrong.
Traditionally, emergency management has been understood as mainly reflexive function
of public policy which concerns few outside the specific first responders (Schneider, 2003).
However, increasingly the logic of long-term, integrated emergency management is being
5
recognized by practitioners who see critical opportunity in the incorporation of emergency
management into wider community development decision-making (Beatley, 1995). Strategic or
New Emergency Management seeks to move away from the ‘old’ reaction/recovery model in
favor of proactive focus on hazard mitigation integrated within a broader sustainable community
development context for both natural and manmade disasters (Schneider, 2003). This broader,
sustainability-minded understanding of emergency management one lens through which we can
begin to understand and analyze how managers can improve on their response to terrestrial
environmental emergencies.
1.2 Research Purpose
The purpose of this study is to explore Nova Scotia’s provincial emergency management
system and to evaluate this system in the context of environmental emergencies, specifically a
potential hazardous materials release caused by a tailings dam failure. The primary research
question is: to what extent is Nova Scotia prepared for an environmental emergency? This
inquiry is further guided by three key sub-questions:
1. What are the elements or best practices that make up a ‘good’ emergency management
system?
2. Who is in charge in the case of an environmental emergency in Nova Scotia?
3. How can we evaluate both the emergency management system and the extent to which it
considers environmental emergencies?
The larger context of these questions are attempts to discern how we, both in Canada
broadly and in Nova Scotia, can establish decision-making process and tools for a more
environmentally and socially responsible mining industry. Like most questions of sustainability,
this is a ‘wicked’ problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973) characterized by multiple crucial facets,
including everything from policy to individual practice, that involves the interests of many
stakeholders with no distinct ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer. The assertion of this study is that
environmental emergency response planning is one of the many important aspects Nova Scotian
policy makers must keep in mind as they work towards the goal of a more responsible mineral
extraction industry in this province.
In addition, this research is potentially significant as it will provide insight into the aspects
of environmental emergency management planning in which Nova Scotia excels, identify
6
potential gaps or areas to be improved, and promote the value of pre-emptive emergency
management planning. Hopefully, this work will also serve to facilitate discussion around the
current emergency management capacity in Nova Scotia and expand on emerging literature on
environmental emergencies. It will also contribute a Canadian case study to a field dominated by
literature from Europe, the US and China.
1.3 Limitations and Delimitations
This study was limited by access to provincial emergency planning documents. The
scope of this study was also limited as to reflect the time and resources available. The study did
not seek to deeply analyze or critique the legislation at various levels of Canadian government
which regulate extractive industry, emergency management or pollution incidents, nor will the
study examine the merits of certain containment technologies. Rather, the focus was on the
actual plans currently in place that are accessible to public responders in the case of a hazardous
release due to a tailings dam failure. Moreover, though industry stakeholders are increasingly
concerned with emergency preparedness and response planning (Sanford, 2012), this study will
not seek to incorporate or analyze plans developed by private groups. This is to reflect the
implications of the definition of ‘emergency’ as related to planning in each province where when there is a threat to human wellbeing and environmental integrity - provinces have the
authority and responsibility to coordinate effective response.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to address the question of Nova Scotia’s environmental emergency management
capacity, it is first important to explore the evolution of emergency management as a field, the
barriers emergency managers face, they specific challenges of tailings dams, and the broader
theory around emergency management program evaluation. Insights from the authors below
include a general acknowledgement of the lack of robust, consensus-driven scholarship around
emergency management, particularly in the case of environmental emergencies and the task of
evaluation. However, most also point to the important of undertaking systematic academic
exercises around emergency management and to the idea that while having a plan is much better
than having a plan, there is no guarantee that in practice things will always go according to said
plan. So, it is important to keep in mind that many of the processes and systems described below
7
are by their nature speculative and that reiterations of these systems tend to happen in response to
new or worsening emergency situations.
2.1 Emergency Management
Societies have faced the challenge of understanding and responding to events that
threaten life and property for eons, but it has been only relatively recently that ‘emergency
management’ has become an institutionalized function of local governments and a topic of
academic scholarship in its own right. Emergency managers engaged in the task of preparing for
emergencies must identify risks to people and property, assess the vulnerability of communities
and establish clear response protocols with the aim of minimizing loss. In the past, managing
emergency events has been a task reserved for first-responders, and it occurred in a relatively
informal, ad-hoc way (Schnieder, 2003). The US Federal Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act of 1986 is cited as the first attempt to mandate and planning functions across
all levels of government ; it also gave citizens the explicitly right to demand information and
consultation around risks in their local areas (Wolf, 1996).
Briefly, it is important to speak to the fact that there are many ways of defining what
counts as an ‘emergency’. In Nova Scotia, an emergency is defined as “a present or imminent
event in respect of which the Minister [of Justice] or a municipality, as the case may be, believes
prompt co-ordination of action or regulation of persons or property must be undertaken to protect
property or the health, safety, or welfare of the people in the Province” (Government of Nova
Scotia, 2011). Emergency management scholarship differentiates between hazards,
emergencies, and disasters. The term ‘disaster’ is applied only to events where the magnitude of
loss exceeds response the capacity of the community, while ‘emergencies’ are more minor,
routine events that cause consequences, but are more well understood and can be dealt with
effectively by standardized response protocols administered by local/regional services (Lindell,
Prater & Perry, 2006). ‘Hazards’ are the natural processes and artificial developments that have
the capacity to do harm (Lindell, Prater & Perry, 2006). However, disaster theorists have noted
that it is important to recognize that emergency events are not caused by hazards; rather, they are
caused by the failure of human societies to effectively adapt to and safely interact with their
environment (Carr, 1932).
8
For emergency management academics and professionals, the basic assumption is that
emergency events will occur and that preparing response procedures will minimize the scale of
loss damage (Jat, 2008). Most often, these plans take all-hazards approach, meaning that a single
response plan is created to deal with both natural hazards, such as earthquakes and severe storms,
and human-social hazards, such as terrorism and technological activities are treated
synonymously (Beately, 1995). In the past, these plans have dealt almost exclusively with
emergency response and the technical capacity of a government to carry it out. Reactive
approaches to emergency management planning are disaster-driven, limited their capacity to
minimize loss, and they fail to garner political or public interest (Perry & Mushktel, 1984). This
‘old emergency management’ paradigm, as Schneider explores, fails to recognize the long-term
logic of integrating emergency preparedness, vulnerability assessments, land-use planning and
other mitigation measures, response protocols, and recovery efforts into broader community
planning (2003).
The ‘new emergency management’ paradigm (Schneider, 2003) or ‘Strategic Emergency
Management’ (STEM) (Paton, 2000), shifts focus from reactive emergency management systems
to proactive planning and community development integration. Drawing on sustainable
development concepts, emergency managers are increasingly linking emergency planning to
broader environmental, social and economic development concerns (Waugh, 2005; Paton, 2000).
In this new paradigm, emergency preparedness requires emergency managers to be trained as
public policy administrators, to integrate all four functions of emergency management
(preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery), and, in accordance with sustainable
development principles, meaningfully engage stakeholders in these community planning
activities (Beatley, 1995; Waugh, 2005). Emergency managers must understand vulnerability, or
the extent to which communities and specific groups within those communities are likely to be
damaged or impacted by a hazard, and recognize that vulnerability is socially constructed (Jat,
2008). It is assumed that this fundamental integration of emergency preparedness planning and
long-term community development will reduce the impacts of emergency events more
effectively than the ‘old’ paradigm, because it is proactive and requires emergency managers to
engage with and educate the wider public (Schneider, 2003). Public policy officials may also
garner more attention and political support for emergency preparedness under this paradigm
(Waugh, 2005).
9
While the ‘new’ paradigm also relies on all-hazards approaches to planning, it does so
only in so far as to reduce the reliance on react-response emergency management models;
hazard-specific planning must also occur. It is only logical to recognize that the magnitude of
loss, response protocols, and predictability of long-term impacts will differ in practice between,
for example, a tsunami, a terror attack and a tailings dam collapse. For the purposes of this study,
it is important to briefly expand on how environmental emergencies and environmental
emergency planning fit into this discussion. The characteristics of the specific hazard at hand –
tailings dams at mining sites – are explored later. Environmental emergencies or technical
emergencies as some authors refer to them, are defined in Canada as (1) “an uncontrolled,
unplanned, or accidental release, or release in contravention of regulations or interim orders
made under this Part, of a substance into the environment; or, (2) the reasonable likelihood of
such a release into the environment” (Government of Canada, 2002). More broadly, they refer to
events that are characterized by their negative, short or long term impacts on land, air quality,
water quality, natural systems and organic and inorganic matter as well as their direct impacts on
human systems or property (UNEP, 2002). Environmental emergencies are often cumulative they can be caused by or contribute to other emergency events (Lindell, Prater & Perry, 2006).
For example, the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster in 2010 that killed 11 people, threatened over
400 animal species, destroyed the livelihoods of thousands, and began with a more general
emergency – a rig fire and explosion (Westall, 2015). The eventual release of approximately 650
million litres of oil into the Gulf of Mexico is lauded as the greatest environmental disaster in US
history. There were dozens of hazardous-materials releases that were directly tied to both the
actual meteorological impacts Hurricane Katrina (high winds, flooding) and the social upheaval
following the response (Cruz & Krausmann, 2009).
Planning for and responding to environmental emergencies forces emergency managers
to seek environmental, chemical and biophysical science enterprise, create hazardous materials
management training for managers, perform water and soil quality monitoring, recognize the
ways our systems are vulnerable to pollution, and implement mitigation strategies to protect both
people and ecosystems (Belling, 2001). For many governments, particularly for governments in
the Global South, these tasks are not feasible or high-priority, but there is increasing international
pressure from supranational bodies like the IFC, UN, WB and IMF to ensure proponents have
contingency plans in plan before projects are funded/approved (Sanford, 2012).
10
2.2 Challenges for Emergency Management Planners
Today, emergency events are becoming increasingly frequent and damaging, and
emergency managers must grapple with psychological, institutional, and funding shortcomings in
their efforts to prepare for more disasters. As Quarantelli notes, characteristics of our modern
society such as urbanization have resulted in an ever-increasing number of people gathering in
dense, urban areas, meaning that when disasters strike urban areas, the loss of life, property and
social stability is often much greater (1996). There is compelling evidence suggesting that
industrialization, anthropogenic climate change, and the resulting biophysical process disruptions
is resulting in growing uncertainty around the integrity of both old new infrastructures and
putting more people at risk (Lemmen, Wattern, & Lacriox, 2008; Quarentelli, 1996). Emergency
managers must also consider that climate change can also negatively impact resilience of
communities and increase the vulnerability of social systems by destabilizing traditional
economic systems or access to ecosystem services that would otherwise support response and
remediation efforts in the event of an emergency (Cutter, et al., 2008).
Emergency managers understand that human psychology and institutional challenges
play a huge part in our capacity to understand risks, plan for emergencies, and responds
effectively in crisis situations. We even struggle to plan effectively for emergency situations that
we have experienced before or have a good grasp on in terms of likelihood and magnitude of
