Journal of Sport Management, 2010, 24, 291-318
© 2010 Human Kinetics, Inc.
Decision Making in Major Sport Events
Over Time: Parameters, Drivers,
and Strategies
Milena M. Parent
University of Ottawa
The purpose of this article was to examine how the decision-making process
changes as a major sport event’s organizing committee moves from the planning to the implementation to the wrap-up modes. A case study of the 1999 Pan
American Games, its organizing committee, and its stakeholders was built by
means of interviews and archival material. Velocity impacted decision making in
different ways. First, the importance of the time, context, and resources parameters
changed, as did the model of decision making (from administrative to garbage
can to rational). As well, four drivers of decision making (structural dimensions,
stakeholder interactions, information management, and personal characteristics)
were found. A key strategy for decision makers faced with an increasing velocity
environment was planning for the need to react (come Games time) through risk
assessments and contingency plans.
Imagine an organization that is nonprofit by nature, yet expected to make a profit
for its various stakeholders (Freeman, 1984), that is as much a project and business
as a cause, that grows from a handful of employees to thousands in a matter of a few
months, that has a budget in the billions of dollars, that has no direct competitors yet
where failure is not an option as the whole world is watching, that knowingly enters
a state of crisis, all to close its books at a predetermined date and let the various
stakeholders determine its success and reputation. That is the world of organizing
committees of major international sport events like the organizing committees of
the Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup. It is also similar to other major pulsating organizations (Hanlon & Cuskelly, 2002) such as large construction projects,
movie projects, and conferences. Leaders of these organizations find themselves in
an increasingly high velocity environment (i.e., where decision makers have little
or no time to make decisions; cf. Eisenhardt, 1989b), where each decision is more
critical than the previous, only to find themselves postproject or postevent with
enough time on their hands to make the organization’s final decisions.
Research related to major sport events has notably included marketing, sponsorship, and brand studies (e.g., Brown, 2002; Green, Costa, & Fitzgerald, 2003; Irwin,
Parent is with the School of Human Kinetics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5, Canada.
291
292 Parent
Lachowetz, Cornwell, & Clark, 2003; Séguin, Lyberger, O’Reilly, & McCarthy,
2005; Séguin, Richelieu, & O’Reilly, 2008); image and identity studies (e.g., Chalip,
Green, & Hill, 2003; Parent & Foreman, 2007; Reid, 2006; Whitson & Macintosh,
1993), and economic impact and tourism studies (e.g., Crompton, 1995; Daniels
& Norman, 2003; Deery, Jago, & Fredline, 2004; Getz, 1998; Gratton, Dobson,
& Shibli, 2000; Gratton, Shibli, & Coleman, 2006; Hughes, 1999; Lee & Taylor,
2005; Preuss, 2005; Tomljenovic & Weber, 2004; Whitson & Macintosh, 1996).
However, few studies (Theodoraki, 2001; Parent, 2008 are exceptions) have truly
examined organizational and managerial processes within major sport events, which
is essential for the successful (efficient and effective) hosting of major sport events.
One exception is Parent (2008) who described the evolution of a sport event
as moving from 1) a planning mode, where it must prepare the bid book, business
plan, operational plan, and division-specific operational plans; 2) to the implementation mode halfway-through its existence, where venue-specific plans are prepared
and lead to the actual Games time; and 3) to the wrap-up mode for the final six to
twelve months of its existence, where the final reports are written for the various
stakeholders, and where the event’s legacy is managed and distributed since the
organizing committee is a nonprofit organization. Throughout these three modes,
the organizing committee will deal with 13 different issue categories—politics, visibility, financial, organizing, relationships, operations, sport, infrastructure, human
resources, media, interdependence, participation, and legacy—the predominance
of which is dependent on the mode of the organizing committee.
While Parent (2008) presented specific issues with which to deal in each
operational mode, this study takes the next step and examines how these issues
are resolved (i.e., decision making) over time. The fact that issue predominance is
dependent on the organizing committee’s mode would indicate that decision-making
processes may also change as the organizing committee moves from one mode to
the next. This fact has yet to be examined as our understanding of decision making
within major sport events is lacking.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine how the decision-making
process changes as an organizing committee moves from the planning to the
implementation to the wrap-up mode. Examining this process includes determining what limits or frames decision making (parameters), what facilitates or pushes
decision making (drivers), and what kinds of plans or tools are used to make the
decisions (strategies). Given the lack of decision-making research within major
sport events, this study was exploratory in nature, iterating between the data and
theoretical arguments (Pratt, Rockmann, & Kaufmann, 2006), which can be found
in the management literature on decision making (see next section). The study’s
findings suggest three key parameters limiting decision making, as well as four
drivers of decision making, with related strategies. Thus, the study contributes to
the sport event management literature by 1) extending the work of Parent (2008);
and 2) beginning the theorizing process relating to decision making in sport event
management—that is, providing the what and how (domain/subject of the theory
description), and the who and when (contextual and temporal factors acting as
boundaries for the range of the theory; see Whetten, 1989). This study also considers the various decision-making theories as possible explanatory options, thereby
testing the generalizability of these theories in an innovative setting, and finds that
decision making is not as linear or consistent as the theories would lead us to believe.
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 293
The paper is structured as follows. First, the conceptual framework used for
the iterative data analysis process is described, followed by the data collection
and analysis methods. Results are then presented and discussed, with concluding
remarks and future directions ending the paper.
Conceptual Framework
Management is essentially about decision making (Pugh & Hickson, 2007; Simon,
1965, 1976, 1977). Researchers have argued for various models of decision making,
such as the rational, administrative, and garbage can models (cf. Allison & Zelikow,
1999; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Simon, 1976,
1977). Even unstructured decisions have a certain structure (Mintzberg, Raisinghani,
& Théorêt, 1976). Studies have notably examined fast versus slow decision making
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989b), characteristics of key decision makers, that is, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and top management teams
(e.g., Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
1988; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Schwenk, 1995), politics and power issues
(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) and different contextual or environmental factors
(e.g., Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2000; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2005; Elbanna
& Child, 2006). Thus, understanding decision making means understanding the
process but also the characteristics of the decision makers and the internal and
external factors which impact or frame the process.
Moreover, Eisenhardt and colleagues (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Brown
& Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) examined
decision making in a high velocity environment. A high velocity environment is
defined as one where the environment offers little or no time for decision makers to
make a decision. What actually frames or drives decision making when the velocity
increases or decreases? Besides the temporal or velocity issue, this paper argues
that other environmental conditions and internal processes should be considered
for a conceptual framework examining decision making in major sport events.
Each is described below.
Velocity
The organizing committee’s processes are time dependent given the unmovable
opening ceremony date. Thus, this paper argues that Parent’s (2008) three organizing committee modes can be linked to the concept of environment velocity. A high
velocity environment is one that is dynamic and includes changes in the environment
(in stakeholders, regulations, and technology, for example) making information inaccurate, obsolete, and/or unavailable (see Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). Therefore,
in the first half of an organizing committee’s life, there is time to make decisions
and to receive feedback from the stakeholders. However, this availability continually decreases. In other words, there is a moderate level of velocity, which increases
the moment the bid is won as the time to make decisions progressively diminishes.
Velocity reaches its peak during the implementation mode when decisions need to
be made immediately in reaction to an environment that is constantly changing. In
the wrap-up mode, the organizing committee managers have time to assess the endstate of the Games (e.g., legacy) and make decisions, thus velocity is low.
