Target authors: John R. Hibbing, Kevin B. Smith, John R. Alford
Abstract: 56 words
Main text: 961 words
References: 338 words
Entire text (total + addresses etc.): 1,436 words
Title: The “Chicken-and-Egg” Problem in Political Neuroscience
John T. Jost, Sharareh Noorbaloochi, Jay Van Bavel
New York University
Department of Psychology, 6 Washington Place, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10003
212-998-7665 (Jost), 212-992-9627 (Van Bavel)
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
www.psych.nyu.edu/jost/
www.psych.nyu.edu/vanbavel/
Abstract
A masterful review by Hibbing and colleagues establishes close links between physiological and
psychological responses and ideological preferences. However, existing research cannot resolve the
“chicken-and-egg problem” in political neuroscience: which is cause and which is effect? We
consider the possibility, which they reject, that general ideological postures, if consistently adopted,
could shape psychological and physiological functioning.
Main text
Political discourse in the U.S. and elsewhere is characterized by vast differences in cognitive,
perceptual, rhetorical, and motivational styles as well as ideological substance or content as a
function of left-right (or liberal-conservative) political ideology. These differences are manifested in
budgetary stalemates, protracted conflicts over tax policy and social security, debates about military
spending and intervention, and disputes over cultural issues. Ideological differences have long been
assumed to arise from exposure to mass media, family socialization, economic interests, and beliefs
about human nature.
Ten years ago it was controversial to suggest, as Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) did,
that ideological differences result, even in part, from situational and dispositional variability in
psychological needs or motives that are not explicitly political—such as basic needs to manage or
reduce uncertainty and threat. There is by now evidence from a variety of laboratories around the
world using a variety of methodological techniques leading to the inescapable conclusion that the
cognitive-motivational styles of leftists and rightists are quite different (e.g., Jost & Amodio, 2012;
Kandler, Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2012). This research consistently finds that conservatism is positively
associated with heightened epistemic concerns for order, structure, closure, certainty, consistency,
simplicity, and familiarity, as well as existential concerns such as perceptions of danger, sensitivity to
threat, and death anxiety.
Masterfully, Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (in press) have reviewed dozens of studies revealing, among
other things, that conservatives exhibit stronger physiological and psychological responses to
negative stimuli (including stimuli that are threatening or disgusting), in comparison with liberals. We
now know that there are also ideological differences in neurological structure and function,
especially when it comes to the anterior cingulate, amygdala, and insula (Amodio, Jost, Master, &
Yee, 2007; Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011).
The first objection that Hibbing and colleagues consider is the one that we feel is most in need of
conclusive scientific research. They ask on p. 25: “Do physiological and broad psychological traits
shape political dispositions or might political dispositions actually shape physiological and broad
psychological traits?” The authors argue that the former direction of causality is far more plausible
than the latter, but they acknowledge that existing empirical research is almost entirely crosssectional and correlational in nature. As a result, their important question remains unanswered; we
refer to this as the “chicken-and-egg problem” in political neuroscience.
Hibbing and colleagues assume that psychological and physiological responses are relatively stable
over time, and so they must give rise to political ideology. This is certainly one possibility, but it
seems more likely to us that ideological differences in neurocognitive structure and functioning
reflect a constellation of social and psychological processes that unfold over time and give rise to the
expression of beliefs, opinions, and values. Ideology, in other words, results from an “elective
affinity” between the socially constructed, discursive elements of a belief system and the underlying
needs, motives, and interests of individuals and groups who seek out and embrace those elements
(e.g., see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).
Therefore, we are not as dismissive as Hibbing and colleagues are of the possibility that “political
attitudes [could] shift a person’s general emotional dispositions” (p. 27; see also Inbar, Pizarro, &
Bloom, 2009). We believe that general ideological postures, if they are consistently adopted, could
shape psychological and physiological characteristics as well. For the time being, however, existing
research—including that reviewed by Hibbing et al. (in press)—simply does not allow us to
determine whether (a) individual differences in brain structure and function bring about divergent
ideological preferences, as the authors contend, and/or (b) the adoption of specific ideologies leads
individuals to think in certain ways, causing our brains to process information differently.
