Agriculture Subsidies and Trade
600
500
US$ Billion
166
400
300
21
200
100
378
210
0
Total subsidies
Developed countries
Total exports
Developing countries
Average Tariffs
%
70
60
62
50
40
30
20
29
17
10
9
0
MFN Bound
Agriculture
MFN Applied
Industrial
Why the Agreement on Agriculture?
 Agriculture in GATT but...
•
exemptions for agricultural products (import restrictions,
domestic support, export subsidies – allowed)
•
market access difficult
Research - inefficiency
of policies
Trade tensions and
disputes
Punta del Este
Uruguay Round
Declaration
Negotiations
(1986)
(7.5 years)
Agreement on
Agriculture
Legal Framework
Modalities
+
Supporting
Tables
Legally Binding Commitments
Agreement on Agriculture
Schedules of Commitments
Other WTO Agreements
Protocol of Accession
ACC/4
Structure of the Agreement
Market access
Tariffs
Tariff Quotas
Special Safeguard
Domestic support
Green Box
Blue Box
Article 6.2 – Development
Programmes
Amber Box
Export competition
Export subsidies
Anti-circumvention
Export prohibitions and
restrictions
Other rules:
S&D, Peace Clause, commitment to reform, NFIDC Decision
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Uruguay Round Reduction
Commitments
Time period
Market access
Tariff reduction
Domestic support
Total AMS reduction
De minimis
S&D exemption
Export competition
Export subsidy reduction
S&D exemption
Developed
Developing
6 years
10 years
36% average, 15% minimum
24% average, 10% minimum
20%
5%
13.3%
10%
Article 6.2 (investment, input and
diversification subsidies)
36% value, 21% volume
24% value, 14% volume
Article 9.4 (transport and
marketing subsidies)
No reduction commitments for least-developed countries
Long-term Objective
“... establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading
system ... ”
 Uruguay Round reform programme
 Major achievements but also some unfinished business
 Mandate for further reform - Article 20
Committee on Agriculture
•
role to monitor implementation of UR commitments
- matters raised under Article 18.6
- review of notifications
•
•
preparatory work – analysis/exchange of information
mandated negotiations - Special Sessions (since 2000)
The Doha Ministerial Declaration
 Comprehensive negotiations aimed at:
•
•
•
substantial improvements in market access
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export
subsidies
substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support
 S&D - integral to negotiations and outcome
 Non-trade concerns to be taken into account
 Deadlines
•
•
•
March 2003 – modalities
5th Ministerial Conference - draft Schedules
1 January 2005 - conclusion
Framewor
k
modalities
- July
2004
Market access
Objective
“… substantial improvements in
market access …”
Sample MFN tariffs (%)
Simple
average
bound
tariff
Maximum
ad valorem
Share of non-ad
valorem tariff
lines
Simple
average
applied
tariff
Maximum
ad valorem
Share of nonad valorem
tariff lines
European Communities
5.8
75.0
40.8
5.9
75.0
39.9
United States
6.9
350.0
49.6
5.1
350.0
1.4
Japan
6.9
62.0
22.7
7.3
50.0
22.6
Canada
3.5
238.0
26.0
3.1
238.0
20.1
Brazil
35.5
55.0
0.0
11.7
55.0
0.0
China
15.8
65.0
0.0
19.2
71.0
0.6
Kenya
100.0
100.0
0.0
20.1
100.0
0.1
Barbados
111.2
223.0
0.0
33.0
243.0
8.5
Indonesia
47.0
210.0
0.4
8.2
170.0
0.7
Malaysia
12.2
168.0
27.4
2.1
30.0
4.9
Saint Lucia
114.6
250.0
0.0
14.8
45.0
0.0
Myanmar
102.8
550.0
0.6
8.5
40.0
0.6
Source: World Trade Report 2004, WTO
Export competition
Objective
“… reductions of, with a view to
phasing out, all forms of export
subsidies …”
Export Subsidy Expenditures
2000
3,000
2,509
2,500
US$ Million
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
189
55
0
17
Japan
Korea
45
0
Norway
Brazil
0
EC
US
Switz-Liech.
Domestic support
Objective
“… substantial reductions in
trade-distorting domestic
support …”
Globally …
280
210
Billion US$
140
70
0
1995
2001
NOR, CAN, CHE, BRA
17.7
12.1
Korea
8.3
6.5
Japan
69.6
26.7
United States
60.9
72.1
EC
116.5
75.6
Data for Korea are for the year 2000.
The Doha Round negotiations
 Many proposals but deadline for modalities missed in March 2003
 Alliances (G-20, G-90, G-33, G-10, C-4)
 Framework approach explored but Cancún Ministerial ends in
deadlock
 Signs of flexibility & momentum for a framework text in mid-2004
 General Council Decision adopted on 1 August 2004 to guide progress
in the negotiations and the work programme – WT/L/579
 Work towards “first approximation” by July 2005 but no result
 New proposals to move negotiations forward in fall of 2005
 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration puts the Round back on
track…but a new deadline to establish modalities in April 2006 is
missed
 Despite intensive efforts to narrow the differences, negotiations
suspended at the end of July 2006
 February 2007 – back to full negotiating mode
July 2007 – circulation of possible draft modalities by the Chair
Job(07)/128; 17 July 2007; later revised as TN/AG/W/4; 1 August 2007,
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.1; 8 February 2008, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2; 19 May 2008;
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3; 10 July 2008; Lamy’s proposals-25 July 2008 ;
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4; 6 December 2008
Market Access
Market Access - Outline
 Current disciplines
• Tariffs and tariffication
• Tariff quotas
• Special safeguard
 The Framework and the negotiations
Tariffs and Tariffication
 Tariffs – bindings, reduction
 Non-tariff measures converted to tariffs
 Tariff only regimes
Tariffs
DEVELOPED
DEVELOPING
Implementation
period
6 years
1995-2000
10 years
1995-2004
Average cut
-36%
-24%
Minimum cut
-15%
-10%
No reduction commitments for LDCs
Tariffication Formula
E = (Pi - Pe) / Pe * 100
E = Tariff equivalent
Pi = Internal price (representative wholesale)
Pe = External price (c.i.f. unit values)
Base period average: 1986-88
Ceiling bindings for developing country Members
Tariff Only Regimes
Prohibition to maintain, resort or revert to:
 Quantitative restrictions
 Variable levies
 Minimum import prices
 Discretionary import licensing
 NTMs maintained through STEs
 Voluntary export restraints
 Similar border measures [...]
BUT ... Special Treatment (Annex 5) for Japan, Korea,
Philippines, Israel and Chinese Taipei
Tariffs only but ...
Morocco:
Canada:
Peaks
Minimum tariff 0%
Minimum tariff 0%
Maximum tariff
Maximum tariff
289%
238%
Escalation
Chinese Taipei: Tomatoes, fresh 10%
Tomato juice 30%
EC: Cocoa beans 0% Cocoa paste 9.6%
Chocolate 18.7%+
Various Forms
Ad valorem (15%)
Non-ad valorem: Specific (2$ per kg), Compound (10% plus 2$ per kg),
Mixed (10% or 2$ per kg, whichever is higher),
Technical (9% plus EA MAX 18.7% plus ADS/Z)
Tariff Quotas
 Current and Minimum Access Opportunities
3% - 5% of domestic consumption
 Low tariff for limited volumes
Tariff rate
Out-of-quota duty
60%
20%
In-quota duty
Quota volume
Imports (MT)
Tariff Quotas but ...
%
100
80
60
40
20
Minimum / Current
Access
Fill rate - 60%
0
Domestic
consumption
Tariff quota
TQ fill
TQ Administration
 The rules
 The methods
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Applied tariffs
First-come, first-served
Licence on demand
Historical importers
Producer groups
Imports by STEs
Auctioning
Other
Possible causes for TQ underfill?
Special Safeguard
Additional import duty on over-quota imports,
temporarily, if:
Tariffication
SSG in Schedule
Volume or price triggers (notification)
Volume-based SSG
Trigger: import surges
Extra duty: 1/3 of applied rate
Price-based SSG
Trigger: price falls
Extra duty depends on price
Negotiations
Objective
“… substantial improvements in market access …”
Technical elaboration of modalities for further commitments