damage – or ‘predictable surprises’ (Bazerman & Watkins, 2004) One contributing factor to this
is that planning institutions tend to emphasize probabilistic thinking over possibilistic thinking
(Clarke, 2007). Probabilistic thinking relies on the measurable probabilities of a hazard
occurring, how much damage it might inflict, and on whom; it is based in reasoned, empirical
data and is viewed as the ‘normal’ way to approach decision making. However as Clarke
explores, an exclusive focus on probabilism can cause planners to forget or discount worse case
disaster scenarios which can lead decision-makers to justify dangerous developments (2007).
While there is no doubt that understanding probability and risks is vital to emergency
management planning, it’s important to note the influence of cognitive biases and institutional
information systems failures that skew the extent to which we can completely understand and act
on probabilities. Bazerman and Watkins explore the implications of social psychology literature
to enumerate several reasons why we, as individuals and as collectives, struggle to mitigate and
prepare for emergencies. These reasons include (1) the fact that we tend to hold overly positive
11
illusions about ourselves, the probable severity of the consequences of our (in)action, and our
ability to control uncontrollable events, (2) we are unable to make unbiased decisions ,(3) we
more prone to errors of omission (doing nothing) than errors of commotion (causing harm;
taking risk) which maintains status quo, (4) we focus on short-term harm and discount the future
harms, and (5) we struggle to invest in problems we have not experienced them personally. In
addition, institutions who undertake emergency management functions can struggle to
effectively plan for and respond to emergencies due to failures of information scanning,
integration, lack of incentives, and organizational learning disabilities resulting from personnel
loss and bureaucracy. (2004)
Moreover, the relatively low prioritization in most communities for comprehensive
emergency management planning efforts means that the work is chronically under-funded and
under-resourced (Schneider, 2003) Recognizing problems as such before they occur, particularly
at an organization level, requires a well-defined vision, disciplined learning processes, network
building and scenario planning (Bazerman & Watkins, 2004). However, local governments
rarely have the motivation or ability to devote to the resources to such intensive emergency
preparedness efforts (Hestra, 2010; Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). Due to the institutional and
human psychology factors discussed above, emergency preparedness tends to only make it onto
the agendas of policy makers in the event of a high-loss disaster (Schneider, 2003; Beatley,
1995).
2.3 Planning for Hazard-Specific Emergencies: Tailings Dam Failures
As all hazards cannot effectively be addressed through a single lens, neither may
environmental emergencies be treated as completely synonymous. The specific environmental
emergency this study examines is the event of a large-scale terrestrial hazardous materials
release resulting from the failure of a tailings dam. As such, it is necessary to spend some time
exploring the specific characteristics of tailings dams, the reasons they fail, and the implications
of such a release. It is important to note that nearly all authors in their discussions of these events
point to the lack of baseline environmental data, public information about the contents of tailings
ponds, and true data on the rates of failures as serious issues for planning and response.
In short, tailings dams are containment facilities used by industry to contain liquid waste
near the site of work. They are some of the largest man-made industrial structures, and account
12
for the highest volume of waste in extractive industries (Davies, Martin & Lighthall, 2002). In a
mining context, these tailings dams contain what is called process water, typically a blend of
unwanted minerals, leftover dust and ore, and process chemicals including hydrometallurgical
reagents like sulfuric acid, activators and depressants like lead nitrate, hydroxides, flotation
reagents including alcohols, tars, and many more (Lottermoser, 2010). Tailings dams take one of
four main structural forms depending on the local topography, hydro-geology, climate, design
specifications, cost and available construction materials : (1) Specially Dug Pits, (2) RingDykes,(3) In-Pit Systems, or (4) Valley Designs - with the latter being the most common (EPA,
1994). Valley Designs rely on natural topographic depressions near the mining site that are
dammed with embankments, made usually with local materials, creating a containment area for
the process water (EPA, 1994). These structures are well-understood, but under-regulated in
terms of design criteria as each is engineered for specific situations, and while Valley Designs
save cost upfront by using local materials as fill, the maintenance of these dams is very costly.
(Rico, et al., 2007). Tailings dams should be constructed to hold the process water indefinitely,
but non-active tailings are rarely sufficiently monitored or improved as environmental conditions
change (Lottermoser, 2010).
Public interest in the risks associated with tailings dams have been growing worldwide in
the wake of massive disasters like the Aznalcollar sulphide tailings spill in 1998, the Baia Mare,
Baia Borsca and Aitik Mine mining chemical releases in 2000, and the recent Mount Polley
disaster in August 2014. Despite massive investment in research, technology development,
regulatory programs, and transnational industry organizations addressing concerns around
tailings dams over the last 30 years, there has constant rate of failure of about 1 per year (Davies,
Martin & Lighthall, 2002). In a massive study conducted by Rico, et al. on tailings dam disasters,
the authors analyzed 147 cases from around the world to find that 90% of failures occur on
active mine sites, 39% of the failures were attributed to a combination of meteorological events
like heavy rain/snow and the resulting overflow/structural damage, 10% of worldwide cases, and
12% of European cases were attributed to poor or deficient application of management or safety
regulations (2007). Other factors that contribute to containment failures include engineering
errors, misevaluations of environmental stresses like rainfall or an earthquake, operational
problems such as failure of electricity supply or fire, and delayed or inadequate execution of
maintenance work (Modoi, et al., 2000) Engineering and design decisions around these
13
controversial structures suffer from an all-or-nothing consultative approach where firms tend to
either dismiss the insights of third-party consultants/case studies, resulting in a design decisions
that is based on ideals rather than what will work on the ground , or firms will reject outside
expertise, resulting in systems which may not be completely thought out (Davies, Martin &
Lighthall, 2002). These factors must also be considered within the context of relatively low
institutional capacity to enforce monitoring and maintenance regulations (Modio, et al., 2000).
The impacts of tailings dam failures are not well-understood outside of the face-value
losses such as physical property damage caused by the release, making it very difficult to
develop specific response guidelines. As discussed previously, lack of detailed information about
the contents and concentration of the process chemicals, insufficient baseline data, and slow
response times to monitor the aftermath are challenges to drawing conclusions about the longterm impacts of these disasters (Modoi, et al., 2000; Lottermoser, 2010; Rico, et al., 2007). Short
term impacts in regards to cyanide levels in released tailings water were studied by Mudder &
Botz (2004) who discuss aquatic systems, migratory birds, and terrestrial animals as the primary
groups of concern. In general, fish kills, human deaths, water pollution, and sediment
contamination are common ways to measure short-term impacts (Lottermoser, 2010). In the
effective management of these risks, Modoi, et al. (2000) suggests that future impact studies
must understand not only the potential of the pollutants contained in the process water but also
the specific ecological context in which they are released in order to develop usable best
management and effective monitoring practices.
2.4 Evaluating Emergency Management Systems
One of the greatest challenges facing public mangers today, and the primary task of this
research, is that of program evaluation. In the case of emergency management, they system and
its components are often not meaningfully examined until they fail in practice (Bazerman &
Watkins, 2004). Measuring performance in public works, particularly in the case of emergency
management programs, can be extremely difficult due to complexity of problems, intangibility of
outcomes, and uncertainty (Alexander, 2005). The lack of resources and salience with public
officials that plagues emergency managers extends to the task of evaluation, and absence of local
emergency experiences makes it difficult to identify gaps in a system (Hestra, 2010).
14
Evaluations of emergency plans are important for many reasons. Inefficient or incomplete
management can create/deepen chronic emergency needs by failing to link or develop resources
and procedures. (Alexander, 2005) Static emergency management systems that are not defined or
practiced can lead to avoidable damage or casualties, and evaluations can help identify gaps in a
given system (Alexander, 2005). While environmental and property damage is most likely to
occur as a result of a tailings dam failure, it is important to note that even events that do not lead
to casualties, if poorly managed, can contribute to social disruption, political unrest, and
economic cost. (Quarantelli, 1996) Additionally, evaluations can act to strengthen accountability
and to promote the value of these systems in order to demonstrate need for further public
investment (Hestra, 2010). As Rusch asserts, ultimately public managers look to defined
measurables to in order to make decisions around resource allocation and priorities; without
proactive evaluations to give them measurables, emergency management will not make it onto
the agenda until something goes wrong (1993).
There are many ways to evaluate emergency management programs, and the academic
literature is full of attempts to operationalize and create a methodology around this task. Some
attempt to develop standards of functionality, efficiency and accountability (Alexander, 2005)
while others, problematically, look solely to the past for guidance on ‘what went wrong’
(Quarentelli, 1995). Guidelines or ‘guiding principles’ have been developed by both academics
and professionals as an attempt to understand the necessary aspects of ‘good’ emergency
management components, often emerging in practice as checklists (Hestra, 2010). Burnett
conducted a systematic literature reviews with the intent of developing management strategies
and crisis identification matrices to most effectively approach the planning and response
processes (1998). Despite these and many other attempts there is relatively little consensus
among research as to the ‘best’ or ‘most effective’ evaluation tool, and scholars in the field note
the abstract conceptualizations of emergencies, specific-hazard emergency response protocols,
and jurisdictional differences as barriers to rigorous, widely applicable evaluations tools
(Lindell, Prater & Perry, 2006).
It is critical to note that while emergency management system evaluations are critical to
continual improvement, improving salience amongst public officials, and strengthening
government accountability; their results cannot be regarded as absolutely predictive of success or
effectiveness (Alexander, 2005).
15
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
In order to attempt a risk-specific evaluation of Nova Scotia’s emergency management
system, it was necessary to conduct systematic data collection using internet databases to first
identify a best fit evaluation framework, then to identify information, documents and policy
within the system for analysis.
3.1 Searching for an Evaluation Framework
As the purpose of this study is ultimately to address the question of Nova Scotia’s
preparedness for an environmental disaster, the first step was to identify a best-fit evaluation
tool. The search for this tool was guided by insights from the general literature on emergency
management, the task of program evaluation, and the specific limits of this study. Therefore, it
was essential for the evaluation tool to (1) be grounded in a STEM approach that recognizes the
importance of all four stages of emergency management planning and the need for multistakeholer engagement, (2) provide specific, measurable results, (3) adaptable to a risk-specific
context, and (4) balance depth of analysis with the time and resources available for this study.
Options for evaluation tools were found through internet database searches (Google,
Novanet, WorldCat) focusing on combinations of key terms such as ‘emergency’, ‘emergency
management’, ‘preparedness’, ‘emergency planning’, ‘emergency response’, ‘evaluation’,
‘framework’, ‘best practices’, ‘tool’, and ‘decision making’. ‘Disaster’, ‘hazard’, and
‘emergency’ were treated as synonymous terms at this stage.
3.2 Data Collection
Once a best-fit evaluation tool was identified, it was necessary to assemble the
documents, web-pages, and relevant policies at the provincial level that would act as the
emergency system data. These data were systematically gathered using internet searches to mine
the official Government of Nova Scotia website and Google for publically available documents,
manuals, and policies addressing the task of emergency management. In addition, requests were
made to individuals from the Emergency Management Office (EMONS), Nova Scotia
Environment (NSE), and the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for access to
updated/unpublished emergency management planning documents such as manuals, training
materials, or program guides. The EMO pointed to an updated copy of the Nova Scotia
16
Emergency Response Plan (2012), and NSE provided copies of the Environmental Monitoring
and Compliance Division Emergency Response Manual (2009) and the Nova Scotia
Environmental Emergency Response Plan (2008). DNR did not provide any documents, despite
initial interest and repeated contact attempts. The publically available data sourced for analysis
were:

