Boosting Investment and well-functioning
markets in Namibia through competition
policy
Tania Begazo
Senior Economist
Trade & Competitiveness Global Practice
Competition Policy Cluster
September 2016
Positive effects of promoting competition
Boosting shared prosperity and
welfare of low income households
Consumers:
• Mexico: lack of competition
costs the poorest
households 20% more than
the richest.
• Dev’ economies: Cartels raise consumer prices
by 49% on average.
Small Producers:
• Sierra Leone: Entry in manufacturing of ice led to
a 19 pp increase in provision of credit to
fishermen
• India: Collusion in wheat auctions depresses
farmer prices
Jobs
• Egypt: Entry of politically connected firms
reduces employment growth by 1.4 pp annually
Enhance innovation, productivity,
competitiveness
•
India: Higher total factor productivity at the state
level associated with more pro-competition
regulatory environment.
•
India/S.Africa: reform of product market
regulations would increase 0.4% growth of GDP
per capita.
•
Japan, Vietnam: Industries with less market
concentration, more market share instability and
more perceived competition export more
•
OECD countries: pro-competition market
regulation stimulates trade and reduces input costs
for exporters
2
Competitive and efficient input and output markets contribute to
competitiveness and leverage impact on growth and shared prosperity
Output
Inputs
Non-tradable
e.g. wholesale,
mobile/broadband
telecommunications,
courier, construction,
sanitation/sewage,
e.g. health services
(except telemedicine),
domestic travel/tourism
services, retail
Firms
Welfare,
equality
Families
SMEs
Tradable *
Services, e.g. call
centers, banking,
business processing
Goods, e.g.
agribusiness inputs,
intermediate
products
e.g. final
manufactured or
agricultural products
Transport
(Air,
maritime,
road),
logistics,
telecoms
Competitiveness &
Access to int’l markets
Jobs
Consumption goods:
food, FMCG,
pharmaceuticals
Inputs: Fertilizers,
construction materials,
equipment, etc.
Access to imported products
(regional, int’l trade)
3
*Definition based only on Mode 1/cross-border trade: “producing services in one country
to be consumed in another” (Molinuevo, Saez, 2014)
How to enable and promote competition?
Policies, laws and government interventions that ensure that competition in
the marketplace is not restricted in such way as to reduce economic
welfare.
OPEN MARKETS AND REMOVE
ANTICOMPETITIVE SECTORAL REGULATION
EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE COMPETITION LAW
AND RULES ECONOMY WIDE
Remove restrictions to the number of firms,
Tackle cartel agreements that raise the costs of
statutory monopolies or bans towards private
key inputs and final products
investment, restrictions on consumer choice
Eliminate controls on prices and other market
Prevent anticompetitive mergers
variables that increase business risk
Guarantee a level playing field and non- Strengthen antitrust framework
discriminatory treatment against certain firms
anticompetitive conduct
to
combat
Control state aid to avoid favoritism and ensure
competitive neutrality
MARKET
4
Competition Policy Assessment for Namibia
Objective:
Identify actions to improve economic regulation - procompetition government
interventions - so that private sector participation delivers larger benefits to the
economy: consumer welfare, productivity, competitiveness, investment, jobs
Scope:
• Economy-wide factors: government participation in markets, regulatory
system that integrates competition principles, antitrust enforcement
• Sector-specific factors: rules that impede entry and increase dominance,
discriminate between firms and distort the level playing field, increase the costs
of competing or facilitate collusion
Components:
• General assessment of the regulatory framework across the economy and
in key input sectors (tool: Product market regulations (PMR) indicators and
WBG Markets and Competition Policy Assessment Tool)
• Assessment of the competition law (tool: WBG Competition policy checklist)
Note: Assessment for Namibia conducted in 2014. Some reforms have already
taken place after the assessment (.e.g. public procurement)
The framework for
analysis
6
Tools used for the assessment: PMR
OECD PMR (Product Market Regulations) indicators capture “on-the-books”
characteristics of economic and administrative regulations that affect product
markets
• Economic regulations: constraints and incentive mechanisms on market
access, use of inputs, output choices, pricing, foreign investment.
• Administrative regulation: means for communicating regulatory
requirements to the public as well as compliance procedures to enter markets
• Sectors: electricity, telecom, transport, professional ss, retail, water, gas.
• Sub-indicators: State control (SOE, price controls), barriers to
entrepreneurship (entry and access), barriers to trade and investment
7
• The PMR indicators allow researchers and policy-makers to have a first cut on
the extent to which national rules encourage competition or distort markets.
• The WBG has partnered with OECD to calculate PMR for additional
developing economies (OECD PMR available for OECD countries (1998), BRICS and other
European countries)
• In Africa: Data for Kenya, Rwanda (2014) and South Africa (2008, 2013)
• In LAC: 10+ countries in addition to Mx and Br
• Indicators in process to be calculated in Egypt, Philippines
Overview of PMR components
8
Markets and Competition Policy Assessment –
Government interventions and effects on competition