294 Parent
Organizing Committee’s Environment
An organizing committee’s environment is made up of stakeholders. If the focal
organization comprises the top management of that organization, the stakeholders
of a major international sport event include 1) middle and lower level management
(both volunteer and paid staff) of the organizing committee; 2) various levels of
government (municipal, state/regional/provincial, federal); 3) media (print, television, radio, internet); 4) various community members (residents, businesses/sponsors, community groups, schools); 5) delegations (athletes, coaches, support staff);
and 6) various levels of sport organizations (state/regional/provincial, national,
continental, international; Parent & Deephouse, 2007). Each stakeholder group
has different needs and expectations (see Parent, 2008).
Organizing Committee Internal Processes
While Parent’s (2008) organizing committee modes and 13 issue categories allow
some description of the organizing committee’s internal processes, they are not
sufficient in offering a conceptual framework for understanding decision making.
The Bradford studies (e.g., Cray, Mallory, Butler, Hickson, & Wilson, 1988,
1991; Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, & Wilson, 1985, 1986, 2001) on strategic
decision making may help in this matter as these studies offer a relatively comprehensive framework of the types and process (e.g., who, what, when, where and
how, which are key components to theory building, cf. Whetten, 1989) of decision
making applicable to a wide range of organizations. In building the framework,
the authors sampled 30 British organizations: for-profit and public organizations,
product-oriented and service-oriented organizations, and small (100 employees)
to large (over 50,000 employees) organizations. Thus, while the Bradford studies
have yet to be applied in the context of a major sport event—a contribution of this
study—the applicability in many other types of organizations, as well as in the
context of interuniversity athletics (see Hill & Kikulis, 1999), make the Bradford
studies a good starting point to understand decision making in major sport events.
For example, the Bradford studies noted that decisions could be made in a
sporadic, fluid, or constricted manner (Cray et al., 1988). Of interest to the current
study, the Bradford studies suggested five dimensions related to decision-making
processes (for more information, see Cray et al., 1988, 1991). One temporallyrelated dimension, flow, included the occurrence and length of disruptions, as
well as impedance or how much control decision makers have over delays (Cray
et al., 1988, 1991). A second dimension, duration, considered the gestation of
the decision until an action ensued and the amount of time the action-to-decision
approval process took. While flow may be of interest in the current study, the
duration dimension is not considered as the study takes a more macro perspective
in examining the overall decision-making process of an organization over time.
Next, the Bradford studies suggested a centrality dimension, that is, where the
decision is centralized in the hierarchy (locus of decision making). Scrutiny, the
fourth dimension of the decision-making process identified by the Bradford studies, focused on information in terms of a) expertise (i.e., internal versus external
sources of information); b) disparity (i.e., degree of confidence in the sources); c)
externality (i.e., “the ratio of the confidence in external information to that placed
in all information” (Cray et al., 1988, p. 16)); and d) effort (i.e., how easily the
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 295
information was obtained; Cray et al., 1988, 1991). Edelenbos and Klijn (2005)
added that the quality of the decision-making process is dependent upon the use of
information/solutions provided by the various stakeholders. Brodbeck, Kerschreiter,
Mojzisch, and Schulz-Hardt (2007) further theorized that information distribution
before, and information processing during, group decision making will impact the
quality of the decision. Fifth, interaction is described as being informal or formal,
with a greater or smaller scope of negotiation (i.e., number of people involved in
the decision; Cray et al., 1988, 1991).
In summary, a conceptual framework consisting of the changing velocity across
an organizing committee’s modes, the nature of the stakeholder environment, and
four of the five dimensions of the Bradford studies (Cray et al., 1988, 1991)—flow
(length & impedance of decision making), centrality (locus of decision making),
scrutiny (expertise, disparity, externality, and effort of decision making), and
interaction (formal/informal nature and scope of negotiation)—combine to form
the conceptual framework to be used to analyze the data and theorize the findings.
Method
A case study of the Pan American Games and its organizing committee, the Pan
American Games Host Society (PAGS), was used for this paper. Case studies are
an appropriate method for questions relating to events over which the researcher
has little or no control. They are valuable for providing in-depth knowledge of
complex events as they unfold over time (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2003). Eisenhardt
and Graebner (2007, p. 25) argued that case studies “emphasize the rich, real-world
context” of the phenomenon under study. Siggelkow (2007, pp. 22–23) added that
case studies can “provide a much more persuasive argument about causal forces
than broad empirical research can.” This is due to the researcher’s “close adherence
to the data,” which keeps the researcher “honest” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p.
25). Given the explicitly exploratory nature of the current study, qualitative and iterative methods are used (Pratt et al., 2006). Data collection and analysis techniques
are presented followed by a description of the trustworthiness of the procedures
undertaken. But first, details relating to the setting are provided.
Setting
The 1999 Pan American Games were held in Winnipeg, Canada from July 23 to
August 8, 1999. There were 4,949 athletes and 2,266 technical officials and technical support officials from 42 countries across the Americas. Thirty-five Olympic
and six non-Olympic sports in 22 venues were presented. Over 20,000 volunteers
delivered the Games. The Games are held every four years (summer editions only)
under the auspices of the Pan American Sports Organization (PASO), a continental
governing body, but the Games are ultimately the property of the International
Olympic Committee. As with the Olympic Games, the focus of the Pan American
Games is sporting excellence.
The organizing committee, Pan American Host Society or PAGS, was created
in fall 1994 (following the bid’s success in July 1994), and was led by a volunteer
board of directors composed of stakeholder representatives (e.g., governments,
sport organizations, individual and corporate community members). The board
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of directors determined the general direction of the Games (i.e., vision, mission,
policies, and business plan). This 24-member board met every three months
(PAGS, 1999a). Thus, to speed up decision making, an executive committee was
established. This committee, which met weekly or biweekly, was composed of the
Chairman, CEO/President, Chief Operating Officer (COO), Vice-President (VP)
volunteers, VP sport, and representatives from other key areas as needed, such as
policy development, budget, support staff, and implementation of the business
plan. Next, volunteer divisional chairs were responsible for the various functions
such as Games operations (mainly logistics), volunteers (volunteer management),
sport (technical aspects of the sports presented), communications/marketing, and
finances. The volunteer chairs met monthly as a group for updates and to deal with
interfunction issues.
Originally, the Games were to be volunteer-driven and delivered, with minimal
paid staff support. Thus, volunteers were to be responsible for every aspect of planning and hosting the Games. However, midway through the preparations (late 1996),
the volunteers realized the need for staff support. As such, a mirror or parallel team
of paid staff was created in the first half of 1997 (e.g., there was a Sport divisional
chair—the volunteer—and a Sport VP—the paid staff member). The volunteers
then concentrated on external stakeholder group issues (e.g., volunteer recruitment)
and the staff handled the day-to-day issues (e.g., volunteer needs assessments). The
Games’ planning therefore became staff-driven but the Games themselves remained
volunteer-delivered. The volunteers retained the ultimate decision-making power,
though most staff and volunteers in the same area worked in close partnership with
each other to make decisions. Figure 1 illustrates the basic timeline, as well as some
of the key processes and activities of PAGS and the 1999 Pan American Games.
Data Collection
There were two main data collection steps. First, data were collected from archival
material to better understand the organizing committee structure, to draw a preliminary list of the stakeholders surrounding the organizing committee, and to support,
complement, and build upon the various aspects raised by the interviewees. A total
of 99 archival documents about PAGS and its stakeholders were collected from
various sources: local, national and international media (e.g., the Winnipeg Free
Press, New York Times, Central American & Caribbean Affairs); organizational
websites (e.g., Canadian Olympic Committee); and organizational documents (e.g.,
PAGS meeting notes, venue team (VTeam) leader Games-time diary, PAGS final
report, and PAGS and stakeholder annual reports).