Information found on Government of Nova Scotia website including the Emergency
Management Office, Department of Community Services, Department of Municipal
Affairs, DNR, and the Department of Transportation sections.

Susceptibility & Risk Hazard Assessment (EMO, 2010)

Emergency Management Act (2005)

Business Continuity Management Program (EMO, 2012)
3.3 Analysis
The data were sorted and analyzed in a matrix constructed from the best fit evaluation
tool – the Adapted Hestra Frame. A careful reading of each of the emergency system data
elements was conducted, and information was synthesized, summarized, and sorted within the.
Each criterion then received either a presence-absence or low- medium- high quality designation
as per the Hestra evaluation structure (see Appendix 1). Each designation was justified and
translated into a weighted score .The results were then subjected to thematic analysis where gaps
and successes of the system were identified and explored in their relationship to the system’s
characteristics and overall quality.
CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION & RESULTS
4.1 The Hestra Frame
The ‘best fit’ tool chosen for this study was a framework evaluation created by David
Hestra to aid local governments in evaluating their general (all-hazards) emergency management
system. The Hestra Frame is based on an extensive literature review of both emergency
management literature and previous evaluation strategies including check-lists, best practices
manuals, and policy guidelines. Providing an extensive list of 30 key criteria (Fig. 1) supported
17
by the literature and divided into the four key
emergency management planning stage, the Hestra
Preparedness









Emergency manager
Program committees
Hazard identification and risk
assessment
Response plan
Annual plan review
By-Law
Training
Exercises
Mutual aid agreements
Critical Infrastructure protection
Special needs planning
Business engagement
Mitigation





Mitigation plan
Warning system
Public education
Dangerous goods routing by-law
Risk-based land-use planning
Response








Emergency operations center
Incident management system
Evacuation plan
Emergency shelter arrangements
Volunteer management
Community emergency response
teams
Search and rescue
Emergency public information





Recovery plan
Continuity planning
Damage assessment
Debris management
Rehabilitation
Frame evaluates the ‘quality’ of an emergency
management system which he argues is a causal
factor in the effectiveness of emergency response.
Quality is defined as “the extent to which a local
government has adopted policies to prepare for
emergencies, mitigate their impacts, ensure an
effective emergency response, and facilitate
community recovery”. Hestra describes each
criterion (Appendix 2) and creates a framework
around what it takes for a system element to achieve
a low, medium, or high-quality score (see Appendix
1). While each of the 30 criteria is considered
essential aspects to a high-quality system, they are
not all equal in the eyes of the literature. As a result,
Hestra adds an additional layer of complexity by
creating a weighted scoring system to reflect the
importance of one criterion over another. Emergency
management system data such as documents,
policies, and webpages can then be analyzed one



Recovery
criterion at a time in order to determine the quality of
the system as a whole (2010).
Fig 1: List of Hestra Criteria
The Hestra Frame was the best fit tool chosen because it is supported by academic
literature, it provided a well-articulated evaluation template that was feasible to apply to the
provincial system in Nova Scotia in the time available, and it represented a STEM approach by
incorporating key considerations from preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery planning.
While it does not explicitly address the desire for a specific environmental emergency
management system evaluation tool – there was no tool found that did this specifically – Hestra
notes in his discussion of the framework that modifications should be made in to better address
the needs, vulnerabilities, and characteristics of each jurisdiction and application. As a result, in
18
the analysis of Nova Scotia’s emergency management system, an additional evaluative column
was added to track instances of specific consideration of environmental emergency and/or
mining hazards and/or large, land-based hazardous materials releases that would be characteristic
of a tailings dam failure.
4.3 Evaluation Results
Reporting Table Legend
Hestra frame point (given) see Appendix x for full criteria descriptions, and Appendix x for
the original framework including the weighting scheme and for definitions of low, medium
and high quality results.
Hestra frame point (not given).
Weighing limit per criterion. As per Hestra’s frame, criterion that are given a higher
weighting have more possible points which reflects their importance to a high-quality EMP
as reflected in the literature. (2010) Criteria with one possible point are weighted 1 and are
characterized as present/absent criteria.
Explicit environmental emergency and/or hazardous materials spill and/or mining-related
consideration is addressed in the provincial planning document.
Environmental consideration not present.