Any government body can issue rules or adopt decisions that affect competition dynamics

Governments can affect market outcomes not only through traditional regulatory instruments
but also through direct participation as buyer and as a provider of goods and services.

Private agents can also restrict competition through co- regulation or self-regulation schemes.

How rules are implemented can have different effects on competition (not only on the books)
Authorities/agents
that can affect
competition
Congress
Ministries
Cross-cutting authorities
(e.g. Investment, Public
Procurement, Competition)
Sector regulators
Self and co-regulation
schemes
Types of market
interventions/instruments
Cross-cutting and sector
regulation
State aid/incentives/subsidies
Potential
anticompetitive
effects of rules
Rules that reinforce
dominance or limit entry
Direct participation in the
market: SOE
Rules that are conducive to
collusive outcomes or
increase costs to compete in
the market
Privatization/ concession
schemes, PPP
Rules that discriminate and
protect vested interests
Public procurement rules
Findings in Namibia
Do government policies
and regulations enable
competition in key
markets?
10
Government involvement in markets

Government commercial activities in sectors where private sector
seems viable based on experience in other countries (e.g., fishing,
tourism, mobile telecom services) . In many input markets (infrastructure),
SOE hold between 90-100% of the market

Accumulation of commercial and regulatory functions by SOEs can
create regulatory risks, as well as limited independence of market
regulators. E.g. in water transport, Namport both port operator and regulator,
issues in electricity and competition law enforcement.

Regulatory framework limiting access for private sector. E.g. in tourism,
Namibia Wildlife Resorts (NWR) as main operator in protected areas

