Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Hölmstrom
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1. (Spring, 1979), pp. 74-91.
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You have printed the following article:
Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Hölmstrom
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1. (Spring, 1979), pp. 74-91.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197921%2910%3A1%3C74%3AMHAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
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[Footnotes]
1
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection
Mark V. Pauly
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 88, No. 1. (Feb., 1974), pp. 44-62.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28197402%2988%3A1%3C44%3AOAPPOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V
1
Insurance, Information, and Individual Action
Michael Spence; Richard Zeckhauser
The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1971), pp. 380-387.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197105%2961%3A2%3C380%3AIIAIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X
2
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
Stephen A. Ross
The American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1973), pp. 134-139.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197305%2963%3A2%3C134%3ATETOAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.
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- Page 2 of 5 -
2
The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization
James A. Mirrlees
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Spring, 1976), pp. 105-131.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197621%297%3A1%3C105%3ATOSOIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S
7
Insurance, Information, and Individual Action
Michael Spence; Richard Zeckhauser
The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1971), pp. 380-387.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197105%2961%3A2%3C380%3AIIAIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X
11
Insurance, Information, and Individual Action
Michael Spence; Richard Zeckhauser
The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1971), pp. 380-387.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197105%2961%3A2%3C380%3AIIAIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X
11
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
Stephen A. Ross
The American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1973), pp. 134-139.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197305%2963%3A2%3C134%3ATETOAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
12
The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization
James A. Mirrlees
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Spring, 1976), pp. 105-131.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197621%297%3A1%3C105%3ATOSOIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S
24
Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems
Joel S. Demski; Gerald A. Feltham
The Accounting Review, Vol. 53, No. 2. (Apr., 1978), pp. 336-359.
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http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4826%28197804%2953%3A2%3C336%3AEIIBCS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
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References
Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
Karl Borch
Econometrica, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Jul., 1962), pp. 424-444.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28196207%2930%3A3%3C424%3AEIARM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F
Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems
Joel S. Demski; Gerald A. Feltham
The Accounting Review, Vol. 53, No. 2. (Apr., 1978), pp. 336-359.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4826%28197804%2953%3A2%3C336%3AEIIBCS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health
Insurance, and Law Enforcement
Milton Harris; Artur Raviv
The American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Mar., 1978), pp. 20-30.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197803%2968%3A1%3C20%3ASROICW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization
James A. Mirrlees
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Spring, 1976), pp. 105-131.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197621%297%3A1%3C105%3ATOSOIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S
Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing
Jan Mossin
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 4, Part 1. (Jul. - Aug., 1968), pp. 553-568.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28196807%2F08%2976%3A4%3C553%3AAORIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J
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Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection
Mark V. Pauly
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 88, No. 1. (Feb., 1974), pp. 44-62.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28197402%2988%3A1%3C44%3AOAPPOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
Stephen A. Ross
The American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1973), pp. 134-139.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197305%2963%3A2%3C134%3ATETOAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Steven Shavell
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1. (Spring, 1979), pp. 55-73.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197921%2910%3A1%3C55%3ARSAIIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H
Insurance, Information, and Individual Action
Michael Spence; Richard Zeckhauser
The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1971), pp. 380-387.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197105%2961%3A2%3C380%3AIIAIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X
Incentives, Risk , and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy
Joseph E. Stiglitz
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Autumn, 1975), pp. 552-579.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197523%296%3A2%3C552%3AIR%2CAIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8
The New Soviet Incentive Model
Martin L. Weitzman
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Spring, 1976), pp. 251-257.
Stable URL:
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The Theory of Syndicates
Robert Wilson
Econometrica, Vol. 36, No. 1. (Jan., 1968), pp. 119-132.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28196801%2936%3A1%3C119%3ATTOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J
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