PREPAREDNESS
28 of 32 possible Hestra points are fulfilled by the Nova Scotia Emergency Management
System documents analyse
6 of 12 Hestra criteria address specific environmental emergency considerations
Emergency Manager





Within the Nova Scotia Emergency Management Office, there are full-time individuals
responsible for EM and preparedness functions (EMO, 2015). In addition, within each provincial
department, there is a designated Departmental Emergency Response Coordinator (DEPO) who
plans for the specific needs and risks of their respective departmental portfolios. In the case of an
environmental emergency, including the event of a hazardous materials release as result of a
tailings dam failure, Nova Scotia Environment’s (NSE) DEPO would have the resources and
training to mobilize resources and coordinate with other levels of government (NSEERP, 2008,
p. 18).
Program Committees


19
There exists a multi-stakeholder Executive Emergency Management Committee (EEMC). This
committee is chaired by the Minster of Public Affairs, and the committee includes several senior
representatives including the Deputy Minister of the Treasury, representatives from the EMO,
Department of Justice, Office of the Premier and other experts. There is no explicit consideration
of environmental emergencies in the description of this committee, though it is likely that the
EEMC holds such events within its portfolio. (NSERP, 2012, p.23)
Hazard ID & Risk Assessment



Nova Scotia’s EMO developed a ‘Susceptibility Analysis’ which outlines 74 vulnerable groups
in Nova Scotia and to which kinds of emergencies each group is most vulnerable (2010). No risk
assessment was found identifying industrial or geological risk factors as hazards for response
planning; however, the NSEERP (2008) does identify several environmental hazards, including
land-based chemical spills, and the EMCDM (2009) provides a basic overview of the response
characteristics for each event.
Response Plan





Nova Scotia has a well-developed, all-hazards Response Plan the clearly outlines response
protocols for crisis decision making. The document is the key EM resource for the province.
(2012) NSE also has a comprehensive environmental emergency response plan. (NSEERP,
2008)
Plan Review



An annual review of Nova Scotia’s Emergency Response Plan is legislated to occur on an annual
basis through the Emergency Management Act (EMA). This review is meant to be substantive,
including consultation with other departments and experts in order to ensure continuous
improvement and integration. (2012) Hazard specific plans, including those dealing with the
release of hazardous material, compromised potable water systems, and flooding, receive a
review every 2 years min. (NSERP, 2012, p. 33)
By-Law

20
According to the Emergency Management Act (EMA), municipalities are required to implement
an emergency management by-law that includes provisions for a senior advisory committee as
well as the creation of an emergency management plan (EMP) (NSERP, 2012, p.59) The EMA
does not give any specific requirement for environmental emergency planning.
Training



Awareness training for EM policies and plans is required for all NS employees (auxiliary staff).
Emergency Management Planning Officers (EMPOs) are trained in managing diverse situations
and regional EMPOs laisse with vulnerable stakeholders including first Nations groups in
attempt to deliver resources for response in the case of an emergency (EMO, 2015). More
advanced training for senior officers is administered upon hire and renewal is not mandatory
(NSERP, 2012, p.28). EMPOs hold experience in multi-hazard situations such as hazardous
materials spills and mining disasters, and extensive training on such events occurs on a
recommended 5-year rotation. (NSEERP, 2008, p.55)
Exercises



According to the Emergency Management Training portal on the EMO website, tabletop
exercises occur for EMPOs several times a year; but there is no indication of a province-wide
simulated exercise schedule (2015). NSE holds table-top exercises for environmental
emergencies every 1-2 years, and simulated exercises occur every 2-4 years. (NSEERP, 2008,
p.58)
Mutual Aid


Nova Scotia has mutual aid agreements between provinces, the federal government and the US
through the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact signed in 1998. The
mechanisms/situations which activate these agreements are explored in the NSERP (2012, p.67).
These documents reflect an all-hazards approach.
Critical Infrastructure Protection




21
EMO has developed Critical Infrastructure Response Plans (CIERPs) and they collaborate with
key infrastructure systems including NS Power, sewage and potable water providers, and
telecommunications to develop these plans (NSERP, 2012, p.67). No CEIRP was acquired
during the course of this resource, so the extent to which they may address specific
environmental, hazardous-materials, or mining concerns was not determined.
Special Needs Planning

NSERP included provisions for the protection, care and attention to persons with disabilities
(2012, p.31).
Business Engagement


NSERP notes industry and private sector collaboration in the development and assessment stages
of emergency management planning, including involving these stakeholders in risk-specific
response strategies, CEIRPs, and business continuity (2012,p.70).


MITIGATION
3 of 8 possible Hestra points are fulfilled by the Nova Scotia Emergency Management
System documents analysed
0 of 5 Hestra criteria address specific environmental emergency considerations
Mitigation Plan
No articulated mitigation planning was found to address the need to reduce vulnerability of
people to hazards or to identify mitigation goals and strategies.
Warning System

Municipalities are in primarily responsible for local warning systems, and provincial emergency
call outs occur through radio, television, official webpages and government social media.
(NSERP, 2012, p. 9)
Public Education

22
Public information is available online through the EMO website.
Dangerous Goods Routing By-Law

The Dangerous Goods Transportation Act (1989) and associated hazardous materials,
transportation by-laws, and environmental regulations, act together to protect the public and
critical infrastructure from an accidental release as a result of shipment accidents. (Department of
Transportation, 2015)
Risk-Based Land-Use Planning
?
Under the Municipal Government Act (1998), municipalities are empowered to enact land-use
by-laws in order to support planning strategies. These land-use by-laws require a public
consultation process and should consider “existing land use and location, size, soil type, and
conditions of local watersheds”. (GMA, 1998) In addition, the Department of Natural Resources
is in charge of creating a comprehensive understanding of Nova Scotia’s geohazards such as
flooding, coastal erosion, and landslides. (DNR, 2015) This criterion receives half a point
because, though risk-based land-use planning exists conceptually, it is never explicitly tied to the
EM planning processes.


RESPONSE
14 of 17 possible Hestra points are fulfilled by the Nova Scotia Emergency Management
System documents analysed
4 of 8 Hestra criteria address specific environmental emergency considerations
Emergency Operations Center





Incident Command Centers are established on the scale/characteristics of the emergency and the
communication/response capacity of the given jurisdiction. (NEERP, 2008, p. 25) There are
established protocols and procedures that differentiate between command structures based on
certain kinds of emergencies, including environmental emergencies. (NEERP, 2008, p. 25)
Municipalities are responsible for designating a physical Emergency Operations Center that is
suitable and staffed for 25hr operations, data analysis, and communication. (NSERP, 2012, p.
64-65)
23
Incident Management System



Nova Scotia trains all staff in an Incident Command System (ICS), and they system is designed
to be adaptable, interdisciplinary and ensure support for all levels of the command chain. In the
case of environmental emergencies, Levels 1-3, NSE is the defined lead agency for response
management (NSERP, 2012, p. 42).
Evacuation Plan

Municipalities are responsible for the development of clear evacuations plans in the event of an
emergency; however, the JEOC does also have jurisdiction as a lead agency in a major event
which required mass evacuations (NSERP, 2010, p. 59). No examples detailed of NSE or EMO
evacuation plans were found.
Emergency shelter arrangements



As per agreements made with Nova Scotia Community Services, the Canadian Red Cross
assumes responsibility for the planning, training and response functions associated with
emergency social services (ESS) including shelter arrangement (2015). It is noted that
specialised ESS planning occurs in relation to technological and environmental accidents with
chemical spills listed as an example (NSCS, 2015).
Volunteer management
Donations and volunteer management are not tasks for which the provincial EMO is responsible.
(NSERP, 2012, p. 73)
Community emergency response teams
CERTs do not exist as subsidiaries of the provincial emergency management structure.
Search and rescue

There exists a developed plan and staffing for search and rescue in the case of emergencies.
(EMO, 2015) No indication was found pointing to specific training for consideration for
environmental emergencies, though it is assumed that search and rescue training involves
24
hazardous materials awareness.
Emergency public information