Tariffs
Tariff quotas
TQ administration
Importing STEs
Other market access issues
Tariffs – Main issues
 Tariff reductions
•
•
•
•
Average and minimum cut – UR formula
Harmonizing formula – Swiss formula a*t/(a+t)
Tariff band approach
Other methods: request and offer, zero-for-zero
 Tariff peaks and escalation, forms of tariffs
 S&D:
•
Special Products (objective criteria or self-designation;
tariff reductions)
 Trade preferences
•
Preference erosion
 Tropical and diversification products
•
Fullest liberalization of trade
UR Formula vs. Swiss Formula
Tariff Quotas – Main issues

Tariff quota expansion
•
Expand by x% (e.g. 20%)
Current TQ = 100 t
New TQ = 120 t
Expand by y% (e.g. 6%) of domestic consumption
Current TQ = 100 t, Domestic consumption = 2000 t
New TQ = 100 t + 120 t
Expand to z% (e.g. 15%) of domestic consumption
Current TQ = 100 t, Domestic consumption = 2000 t
New TQ = 2000*15% = 300 t
•
•
 In-quota tariff reduction
 S&D: Duty-free access for key products; Special Products – no TQ expansion
 TQ administration
Special Safeguard –
Main issues
 Current SSG
•
•
Retain
Abolish and when
 Special Safeguard for developing country
Members:
•
•
•
What products
What measures (price-based, volume-based)
What about other developing country Members
Framework modalities
Tariff reduction - Tiered formula
1
Principles
• Tariff reductions from bound rates
• All Members, except LDCs, to contribute
• Deeper cuts for higher tariffs; flexibilities for sensitive products;
substantial improvements in market access for all products
2
Thresholds and type of tariff reductions to be negotiated
3
Tariff cap?
4 bands for tariff cuts agreed at Hong Kong
Tariff Reductions Proposals:
Developed Country Members
Bands
ACP
Levels
G-10
cuts
Levels
EC
cuts
Levels
G-20
cuts
Levels
cuts
US
Levels
cuts
A
0-20
23%
0-20
27%
0-30
35%
0-20
45%
0-20
55-65%
B
20-50
30%
20-50
31%
30-60
45%
20-50
55%
20-40
65-75%
C
50-80
35%
50-70
37%
60-90
50%
50-75
65%
40-60
75-85%
D
80+
42%
70+
45%
90+
60%
75+
75%
60+
85-90%
Other
Average
reduction: 36%
More flexibility in
each band: some
tariff could be cut
more deeply to
allow others to be
reduced less in the
same band
Flexibilities in the
band A of
between 20-45%
Average
reduction: 54%.
Tariff Reductions Proposals:
Developing Country Members
Bands
ACP
Levels
1
0-50
G-10
cuts
15%
Levels
0-30
cuts
EC
Levels
0-30
G-20
cuts
25%
Levels
0-30
US
cuts
25%
Levels
0-20
2
50-100
20%
30-70
30-80
30%
30-80
30%
20-40
3
100-150
25%
70-100
80-130
35%
80-130
35%
40-60
4
150+
30%
100+
130+
40%
130+
40%
60+
Other
Maximum average
cut: 24%
Low ceiling
bindings
Maximum average
cut: 36%.
cuts
“slightly less
than cuts for
developed
countries ”
Sensitive products
1
Number of sensitive tariff lines - to be negotiated
2
“Substantial improvement” will apply to each
product
3
Tariff quota commitment + tariff reduction
4
Base for tariff quota expansion – criteria to be
developed
Average fill rate (%)
Tariff Quota Fill - 2002
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EC
91
U
S
54
Ja
n
a
p
20
Th
a
nd
a
il
23
rb
a
B
os
d
a
36
Numer of tariff quotas
Data for Barbados are for 2000.
o
o
M
cc
o
r
67
C
ol
bi
om
67
a
Special Products and SSM
Special Products
• Selection: “appropriate” number
• Treatment: “more flexible treatment”
Special Safeguard Mechanism
• Selection
• Trigger
• Remedy
• Duration
Other flexibilities
LDCs:
 Access to all S&D provisions
 No reduction commitments
 Developed Members, and developing country Members in a position to do so,
should provide duty-free and quota-free access for LDCs
Duty-free quota-free access for at least 97% of products
from LDCs - agreed at Hong Kong
Concerns of recently acceded Members - to be addressed
Preferential Schemes –
Para. 16 of TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1
 Maintain, to the maximum extent technically feasible, the nominal margins of
tariff preferences
 Exception to the tariff reduction modality:
Longer implementation (by the preference-granting Members) of tariff
reductions affecting long-standing preferences in respect of products which are
of vital export importance for developing country beneficiaries
First instalment of the reduction – deferred to year [3] of implementation
 Products concerned - to account for at least [20] per cent of the total
merchandise exports of any beneficiary
 Interested beneficiaries to notify the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session
and submit relevant statistics
 In-quota duties for these products - to be eliminated
 Preference-providing Members to undertake targeted technical assistance to
support preference-receiving countries in efforts to diversify their economies and
exports
Other elements
 Reduction/elimination of in-quota tariffs
 Improvements in TQ administration
 Tariff escalation – to be addressed
 Tariff simplification, special agricultural safeguard
(SSG) – remain under negotiation
S&D
1
Lesser tariff reduction or TQ expansion commitments
2
Flexibility to designate Special Products to address food security,
livelihood security & rural development needs
3
Special Products – eligible for more flexible treatment
4
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)
5
Fullest liberalization of trade in tropical and diversification
products – to be addressed
6
Erosion of trade preferences - to be addressed (reference paragraph 16 of TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1)
Tariff Reduction Proposal: Chairman Crawford –
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4; 6 December 2008
Developed – cuts in 5
instalments (Average cut - 54%)
Bands
Levels
cuts
Developing – cuts in 8 instalments
(Average cut – 36%)
Levels
cuts
1
0-20
50%
0-30
33.3%
2
20-50
57%
30-80
38%
3
50-75
64%
80-130
42.7%
4
75+
66-73% [70%]
130+
46.7%
Developed Country Tariff Cuts & Flexibility
TIERED FORMULA
Threshold/Tier/Band (tariffs)
Cuts
0-20%
50%
20-50%
57%
50-75%
64%
>75%
70%
Overall minimum average cut of 54%
Sensitive Products
 In general, [4]% of tariff lines (Japan & Canada argue for
more, plus some additional flexibility)
 Lower tariff reductions but quid pro quo – tariff quota
expansion
Tariff Cap
 100% on non-Sensitive Products (with possibility for limited
exceptions)
44
Developing Country Tiered Formula Cuts
SVEs
RAMs*
Threshold/Tier/Band
(tariffs)
Cuts
(2/3rds DdC cuts)
Cuts
Cuts
0-30%
33.3%
23.3%
25.3%*
30-80%
38%
28%
30%
80-130%
42.7%
32.7%
34.7%
>130%
46.9%
36.9%
38.9%
Overall maximum average cut of 36%
Tariff Cap
 150% but doesn’t apply to Sensitive or Special
Products
*No cuts if tariff less than or equal to 10% & very recent RAMs and
small low-income RAMs with economies in transition exempt from
reduction commitments
45
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Sensitive Products
 Number:
4 per cent of [dutiable] tariff lines or 6 per cent
where over 30 per cent of the developed-country tariff
lines are in the top band or where tariff concessions have
been scheduled at the 6 digit level
Canada and Japan reservations
 Developing countries can designate one-third more of
tariff lines as sensitive
 Treatment: ⅓, ½ or ⅔ deviation from envisaged normal
cuts. Thus if developed countries have to reduce their