State support measures that can distort markets (in addition to fiscal
effects). E.g. SOEs receive recurrent subsidies, state guarantees and loans
The Namibian Government controls at least 1 firm (SOE)
in 15 sectors…
National, state or provincial governments control at least one firm in the sector
Electricity generation, import, transmission, distribution and supply
Gas generation, import, transmission, distribution and supply
Telecommunication fixed line, mobile and internet services
Post basic and courier services
Railways transport
Air transport
Operation of air transportation infrastructure
Operation of water transportation infrastructure
Operation of road infrastructure
Water collection, treatment and supply
Manufacture of tobacco products
Manufacture of refined petroleum products
Manufacture of basic metals
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
Building and repairing of ships and boats
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
Construction
Wholesale trade, incl. of motor vehicles
Retail trade, incl. of motor vehicles
Accommodation, food and beverage service activities
Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport
Financial service activities, except central banking, insurance and pension funding
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding
Other business activities
Human health activities
Motion picture distribution and projection
TOTAL
Source: 2013 survey for Namibia that follows the OECD PMR template.
Yes
X
No
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
15
X
12
…while the top 5 OECD governments control firms in 8 sectors, on
average
25
20
15
10
5
United Kingdom
Estonia
Netherlands
Ireland
Denmark
Japan
Korea
United States
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Germany
Iceland
Slovak Republic
Chile
Austria
Belgium
Portugal
OECD Average
Australia
Finland
New Zealand
Czech Republic
Greece
Namibia
Hungary
Israel
Switzerland
Slovenia
South Africa
Russia
France
Italy
Spain
Sweden
Philippines
Tunisia
Norway
Indonesia
China
0
Source: 2013 survey for Namibia that follows the OECD PMR template; 2013 OECD PMR database, with the exception of Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, Brazil and United States (from 2008 as of July 2013); 2012 PMR survey for Tunisia and 2013 PMR survey for the
Philippines.
Recurrent Government support measures:
subsidies, financial guarantees and government loans
The government provides subsidies, grants and other transfers
• aimed at attracting FDI, promoting SME development and exports,
encouraging agriculture development
• on average, amounting to 3.6% of GDP during 2007-2012
However, SOEs are the beneficiaries of a significant share of support
measures:
• Recurrent subsidies for Development Bank of Namibia, Air Namibia,
NamPower, Agribank and NamWater
• Almost 90% of all guarantees (during 2006-2011) distributed among several
SOEs (Road Fund Administration, Agriculture Bank of Namibia, and Air
Namibia)
• Few SOEs also account for around 30% of the loans granted
Currently, lack of specific criteria for designing measures that minimize
distortions on competition and achieve policy results, and limited
monitoring of the effects of the state support measures on competition
conditions and goals
Steps in Minimizing Distortions to Competition Associated
with State Support
No
Wrong instrument
Yes
Is it thanks to the
measure?
(incentive effect)
Does the measure
meet intended
objective?
What market
failure does it
address?
How to assess it
1. Collect data on
beneficiaries, way
measure was
selected, amount of
aid, etc.
2. Evaluation methods
• Quantitative
methods build
counterfactual
• Qualitative
method as
support
No
Wrong instrument
Yes
Does it produce
effects that distort
competition?
No
Yes
• Does it limit number of
undertakings?
• Barriers to entry or exit
• Licenses, exclusive
permission/rights
• Does it constraint firms
ability to compete?
• Price controls
• Constraints to market
access
• Does it decrease
incentives to compete?
• Grants dominant
position to
undertaking?
• Asymmetry of benefits?
Right instrument
No
Wrong instrument
Yes
Are there
alternatives?
Are restrictions
justified?
Does it comply
with the following
principles?
• Proportionality
• Necessity
• Transparency
• Predictability
(minimize
distortions)
No
Right instrument
Yes
Full assessment of
alternatives
Important to analyze costs and benefits of state support. Find measures that
minimize distortions on competition conditions.
Regulations that facilitate coordinated behavior and set
prices
Prices generally set free in Namibia
• Exceptions include regulated prices for professional services, few food staples,
utilities and gasoline
Still, self-regulation and state regulation of professions potentially creating
anti-competitive effects that do not benefit or protect consumers
Regulations of professional service bodies:
• setting “recommended” minimum and maximum prices for all services
provided by lawyers.
Government regulations:
• setting binding minimum prices for engineers and binding minimum/maximum
prices for architects
• Other limitations in the professional services market: restrictions on legal form,
sharing premises
Competition policy reforms for professional services are consistently
linked to large economic benefits through boosting productivity
Evidence pointing to increases in
productivity, impact on growth in
downstream, service-dependent
industries and significant cost
savings
International practice reflecting
increasing liberalization of
professional services (e.g. in the EU
space; China)
The majority of OECD countries have no
price regulation for these professional
services at all,
• although some jurisdictions do publish
non-binding price recommendations
Source: World Bank based on OECD Product Market Regulation Database,
2013
Barriers to entrepreneurship may be streamlined and
access to certain markets may be improved
Well established communication strategy on regulations for business creation
But company registration: lengthy and cumbersome (dropped from 154 to 164 in
DB2016)
• taking 10 procedures and 66 days on average.
• slowed down by an excessive number of due-diligence procedures, lack of
computerized records and a slow process of checking the uniqueness of the
company name
In the air transport, provision of certain types of air transport services hindered by
frequency restrictions in the existing bilateral air service agreements (BASA)
In the road transport, limits to foreign trucking services, delays and limitations for
cabotage and backhauling.
In telecom, rules on access to essential infrastructure, rules to access essential
resources (spectrum).
The government as a buyer affects competition in markets