Nova Scotia uses web, television, and radio-based emergency alert platforms to communicate to
the public. (NSERP, 2012, p.9) Each department, including NSE, in the case of an emergency
has an identified Public Information Officer (NSERP, 2012, p.25). In the NSE response
command chain, a media relations officer and communications liaison work closely with the
JEOC. (NSEERP, 2008, p. 15)


RECOVERY
4 of 8 possible Hestra points are fulfilled by the Nova Scotia Emergency Management
System documents analysed
0 of 5 Hestra criteria address specific environmental emergency considerations
Recovery Plan
No articulated emergency recovery plan was found.
Continuity planning

All provincial departments are required to have plans to maintain essential services in the case of
emergency, and there are resources developed to help private businesses plan for business
continuity. (EMO, 2012)
Damage assessment


Post-emergency, a federally-funded, provincially coordinated Disaster Financial Assistance
Arrangement unit is responsible for damage assessment and fund distribution. (NSERP, 2012, p.
72)
Debris Management
No articulated debris management plan was fund.
Rehabilitation

It is noted in the NSERP that the provision of psychosocial services for both first responders and
25
victims is critical, though no articulated plan or clear responsibility designation for this function
was found. (NSERP, 2012, p. 70)
4.4 Hestra Results Summary
Five key documents, the Nova Scotia Emergency Response Plan (2012), Nova Scotia
Environmental Emergency Response Plan (2008), Emergency Susceptibility Analysis (2010),
Business Continuity Management Program (2012), and Emergency Management Act (2005),
were analyzed through this framework along with information available through official
department webpages.Based on these documents, the general emergency management system in
Nova Scotia at the provincial level is of medium-high quality with a Hestra score of 75.4%
(49/65 points). As shown in Figure 2, the highest quality stage in Nova Scotia’s emergency
management planning system is Preparedness with 87.5% (28/32) fulfilled Hestra points with
Response following at 82.4% (14/17), Recovery at 50% (4/8), and lastly Mitigation at 37.5%
(3/8).
Summary Result of Hestra Frame Analysis of Nova Scotia's
Emergency Management System by Stage
35
4
30
28
Hestra Points
25
20
Hestra Points Unfulfilled
3
15
Hestra Points Fulfilled
14
10
5
5
4
4
3
0
Preparedness
Mitigation
Response
Recovery
Figure 2: Summary of Hestra frame results per stage of emergency management planning
including the amount of points possible for each stage, the points fulfilled, and the points
unfulfilled.
26
Explicit planning consideration of environmental emergencies occurred in 1/3 of Hestra’s
framework criteria with the overwhelming majority of relevant data coming from the NSEERP.
As shown in Figure 3, of the 30 criteria, 6 in the Preparedness stage and 4 in the Response stage
explicitly dealt with environmental emergencies and/or situations linked to the release of
hazardous materials. There were no environmental considerations found relating the Hestra
criteria in the Mitigation or Recovery stages.
Summary Results of Environmental Consideration in
Nova Scotia's Emergency Management System
Response criteria with
environmental consideration
present
4
6
20
Preparedness criteria with
environmental consideration
present
Hestra criteria (all stages)
without environmental
consideration
Figure 3: Summary of NS EMS Hestra frame analysis focusing on the presence or absence of
environmental consideration
27
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
5.1 Nova Scotia’s Emergency Management Landscape
In Nova Scotia, the emergency management system emerges from the authority,
responsibilities and powers assigned to provincial public officials by the Emergency
Management Act of 1990 (amended 2005). The purpose of the Act is to ‘provide for a prompt
and coordinated response to a state of emergency’ and is administered, currently, by the Minister
of Justice and the Executive Emergency Management Committee (EECC) (Government of Nova
Scotia, 2011) though the Emergency Management Office (EMO). The EECC is composed of the
Minister of Justice, Deputy Minister of the Treasury Board, Deputy Minister of the Office of the
Premier, Deputy Minister of Justice, and other experts appointed by the Minister. This
interdisciplinary team is tasked with providing “oversight and direction to the Minister regarding
emergency preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery” (Emergency Management Act,
2005). A complete, extensive breakdown of the divisions and duties of public officers within the
Emergency Management Office and all other provincial departments are available in the Nova
Scotia Emergency Response Plan, but for our purposes this discussion is limited to (1) the
sources of the documents analyzed as a result of the evaluation and (2) the duties and reporting
relationships activated by an particular environmental emergency – a tailings dam failure.
There are many other actors involved in Nova Scotia’s emergency management system
(See Fig 1). Canada’s federal Emergency Management Act requires provinces to legislate their
own emergency preparedness programs and those of municipalities; the federal government’s
role in emergency response on the ground is limited and they tend to focus more on
terror/security concerns than natural or man-made emergencies (Grieve, 2013). The Canadian
Red cross also plays a large role in the delivery of emergency response aid and programing in
Nova Scotia, and the province has a formal agreement with the Red Cross to provide key
services and donations management in the event of an emergency (Grieve, 2013). The province
also mandates contingency planning for private industries and attempts to engage them in the
broader emergency preparedness effort (NSERP, 2010).
Nova Scotia’s EMO has a clear vision, “to be recognized by [Nova Scotian’s] for our
integrity, innovate, and responsiveness in administering high quality emergency management
programs, while encouraging intergovernmental and international partnerships for greater
28
governmental efficiency through effective mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery
strategies” (NSERP, 2010, p. 18). This vision embodies the ‘new’ paradigm of emergency
management in so far as to recognize the importance of mitigation and recovery and to promote
integration of multiple stakeholders in emergency planning. The EMO does not, however,
explicitly connect emergency management to ideas of long term community planning nor
sustainable development in the province.
Private Industry
Nova Scotia
Environment
Environmental Monitoring
and Compliance Division
Emergency Response
Manual
Muniscipal
Government
Nova Scotia
Government
Environmental
Emergencies Response
Plan
Emergency
Management
Office
Nova Scotia Emergency
Response Plan
Risk & Susceptibility
Anlaysis
Red Cross
Federal Government
Department of
Justice
Other
Department's
EP
Business Continuity
Management Program
Emergency
Management Act
Fig 3: Nova Scotia’s emergency management system components including (shaded) outside actors, key
departments and the sources of the documents analyses in this study. The two-sided arrows indicate information
exchange and legislative relationships between actors.
Emergency response protocols in Nova Scotia relate directly to the nature of the
emergency, and within all departments of the Government of Nova Scotia, there is a
Departmental Emergency Preparedness Officer (DEPO) who deals directly with planning for
emergencies relating to the specific portfolio of that department. Environmental emergencies are
managed by Nova Scotia Environment supported by other key departments like the Department
of Energy, Natural Resources, and Public Health through Regional Environmental Emergency
Teams (REET). The NSERP enumerates 20 emergency response actions for which NSE is
29
responsible (See Appendix x) including water supply monitoring, the development of in-house
training programs, and the provision of technical personnel and advice to municipalities
regarding pollution-vulnerable systems (2010).
Safety &
Environmental
Officer
Liasons
Officer
NSE Incident Command
Center (Response
Coordinator)
Communications
Officer
Logistics
Section
Information &
Business
Services
Technical
Advisement
Section
Operations
Section
Applied
Science &
Sustainability
Environmental
Monitorng and
Compliance
ERP Planning
Coordinators
Field
Assessment
Units
External
Agency
Support
Figure 4: Schematic of the NSE Incident Response hierarchy.
In the event of an environmental emergency, senior staffs designate a Response
Coordinator who works with the DEPO and REET to establish an NSE Incident Command
Center. NSE response functions are split into logistics, technical advisement, and response
operations with additional safety, liaison, and public communications officers aiding the DEPO
in overall response coordination (See Fig. 4) The Nova Scotia Environmental Emergencies
Response Plan (2008) and Environmental Monitoring and Compliance Division Response
Manual (2009) describe response protocols as they relate to various levels and classifications of
environmental emergencies.
30
A tailings dam collapse would be classified as a large, potentially severe environmental
emergency requiring a Level 3 land-based hazardous materials spill response. (NSE, 2009). NSE
outlines three key steps to managing hazardous chemical spills noting that these particular events
require extreme caution and coordination of outside resources (See Fig 5.) Specific procedural
response steps for a hazardous materials release are not developed; rather, NSE refers to landbased oil spill protocols as sufficient guides.
1) Identification
•Type of material
•Quantity of materials
•Type of packaging
that has failed to
contain the materials
•Hazards posed by the
material released
2) Evaluate Risks
•Confirm the product
•Confirm the hazard
•Enact safety limits
•Are first aid or safety
officers required at
the scene?
3) Coordinate
Response
•Ensure Person
Responsible is taking
ppropriate actions to
stop the release and
contain the spill, if
not the NSE
responder may iniate
measures
•Access and use
needed equipment
•Engage in
communication
Figure 5: Three step process outlined in the EMCDM to guide hazardous materials spill response.
A tailings release would pose serious challenge for first-responders. Uncertainty
regarding the contents and concentration of pollutants in tailings dams, their potential impacts,
and the general extent of possible damage (which would rely on estimates of the volume and
types of material released) make identification and evaluation of risks very difficult in practice.
Minerals mining activities, for the most part, do not occur near urban centers – so, it is also
important to take into consideration the time it would take to assemble temporary containment