tariffs by 66%, the resulting cuts would be 44%, 33% and
22%, respectively.
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Tariff Quota Expansion
 Where ⅔ deviation is used, the TQ shall result in new access
opportunities equivalent to no less than 4 per cent of domestic
consumption
 Where ½ or ⅓ deviation is used, the TQ shall result in new access
opportunities equivalent to no less than 3.5 and 3 per cent of domestic
consumption, respectively
 Members can choose to designate more sensitive products (by 2
percentage points – 6%). In that event, additional access of 0.5% of
domestic consumption has to be granted
 If after the application of the formula, a Member has some its tariff lines
in excess of 100%, it can retain these provided its overall limit is not
breached and if it applies a further expansion of [0.5%] of domestic
consumption for these sensitive products
 New Tariff Quotas?
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 TRQ Expansion: SDT for developing countries: two-thirds of the volume for
developed countries. Consumption of subsistence production excluded
 Tariff Simplification
 No tariff should be bound in a form more complex than the current binding
 Simplified bound tariffs should not result in an increase of their current levels
 All bound tariffs to be expressed as simple ad valorem tariffs. In any event,
highly complex form of tariffs such as complex matrix tariffs shall be converted
into ad valorem tariffs or specific tariffs
 EC: can keep 15% of its tariff lines in non-ad valorem form
 SDT for developing countries – 2 additional years for developing countries to
effect such changes. LDCs exempted from this obligation
 Bound in-quota tariffs: To be reduced by either 50% or to 10% whichever results in a
lower tariff.
 Where the in-quota tariff is ≤ 55 ad valorem, then should be eliminated at the end of the
1st year of implementation: SDT for DCs (15%) and SVEs (7.5%)
 Tariff quota expansion: applied on MFN basis. Administration of TQs to e
subjected to the Agreement on Import Licensing. Enhanced transparency
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Special Products
 Developing countries entitled to self-designate 12% of their tariff
lines as special on the basis of the agreed indicators – food
security, livelihood security and rural development
 Up to 5% of the tariff lines not be subjected to any cuts.
 The overall average cut shall be 11 per cent
 Under Lamy’s 25 July 2008 proposal, developing countries
can designate 12% of tariff lines as special products. No cuts
on 5% of the tariff lines but an overall average cut of 11%
 SVEs and RAMs – Flexible treatment : Under Lamy’s proposal,
RAMs will be able to designate 13% of their tariff lines as SPs
and make an overall cut of 10%
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG)
 Developed-country Members not to have the right to use
SSG (DCs’ proposal)
 Reduction to 1 percent scheduled tariff lines – the number
of tariff lines eligible for SSG [Under Lamy’s 25 July 2008
proposal, same figure]. To be phased out within 7
years. Remedy not to exceed UR bound rates
 Developing countries - eligible tariff lines to be reduced to
no more than 2.5 per cent on the 1st day of implementation
 Terms and conditions of the SSG to remain unchanged from
the URAA terms and conditions. However, tariff rates to be
updated to reflect Doha outcome
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM): To be available for all
products in principle. However, not to be invoked for more than
2.5% of all and only if surge in imports is accompanied by declining
prices
 TRIGGERS: Both price and volume-based SSM will be available. The
two may not be imposed at the same time. Neither can any one of
them be imposed in respect of a product which is the subject of a
safeguard measure, including under Art 5 of the AoA, an antidumping or countervailing measure
 Detailed rules on volume and price triggers and their remedies
 As regards remedies, the maximum increase over the UR BR could
not be more than 15% or 15% of the current BR, whichever is higher
 Cannot be used for more than 2-6 products in a given period nor in
two consecutive periods
Special Safeguard Mechanism
 For volume-based SSM, developing countries can increase tariffs by
25% if imports exceed 110% of base imports; by 40% if imports exceed
115% of base imports; and 50% if imports exceed 135% of base imports.
(G-33: 105%, 110% and 130% of base imports with accompanying
remedies of 40, 50 and 60%)
 Base imports to be calculated as a rolling average of imports in the
preceding 3-year period and the remedy could not exceed UR levels
unless specified conditions met.
 Volume-based SSM could be maintained for a maximum period of 12
months from the initial invocation of measure, unless a seasonal
product is involved, in which case the period will be 6 months
 No product to be subject to volume-based SSM consecutively for more
than 2 periods and where this has occurred, this measure may not be
resorted to again before the lapse of a further two consecutive periods
Special Safeguard Mechanism
 Flexibility for least-developed countries and SVEs
 With respect to LDCs, the maximum increase over the
UR bound rate could be no more than 40% or 40% of
the current bound tariff, whichever is higher
 With respect to SVEs, the maximum increase over the
UR bound rate could be no more than 20% or 20% of
the current bound tariff, whichever is higher, for up to
a maximum of 10-15% of tariff lines in any given period
SSM – Volume-based
Basis of rolling average of imports over 3 preceding years
Thresholds
(para 134)
Remedies[1]
110%-115%
25% current bnd tariff OR 25 percentage points
115%-135%
40% current bnd tariff OR 40 percentage points
>135%
50% current bnd tariff OR 50 percentage points
[1]
 Exceeding pre-Doha bindings - LDCs, SVEs and DgC
 TN/AG/W/7 suggests 2 triggers & remedies for exceeding pre-
Doha bindings
(i) 120% - 140% - 1/3rd of current bound or 8
percentage pts whichever is the higher
(ii) >140% - ½ of current bound or 12 percentage
pts whichever is the higher
Other Issues
 Length of remedy – 4/8 months; may be re-imposed after the
lapse of 4/8 months (equal period of time must lapse)
 Cross-check (not normally applicable if domestic price falling)
 Limitation on scope (2.5% TLs?)
54
SSM – Price-based
Trigger
85% of three
year monthly
average
Remedy
85% of difference between trigger price and
import price
max duty current bound duty
 Applied on a shipment-by-shipment basis
 Not normally take recourse if import volumes manifestly declining
(cross-check)
55
How SSM will work in practice
Pre-Doha BR=80%; Post Doha BR=60%; AR=30/50%
Trigger
(import rise)
Remedy (tariff increase) % of
current BR + % of current AR;
current AR+ percentage points
BR=60%
AR=30%
BR=60%
AR=50%
10-15%
25% or 25 percentage points
whichever is greater
45% or 55% 75
55
30-35%
40% or 40 percentage points
whichever is greater
54% or 70% 90>80
70
35% +
50% or 50 percentage points
whichever is greater
60% or 80% 100>80
80
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 For price falls (“price based”), the starting point is the