Previous public procurement framework: limited elements to ensure procompetitive tenders. New 2015 framework incorporates more pro-competition
tools but preferential treatment to certain players is still allowed.
 granting of a large number of exemptions from public tenders: contract
amounts given through tender exemptions - two or three times more than
those given through tender; all tender exemptions are justified to relate to
emergency procurements.
 lack of clear and transparent procedures to grant such exemptions –
Regulations are needed
 New framework recognizes competition as important principle and increases
transparency
 Allows for electronic tenders
 Mentions explicitly competition contraventions (bid rigging, price fixing)
 Enhanced cooperation between public procurement agency and the NaCC to
eliminate overcharges that affect fiscal accounts (spillover effects on social
policies and infrastructure development, SOE)
Cartel overcharges that could be prevented
Distribution of cartel episodes and overcharges determined by competition
authorities by region
60
180
160
48.4
50
140
40
33
%
32.2
30
20
120
36.8
32.7
25.1
25
100
80
20
17.7
60
17.2
40
10
20
0
0
N America
EU
Median
Western Europe Asia & Oceania
Mean
No of Episodes (Right Axis)
Africa, Latin
America, E.
Europe
Overcharges
Median: 16 – 23%
Mean: 16 - 49%
Source: Elaboration on data from Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges 3rd Edition, 2014 (485 decisions)
20
Detected cartels
in public
procurement:
Construction
(UK, SA, NL),
pharmaceuticals
and medical
supplies (Mx,
Pe, Col, Chi,
NL)
Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice – Competition Policy Team
Infant industry protection
 Covered sectors such as
pasta, poultry, milk, cement.
 Some protection measures
have expired and others
have been extended (pasta,
cement)
 Cost and effects should be
systematically monitored
(e.g. effects on consumers
versus effects on firms)
Increasing the effectiveness of antitrust law (1)
Scope of the law
• Is competition the only objective?
How to balance different objectives?
• Are exemptions to the law in place?
Anticompetitive practices
• Can hard-core cartels be
exempted?
• Are investigative powers adequate
for deterring cartels? How are they
implemented?
• Are fines according to gravity of
anticompetitive behavior?
• Are other instruments to stop/deter
anticompetitive behavior in place?
22
Leniency? Settlements?
• More sectors, markets,undertakings
exempted -> less effective,
distortions to level playing field
• Namibia: certain sectors, definition
of undertaking (SOE), possibility of
exempting other sectors/firms
• Central elements in any anticartel
enforcement program: sophisticated
detection + incentives + enhanced
sanctions = effective deterrence.
• Hard-core cartels considered per se
illegal but ability to analyze effects in
other cases
• Namibia: No leniency, fines decided
by Court & no specific methodology,
use of available tools (raids)
Increasing the effectiveness of antitrust law (2)
Mergers
• Which transactions are evaluated?
• Are there thresholds in place? Are
these quantitative? Are these adequate
given the size of the economy?
• Are efficiencies analyzed?
• What are the remedies that can be
imposed?
• What is the procedure? Due process &
confidentiality
Advocacy powers
• Has the Competition Authority the
mandate to issue opinions on
government policies and regulations?
• Are legal opinions from the Agency
binding/ non- binding?
• Are there cooperation agreements with
agencies in force?
• Tackle only potentially harmful
mergers.
• Use resources efficiently
• Minimize unnecessary cost for
doing business
 Proper definition of merger
Notification threshold
Two-phase procedure
• Power to access information for
market assessments
• Power to influence regulation.
• Champion competition reforms
• Minimize anticompetitive
regulation
Actions to enable
competition in Namibian
markets
24
Policy Options – State Support Measures
Short-term options
• Consolidate an
inventory of all
state support
measure, including
objectives, legal
instruments, value
and beneficiaries.
• Apply good
practice criteria
when granting
state support to
firms
• Balance
competition policy
objective with other
objectives
stemming from
industrial and black
empowerment
policies
Medium-term options
• Consider
developing a
framework to
control state
support measures
that could include:
(i) relevant criteria
for identifying
support measures;
(ii) application of
exemption rules in
specific sectors;
(iii) assessment of
prohibited
measures and their
potential impact on
competition; and
(iv) definition of
implementation
procedure and
monitoring.
Expected effects
• Minimize distortive
effects of state
support measures
on competition
conditions
• Full transparency
and accountability
in the use of public
funds
• Public sector
savings
Implementing body: Ministry of Finance, NaCC,,all other granting ministries and bodies
Policy Options – Competitive Neutrality
Short-term options
• Ensure full
applicability of
the competition
act to SOEs
Medium-term
options
• Consider a
regulatory
framework (i)
with the same
set of rules for
public and
private
enterprises
• Consider
allowing local
institutional
investors to buy
minority equity
stakes in some
of the
infrastructure
SOEs
Expected effects
• A level playing
field for SOEs
and private
enterprises
Implementing body: Government Ministries, NaCC (reform advocate)
Policy Options – Public Procurement
Short-term
options
• Issue public
procurement
rules to limit
exemptions
to
competitive
processes
and provide
guidance on
preferential
treatment
Medium-term
options
• Sign an MoU
between the
procurement
agency/ies
and the
Namibia
Competition
Commission
(NaCC) to
promote
competition
Expected
effects
• Enhanced
competition
in public
tenders and
less bid
rigging
practices
• Public sector
savings
Implementing body: Public Procurement agency, all relevant government ministries, NaCC
Policy Options – Business Entry
Short-term options
• Promote the
streamlining of
procedures on
registration of
businesses, particularly
by improving the
process of checking the
uniqueness of the
company name and
putting in place an
online system allowing
to do the search and
reservation of names for
companies
Expected effects
• Easy entry for potential
investors
• Reduced administrative
burdens on
entrepreneurs
Implementing body: MTI and all relevant bodies, NaCC (reform advocate)
Policy Options – Infant Industry Protection
Short-term options
• Ensure that
additional regulatory
restrictions that stifle
the competitive
conditions in the IIP
sectors are not
introduced
• Ensure that (i) firms
operating in the input
markets that serve
the IIP sectors do
not engage in
anticompetitive
behavior and (ii) IIPprotected firms do
not engage in
anticompetitive
behavior in the
market
Medium-term options
• Monitor that the
costs of IIP do not
permanently
outweigh the
benefits for
consumers
Expected effects
• Prevent additional
anticompetitive
regulation and
practices in the IIP
sectors
• Reduce
unnecessary
operational costs of
the IIP-protected
firms to enable them
to become more
competitive
Implementing body: MTI, NaCC, other relevant government ministries and bodies
Constraints and Policy Options in key sectors – Electricity
 Institutional setup that affect regulatory risk: ECB, Ministry of Energy, vertically