structures, testing equipment and staff at the site. If the spill were to occur at an inactive mine
site, it is unlikely there would be swift containment response from the Party Responsible who
would not have staff onsite. On the positive side, the documents examined did contain extensive
resource lists and contact sheets for the speedy assembly of expertise and equipment.
31
5.2 System Successes and Gaps
Thematic analysis of framework evaluations revealed several key insights into the areas
of emergency management Nova Scotia succeeds in, where there are gaps, and the extent to
which the system as a whole deals with environmental emergencies. It is important to reiterate in
this discussion that, while program evaluation is a vital task for public managers, in an
emergency management context the results of such are not absolute predictors of response
effectiveness in the case of an emergency. Still, it is important to proactively identify aspects of
the emergency management system that are lacking in terms of quality. Once identified,
resources can be diverted to address these concerns. Established planning strategies, stakeholder
relationships, and expertise used in the development of the high-quality aspects of Nova Scotia’s
emergency system could be applied to these gaps. In addition, from a crisis response stand-point,
knowing what aspects of the emergency system are stronger than others may aid in decisionmaking.
5.2.1 Successes
Nova Scotia’s provincial emergency management system does an excellent job defining
clear planning responsibilities and response command-chains, engaging critical service
providers, and accounting for various emergency situations. In the event of an emergency,
provincial officials have an accessible, well-laid out document to refer to in order to determine
who the lead agency is, what the reporting relationships are, and what everyone’s responsibilities
are. With both a staffed Emergency Management Office and Departmental Emergency
Management Officers, The Government of Nova Scotia has set itself up to facilitate
interdisciplinary planning and response functions, especially in the case of a severe emergency
that triggers Joint Emergency Operations Center action. Clear command chains facilitate and
prioritize response functions and decision-making in crisis situations, so this organizational
clarity forms a solid foundation on which the rest of the emergency management system can
stand. In addition, these command-structure documents deal explicitly with an array of
emergency situations and levels of severity, adding both depth and breadth to the understanding
of public officials tasked with crisis decision making. Lastly, another major success of Nova
Scotia’s emergency management system is it’s collaboration with private sector businesses,
particularly with key service providers like regional potable water services, telecommunications
32
providers like Bell, and Nova Scotia Power. While this study focuses on the preparedness and
capacity of the provincial government, there are many more stakeholders that are considered
emergency management actors; forging relationships and sharing resources before an emergency
increases awareness and integration of emergency preparedness and response actions. EMONS
reports that it has created resources for private businesses and that the private sector is actively
engaged during the annual NS Emergency Response Plan review.
5.2.2 Gaps
Where the current emergency management system in Nova Scotia succeeds in managerial
clarity, it is lacking in terms of public engagement, mitigation planning, and recovery functions.
Major public engagement criteria like volunteer management planning, community emergency
response teams, public information planning, and public education are partially or completely
unfulfilled by this system. Some of this may be attributed to the fact that these functions are
simply not understood to be within the Government of Nova Scotia’s emergency preparedness
mandate. In the event of an emergency that resulted in large numbers of donations and
volunteers, the organizational responsibility may fall to the Red Cross or public communications
officials within the lead agency. Community response teams may exist in regions around the
province, but they are not formally recognized or managed by the provincial government. An
explicit emergency communications plan was not found, but likely exists as part of general
communications protocols and guides within the government. Public education is a critical task
for emergency managers in order to make individuals aware of resources and emergency
response procedures; this information should be accessible to all and ideally delivered or offered
through workshops. Nova Scotia’s public education is limited to online resources which may not
be accessible to many groups, especially vulnerable populations such as the elderly, visually or
physically impaired individuals, and immigrants/refugees/low-income groups who may not
speak English or have regular access to computers. In addition, the heavy reliance on online
resource and information dissemination strategies is a risk; if an emergency causes
telecommunication or power blackouts, most Nova Scotians would probably struggle to navigate
the situation and find information.
Mitigation planning is another ‘missing’ category. Hestra defined mitigation planning as
“the effort of developing strategies to reduce vulnerability of people and property to hazards”
33
(2010). Ideally, the plan should relate to the local government’s own specific risks, define goals,
and identify strategies to achieve them. In the documents analyzed, there was no explicit
development of such a plan, nor were links between risk assessments, land-use planning, special
needs planning, and infrastructure protection drawn together as ‘mitigation strategies’ – though,
at least in the eyes of this researcher, that is what they are. This apparent gap may be more a
result of what seems to be Nova Scotia’s attitude that all preparedness planning seeks, ultimately,
to mitigate impacts, so a separate plan would be redundant. However, some effort could be put
into drawing together the links more effectively, including developing links between climate
change mitigation/adaptation works to emergency preparedness.
Lastly, the Nova Scotian system lacks a well-developed recovery plan, particularly in the
areas of debris management planning and community support. Much of the managerial effort
Nova Scotia excels at ends abruptly with response functions, and very little clarity is given in
terms of the short and long-term recovery efforts. One explanation for this may be that the
recovery demands of one emergency to another are so different that expending resources to
develop such a fleshed out plan would be impractical. Another explanation could be that Nova
Scotia’s provincial agencies, in practice, transfer most of the recovery functions beyond damage
assessment to municipal bodies. It may be that somewhere in the EMO or at NSE there exists
resources that detail how best to handle, dispose of, and track debris after an emergency –
particularly if said debris is hazardous. However, again, this information was not consolidated
within the documents analyzed. Additionally, while the NSERP (2008) notes that the provision
of psychosocial services post-emergency is a critical function of response, questions of who is to
provide these services, to whom, and through what mechanism remain unanswered. Postemergency, social stability often suffers which can result in elevated crime rates, mental health
issues, and political unrest which could be, ultimately, as costly as the initial emergency event,
so planning for rehabilitation and recovery is crucial (Quarentelli, 1996).
5.3 Environmental Emergency Preparedness
As there was no specific best-practices guideline or evaluation tool found to specifically
address environmental emergency preparedness, it was necessary to superimpose a broad
environmental emergency criterion onto the Hestra all-hazards evaluation framework. This
method succeeded in teasing out a few nuances within the broader emergency management
34
system in Nova Scotia, but the results are far from the rigorously studied, well-researched
implications derived from the original Hestra Framework. That being said, the exercises of
incorporating the environmental criteria, with a specific hazard in mind, is still a useful one in
terms of understanding the extent to which the Nova Scotia government has recognized and
systematically planned for these particular emergency scenarios.
Nova Scotia Environment’s Environmental Emergencies Response Plan and
Environmental Monitoring and Compliance Monitoring Response Manual work together to
address broad environmental emergencies related to pollutant releases and threats to water
supply. These documents meet basic – but critical – emergency management requirements
including having clearly laid out response command structures, defined emergency managers,
mandates, training programs, and emergency public communications personnel. While emphasis
in the NSE guidelines is on oil /petroleum releases, the procedures outlined in the documents are
also applicable, at least in the eyes of NSE planners, to hazardous materials releases like tailings
dam release. Particularly because NSE also is concerned with potential water pollution, which is
a major implication of tailings dam failures, the tools currently developed within the emergency
management system have the potential to give effective guidance to responders despite the
uncertainties involved.
However, as with the emergency management system in general, NSE has not explicitly
expanded on mitigation strategies to protect people and property from pollutant releases and
water contamination, nor has this mandate been explicitly connected to sustainable development.
Efforts to mitigate and adapt to forces that influence the frequency of emergencies –
environmental or otherwise – like climate change, population growth, and industrialization may
exist within NSE or other Government of Nova Scotia departments, but they are not directly
linked to emergency management. If the EMO and NSE wish to prepare for effectively for
environmental emergencies in Nova Scotia, these issues should be addressed – ideally supported
by a consultation process including other government actors, private businesses, and community
stakeholders.
5.4 Limits of the Hestra Framework
The process of the research unveiled a few important considerations on the limits and
applicability of the Hestra Frame to the question of Nova Scotia’s emergency management
35
capacity. First, the framework itself was developed as a tool for local governments, specifically
municipalities and small regions. While a few minor changes were made to the original criteria
(see Appendix) in order to make the language specific to a provincial jurisdiction, it is likely that