average monthly import (C.I.F) price over the previous three
years — i.e., before the current year. (Par.126)
If the price of a shipment is 15% or more below that reference
(85% of the reference average), then the tariff can be imposed
on that shipment — shipment by shipment. (Par.126–7)
Prices for preferential trade cannot be used. (Par.129)
Remedy: The tariff increase cannot be more than 85% of the
gap between the price of the shipment and the trigger price.
(Par.127)
SSM “normally” cannot be used if the import volume is
“manifestly declining” or is a “manifestly negligible” amount
that cannot undermine the domestic price (Par.128).
Other details on currency fluctuations, transparency, etc
Exceeding-Pre-Doha /UR BR
Country Trigger (import
rise /price fall)
Remedy (tariff increase) % of
current BR + pre-Doha BR;
Pre-Doha BR+ percentage
points
PreDoha=80%
Current
BR=60%
DCs
15% or 15 percentage points
whichever is greater
2-6
89% or
95% 95 products
import rise /price
fall
Limits
in each
period
at the 6
digit level
Not in 2
periods
SVEs
import rise /price
fall
20% or 20 percentage points
whichever is greater
92% or
100%
100
10-15%
of tariff
lines:
Detailed
products
LDCs
import rise /price
fall
40% or 40 percentage points
whichever is greater
104% or
120%
120
No
specific
limit
Other Market Access Issues –
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Under Lamy’s 25 July 2008 Text:
 SSM for above bound rate trigger is 140% of base
imports
 Remedy for above bound is applicable with a ceiling
of 15% of current bound tariff or 15 ad valorem
points, whichever is the greater
 That remedy is not normally applicable if prices are
not actually declining
 Maximum number of tariff lines for above bound
2,5% in any year
Exceeding-Pre-Doha /UR BR
Lamy’s Proposal
Country Trigger
(additional for
import rise)
Remedy (tariff increase) % of
current BR + pre-Doha BR;
Pre-Doha BR+ percentage
points
PreDoha=80%
Current
BR=60%
DCs
15% or 15 percentage points
whichever is greater
2.5% of
89% or
95% 95 tariff
40%
Limits
in each
period
linesdetailed
products
TROPICAL PRODUCTS – Annex G
 Deeper tariff cuts
 Where the scheduled tariff is less or equal to 25% ad valorem, it shall be
reduced to zero
 Where the scheduled tariff is greater than 25% ad valorem, the applicable
tariff cut shall be 85%
 Where the scheduled tariff is greater than or equal to 10%, the applicable tariff
cut shall be 70%, except for tariffs in the top band, which shall be reduced by
the tariff escalation tariff cut for that band increased by 2%
 [Where the scheduled tariff is less than 10%, it shall be reduced to zero]
 [Tropical products shall not be designated as sensitive]
 [Implementation by developed-country members in 4 equal instalments]
 Developing countries in a position to do encouraged to do more
 Considerable progress made in July 08 mini-Ministerial
 A lot depends on the outcome of the banana agreement
 Chairman wanted to record progress in latest draft modalities text but due to
“certain material changes” which occurred post July, the Chairman was unable to
modify the draft modalities text
PREFERENCE EROSION – Annex H
 No tariff cuts on the items listed in Annex for 10 years
 Tariff cuts to be implemented thereafter over 5 years in equal
instalments
 Where a product is listed in the Annex and the ff conditions
are met, the implementation period will be 10 years (8+2)
 the pre-Doha MFN tariff is greater than 10% ad valorem
 the total value of trade over a 3 year representative period is greater
than $50,000 or constitutes [3]% of the long standing preferencereceiving country’s total agricultural trade to the market concerned
 there is unlimited long-standing preference eligibility in the market
concerned
 Provisions to prevail where there is overlap with provisions
on tariff escalation / tropical products
 Targeted technical assistance
TARIFF ESCALATION
 [Tariffs on processed products to be reduced more steeply. Instead of
taking the cut that would otherwise apply to final bound tariffs in the band
to which the processed product belongs (with the exception of the top
band), the processed product shall take the cut applicable to tariffs that
fall in the next highest band
 [Products falling in the top band to be reduced by a cut that would
otherwise have been applicable according to the tiered formula increased
by 6 ad valorem points]
 Supplementary cuts to be moderated in two situations: First, where the
absolute difference between the processed and primary product after the
application of the normal tariff formula would be 5 ad valorem percentage
points or less in any given tier except the bottom tier – no additional tariff
escalation adjustment to be required
 Second, the application of adjustment formula should not lead to a higher
tariff on the primary product than the processed product
COMMODITIES
 Where problems persist after the application of the formula,
including the tariff escalation adjustment formula, Members
are to engage with commodity-dependent producing countries
to ensure satisfactory solutions
 Identification of products for the purpose of applying the tariff
escalation formula – specific targets; non-ad valorem duties to
be converted and bound
 Elimination of NTBs
 Joint action – intergovernmental commodity agreements etc
LDCS
 LDCs: No reduction commitments
 DFQF – 100% : By 2008 or the start of the
implementation period; where there are difficulties,
97% at the beginning to be increased gradually to
100%
 Developing countries in a position to do so
encouraged to grant DFQF – phase in of
commitments
 Cotton Market Access: DFQF for LDCs
SVEs
 The term SVEs to apply to Members with economies that,
in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of:
 World merchandise trade of no more than 0.16% or less
 World trade in non-agricultural products of no more than 0.1%
 World trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4%
 SVEs could moderate the two-thirds cut by developing
countries by a further 10 ad-valorem points in each band
 Flexibility in the designation of special products – SVEs
can deviate from the tiered formula cut for as many tariff
lines as they choose to designate as SPs provided they
meet the overall average cut of 24%
 Products designated as SPs need not be subject to a
minimum tariff cut nor designation be guided by the
indicators
RAMs
 Entitled to moderate tariff cuts in the top 2 bands by 10




