DRC Public Service Reform
and Rejuvenation project
Latin America and the
Caribbean’s Citizen Security
Team
World Bank:
Sadia Afolabi
Chiara Bronchi
Marco Larizza
Eric Mvukiyehe
Michael Roscitt
Dan Rogger
Columbia University, Harvard
Raul Sanchez de la Sierra
Impact Evaluation 4 Peace
24-27 March 2014, Lisbon, Portugal
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Problems

Low state capacity
 Low quality of public service delivery

Former solutions
 Aid delivery

Here: target low performance of civil servants
 Lack of skills: brain drain, ageing
 Bad motivation
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Intervention summary

Management of the retirement process
 Identify civil servants eligible to retire
 Guarantee retirement benefits

Young professional program (500-1000)
 Targeting: attract skilled, Motivated, Women (25%)
 Deploying
 Training: promote skills and motivation
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Evaluation Questions
1. Recruitment
 How best to get skilled aspiring civil servants?
 How best to get motivated aspiring civil servants?
2. Individual performance
 How best to increase performance of civil servants?
3. Change in norms
 Can individual change lead to change in norms?
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1. Recruitment: Evaluation Design
Phase 0: Open call for YP positions (~5 000)
Phase I: Pre-select eligible candidates (~2 000)
Phase II: Randomize job application profiles
Standard wage
Non financial incentives: YES
Non financial incentives: NO
Lower wage
Package I
Package II
Outcome: who applies?
Hypothesis 1: wage attracts more qualified, but likely
opportunistic (lower retention, less effort)
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1. Recruitment: measurement
 Skills
▪ IQ test, Work experience, Education
 Personality test
 Behavioral games
▪ Pro-social behavior
▪ Public goods / public service game
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2. Performance: Evaluation design

Phase III: Send job offers
 500 – 1000 applicants
 Surprise bonus: equalize wage package

Phase IV: Training
Skill-based training
Intrinsic motivation-based
training
Yes
No
Yes
I
II
No
III
IV
Hypothesis 2: Performance will increase if individuals
are provided with skills and/or motivation
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2. Performance: Measurement
Yearly core outcome measurement:

Performance outcomes:
 Attendance (random calls)
 Corruption: random audit

Auxiliary outcomes:
 Satisfaction, Self-esteem
 Motivation
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3. Norms: Evaluation Design

Deployment design
 Allocate YP to government agencies (geographical)
 Vary presence of YP by agency
Hypothesis 3:
Civil servants exposed to more YP’s will be more likely
to change their behavior, norms and expectations

Measurement
 Self reported norms
 Behavioral game: public goods
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3. Norms: Varying intensity of YP
Unexposed unit
Exposed unit
Next steps
 Field visit: September 2014-December 2014
▪ Fine tune hypotheses: meetings, focus groups
▪ Re-examine evaluation budget
 Finalize CN with GOV: September 2014-January 2014
 Mini Pilot: January 2015- June 2015
▪ Recruitment of 50 YP’s
▪ Evaluate capacity to manage the program
 Project Implementation
▪ Recruitment: July 2015- October2015
▪ Training: October 2015- October 2017
▪ Measurements: November 2017- January 2018
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