integrated SOE
NamPower’s generation and transmission functions not separated (in the
majority of OECD countries an ownership separation of these segments exists)
Short-term options
•Discuss ring- fencing
NamPower generation and
transmission functions in
separate business units
Medium-term options
•Once entry in the
generation segment is fully
ensured, consideration
may be given to
introducing rules that
discourage
discriminatory/preferential
treatment of players
Expected effects
•Increase access to
electricity for corporate
and individual consumers
•Create a level playing field
Implementing body: Ministry of Mines and Energy, ECB, NaCC (reform
advocate)
Constraints and Policy Options in key sectors – Maritime
Transport
♦ Accumulation of operating and regulatory functions
♦ may potentially shield SOEs from competitive pressure or regulation
that simulates competition
♦ Namport is both the port operator and regulator
Medium-term options
• Discuss a review of
and consider the
separation of the
Namport regulatory
responsibilities from its
development and
operations functions
Expected effects
• Eliminate potential
conflict of interest
• Stimulate entry of new
port service providers
Implementing body: Ministry of Works and Transport, Namport, NaCC (reform
advocate)
Constraints and Policy Options in key sectors – Telecom
♦ Complete or majority Government ownership in both fixed and mobile operators
♦ More access to spectrum and introduction of MVNO needed
♦ Conflicting decisions (especially on mergers in the telecom sector) between NaCC
and the Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia (CRAN
Short-term options
• Promote the
adoption of an
action plan for
cooperation
between NaCC
and CRAN based
on the existing
MOU to strengthen
cooperation
• Issue rules to
facilitate entry in
telecom (infra
sharing, access)
•…
Implementing
body:
Medium-term options
• Promote the
introduction of
“mobile virtual
network operators”
(MVNO)
• Promote the
inclusion of
competition
principles during
spectrum allocation
Expected effects
• Full transparency
for the telecom
operators
• Increased
innovation and
price competition
CRAN, Ministry of Information and Communication
Technology, NaCC (collaboration)
Constraints and Policy Options – Air Transport
♦ Provision of certain types of air transport services hindered by frequency
restrictions in the existing bilateral air service agreements (BASA)
Short-term options
• Discuss the review
of any frequency
restrictions in the
BASA to allow
carriers to expand
certain air services.
Expected effects
• Increased offering
of non-scheduled
flights and other
types of services
Implementing body: Ministry of Works and Transport, NaCC (reform advocate)
Constraints and Policy Options in key sectors – Road
Transport
♦ Lack of a level playing field and unnecessary barriers to entry
♦ limits for foreign trucks,
♦ delays and limitations of cabotage and backhauling application processes
Short-term options
• Support the
streamlining of
the application
process for
cabotage and
backhaul
transportation
to facilitate road
transport
service
operations
Medium-term
options
• Promote the
review of the
process for
issuing truck
permits for
certain
transport
service
providers
Expected effects
• Easy entry and
operations
• Reduced
operation costs
for transport
service
providers and
final consumers
Implementing body: Ministry of Works Transport, NaCC (reform advocate)
Constraints and Policy Options – Tourism
 Regulatory framework limiting access for private sector
 protected areas of Namibia assigned through a concession to Namibia
Wildlife Resorts (NWR), which is the sole operator.
 entry barriers to the detriment of private operators
Medium-term options
• Discuss instruments
(such as concessions)
that would open access
to the private operators
to diversify service
offering at competitive
prices for tourists
Expected effects
• Stimulate service
offering at efficient prices
Implementing body: Ministry of Tourism, NWR, NaCC (reform advocate)
Constraints and Policy Options – Professional Services
 Regulations of professional service bodies:

 setting “recommended” minimum and maximum prices for all services
provided by lawyers.
Government regulations:
 setting binding minimum prices for engineers and binding minimum/maximum
prices for architects
Medium-term options
• Promote the elimination
of minimum and
maximum prices for
lawyers, minimum and
maximum prices for
architects, and minimum
prices for engineers
Expected effects
• Enhanced service
efficiency and lower the
costs for consumers
Implementing body: Ministry of Justice, Professional associations, NaCC (reform
advocate)
Potential benefits of
addressing regulatory
constraints
37
What would be the benefits of eliminating restrictions on
competition? Example: Labor productivity in Tunisia
•
•
Drop of 5 pp in price-cost margins associated with additional LP growth of 5% / yr
Large potential gains in key service sectors (transport, professional services) and
agriculture
Expected gains in labor productivity following a 5%
Examples
• Road transport services:
restrictions on foreign
participation; restrictive entry
requirements and/or
discriminatory fiscal treatment in
transportation for third parties
• Agriculture: lack of transparent
implementation of (a) import
licenses for agricultural inputs
for seeds, fertilizers, and
pesticides, (b) licenses for the
commercialization of these
inputs at wholesale and retail
level + presence of marketing
boards (e.g. cereals, oil, etc.)
38
decrease in PCMs relative to the 7-year mean by subsector
Source: World Bank (2014) The Unfinished Revolution: Bringing Opportunity, Good
Jobs and Greater Wealth to All Tunisians (Chapter 2)
What would be the benefits of eliminating restrictions on
competition? Example: GDP growth in South Africa, Kenya
OECD WBG Product Market Regulation Data
Higher values are associated with regulations more restrictive to competition
3.5
3.0
2.5
• Protection of incumbents in networks sectors (e.g. electricity,
telecom, railways, aviation)
• Weak governance of SOE that affects competitive neutrality
and crowds out private investment
• Discrimination against foreigners (e.g. public procurement,
professionals, ownership restrictions)
• Price controls and minimum prices
Kenya: Removal of restrictive
product market regulations in
service sectors (professional
services, telecom) -> increase of
GDP growth by 0.39 pp (USD 218
million in the first year)
South Africa: Improved regulations
in professional services -> increase
of GDP growth by 0.4-0.5 pp
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United States
Austria
Denmark
New Zealand
Italy
Slovak Republic
Australia
Estonia
Finland
Germany
Portugal
Hungary
Belgium
Czech Republic
Japan
Canada
Spain
Ireland
Luxembourg
Norway
France
Iceland
Switzerland
Chile
Lithuania
Sweden
Malta
Bulgaria
Latvia
Poland
Cyprus
Romania
Slovenia
Greece
Colombia
Korea
Mexico
Peru
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Croatia
Israel
South Africa
Russia
Rwanda
Dominican Rep.
Jamaica
Indonesia
Costa Rica
Turkey
Brazil
Kenya
China
Honduras
India
0.0
High-income countries
High middle income countries
Low middle income and low income countries
39
Note: Data for 2013, except for United States from 2008 as of Aug 2014, and Kenya and Rwanda for 2014. Sources: OECD,
Product Market Regulation Database; OECD-WBG, Product market regulation indicators for LAC, Rwanda and Kenya
What would be the benefits of eliminating restrictions on
competition? Example: poverty alleviation in Kenya
Eliminating overcharges of 20% in sugar and maize markets (e.g. from potential
anticompetitive practices facilitated by business associations, NTBs, government
influence in markets) would increase real income and reduce poverty…
Household expenditure share in maize
Poverty by 1.8 pp
Poorest decile gains 6.4 times more
than the richest
Household expenditure share in sugar
Poverty by 1.5 pp
Poorest decile gains 3.4 times
more than the richest
Referred in analysis of political economy in the agriculture sector. Captured in draft Kenya CEM
40
Source: KIHS 2005/2006. Argent and Begazo (2015)
Concluding remarks
41

Competition policy can help Namibia achieve Vision 2030
and the goals of the National Development Plan

Evaluating the costs and benefits of government
interventions – considering market characteristics - is key
to increase effectiveness and create the right incentives for
private sector to contribute to Namibia’s development

All government agencies and NaCC have a shared
responsibility in this area
Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice – Competition Policy Team
42