Second, semistructured interviews were conducted to further examine the
organizing committee, its stakeholders, their needs, and the general perception
and management of the various stakeholders by the organizing committee. The
interviews were conducted within four years of the event, thus making them retrospective in nature (cf. Golden, 1992, 1997; Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997).
These interviews allowed for a “before-during-after” type of questioning in one
session. In addition, it may be argued that hindsight is “20/20” and may actually
be more desirable since it provided interviewees with time to reflect on the overall
event and decision-making outcomes. As the accuracy of retrospective accounts
can be questioned (cf. Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001; Golden, 1992,
297
Figure 1 — Timeline of modes and major activities for the 1999 Pan American Games.
298 Parent
1997; Miller et al., 1997), precautions were taken. While interviewees generally
responded readily (i.e., memory lapses did not seem to be an issue), recollection
was assisted by the fact that working for a Games is a truly memorable experience, one which is remembered long after the Games are over. For example, some
interviewees compared their 1999 Pan American Games experience to past Games
experiences (e.g., Winnipeg 1967 Pan American Games, Calgary 1988 Olympic
Winter Games, and Winnipeg 1990 Western Canada Games) or used them as supportive examples. Second, recollection was facilitated by providing the participant
with a list of key issues that would be discussed in advance of the interview (in the
information letter). During the interviews, many participants mentioned that they
had reviewed their Games documents and some had key points (written notes) with
them during the interview. Third, a number of participants (see Table 1 for the list
Table 1 List of Interviewees
Hierarchical Level
Position
Member Type
Interview
Method
Organizing Committee
(OC) Top Managers
Chairman of the Board
President and Chief Executive
Officer
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice-President
Chair Communications, Promotions, and Media (CPM)
Chair Games Operations
Chair Marketing
Chair Sport
Chair Volunteers
Vice-President (VP) CPM
VP Sport
VP Games Operations
Manager Sport Operations
Cochair Volunteer Recruitment,
Interviewing, and Placement
Manager Volunteers
Venue Team Leader 1
Venue Team Leader 2
Government of Canada
Government of Manitoba
City of Winnipeg
Aboriginal Community
Sponsoring Company
Local Newspaper
Host Broadcaster
National Sport Organization
Volunteer
Staff
In-person
In-person
Staff
Staff
Volunteer
In-person
In-person
In-person
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Staff
Staff
Staff
Staff
Volunteer
In-person
In-person
Telephone
In-person
Telephone
In-person
Telephone
In-person
Telephone
Staff
Volunteer
Volunteer
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Telephone
In-person
Telephone
In-person
In-person
In-person
Telephone
Telephone
In-person
Telephone
Telephone
OC Middle Managers
OC Lower Managers
Stakeholders
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 299
of interviewees) and data sources were used to validate the interview information.
Interviewee responses generally supported the statements of the others and of the
archival material. Any discrepancies were verified with the interviewees and/or
with archival material.
Given the exploratory and iterative nature of the study, questions were modified or added to the interview guide as the study evolved to more precisely follow
emerging themes (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Pratt et al., 2006). Seventeen interviews
across PAGS’s three hierarchical levels and eight stakeholder interviews (see Table
1), each lasting on average 60–90 min, were conducted and then transcribed. The
transcripts were returned to the interviewees so that they could add, modify, and/
or delete any passage, thus increasing the validity of the data (Bauer & Gaskell,
2000; Denscombe, 1998; Yin, 2003). As such, sampling was a combination of
purposeful (to target key knowledgeable individuals/representatives) and snowball
(to include individuals with additional information), which ended when theoretical/information saturation was reached (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Glaser & Strauss,
1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Data Analysis
Data were managed using the qualitative data analysis software, ATLAS.ti 5.0. Collected data went through two types of coding: general/open coding and conceptual
coding (Corley & Gioia, 2004). In the general/open coding, a grouping of initial
concepts within the data into categories occurred, such as information relating to
decision making, time, and different types of issues and strategies. Notably, data
were coded for all references to time (e.g., timeframe, timeline, time, mode, stage,
and phase codes). Quotations were then compared with establish a timeline (see
Figure 1 for an overview of the timeline).
Next, conceptual coding occurred. First, in-vivo or first-order coding (terms
used by participants) occurred, where data comparison allowed for a list of aspects,
drivers, contingencies, and strategies relevant to decision making to emerge.
Second, axial coding (looking for relationships between categories) was done to
highlight patterns or trends. Possible trends explored (i.e., alternative conceptual
frameworks) included patterns based on the type of stakeholder, types of issue,
and the mode or timeline. As data were analyzed, the trends emerged based on key
parameters, including the temporal aspect, and drivers with associated strategies.
These became the higher-order themes (i.e., overarching dimensions making up
the basis of the framework).
Trustworthiness Procedures
To ensure trustworthiness of the data and findings, several strategies were used.
First, appropriate data collection, analysis, and management techniques were
followed as suggested by Yin (2003). These included the use of a case study protocol, of multiple sources of evidence (interviews and archival material), and of
a database management program ATLAS.ti 5.0 to ensure the establishment of a
chain of evidence by including archival material, participant-reviewed interview
transcripts, postinterview summary forms, and memos written during the data
analysis process (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003). Second, the
data were reexamined to ensure fit (or misfit) of the emerging framework (Pratt et
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al., 2006). The use of parameters, drivers, and strategies were found to be the best
way to describe the findings in the data; therefore, they became the components of
the emerging framework for decision making in major sport events. Third, the findings were compared with the literature to determine analytic generalizability (i.e.,
back to theory), the outcome of which is found in the discussion section below (Yin,
2003). Fourth, distinguishing between first-order (raw data, direct quotations) and
higher-order data (outcome of the analysis of the data, the findings) was ensured.
More precisely, following Corley (2004, p. 1153), “first-order data are reported
in the form of direct informant quotes as a way to support” higher-order findings,
which are illustrated in Table 2. Finally, an earlier version of this paper was sent
Table 2 Parameters, Drivers, and Strategies of Decision Making
in Major Sport Events over Time
Mode
Planning
Implementation
Wrap-up
Velocity
Key decision parameters
Medium (increasing)
Context and resources
Low
Resources
Drivers
Strategic (top/macro;
thinkers) moving to
middle-managers
(links/meso; flow
between top and lower
levels)
Increasing decentralization
Increasing formalization
Increasing role and
control type clarity
Direct involvement
Cooperation
Conflict resolution
Answer-driven process
Formal communication
High
Time followed
by resources
Operational
(doers)
Structural
dimension
Stakeholder
interaction
Information
management
Personal
characteristics
Decentralized
Top and key
middlemanagers
Centralization
Same as planning Same as
phase
planning phase
Formal
Formal
communication
Uncertainty, risk
Informal commu- Use of available
nication
information
High focus on informa- Use of available
tion gathering from all information
possible sources
Use of internal
Use of external experts experts
Use of group and
Use of personal N/A
qualities
organization-wide
qualities (skills, knowledge, experience, and
networks)
(continued)
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 301
Table 2 (continued)
Mode
Degree of control over
decision making
Decision-making
strategies
Planning
Decreasing
Implementation
Low
Wrap-up
High
Proactive
Routinize change (e.g.,
conduct risk assessments, create timelines
and contingency plans)
Reactive
Conduct test
events and
review risk
assessments
Review and use
contingency
plans
Venue management system
Issues and crisis
management
Informal, small
negotiation scope
Win-win
approach
Constant communication
Garbage can
Proactive
Formal, moderate negotiation
scope
Formal, greater
negotiation scope
Win-win approach
Constant communication
Decision-making model
Administrative
Win-win
approach
Rational
to all PAGS participants and three independent individuals (who are experts in the
field of sport event management; Corley, 2004; Yin, 2003). Feedback received was
positive in terms of the core ideas presented in the results and discussion sections.