ad-valorem percentage points and by 5 ad valorem
percentage points in the bottom two bands
Saudi Arabia, Macedonia, Vietnam and Tonga exempted
from undertaking cuts
For other RAMs, where there is an overlap between
accession commitments and commitments associated
with modalities, the start of the IP shall be one year after
the end of the accession commitment
Implementation period shall be 10 years (8+2)
Flexibility in the designation of special products – one
tenth greater than the amount to be designated by
developing countries. Relevant cuts for the designated
tariff lines may be further reduced by 2 ad-valorem points
Domestic
Support
Domestic Support - Outline
 Current disciplines
 Green Box
 Blue Box
 Article 6.2 – Development Programmes
 Amber Box
 The Framework and the negotiations
The Boxes
Green Box
Annex 2
No more than minimally trade or
production distorting
Article 6.2 Measures
Development programmes:
investment, input, diversification
Blue Box
Article 6.5
Production-limiting programmes
Amber Box
Subject to reduction
commitments
De minimis allowance
How much domestic support?
300
250
US$ Billion
200
150
100
50
0
1995
2001
Canada
3.0
3.0
Norway
3.3
2.5
Brazil
5.5
2.8
Switzerland-Liecht.
5.9
3.8
Korea
8.3
6.5
Japan
69.6
26.7
US
60.8
72.1
EC
116.9
75.6
Data for Korea are for the year 2000.
Categories of support - 2001
90,000
75,000
60,000
Million US$
45,000
30,000
15,000
0
EC
US
JPN
KOR
CHE
BRA
NOR
CAN
Current Total AMS 35,151 14,413 5,328 1,495
773 7,045 257
463
De minimis
1,632
0
1,187
1,791
-
976
-
164
Blue Box
21,231
-
728
-
-
-
813
-
Article 6.2
-
-
-
45
-
332
-
-
480
1,088
Green Box
18,489 50,672 20,355 4,469
Data for Korea are for the year 2000.
2,190 1,462
Green Box
No, or at most minimal, trade-distorting
effects or effects on production
Basic criteria
Assistance:
- Provided through publicly funded
government programme
- Not involving transfers from consumers
- Not resulting in price support to
producers
Green Box – Scope
General services, including:
 research
 pest and disease control
 training
 extension/advisory services
 inspection
 marketing and promotion
 infrastructural services
 Public stockholding for food
security purposes
 Domestic food aid
Direct payments, including:
 decoupled income support
 income insurance and income
safety-net
 relief from natural disasters
 structural adjustment assistance
 producer retirement
 resource retirement
 investment aids
 environmental programmes
 regional assistance programmes
Policy-specific “decoupling”
X