a few of the criteria like debris management and volunteer/donations management simply are not
believed to be the responsibility of the provincial body. It could also be that, in practice,
provincial responders have never felt the need or been faced with a situation that debris
management and volunteer management needs exceeded the scope of municipal or private
response teams. A more precise evaluation would require a complete adaptation of several of the
criteria based on the provincial emergency management responsibilities as outlined by the
Emergency Management Act (2005). Overall, there were only a few instances where there
seemed to be jurisdictional inconsistencies.
One of the other limits of the Hestra Frame, more generally, is its broadness and
simplicity as an evaluation tool. While this can be viewed as a strength from the perspective of a
program evaluator who has few resources, access to expertise, or specific research to provide a
more complex system evaluation it is also a weakness. There were a few instances were certain
criteria if allowed a more nuanced scoring scheme or description would not have received full
points as they did in this Adapted Hestra Frame evaluation. Specifically, the preparedness
criteria training and special needs planning fulfilled the Hestra requirements to offer emergency
training to auxiliary staff and to engage in planning for vulnerable groups respectively. While
Nova Scotia has a developed training regimen divided by different levels of emergency response
responsibility, the frequency of re-testing or re-certification in these training programs is not
considered by the Hestra Frame. While it is not realistic to expect full-scale training and
exercises to be carried out on a yearly basis for management staff, there is no actual requirement
for senior emergency policy staff to recertify in this training. Instead retraining occurs on a
recommended 5 year time scale (NSSERP, 2008). It occurs to me that this should probably bear
some weight in terms of the quality score of training as a criterion in the Hestra Frame as
emergency response protocols shift as positions and contact information changes, departments
are renamed, mandates are redefined, and as emergency plans are updated.
Another criterion that deserves some discussion is that of special needs planning. While
the EMO has effectively identified vulnerable populations and the hazards to which they are
most vulnerable in the Risk and Susceptibility Analysis (2010), the NSERP notes explicit
36
consideration only of individuals with disabilities and only in the context of evacuations (2008).
Critical populations identified in the Risk and Susceptibility analysis include children (newborns,
day-care populations, schools, etc.), university populations, and the ill (hospital patients, drugdependent or immunosuppressed individuals, diabetics, etc.) with a notable absence of recentimmigrants or refuge populations (though it might be assumed, imperfectly, that these are rolled
into the category of ‘language limited’ individuals). Again, as in throughout this study, it is
possible that planning for these populations exists, but it is not explicitly tied to the emergency
management framework explored here. If planning for these populations does not exist, Nova
Scotian emergency managers may find it difficult to communicate effectively with and mitigate
the impacts on these populations.
5.5 Opportunities for Future Research
There are several possible avenues for continued research in this area. Similar framework
evaluations could be conducted across a wider sample of Canadian provinces in order to discern
and compare broader preparedness and emergency management trends in Canada. Within Nova
Scotia, a more details evaluation could systematically attempt to evaluate preparedness within
individual regions of the province based on municipalities or regional planning teams.
Qualitative interviews of emergency managers in the province could tease out more nuance in
terms of how planning resources are (or aren’t) used in cases of crisis, how they are reviewed
and improved, and how they are received by various levels of government. These interviews, or a
separate study itself, could attempt to explore the attitudes of emergency managers at a given
level towards environmental emergencies. Many of these designs could also be applied to
emergency management professionals working outside public service or with health and safety
managers in the private sector.
Furthermore, addition research into the broader integration of knowledge between
engineering, public policy, environmental science and public health academics would help to
proactively define a specific sub-field of environmental emergency management. As it stands, it
seems environmental emergency research, including this study, emerges primarily in response to
crisis situations. I echo concerns identified by other authors about the lack of public information
around and monitoring of tailings dams. In the Rico, et al. study, Canadian cases were simply
excluded due to lack of reliable, accessible information. The task of compiling and reporting
37
information about process water contents, rates of tailings failures, causes, responses, and
impacts is a massive one, but it is critical if we hope to gain an understanding of mining risks,
population vulnerabilities and effective mitigation strategies
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Mining is likely going to continue to be a contributor to Nova Scotia’s economy, and as
we continue to change our climate, gather in urban areas, and invest in sustainable development
priorities, it is crucial to recognize the opportunity to integrate emergency management planning
into decision making processes. Nova Scotia is in a good position; the provincial government
and it’s agencies administer a medium-high quality emergency management system that
meaningfully addresses aspects of all four major phases of emergency planning – preparedness
planning, mitigation, response, and recovery. In the case of an environmental emergency, the
clearly defined lead agency, Nova Scotia Environment, possesses the resources, mandate and
capacity to both respond to and plan for threats to water quality and releases of pollutants. Where
work could be done to address more he unique challenges of events like a tailings dam release,
the overall conclusion is that Nova Scotia would have the capacity to effectively respond to and
manage such an environmental emergency.
There are gaps in the system though, and, more problematically for the advocates of the
‘new’ emergency management paradigm, Nova Scotia does not conceptualize emergency
management as a community development task. Rather, emergency management documents are
very contained within the framework of the Emergency Management Act and the departmental
requirements of the Emergency Management Office. While there is a great deal of
intergovernmental expertise and information exchange indicated, these exchanges are focused
solely on how to plan more effectively a more effective response. The Nova Scotia Government,
it’s Emergency Management Office, and Nova Environment should recognize that the
stakeholder communication and interdisciplinary government networks required to integrate
emergency management explicitly into sustainable community development already exist via
tasks such as business continuity planning, training and plan reviews. These networks should be
exploited for the improvement of the system to this end.
38
Ultimately, the purpose of this research was not to address the broader concerns around
sustainable mining or to critic Nova Scotia’s regulatory capacity in this industry; rather, it was to
assert that failures happen and that we should be prepared for them. If we do not, we are
essentially blindly charging into risky situations without containment or escape plan. In the
context of a hazardous release, the potential for long-term devastating environmental
consequences is greater without the clear response protocols, chains of command, and training
that constitute preparedness. Hopefully, Nova Scotia, the EMO, and NSE will continue to engage
with the struggle of emergency management planning, seek out ways to improve their mitigation
strategies, and integrate their work into the broader task of ensuring all Nova Scotians have the
opportunity thrive.
39
REFERENCES
Baker, P. (2014, August 4). Residents calling it an environmental disaster: tailing pond breach at
Mount Polley near Likely, Bc. Global News, pp.
http://globalnews.ca/news/1490361/tailings-pond-breach-at-mount-polley-mine-nearlikely-bc/.
Bazerman, M., & Watkins, M. (2004). Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have
Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them. Harvard Business Press.
Beatley, T. (1995). Planning and sustainability: a new (improved?) paradigm . Journal of
Planning Literature, 383-395.
Belling, P. G. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (2001). Establishing a
national environmental emergency response mechanism . Retrieved from Emergency
Services Branch website:
http://www.eecentre.org/Modules/EECResources/UploadFile/Attachment/Guidelines_for
_the_Development_of_a_National_Environmental_Contingency_Plan.pdf
Beswick, A. (2012, November 30). A glittering prize may flow from old veins. Chronicle
Herald.
Carr, L. (1932). Disaster and the sequence-pattern concept of social change. American Journal of
Sociology, 38, 209-215.
Clarke, L. (2006). Worst cases terror and catastrophe in the popular imagination. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press
Cruz, A., & Krausmann, E. (2009). Hazardous-materials releases from offshore oil and gas
facilities and emergency response following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Journal of
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 59-65. Retrieved October 27, 2014.
Cutter, S., Barnes, L., Berry, M., Buron, C., Evans, E., Tate, E., et al. (2008). A placebased
model for understanding community resilience to natural disasters. Global
Environmental Change, 18(4), 598-606.
David Alexander, (2005) "Towards the development of a standard in emergency planning",
Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 14 Iss: 2, pp.158 175
Davies, M. P., T. E. Martin, et al. (2002). Mine Tailings Dams: When Things Go Wrong.
Tailings Dams 2000, Association of State Dam Safety Officials, U.S. Committee on
40
Large Dams, LasVegas, Nevada: pp. 261-273.
EPA, (1994). Design and evaluation of tailings dams. Retrieved from website:
http://epa.gov/waste/nonhaz/industrial/special/mining/techdocs/tailings.pdf
Rusch,G.M. (1993) The history and development of emergency response planning
guidelines, Journal of Hazardous Materials, 33(2). 193-202.
Hestra, D. (2010). Evaluating local emergency managment program: What framework should\
public managers adopt? Public Administration Review, 70(2), 236-236.