While it is common to assume that chicken-and-egg problems such as this one possess a single
(unidirectional) solution, for the time being we favor a dynamic, recursive theoretical framework in
which the connection between physiological (and psychological) functioning and ideological
preferences is conceived of as bidirectional. Recent work suggests, for instance, that compassion
training may alter neural responses in the anterior insula and anterior cingulate—brain regions that
are associated with empathy in response to the pain of others (Klimecki, Leiberg, Ricard, & Singer,
2013). Research of this kind may be more relevant to political psychology than it seems at first
blush, given that differences between liberals and conservatives have been observed with respect to
empathy (McCue & Gopoian, 2001) as well as grey matter volume in these specific regions.
Furthermore, there is growing neuroscientific evidence that experience can alter grey matter
volume—i.e., basic anatomical structure. Woollett and Maguire (2011), for example, showed that
men who complete a 4-year training program to become London taxi drivers exhibit increased grey
matter volume in the posterior hippocampus along with significant changes in memory. Although
some reservations about this study and others have been expressed (Thomas & Baker, 2012), animal
studies demonstrate that the brain can change drastically in response to experience and training (Fu
& Zuo, 2011).
Tackling the chicken-and-egg problem should be a top priority for the fledgling field of political
neuroscience (see Jost & Amodio, 2012). It will require a judicious admixture of prospective,
longitudinal methods (Block & Block, 2006; Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, & Rosiman, 2012) and
experimental investigations of specific causal mechanisms. We envision a multi-methods approach
that may involve not only Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and electroencephalography (EEG)
but also transcranial magnetic stimulation, direct administration of neuromodulators, and research
involving patients with brain lesions. Methods such as these are necessary to test dynamic theories
of causation and, ultimately, to resolve the chicken-and-egg problem. This work has the potential to
elucidate not only the specific neural pathways that underlie political attitudes and behavior; it may
also challenge longstanding assumptions about the stability of both biological and ideological
processes.
References (APA)
Amodio, D. M., Jost, J. T., Master, S. L., & Yee, C. M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of
liberalism and conservatism. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 1246-1247.
Block, J., & Block, J.H. (2006). Nursery school personality and political orientation two decades
later. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 734-749.
Fraley, R. C., Griffin, B. N., Belsky, J., & Roisman, G. I. (2012). Developmental antecedents of
political ideology: A longitudinal investigation from birth to age 18 years. Psychological Science, 23,
1425-1431.
Fu, M., & Zuo, Y. (2011). Experience-dependent structural plasticity in the cortex. Trends in
Neurosciences, 34, 177-187.
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals.
Cognition and Emotion, 23, 714-725.
Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and
neuroscientific evidence. Motivation and Emotion, 36, 55-64.
Jost, J.T., Federico, C.M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and
elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307-337.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated
social cognition. Psychological bulletin, 129, 339-375.
Kanai, R., Feilden, T., Firth, C., & Rees, G. (2011). Political orientations are correlated with brain
structure in young adults. Current Biology, 21, 677-680.
Kandler, C., Bleidorn, W., & Riemann, R. (2012). Left or right? Sources of political orientation: The
roles of genetic factors, cultural transmission, assortative mating, and personality. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 102, 633-645.
Klimecki, O. M., Leiberg, S., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2013). Differential pattern of functional brain
plasticity after compassion and empathy training. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. doi:
10.1093/scan/nst060
McCue, C.P., & Gopoian, J.D. (2001). Dispositional empathy and the political gender gap. Women &
Politics, 21, 1–20.
Thomas, C., & Baker, C. I. (2012). Teaching an adult brain new tricks: A critical review of evidence
for training-dependent structural plasticity in humans. Neuroimage, 73, 225-236.
Woollett, K., & Maguire, E. A. (2011). Acquiring “the knowledge” of London’s layout drives
structural brain changes. Current Biology, 21, 2109-2114.