Type of production
Volume of production
Amount of payments

Domestic prices
International prices

Factors of production

X
In any
year
after
the
base
period
Blue Box
 based on fixed area and yields;
Direct payments under
production-limiting
programmes exempt
from reduction if:
or
 made on  85% of base level of
production; or
 livestock payments are made on
a fixed number of head
Article 6.2
Development
programmes exempt
from reduction:
• investment subsidies generally
available to agriculture
• input subsidies generally available
to low-income or resource poor
producers
• support to encourage
diversification from growing illicit
narcotic crops
Sample Scheduled Reduction Commitment
Amber Box
Schedule LXXIX - THAILAND
PART IV - AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: COMMITMENTS LIMITING SUBSIDIZATION
(Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture)
SECTION I - Domestic Support: Total AMS Commitments
BASE TOTAL AMS
Years of implementation
Annual and final bound
Relevant Supporting Tables and
(million Baht)
1995 - 2004
commitment levels
document reference
(million Baht)
1
22,126.18
2
3
1
21,816.41
AGST/THA
2
21,506.64
Supporting Tables 4, 5, 8 and 9
3
21,196.87
4
20,887.10
5
20,577.33
6
20,267.56
7
19,957.79
8
19,648.02
9
19,338.25
10
19,028.48
What if there is no commitment? - Article 7
% cut in aggregate terms
AMS Reduction Commitment
DEVELOPED
DEVELOPING
Implementation
period
6 years
1995-2000
10 years
1995-2004
Cut in Total AMS
-20%
-13.3%
De minimis
allowance
5%
10%
No reduction commitments for LDCs
EC and the CAP Reform
80
Euros Billion
60
40
20
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003*
Green
18.8
22.1
18.2
19.2
21.9
21.8
20.7
20.4
22.1
Blue
20.8
21.5
20.4
20.5
19.8
22.2
23.7
24.7
24.8
Amber
50.0
51.0
50.2
46.7
47.9
43.7
39.3
28.5
30.9
WTO limit
78.7
76.4
74.1
71.8
69.5
67.2
67.2
67.2
67.2
* This notification covers support to the European Union after enlargement on 1 May 2004. Price gap calculations are performed on
EU25 production levels for a 12 month period and include direct payments to 25 member States. Total AMS commitment level for
2003 (€67,159 million) is without prejudice to the EC25 commitment to be presented in the new EC25 schedule after enlargement.
US and the Farm Bill
60
US$ Billion
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
46
51.8
51.3
49.8
49.7
50
50.1
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
De minimis
1.6
1.2
0.8
4.8
7.4
7.3
7
Amber
6.2
5.9
6.2
10.4
16.9
16.8
14.4
23.1
22.3
21.5
20.7
19.9
19.1
19.1
Green
Blue
WTO limit
Calculating the Current Total AMS
De minimis
Market price support
Non-exempt direct payments
(e.g. loan deficiency payments,
grants, compensatory payments)
Other non-exempt measures
All product-specific EMS
Product-specific
support
Water subsidies
Fertilizer subsidies
Crop insurance
Subsidized credits
Non-product-specific
support
allowance
+
Current Total AMS
Negotiations
Objective
“… substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic
support …”
Technical elaboration of modalities for further commitments
 The Boxes
 S&D elements
The Boxes – Main issues
 Green Box
•
•
•
Cap/reduce or maintain without limits
Tighten or relax criteria
Expand scope to address: NTCs, developing country concerns
 Blue Box – should it stay or should it go?
 Article 6.2 – further flexibilities to pursue targeted development needs
 Amber Box
•
•
•
Reduce or eliminate AMS
Maintain, reduce or increase de minimis
Establish specific flexibilities (S&D, economies in transition, recently
acceded Members)
Key issue - Size of cuts
Framework modalities Overall trade-distorting domestic support
Overall reduction
 Tiered formula, with 20% downpayment
in the first year of implementation
Base level
Final Bound Total AMS
+
Permitted de minimis (half
product specific and other half
non-product specific)
+
Agreed Blue Box level
Deeper cuts for higher levels of support
OTDS - Proposals and main issues
Members’
proposals
Tier 1 (EC)
Tier 2 (Japan
and US)
Tier 3 (Other
Members with
Total AMS)
EC
70%
60%
50%
US
75%
53%
31%
G20
80%
75%
70%
G10
75%
65%
45%
Developing country Members (all in tier 3) to make lesser reductions over a longer implementation period.
Main issue - Size of cuts
Framework modalities –
Trade-distorting domestic support
Individual elements
 Final Bound Total AMS – tiered formula
 Product-specific AMS caps
- average level to be agreed
- base period to be agreed
 Reduction in de minimis
 Capping of the Blue Box
Final Bound Total AMS –
Proposals and main issues
Members’
proposals
Tier 1 (EC)
Tier 2 (Japan
and US)
Tier 3 (Other
Members)
EC
70%
60%
50%
US
83%
60%
37%
G20
80%
70%
60%
G10
70%
60%
40%
Developing country Members (all in tier 3) to make lesser reductions over a longer implementation period.
Main issues:
- Size of cuts in Final Bound Total AMS
- Base period for product-specific AMS caps (1999-2001 or 1995-2000)
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
Trade-distorting domestic support
Bands for reductions
Member with
highest level of
support
Members with
2nd and 3rd
highest levels of
support
Other Members
 Developed country Members in lower bands with high relative level of Final
Bound Total AMS – to make an additional effort
 Developing country Members with no AMS commitments – exempt from
reductions in de minimis and the overall cut
Higher linear cuts in higher bands
De minimis
 Reduction in de minimis (by 50% or 80% or such reduction as to adjust
to the rate of cut in OTDS)
 S&D: Developing countries that allocate almost all de minimis support
for subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt from reduction
% of value of agricultural
production
Use of de minimis - 2001
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
EC
US
JPN
Product-specific
Data for Korea are for the year 2000.
KOR
CHE
BRA
Non-product-specific
NOR
Blue Box
 Direct payments under:
- production-limiting programmes or
- no requirement to produce
- additional criteria to be negotiated
 Blue Box not to exceed 5% of a Member’s average total value of agricultural
production during an historical period
% of value of agricultural
production
Blue Box - 2001
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
813 mln $
21,231 mln $
728 mln $
5% cap
0 mln $
EC
US
JPN
NOR
Blue Box - Proposals and main issues
 Lower the Blue Box cap – 2.5% of VOP (or less)
 Develop additional criteria:
- non-concentration via “double trigger”
- offsetting mechanism
- other?
Main issues:
- how to ensure less trade-distortion
- how to design effective disciplines on “old” and “new” Blue Box
Green Box
 Review and clarify criteria
 Ensure basic concepts, principles and effectiveness remain; take
due account of non-trade concerns
 Strengthen monitoring and surveillance
Green Box expenditure - 2001
60,000
US$ million
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
EC
US
JPN
KOR CHE
BRA
NOR CAN
Data for Korea for the year 2000.
Main issue: what amendments should be made, if any
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
Cotton