http://epa.gov/waste/nonhaz/industrial/special/mining/techdocs/tailings.pdf
Ivany, R., d'Entremont, I., Christmas, D., Fuller, S., & Bragg, J. (2014). OneNovaScotia: Now or
never. Nova Scotia Commision on Building our New Economy.
Jat, B. (2008). Natural Hazards and Disasters: Management for Sustainable Development. In
Natural Hazards & Disaster Management. New Delhi: MD Pub Pvt.
Lemmen, D., Warren, F., & Lacroix, J. (2008). Impacts to Adaptation: Canada in a Changing
Climate . Natural Resources Canda.
Lindell, M., Prater, C., Perry, R., & Nicholson, W. (2006). Introduction to Emergency
Management. In Fundamentals of Emergency Management (pp. 1-33). Emmitsburg:
FEMA Emergency Management Institute.
Lottermoser, B. (2007). Mine wastes characterization, treatment and environmental impacts
(2nd ed.). Berlin: Springer.
Malcom, G., & Turnbull, L. (2013). Emergency Planning in Nova Scotia. In Multilevel
Governance and Emergency Management in Canadian Municipalities (pp. 62-90).
McGill-Queen's Press.
Modoi, O., Stefanescu, L., Marginean, S., Arghius, C., & Ozunu, A. (2009). Management of
risks associated with mining wastes. In I. Apostol, D. Barry, & W. Coldeway,
Optimization of Disaster Forecasting ad Prevention Measures in the Context of Human
Social Dynamics (pp. 130-143). IOS Press.
Mudder, T., & Botz, M. (2004). Cyanide and society: A critical review. European Journal of
Minerals Processing and Environmental Protection, 4, 62-74.
Natural Resoures Canada. (2014, March). Weaker prices result in lower mineral production in
2013; still a robust $44 billion. Retrieved from Canadain Mineral Production:
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/publications/8772
41
Paton, D, Emergency planning: Integrating community development, community resilience and
hazard mitigation, Journal of the American Society of Professional Emergency
Managers, 7 pp. 109-118. (2000)
Perry, R.W. and Mushkatel, A.H. (1984), Disaster Management: Warning, Response, and
Community Relocation, Quarum, Westport.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1996). The Future is Not the Past Repeated: Projecting Disasters in the 21st
Century from Current Trends. Journal Of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 4(4), 228
Rico, M., Benito, G., Salgueiro, A., Díez-Herrero, A., & Pereira, H. (2007). Reported tailings
Dam failures: A review of European incidents in the worldwide context. Journal of
Hazardous Materials, 152(2), 846-852.
Rittel, H. W., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy
Sciences, 155-169.
Sanford, A. (2012, June 4). Response planning and emergency preparedness in the extractive
sector. Retrieved from Borealis: http://www.boreal-is.com/2012/06/response-planningand-emergency-preparedness-in-the-extractive-sector/#.VClY6BZYR2k
Schneider, R. O. (2003). A strategic overview of the 'new' emergency management. Retrieved
from FEMA: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/highpapers.asp
Stothard, P. (2011). Facts and Figures of the Canadian Mining Industry . Retrieved from Mining
Association of Canda: http://www.miningnorth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/MACFactsFigures-2011-English-small.pdf
Waugh, W. (2000). Living with hazards, dealing with disasters an introduction to emergency
management. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Webber, D. (2014, August 1). Exploration and mining highlights in Nova Scotia. Canadian
Mining Journal. Retrieved October 15, 2014, from
http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/exploration-and-mining-highlights -innova-scotia/1003276119/?&er=NA
Westall, R. (2015, April 17). BP oil spill: The economic and environmental cost, 5 years later.
CBC News. Retrieved April 17, 2015, from http://www.cbc.ca/news/multimedia/bp-oilspill-the-economic-and-environmental-cost-5-years-later-1.3037553
Wolensky, R.P. and Wolensky, K.C. (1990), “Local Government’s Problems with Disaster
Management: A Literature Review and Structural Analysis,” Policy Studies Review, 8:
42
703-725.
Wolf, S. (1996). Fear and Loathing about the Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Journal of Land Use and
Environmental Law, 11(2), 218-312.
43
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Hestra Framework (2010)
44
Appendix 2: Hestra Criteria descriptions
All criteria descriptions are quoted from Hestra (2010). Adaptations to these definitions are noted
in italics and confined to issues of government scale..
Preparedness policies
1. Emergency manager – professional individual or secondary function of governing official;
involves coordinating the activities of many actors, both within the local government and in
the broader community who plays a key role in setting policy objects and draws together
community resources to implement them.
2. Emergency management program committee – effective response requires all relevant actors
to be aware of their duties and endorse the objectives of the emergency management
program. Periodic meetings can generate support for emergency management as a continuous
process.
3. Hazard and risk identification – officials must may choices about where to allocate scarce
resources, by identifying hazards that threaten the community and evaluating the risks they
pose, managers formulate appropriate response strategies. Three levels of sophistication exist
for this task (1) hazard identification, (2) vulnerability assessment, and (3) risk analysis.
4. Emergency response plan – most basic preparedness element, which serves as an operational
manual for crisis decision making
5. Plan Review - yearly reviews to keep current.
6. Emergency management provincial legislation (changed from by-law to reflect scope) shows commitment from a governing body to its constituents that disaster preparedness is a
top priority.
7. Training – training teaches actor about their expect roles during an emergency and the
difficulties they are likely to encounter. Training should be provided, at minimum, to key
elected officials and departmental heads responsible for decision makings during an
emergency, but may also be extended to auxiliary staff and volunteers.
8. Exercises – three different types of exercises can be distinguished; (1) table top, (2)
functional and (3) full-sale. These exercises help to detect and diagnose program weaknesses
through the simulation of an emergency.
45
9. Mutual aid – prudent for provincial government to establish mutual aid agreements with
other levels of government (changed from ‘neighboring communities’ to reflect scale)
whereby they can draw upon equipment and personnel if their own capacity is overwhelmed.
10. Critical infrastructure protection – effort has been made to assess the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure systems – electrical power transmission, telecommunication -- which, if
disrupted, could seriously threaten the health, safety and security of citizens.
11. Planning for people with species needs – managers must consider the needs of vulnerable
groups who are especially susceptible to hazards.
12. Business engagement – industry actors should be engaged in planning for these events as
they may have direct impact on the success of their business.
Mitigation
13. Mitigation plan – effort has been put into developing strategies to reduce vulnerability of
people and property to hazards; the plan must specify local government’s mitigation goals and
identify short/longterm strategies to achieve them.
14. Warning system – citizens are key in emergency response, so there must be a warning
systems in place through which emergency managers have means of communicating with
citizens.
15. Public education – fosters sense of responsibility and raises general awareness of emergency
planning which can help people respond to emergencies.
16. Dangerous goods routing – vehicles carrying hazardous substances are a risk for most
communities; specified routes for these vehicles allows for special protective measures to be put
in place and public education targeted at those who live in the area.
17. Risk-based land-use planning – key mitigation tool; refers to restrictions that limit the
exposure of people and property to hazards caused by development.
Response Policies
18. Emergency operations center (EOC) – prearranged location from which officials can
coordinate and communicate with responders, other levels of government, and the public. This is
the hub for coordinating and deploying resources in the event on an emergency.
46
19. Incident management system – prearranged coordination scheme that outlines clearly a chain
of authority encompassing diverse organizations in the event of an emergency
20. Evacuation plans – criteria which help decision makers understand when, how and who to
evacuate in the case of different emergencies.
21. Emergency shelter arrangements – planning for shelter in cases of major emergency –
particularly one which requires evacuation – is important. It is advisable to work with experience
non-governmental agencies who have experience in this kind of coordination. Shelter planning
must occur at various scales (shelter for 10 individuals verse thousands)
22. Volunteer management – Experience with large scale disasters has shown that emergent
volunteers are a powerful resource in emergency response and that preemptive planning for
coordination and management of these volunteers can increase their effectiveness.
23. Community emergency response teams (CERTs) – trained groups of volunteers which
perform a number of important response functions such as first aid, light search and rescue,
communicating field intelligence to the EOC.
24. Search and rescue – Planning for this function, often performed by volunteers, includes
establishing guidelines for activities such as debris searches and technology deployment.
25. Emergency public information – A developed emergency communications plan is key to
advising and protecting citizens.
Recovery Policies
26. Recovery Plan – Advance planning of actors performing recovery functions may establish
partner organizations and assign supervisory roles of officials or subcommittees
27. Continuity of operations planning – Planning for the continuity of critical government
functions and services during recovery phase; developing strategies to restore them if they are
interrupted in an emergency
28. Damage assessment – Provisions for information collection, dissemination, financial
resources/assistance protocols and building-weakness documentation should be included as part
of an emergency management program.
29. Debris management – critical short term recovery priority, particularly is debris is blocking
roads connecting key facilities like hospitals.
47
30. Rehabilitation – pre-planning for psychological counseling and mental health rehabilitation
programs for victims/responders mitigate potential increases in stress related violence –
particularly domestic violence and suicide - post-emergency
48