The findings were also discussed with two other (independent) researchers before
submission. Feedback received pertained to the presentation of a theoretical framework (placing emphasis on the exploratory and inductive nature of the study where
the theory was used for data analysis, i.e., for integration and iteration between
data and literature for clear theory development/framework) and focusing on key
aspects in the presentation of the data (i.e., parameters, drivers, and strategies).
Results
In this study, three parameters and four key drivers emerged as impacting decision
making over the course of an organizing committee’s life. The parameters were
time (or lack thereof), context, and resources. The four drivers were structural
dimensions, stakeholder interactions, information management, and personal
characteristics. The findings, including key strategies used, are presented below.
Parameters of Decision Making
Three parameters framed decision making: time (or lack thereof), context, and
resources. However, as can be seen below, these parameters interacted and affected
each other.
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Time. Time had a major impact on effective decision-making processes by
PAGS members as the velocity changed over the course of the organization’s life.
Initially, PAGS managers were in a medium-level velocity environment (but one
which was progressively increasing); they had time to make decisions: PAGS’s
approach was “someone will look at it, we’re waiting for someone to get back to
us” (PAGS Staff) when needing to make a decision. Thus, members had time to
be flexible, to build stakeholder relationships, and to seek stakeholders’ advice.
They were proactive and had control over the decision-making process, as the two
following quotations note: “the organizing committee was proactive in affiliating
itself with the different groups” (Community Representative).
you’ve got great plans and so that’s exactly what happens. You end up in the
planning stages, you know, 2 years out, you’re going “okay, we’re going to
do this, we’re going to do this, we’re going to build it this way”. (PAGS Staff)
As well, risk assessments were conducted and contingency plans were prepared and
tested through test events: “one of the things that we did with all of these groups
is we insisted that they host a test event” (PAGS Volunteer). Communication with
stakeholders was key.
As PAGS moved into the implementation mode, the velocity of the environment
had increased to a point (during Games time) where there was little or no time left
for making decisions: “the closer you got to the Games, [decisions] were executed.
You know, I guess from pen and paper, [it] was getting faster and faster as we went
along” (PAGS Volunteer). The following quotation highlights the impact of a lack
of time (high velocity) on a decision during the implementation mode: “It was too
late for policies 12 months out. This would be more operations. It became very
fast moving so you couldn’t, you didn’t have time for debate after a while” (PAGS
Volunteer). By Games time, PAGS members had very little control over decisions.
The following quotation highlights the change in control, as well as other related
issues, such as decentralization and organizational complexity over time:
You start with the bid committee, and then you get into the structure and
you begin to move along through that [planning] process. What you’re really
moving from is a very centralized core planning group ultimately to a venue
model at Games time where you’ve pushed decision making, the appropriate
decision making, right down the organization to the lowest possible level …
I don’t know how you can describe it; it was just a culture change… and this
goes to about April ’99 … my comment at that time was “I can’t do anything
about this.” I could firefight specific problems but I can’t change it. It’s going
to be what it’s going to be . . . the worst thing you can do is try to control it.
You can monitor it and you can nudge it, but you cannot control it. It is too big,
it’s too diversified, and it’s too decentralized and you’re trying to put enough
warning systems in the organization to allow you to summon below the waterabove the water kind of concept, but you cannot stay on top of it. (PAGS Staff)
Thus, during implementation, there were many disruptions (Cray et al., 1988,
1991) or issues that were addressed by predetermined contingency plans. Decision
making was pushed down the hierarchy (as discussed below). Risk assessments and
contingency plans (and their use) became prominent, as was formal and informal
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 303
communication. In “the last 6 to 9 months, [it] was more just issues management,
a flying-by-the-seats-of-our-pants strategy” (PAGS Staff).
Once the Games ended, there were no more disruptions as actions to be taken
(i.e., writing the final reports, managing the legacy) were preplanned and only
depended on the resulting legacy. As such, PAGS members had full control over
decision making. Thus, velocity was low. A PAGS volunteer explained the legacy
management process as follows:
When it came to legacy, you know, we sat down and had a committee of
volunteers and we decided in advance, you know, where the money would
go and what would stay and what would be sold afterwards. You know, we
put it all out, I wouldn’t call it tender, but we put it all out for ideas from the
various community clubs in one thing or another and then got some missions
and that’s how we allocated the equipment in the end result.
Context. Contextual aspects impacted decision making largely during the
planning mode. For PAGS, the context related to the city, the region, the province,
the country, and the global situation. For example, Winnipeg was hit hard when
its National Hockey League (NHL) team, the Winnipeg Jets, left the city. This
loss impacted Winnipeg’s sportscape. At the same time, the Canadian economy
was having difficulties, as the following quotations show.
the loss of the NHL team came after the development of this [event] strategy
and I think what it did, if anything, is it intensified it a little bit when that happened. But we were already at a point where we had attracted some events
and I think, if nothing else, we stepped it up a bit to try and compensate for
that. (Municipal Representative)
We were coming out of a tougher economy. Into 1995-96, we didn’t have all
the money we would have liked to have had; we didn’t have any extra money
for facilities. It was a struggle negotiating anything out of the federal government when it was just trying to, for the first time, get into a surplus position
and start putting money towards debt. So it was probably one of the worst
times in our history to be negotiating for Games money. (PAGS Volunteer)
As well, organizing committee members had to make decisions according to what
would “fit” or would be “best” for the community (general public and sport) as
the two following quotations note: “I did ultimately what I thought was right for
sport in Manitoba” (PAGS Volunteer); “we needed 20,000 volunteers, that’s a lot
of volunteers. That was the biggest effort this city had ever had in terms of volunteers. So we needed to make sure our image and how we approached that was well
received” (PAGS Volunteer).
The previous quotations show the importance of sociocultural (sport, community) and economic dimensions. But the political dimension was also predominant
when comparing the involvement of the different levels of government and the
political parties in power, as the following quotation highlights:
[The] provincial government started this thing because this Premier was going
into an election after and he could launch on the basis of the excitement that
this event brought and he did everything in his power to take all the credit,
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which caused the federal government all kinds of grief because they felt they
were putting the most in there and the regional [federal government] minister
… who hated the Premier and hated the provincial government and so they
were not supportive. And then there was the city. Depending on the day, we
had one mayor who was early in his mandate and was just hissy fit one after
another after another … [T]here was no consistency whatsoever among [the
governments]. And the ones that were the most supportive were the province.
Well the province worked hard to get this bid. The mayor at the time was a
different mayor … and she was a big player and a big supporter in all of this,
so the others inherited and thought it was just some sort of Tory conspiracy
because the board was made up of nothing but Tories, and me [a Liberal]. Hee
hee (laughs, lifts hand), here I am. But everything else was, you know, former
Tory cabinet ministers or, you know, former Tory deputies. (PAGS Volunteer)
Resources. During the planning mode, the organizing committee created its
plans based on the resources it could obtain, the extent to which was partly
determined by what stakeholders could offer and what was realistic given the
context, as the two following quotations note: “you need your partners, I mean
the 3 levels of government. I mean, even though we got money from them, we
still need services from them” (PAGS Staff).