All forms of export subsidies to be eliminated by developed countries in 2006
 Developed countries to give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from LDCs from
the start of implementation period
 Trade-distorting domestic subsidies to be reduced more ambitiously and implemented
over a shorter period of time than generally applicable
 Development assistance aspects:
- Consultative Framework process (bilateral donors, multilateral and regional institutions)
- explore a possibility of establishing a mechanism to address income declines in the
cotton sector
- Director General to furnish a third Period Report at the next Ministerial Conference
 Follow-up and monitoring – Director General to set up an appropriate mechanism
1
S&D
Longer implementation period
2
Lower reduction coefficients for all types of tradedistorting support
3
4
Access to Article 6.2 – Development
programmes
De minimis support for subsistence and
resource-poor farmers – exempt from
reduction
Chairman’s Draft ModalitiesTN/AG/W/4/Rev.4
 Base overall trade-distorting domestic support (OTDS)
shall be the sum of:
(i) final bound total AMS;
 (ii) 10% of value of production in the 1995-2000 base period
– representing 5% for product-specific support and 5% for
non-product specific support; for developing countries 10%
each: base period either 1995-2000 or 1995-2004
 (iii) the higher of average Blue Box payments or 5% of the
average total value of production (1995-2000)
 Thus for some developed countries, the base level would be
Amber box commitment plus 15% of production

Chair’s Proposed Draft Modalities OTDS
Bands
Range
Proposed Cuts
1 - EC
≥ $60 billion
[80%]
2 – US and Japan ≥$10 billion and ≤
60 billion
[70%] US
[75%] Japan
3 –Others –
Developed and
Developing
[55] %
≤ $10 billion
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Under the Chairman’s proposal, US OTDS will be reduced
from $48.2 billion to between $13 and $16.4 billion. Under
its own proposal, it will be reduced to $22.5 billion.
Offered in July 2008, to reduce to $14.5 billion
 According to the recent notification by the US, its
payments on OTDS amounted to $ 16.3 billion in 2002,
$10.2 billion in 2003, $18.1 billion in 2004 and $18.9 billion
in 2005
 Estimated that because of high commodity prices in 2007,
the US payments on OTDS amounted to no more than $9
billion. Figure not confirmed by the US
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 The current ceiling of the EC (15 Members) is estimated at
€110.3 billion ($152 billion). Cut will bring the ceiling
down to €27.6 billion or €16.5 billion. Cut of 80 per cent
will bring it down to €22.06 billion (around $35 billion).
 Japan expected to do more, as its overall support is more
than 40 per cent of the total value of its agricultural
production – a cut halfway between the cuts of the top
and the second tiers
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Chair’s Draft Modalities
 Implementation period and staging:
 Developed countries: six steps over 5 years. For the EC, US and Japan, the




base OTDS will be reduced by one-third (33%) on the first day of
implementation and the remainder to be reduced in five equal instalments
For developed Members in the third tier, the base OTDS will be reduced by
25 per cent on the first day of implementation and the remainder to be
reduced in five equal instalments
Developing countries with no Final Bound Total AMS commitments
exempted from undertaking reduction commitments with respect to their
base OTDS. Those with AMS commitments will undertake two-thirds of the
cut made by developed countries in the lowest tier (37%)
Reductions by developing countries shall be implemented in nine steps over
8 years. The base OTDS shall be reduced by 20 per cent on the first day of
implementation and the remainder in eight equal instalments
RAMs which recently acceded exempted, so also are small low-income RAMs
with economies-in-transition. For other RAMs, treatment comparable to
that of other developing countries – two-thirds cut and a transitional period
of 8 years
Chair’s Proposed Draft Modalities - AMS
Bands
Range
Proposed Cuts
1
≥ $40 billion
[70] %
2
≥$15 billion and ≤
40 billion
[60] %
3
≤$15 billion
[45] %
Domestic Support
Chairman’s proposals
 Under the Chairman’s proposal, the amber box limit of the EC




will be reduced from €67.1 billion ($92.5 billion) to €20.1 billion
The amber box limit of the US will be reduced from $19.1
billion to $7.6 billion
Developed countries whose Amber Box support is more than
40% of the value of their agricultural production to make a
bigger cut, i.e. a cut halfway between the cut of their tier and
the tier above
According to figures provided by the US, AMS payments for
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 were $9.6 billion, $6.9 billion, $11.6
billion and 12.9 billion, respectively.
Brazil and Canada are alleging in the dispute settlement
proceedings that the US exceeded its WTO limits for most of
these years, a claim the US denies.
Domestic Support – Chairman’s
Proposals
 Implementation period and staging:
 The EC, US and Japan to cut 25% from the start. All other cuts to be
made over 5 years in 5 equal instalments
 For other developed countries, reductions to be implemented in six
equal instalments over 5 years, commencing on the 1st day of
implementation
 Developing countries expected to reduce their support by two-thirds of
the cut made by developed countries in the bottom tier (30%).
Implementation in nine equal instalments over 8 years, commencing on
the 1st day of implementation
 RAMs which recently acceded exempted from cuts, so also are small lowincome RAMs with economies-in-transition. Some allowed to exclude
investment subsidies from Amber Box calculations. Other RAMs to
make two-thirds of the normal cut
Domestic Support
 PRODUCT-SPECIFIC AMS CAPS – average applied during the








UR implementation period (1995-2000)
For the US – average between 1995-2004 and 1995-2000
S&D for developing countries – base period (1995-2000 or 19952004)
DE MINIMIS: to be reduced by 50 per cent by developed
countries – i.e. cap at 2.5 per cent of the value of production
S&D for developing countries: some exempted, others to make
two-thirds of the cuts of developed countries
BLUE BOX: maximum permitted value not to exceed 2.5 per cent
of the average total value of agricultural production
Lesser cut if over 40% of Member’s support placed in the blue box
Deeper cut in AMS support for cotton
Tightened disciplines for the Green Box
Export Competition and the
Marrakesh NFIDC Decision
Export Competition - Outline
 Current disciplines

Export subsidies

Anti-circumvention

Export prohibitions and restrictions
 The Framework and
the negotiations
The Marrakesh NFIDC Decision
Definition
Export Subsidies
Article 1(e): Subsidies contingent upon export performance, including
the export subsidies listed in Article 9
Legal Framework
 Export subsidies allowed only if listed in the Schedule and subject to
reduction commitments (volume and budgetary outlays)
 Roll-over provisions (now expired)
 S&D: subsidies for marketing and internal transport (during the
implementation period)
 Anti-circumvention provisions
Policy Coverage - Article 9.1
 Direct subsidies contingent on export performance
 Sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non-




commercial stocks at prices below domestic market price
Payments on exports financed by government action (including
producer financed subsidies)
Subsidies to reduce cost of marketing, including handling,
upgrading, international transport and freight
Favourable internal transport and freight charges on export
shipments
Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their
incorporation in exported products
Export Subsidies
DEVELOPED
DEVELOPING
Implementation
period
6 years
1995-2000
10 years
1995-2004
Cut in budgetary
outlays
-36%
-24%
Cut in subsidized
quantities
-21%
-14%
No reduction commitments for LDCs
Members with Scheduled Reduction
Commitments
Australia (5)
Number of products
EC (20)
Poland (17)
Bolivarian Republic
Hungary (16)
Romania (13)
of Venezuela (72)
Iceland (2)
Slovak Rep. (17)
Brazil (16)
Indonesia (1)
South Africa (62)
Bulgaria (44)
Israel (6)
Switzerl-Liecht. (5)
Canada (11)
Mexico (5)
Turkey (44)
Colombia (18)
New Zealand (1)
United States (13)
Cyprus (9)
Norway (11)
Uruguay (3)
Czech Rep. (16)
Panama (1)
Export Subsidy Expenditures
2000
3,000
2,509
2,500
US$ Million
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
189
55
0
17
Japan
Korea
45
0
Norway
Brazil
0
EC
US
But what about the Panels?
Switz-Liech.
Export Subsidies
Article 10 to prevent circumvention of export
subsidy commitments
 Other forms of export subsidies
 Export credits, insurance and guarantees
•
•
Develop internationally agreed disciplines
But ... negotiations with no result - OECD Arrangement on Officially
Supported Export Credits does not cover agriculture
 Food aid
•
•
Specific criteria, Food Aid Convention, FAO
But ... is it always genuine aid or dumping?
Other ways to evade commitments?
- Taxes, production quotas
- Domestic support
- Other
Export Prohibitions and Restrictions


•
•
•
Article XI.1(a) of GATT – provision for the temporary
application of an export prohibition or restriction
Article 12 of the AoA – when applying GATT Article
XI.2(a):
Give due consideration to impacts on importing
Members’ food security
Advance written notice, consultations on request
Not applicable to developing countries which are not
net exporters of the specific foodstuff concerned
Negotiations
Objective
“… reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of
export subsidies …”
Technical elaboration of modalities for further commitments
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Export subsidies
Export credits, insurance and guarantees
Food aid
Exporting STEs
Export restrictions and taxes
Main issues
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Reduce/eliminate export subsidies
Parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies:
Export credits, insurance and guarantees
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Food aid
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Genuine aid vs. surplus dumping; Need declaration vs. response to an
appeal; Concessional vs. grant form
State trading enterprises
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Reduction commitments vs. rules-based approach; Disciplines in favour
of LDCs and NFIDCs
Tackle the enterprises or specific measures
Export restrictions and taxes
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Reduce/eliminate export restrictions; Export taxes – not for negotiation?
Key issue – End export subsidies by ?
Framework modalities
Credible end date
Parallel elimination of:
Export subsidies
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Export credits, guarantees & insurance with
repayment periods > 180 days
Export credits, guarantees & insurance with
repayment periods ≤ 180 days which are not in
accordance with disciplines to be agreed
Trade-distorting elements of export STEs
Food aid that is not in conformity with operationally
effective disciplines to be agreed
Implementation - Annual instalments
S&D
1
Longer implementation periods
2
Access to Article 9.4 (marketing & transportation
subsidies)
3
Disciplines on export credits, guarantees or
insurance programmes - provision for
differential treatment in favour of LDCs and
NFIDCs
4
STEs - Special consideration for
maintaining monopoly status
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
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Parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies – 2013
Substantial part to be eliminated by the end of the first half of the
implementation period
Disciplines:
Export credits, insurance and guarantees ≤ 180 days
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Food aid
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“Safe box” for bona fide food aid in emergency situations
Eliminate commercial displacement via effective disciplines on in-kind food
aid, monetization and re-exports
State trading enterprises
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Should be self-financing, reflecting market consistency and of sufficiently
short duration so as not to effectively circumvent real commercially-oriented
discipline
Disciplines to also cover future use of monopoly power
Access to Article 9.4 for developing country Members for five years
after the end-date for elimination of all forms of export subsidies
Export Competition –
Chair’s Draft ModalitiesTN/AG/W/4/rev1
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Elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 2013.
Budgetary outlays- 50% reduction by 2010 and the
rest in equal instalments
•
Reduction commitments also on quantity of exported
products
S&D for developing countries - 2016
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Developing countries to benefit from the provisions of
Article 9.4 until 5 yrs after the end of the
implementation period
Proposed strengthened disciplines on agricultural
exporting STEs and international food aid
Elimination of all forms of export subsidies for cotton
...
The Marrakesh NFIDC Decision
 Recognize possible negative
effects of reform programme:
• availability of adequate food
supplies from external sources,
on reasonable terms
• short-term difficulties in
financing normal levels of
commercial imports
 WTO list of NFIDCs:
• Least-developed countries (UN
list) plus
• Barbados, Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire,
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Honduras,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius,
Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia,
Pakistan, Peru, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri
Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia
The Marrakesh NFIDC Decision
 Food aid:
• review by the Committee on Agriculture
• new Food Aid Convention 1999 – extended to 30 June 2007
• notifications (quantity and concessionality)
 Consideration given to requests for assistance to improve
agricultural productivity and infrastructure
 Export credits (negotiations ongoing)
 Short-term difficulties in financing commercial imports of basic
foodstuffs - access to resources of international financial institutions,
e.g. IMF and the World Bank
The Marrakesh NFIDC Decision
 Inter-agency Panel of finance and commodity experts from IMF, World
Bank, FAO, IGC, WTO
• explore ways for improving access to multilateral programs and
facilities
to assist with short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial
imports of basic foodstuffs
 Discussions in the Committee on Agriculture
• concept and feasibility of proposal to establish an ex-ante financing
mechanism
 May 2003 - Round-table of experts to:
• explore the need for a safety net
• identify appropriate mechanisms
 Recommendations for the IFIs and the Committee on Agriculture