When we first got the Game … the hope was that “we were all going to
get a new building to house our sport. We’re going to get unlimited supply
of equipment. We’re going to get a huge legacy of money left to our sport.
And, you know, we’ll have this Taj Mahal for our particular activity.” Well
then, of course, reality sets in: it’s not in the budget, it’s not in the budget,
it’s not in the budget! “No, we can’t have that many people. No, it’s cheaper
to rent than buy. We only have 20 participants in that sport in the province, it
doesn’t make sense to spend that kind of money.” Or “if we build this facility,
there’s absolutely no way in the world that you’ll have the financial or human
resources to maintain that, therefore it would be silly to build something like
that.” There’s got to be some financial prudence taken into consideration that
“this just won’t work.” (PAGS Staff)
Thus, financial resources were of the highest concern and impacted the degree to
which other resources could be acquired. These other resources notably included
human resources and material/infrastructure resources.
When the organizing committee moved into the implementation mode, time
became the major limiting factor to acquiring additional resources. Thus, “as time
was short there was no time to stop and start again, and therefore we were forced to
make the best use of what we had” (PAGS, 1999a, p. 18). However, as the nature of
the work was specified, so too was the exact nature of the resources needed: “The
issues became more focused and less general as time went on. [And] as time went
on, I was able to identify the proper resources to deal with these specific issues”
(Provincial Representative).
Once the Games were over, resources once again became the major factor as
most legacy aspects had been pre-planned; therefore, PAGS members were proactive again. By that time, the major concerns were simply to close the organization’s books and manage the legacy. Therefore, resource issues dominated decision
making. The legacy was planned. As a government representative noted, “there’s
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 305
also a desire for people to build in enough to counter certain normal contingencies but to ensure legacy as well and one of the things that (what is) done more
frequently right now is to actually define in advance certain legacy components.”
Given the time, decisions were more rational in nature—there was a process—as
the following quotation notes: there were “different issues after the Games, like
what we needed to sell for revenue and what we could pass on to other groups, and
the selection process involved” (PAGS Volunteer). Thus, human resources were
needed to manage the legacy, and this legacy included resources to be managed,
notably equipment/infrastructure (material resources) and financial resources.
Driver 1: Structural Dimensions. Structural dimensions related to the locus
of decision making (who makes the decisions and at what hierarchical level),
the level of formalization, and the degree of role and decision-making control
clarity. In order to make decision making more effective as velocity increased,
the organizing committee pushed decision-making power down the hierarchy
(decentralization of decision making), as the hierarchy was being formed: “I
wanted to make sure that, at the end of the day, that if the event was going to
proceed forward and a decision had to be taken, the decision had to be taken by
the volunteers who were going to make the Games work” (PAGS Volunteer).
“We pushed the problem solving out to the venue management system so that the
venues managed themselves. That’s the key to success because if you bring it back
to the centre, you can’t do it” (PAGS Volunteer). Only for major issues—notably
those related to money and athletes—did the top management group (i.e., the top
volunteers and staff) get involved.
Thus, the organization’s structure and decision-making authority evolved concurrently. The top management team planned for decentralization and hired lowerlevel members when decisions became needed at second (meso; division-specific)
or third (micro; Games time, venue-specific) levels. Likewise, the formalization of
procedures only occurred as needed: “people would say ‘well, what’s the policy on
this?’ and I would look at them and say ‘I don’t know, let’s make one up; what do
you think it should be?’ because there weren’t any” (PAGS Volunteer). In contrast,
roles had to be clear from the outset:
Well first of all, I tried to understand the role of the VTeam very clearly and my
role in the VTeam. It became very apparent that I could only be a leader, that
I could not be hands-on with anything, and I think any VTeam leader should
know that up-front, that your role is not to drill down, but to make decisions in
conjunction with the other leaders who are on your team because each person
is going to be responsible for executing something specific and the best you
can do is help that person make decisions. (PAGS Volunteer)
Defining the roles included determining who had positive and who had negative
control (i.e., a gatekeeper role) over decisions in order to make the decision-making
process flow more efficiently: “The Canadian Olympic Committee wanted to have
what in effect was negative control on decisions. In other words, they could stop
things but they couldn’t push things” (PAGS Volunteer). Likewise, formalization also referred to timelines and contingency plans. Formalized timelines were
important for individuals coming into the organizing committee at a later stage
(e.g., lower-level members like the VTeams): “It is vital that the timelines on the
project plan are adhered to as closely as possible. Some slippage is normal but
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the compounding effect can be crippling” (PAGS Documentation). However, the
timelines were not always easy to follow: “Pre Games time, the Vteams struggled
with staff decisions and tight time frames” (PAGS, 1999a, p. 93). As well, contingency plans were established and constantly revised: “We had contingency plans
left and right. And we’d always go over those and we had to. And that was very
important” (PAGS Staff).
As such, major sport event managers “structured” their decision-making processes to make them more effective in response to increasing velocity by decentralizing decisions (pushing authority lower), by adapting the degree of formalization
as needed, by providing clear roles for all involved—including determining who
would have positive versus negative control over decisions—and by having formalized timelines and contingency plans.
Driver 2: Stakeholder Interactions. This study finds that PAGS managers were
conscious of the “right attitude” or approach taken in regards to interacting with
stakeholders. First, there should be direct involvement of all stakeholder groups
from the outset in the decision-making process:
The other stakeholders involved would have been really the major funding
partners, which are the 3 levels of government. They were all, by the way,
involved in the board, they all had appointments on the board of directors. So
that allowed them direct involvement and the capacity to be involved in decision making and … I think in many ways [this] helped resolved some of the
problems because if you didn’t have that involvement, then it becomes a bit
more difficult to get one side to understand the other’s viewpoint, whereas that
wasn’t the case in this situation. (Sport Organization Representative)
Second, PAGS managers endeavored to build a stakeholder relationship based
on cooperation between parties, which the stakeholders noted: “The atmosphere
created was a very cooperative one” (Government Representative). Third, any
conflict should be resolved immediately: “the whole concept is, push it down to
the lowest level; so the last thing a disgruntled spectator or athlete wants to hear
is ‘oh, I’ll get back to you tomorrow with an answer’” (PAGS Staff). “You rarely
walked out of a meeting without a decision made, you didn’t get one of those ‘okay,
I’ll get back to you’ kind of thing because, to be honest, you don’t have time to
do that” (PAGS Staff). Fourth, effective decision making is assisted by answers,
not problems, being brought forward to superiors: “The process, yeah, I wouldn’t
take it forward to the minister right off the bat or to my boss even—you don’t take
problems, you take answers” (Government Representative).
While there was heterogeneity within and between stakeholder groups in terms
of issues (Parent, 2008), this was not the case for resolving the issues, that is, for the
decision-making process and strategies used. As the following quotations describe,
all stakeholder and organizing committee representatives described a win-win
approach to decision making, one that was founded upon constant communication
(frequent meetings), where cooperation, collaboration, compromise and negotiation
ruled. For example, a sponsor indicated that they used “constant communication”
for dealing with PAGS by any means necessary (telephone calls, meetings, etc.).
It was pretty much totally win-win. The city went into this from the perspective of we’re not fighting these guys to get this done, we’re cooperating with
the province, the feds [federal government], and the organizing committee
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 307
to make these Games a success. (Municipal Government Representative)
A win-win strategy was used because the Games are put on by volunteers.
[PAGS] must find ways to ensure that everyone is engaged—in a meaningful
way—thus compromise and negotiation are critical to keeping everything on
track. (PAGS Volunteer)
Likewise, within PAGS, constant communication and cross-divisional meetings
were encouraged to ensure that everything was on track: “Yeah, it was cooperation
between [departments], and our relationships were very good” (PAGS Volunteer).
Decisions made in one area do and will affect the operations of another area. It
is this realization that prompted [PAGS] to encourage cross divisional meetings
to resolve some of the inconsistencies and capture activities that may otherwise
have been forgotten. (PAGS, 1999a, p. 89)
Driver 3: Information Management. The third driver consisted of information
management processes. During the first half of the organizing committee’s life
(i.e., during the planning mode), managers consulted as many people as possible
to obtain as much information as possible when making decisions: “how we made
decisions is we asked as many people as we could to get as much information
as possible before we made our decision [since] we didn’t have all the answers”
(PAGS Volunteer). Managers were essentially using a satisficing (satisfy + suffice)
(Simon, 1976) approach to decision making. However, once the organizing
committee moved into the implementation mode and the actual Games time,
when velocity was at its highest, decisions were made with the information
that was readily available, as the following quotation exemplifies: “we acted on
the best information we had” (PAGS Volunteer). Nevertheless, decisions were
always made knowing what the ultimate bottom line would be for the organizing
committee—this bottom line often being financial in nature: “at the end of the
day, you have to know where your bottom line is. You have to be prepared to say
that’s the bottom line. If you don’t, you’ll get run over” (PAGS Volunteer); “it
came down to funding in the end” (PAGS Staff).
Driver 4: Personal Characteristics. The final driver that impacted decision
making was the individuals, the decision makers themselves, or more precisely,
their skills, knowledge/experience, and networks of contacts. Given that time
would become an extremely rare resource by Games time, individuals were chosen
with specific qualities. For example, the Chairman (the key PAGS figurehead)
was chosen for his business acumen (notably having been President of Investors’
Group); his network of contacts of individuals in the community who possessed
key skills, experience (e.g., related to finances, marketing/communications, media,
sport technical expertise, legal affairs), and reputation; his network of contacts of
important organizations and businesses in the community; and his motivational
capabilities. The following quotations exemplify these reasons: “the Chairman
was the first, most critical decision that was made; an exceptionally competent
person with great business skills and business acumen” (PAGS Volunteer).
And then the choice of [the Chairman] and all of the networks of decision
makers, business partners, fundraisers. I mean [the Chairman] was just outstanding, just because of his reach. You know, he had so many relationships
and knew so many people who were top decision makers in the city whom he
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recruited into his executive cabinet, all of whom are sort of the most respected
business people in our city. And he did an outstanding, outstanding job. He
was just absolutely the right person to do that. I can’t say enough about him
in the cause. He was great. And then all of his people, the way they filtered
down and dealt with us. (PAGS Volunteer)
Above all, number one, you’ve got to have somebody at the top who first of all
has charisma and can bring a whole table together under that vision and who has
the smarts to hire the best people for the job . . . If he didn’t know somebody
who was the best in an area, he would find somebody who is. (PAGS Volunteer)
Thus, effective decision-making processes began with the hiring of top volunteers and paid staff members: “it’s so key, it’s so key in terms of who’s around
that management table” (PAGS Staff). Combined, the organizing committee had
to have a range of skills, experience (proven ability to execute major projects,
knowledge), and access to resources: “We certainly had the skills, management,
proven ability to execute, and knowledge to access resources (public or private)
to get the necessities done” (PAGS Volunteer). One PAGS top staff member noted
the importance of past Games experience for the success of the 1999 Games: “The
strength of the committee was, I think, many of them had done it on a smaller scale
so understood what was needed.”
That’s the key thing is go out in the world and find the best people because
you’re putting on just a huge event, a multi-million dollar, a multi-sport event.
You’d better find people who’ve done it or who are quick enough studies that
they’re going to be able to handle the responsibilities. (Media Representative)
As well, part of the skills needed were to find individuals with political connections:
And obviously like any of these situations, there are always people within your
executive or board or even outside of the board who have particular strengths
that you fall toward, basically rely on, I should say, to be able to deal with a
particular issue. When it came to financial issues, in this case, on the executive
committee were two senators from Manitoba. So, as you can appreciate, there’s
a great deal of reliance on those two individuals to help support the cause in
parliament for additional funds. So you basically look at who has strengths
within the board and who has either connections or knowledge or capacity to
be able to influence a final decision that’s going to be beneficial for the Games.
(Sport Organization Representative)
The COO, for example, was recognized as effective because of his accounting and sport skills and experience: “And [the COO] was a fast learner . . . he had
a sport background. He was involved in soccer but he’s also an accountant. And
he was pretty good” (Government Representative). Key stakeholders such as the
municipal government even offered their employees to the organizing committee
(secondments) because of certain skills that could be of use, thereby at the same
time reinforcing the PAGS-stakeholder relationship:
part of the city’s contribution was cash and partly in-kind was city staff who
had certain skills that the organizing committee was looking for. So, and for
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 309
the most part, it was people who had been involved in the bid city process
to some extent and were already familiar so they could just kind of step in.
(Government Representative)
Thus, individuals’ skill-sets, knowledge, past experience, and especially networks of stakeholders for obtaining necessary information/resources were important
during the planning mode, as velocity was increasing. However, decision making
moved to a more individual, personal skills/experience/knowledge decision process
at the point of highest velocity: “Staff and Volunteers working with the Venue Teams
have the Venue Operations knowledge that is required to make proper decisions . . .
Venue Teams need to always be considered during the planning phase and involved
in some of the decision making” (PAGS, 1999a, p. 320).
And eventually, you do get to a point where now either it’s just pre-Games or
it’s during the Games and it’s then “this is the best answer today and it’s the
best decision I can make today and this is what I’m going to do” so you go
for it and cross your fingers. (PAGS Staff)
Summary of Key Strategies
The preceding sections noted key strategies tied to specific parameters or drivers.
The strategies are summarized here by organizing committee mode (see also Table
2). During the planning mode, the organizing committee was proactive as it had
the time to plan its activities. The development of plans included formalized communication with a large number of stakeholders (wide scope) and determining what
would be beneficial to all parties (win-win strategy). A top PAGS volunteer provided
this example of negotiation with stakeholders, knowing that the funding was the
bottom line but that the organizing committee had a vision it wanted to fulfill:
It’s like “what is it you want?” “Here is our vision for the Games, here’s the
money available. We’d love for you to play this kind of role. We think there’s
a major role, for example, in the organization of the opening ceremonies. Can
we get some folks from your organization to be involved in our organizing
committee? We’ve got some ideas on that.” But you know, if for example, the
leadership would say “well we need $1 million to spend ourselves and we want
to do something over here.” Well, I said look “I just can’t do that. And that’s
going to cause a rift. I feel badly because there are so many positive things here
but I simply can’t do that.” And we handled discussion and once we finally
agreed, once they understood that’s as far as I’d go, once I understood what
their issues were that I could deal with, there were things that they wanted that
they pointed out that needed to be changed that we did change.
The organizing committee also created formalized timelines, risk assessment procedures and contingency plans. These formalized strategies allowed the organizing
committee managers to essentially routinize the change to come when velocity
would be at its highest.
During the implementation mode, PAGS created a venue management system,
the VTeam by pushing decision making down to the lower levels, the individuals on the ground, during the Games. The cross-division VTeam ensured crossdivision communication. As well, given the high velocity, organizing committee
members became reactive and “firefighted” issues using an issues management
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“fly-by-the-seats-of-our-pants” strategy as a top PAGS staff member noted. This
strategy meant making almost instant decisions with whatever information and
individuals/groups/organizations were at hand (i.e., informal and narrow scope of
decision making). Nevertheless, for many issues, the organizing committee staff
and volunteers (and especially the VTeams) were ready by having undertaken test
events in the year leading up to the Games, which allowed them to refine their risk
assessments and contingency plans. This strategy ensured that a win-win strategy
could be maintained and promoted communication with stakeholders.
Finally, PAGS returned to a proactive strategy during the wrap-up mode as it
had time to make decisions, especially in regards to legacy management. A formal
approach, which was preplanned, was created to distribute the resources, including
communication with PAGS’s stakeholders to determine where the legacy could
best be distributed (win-win approach), as noted earlier.
Discussion
This section will discuss the findings in relation to the existing literature in terms of
1) the parameters of decision making; 2) the use of the flow, interaction, centrality,
and scrutiny dimensions of the Bradford studies (Cray et al., 1988, 1991; Hickson
et al., 2001), which help understand how decisions are made in major sport events;
3) the impact of changing velocity on decision making; 4) stakeholder interactions
and the importance of conflict resolution; 5) the information-velocity link in decision
making; 6) the importance of the concept of planning for reacting in major sport
events; and 7) the usefulness of existing decision-making models for explaining
how decisions are made in major sport events.
First, time, as well as context and resources, emerged as the key parameters
that framed decision making, instead of the issue at hand as may have been initially
thought. The present study supports Elbanna and Child’s (2006) contention that
environment characteristics—in this case, context, resources, and time—influence
decision making to a greater degree than the nature of the stakeholder group or
issue. It is not surprising that time, context, and resources were found as the three
key parameters. Nevertheless, the current study argues that the relative importance
of these parameters changes as the organizing committee moves from one mode
to the next. As well, the sociocultural, economic, and political context dimensions
were found to predominate. Future studies should examine the relative importance
of these dimensions versus others (e.g., legal, demographic, technological) for different types of sport events (Slack & Parent, 2006).
Second, examining the findings in relation to the Bradford studies (e.g., Cray
et al., 1988, 1991), there is an obvious change in decision-making flow, especially
related to impedance or control over the delays in the decision-making process, for
example, in relation to the use of the VTeam concept. As well, managers changed
their stakeholder interaction strategies. During the planning mode, interactions
were formal (e.g., consultations) with greater negotiation scope (i.e., more people
involved) so as to ascertain what stakeholders wanted to create the various plans
and ensure that the stakeholders are satisfied as much as possible. During the
implementation mode, interactions became more informal due to the lack of time,
with a small negotiation scope given that most decisions were made “on the spot”
by the lower-level staff (e.g., VTeams) and were highly specific to a venue and/or
sport. Finally, during the wrap-up mode, the reporting and legacy management made
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 311
interactions once again formal, but with moderate negotiation scope given their
characteristics (i.e., preplanned and limited to the remaining resources/legacies).
While interaction and centrality aspects were suggested by the Bradford studies (Cray et al., 1988, 1991) as part of the decision-making process, the current
study describes how these aspects are found in effective decision-making processes
where velocity is increasing. Effective decisions were seen to have a certain degree
of formalization—with formalization increasing only when needed (versus having
high formalization from the beginning) but with clear roles and contingency plans
from the outset—and an increasing degree of decentralization. Different stakeholder
roles in relation to decision making also allowed this study to further specify two
types of control over decision making, positive and negative control, where decision
makers knew which type of control their counterparts around the table had, thus
reducing possible role conflict and ensuring greater flow (Cray et al., 1988) of the
decision-making process given the decreasing time available to make a decision.
Thus, this paper contributes to the sport event management literature by specifying
that stakeholders can have positive or negative control over organizing committee
managers’ decision making.
This paper’s findings also support the Bradford studies’ (notably Cray et al.,
1988, 1991) contention that scrutiny (of information), especially in relation to
expertise and effort, is part of the decision-making process. However, the scrutiny
aspect varied depending on how high the velocity of the environment was, which
is a contribution of the current study. More specifically, when organizing committee managers found themselves in a high velocity environment (i.e., during
Games time), their decision-making processes changed in regards to information
management: 1) expertise moved from externally to internally focused, that is,
there was a decreasing use of stakeholders and increasing use of personal characteristics; and 2) disparity, externality, and effort became “irrelevant” as decisions
had to be made almost instantly with the “experts” on the ground (i.e., lower level
staff/volunteers). The present study supports the importance of information in
group decision making as argued by Brodbeck et al. (2007), and highlights a link
between control over decisions and the use of information, although the mediating
versus moderating relationship would need further investigation. These findings
also show the importance of the individuals in organizational decision making, but
goes beyond the cognitive and top management literatures to include networks—or
what can be referred to as social capital (see Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 2000; Inkpen
& Tsang, 2005)—as being key for decision makers in increasing/high velocity
environments. However, the individual qualities driver did not emerge as being
significant in the wrap-up mode.
Third, decision making in an organization facing a changing level of velocity
included the need to interact with all stakeholders using a cooperative approach
to have effective decision-making processes. The findings in this paper therefore
suggest that for decision making where velocity is a major factor, not only do managers need to consider the organization’s structure, the information to gather, and
the characteristics of the individuals hired, but they must also have a stakeholder
inclusion and cooperation approach in their decision making. Thus, flexibility and
openness are needed instead of a closed or protective approach to information management and stakeholder interaction, which has unfortunately been seen in previous
sport events (see for example Parent & Séguin, 2007).“You can’t have any egos”
(PAGS Volunteer), “inflexible or overly ‘principled’ people” (PAGS, 1999a, p. 39)
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for preparing a successful major sport event. As such, effective organizational decision making in a changing velocity environment is dependent on organizational-,
group-, and individual-level contingencies. As well, these contingencies must be set
at the beginning and maintained throughout the life of the organizing committee.
Fourth, effective conflict resolution was important in this setting for effective decision making, thus supporting Eisenhardt’s (1989b) findings related to the
importance of conflict resolution for decision making in high velocity environments. Terms such as cooperation, collaboration, compromise, and negotiation
were used interchangeably by the various organizing committee and stakeholder
representatives to describe their relationship. Thus, even if the political approach
to decision making (e.g., Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
1988; March 1962; Pettigrew, 1973) emphasizes conflicting needs and views
across stakeholders, findings highlight that this heterogeneity did not translate to
the decision-making process and subsequent responses. This may be due to the
“routinization” of behavior, as described in Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioral
theory of the firm. Findings would therefore indicate the creation of common
cognitive maps (cf. Lant & Baum, 1994; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989)
between the individuals forming an organizing committee even though they had
varied backgrounds (e.g., finance, insurance, hospital management experts). As
well, interdependence (coordination, communication, etc.) is favored and fostered.
Thus, it would seem that structural contingency theory (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967; Thompson, 1967) may be an appropriate framework for understanding key
organizing committee processes in future studies.
Fifth, while they attempted to get as much information as possible, PAGS
members knew they did not have all possible information for a given situation
because a certain degree of uncertainty and risk was always present. This therefore
highlights the PAGS managers’ bounded rationality. More precisely, although
managers can be rational, they are limited in their rationality because of, for
example, uncertainty and incomplete information (Simon, 1976, 1977). However,
this study’s findings do suggest that major sport event managers who find themselves in an increasing velocity environment do use as much information as they
can obtain, at least during the planning mode, which partly supports Eisenhardt’s
(1989b) contention that effective decision making in high velocity environments
stems in part from the use of more, not less, information. Yet, when the organizing
committee was at its highest velocity point (during implementation), the managers
used readily available information. Thus, the current study’s findings did not fully
support Eisenhardt’s contention about information use. The findings in the current
study would therefore suggest a curvilinear relationship between information and
velocity, an aspect which contributes to the decision-making literature but one that
requires further examination to determine if it is specific to major sport events or
generalizable to other types of organizations.
Sixth, PAGS members moved from a proactive to a reactive to a proactive
approach (see Figure 1, cf. Clarkson, 1995), or from firelighting to firefighting to
firelighting (cf. Barber & Warn, 2005). These findings therefore support Brown
and Eisenhardt (1997) for the time-paced decisions (according to plans), but
challenges their conclusion about the noneffectiveness of planning and reacting.
The present study suggests that within event and project management—and other
temporary or ephemeral organizations—planning for reacting (i.e., planning for
the fact that staff/volunteers on the ground will only be able to react come Games
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 313
time, for example, through risk assessments and contingency plans) is essential
in the effective delivery of a time-dependent project or event. Thus, planning to
react is a contribution of this paper to the decision making and event management
literatures. Table 2 offers an overview of the key parameters, drivers, and strategies
to consider for each mode as velocity changes.
Seventh, examining Table 2 and Figure 1, it is clear that there are many considerations (e.g., parameters, drivers, issues) during the planning mode, which are
logical given the complex nature of planning a major sport event. This complexity,
need to satisfy the key stakeholders (Simon, 1965, 1976, 1977), and the somewhat
vague objectives/plans (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), especially at the beginning
of the process, justify an administrative model of decision making. This is why
decision makers sought to “improve the rationality, usually by using more information and creating more diverse viewpoints” (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p.
21) from stakeholders, thus creating a variety of plans because of the degree of
uncertainty faced by the decision makers. Decision makers will satisfice (satisfy
+ suffice) stakeholders’ demands through consultations so that stakeholder goals
may be ascertained (cf. Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Simon, 1976, 1977).
In contrast, during the implementation mode, the ground-level, operational
nature of the work highlights the focus on the strategies and the garbage can model
of decision making. The garbage can model is traditionally characterized by high
uncertainty, organized anarchy, luck, and timing. The “random confluence of people,
problems, solutions, and choice opportunities” (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 28)
certainly can be found in the organized chaos of the immediate pre-Games period,
“fly-by-the-seat-of-our-pants” strategy of the organizing committee members, and
the use of readily available resources and information, which are typical of the
implementation mode. However, unlike some of the studies that question the validity
of the garbage can model, the immediacy of the deadlines within major sport events
(i.e., high velocity environment) favored the garbage can model; it did not weaken
it (cf. Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). What may facilitate the garbage can model
during the implementation mode includes the fact that a) decisions are decentralized to the people on the ground; b) these people have key skills, knowledge, and
experience to deal with the problem; and c) they have “practiced” their decision
making through key strategies such as test events, risk assessments and contingency
planning. This practice makes the lower-level managers experts, thereby highlighting similarities between this process and naturalistic decision-making’s nonroutine,
high pressure process of upper-level management experts (see Klein, 1998; Orasanu
& Connolly, 1993). This developed expertise, or intuition and experience (Klein,
1998), explain why the garbage can approach may better explain decisions made
during the implementation mode as there simply is not enough time to draw a list
of alternatives and analyze each one as purported in rational models.
The rational approach (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) is more feasible postevent
(during the wrap-up mode), as velocity is low. The activities of the wrap-up mode
(legacy management and reporting) are undertaken under conditions of little time
pressure and availability of all key information—the information being the various
results and outcomes of the Games.
As such, findings would suggest that velocity impacts the decision-making
model or approach of managers in major sport events, and that decision making
is not as linear or consistent (moving from an administrative to a garbage can to
a rational model) as we might believe. As well, Table 2 highlights that structural
314 Parent
dimensions, information management, and personal characteristics are especially
important drivers for the planning mode, drivers which impact the success of an
event, and over which event managers actually have control. In contrast, the stakeholder interaction driver is consistently found throughout.
Conclusions and Future Directions
This study examined how the decision-making process changes as an organizing
committee moved from the planning to the implementation to the wrap-up mode.
This inductive study extended the work of Parent (2008). More specifically, different
parameters, drivers, and strategies emerged as being important for the decisionmaking process in major sport events. Velocity was found to impact decision-making
processes, highlighting differences in the predominance of parameters and drivers
over time. Important drivers during the planning mode included structural dimensions, information management, and personal characteristics. The fourth driver,
stakeholder interaction, was consistent throughout the three modes. These drivers
and the decisions made were framed or limited by two other parameters besides
time: context and resources. One interesting finding in this study is the fact that the
same group of decision makers moved from an administrative model, to a garbage
can model, to a rational model of decision making, showing the nonlinearity of
decision making over time by the same group of managers. This study therefore
answers Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théorêt’s (1976) and Eisenhardt and Zbaracki’s
(1992) calls for studies examining effective decision making, contingencies (e.g.,
structure), and time. As well, findings indicate that it is effective to be rational at
some point in time, depending on the velocity of the environment (cf. Eisenhardt
& Zbaracki, 1992). Future research should examine the concept of velocity in other
types of sport organizations, notably enduring organizations, to determine its impact
on decision making, as well as other organizational processes.
In addition, strategies evolved from a proactive to a reactive to a proactive
approach. Whereas past frameworks have differentiated between such terms as
compromise, collaboration and negotiation, this study finds that organizing committee and stakeholder representatives did not differentiate between such terms.
This study provides an overview of the types of strategic approaches used by an
organizing committee. As an in-depth examination of each particular strategic
approach was beyond the scope of this paper, future research should examine
issue-specific strategies to build the project and sport event management literatures.
As well, while top management teams may be “crucial” (Eisenhardt, 1989b,
p. 573) to strategic decision making in high velocity environments, the current
study directs attention to the ways in which lower-level managers are also crucial
for effective decision making when decisions have to be made very quickly. Thus,
the time (or lack thereof) may play a significant role in terms of which hierarchical
level may deliver the most effective decision-making process.
Future research should further explore each driver discussed in this paper.
One aspect that was beyond the scope of this paper but merits examination is the
characterization and impact of intuition or gut feel (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Miller
& Ireland, 2005; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004) on organizing committee manager decision-making processes, especially during Games time, when time is an
extremely rare resource and decision making becomes informal and internally
focused (cf. Cray et al., 1988, 1991). How is intuition different (or used differ-
Decision Making in Major Sport Events 315
ently) as velocity increases; what is the impact of gut feel decisions on routine vs.
nonroutine decisions?
In addition, while this study provided details about the who/where, what,
how, and when of decision making in major sport events, the links between these
contextual factors and the assumptions or justifications (why) should be further
examined so that a theory of decision making in major sport events can be more
fully developed (see Whetten, 1989).
Thus, the paper makes three contributions: 1) to the sport event management
literature by beginning to theorize the decision-making process in sport events; 2)
to the broader decision-making literature by examining the topic in an innovative
setting and noting the usefulness of the existing models, but also their joint use
by a given set of managers; and 3) to the sport event managers who now have a
better understanding of what to consider and expect in terms of decision making
over time (see Table 2). Management researchers can use these parameters and
drivers when exploring decision making to help managers make decisions, as all
decisions are, to a certain extent, context-dependent. Such a framework may be
more generalizable to different settings where velocity changes as the emphasis is
on the decision-making contingencies and not specific strategies that are contextdependent. Finally, sport event managers not only have a greater understanding of
what frames and drives their decision making, but they also have specific strategies
that they can use to increase the effectiveness of the decision making, and ultimately,
the success of their event.
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