Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis with
Game-theoretic Rough Sets
Nouman Azam and JingTao Yao
Department of Computer Science
University of Regina
CANADA S4S 0A2
[email protected] [email protected]
http://www.cs.uregina.ca/~azam200n http://www.cs.uregina.ca/~jtyao
Probabilistic Rough Sets (PRS)
• Defines the approximations in terms of conditional
probabilities.
– Introduces a pair of threshold denoted as (α, β) to determine
the rough set approximations and regions
– Lower approximation
– Upper approximation
– The three Regions are defined as
A Key Issue in Probabilistic Rough Sets
• Two extreme cases.
– Pawlak Model: (α, β) = (1,0)
• Large boundary. Not suitable in practical applications.
– Two-way Decision Model: α = β
• No boundary: Forced to make decisions even in cases of
insufficient information.
• Determining Effective Probabilistic thresholds.
• The GTRS model.
– Finds effective values of thresholds with a gametheoretic process among multiple criteria.
Multiple Criteria and PRS
Utilities for Criterion C1
(α1, β1)
0.6
(α2, β2)
0.7
(α3, β3)
0.9
Rankings based on C1
(α4, β4)
0.6
(α5, β5)
0.3
(α6, β6)
0.2
1
2
3
3
4
5
Multiple Criteria and PRS
(α1, β1)
Utilities for Criterion C2
Rankings based on C2
0.7
1
(α2, β2)
0.1
• Dilemma:
(α3, β3)
0.4
– Ranking of C1 vs C2
(α4, β4)
0.6
– Which pair to select
(α5, β5)
0.8
(α6, β6)
0.4
2
3
4
4
6
Game Theory for Solving Dilemma
• Game theory is a core subject in decision
sciences.
• The components in a game.
– Players.
– Strategies.
– Payoffs.
Game Theory: Basic Idea
• Prisoners Dilemma.
• A classical example in Game Theory.
• Players = prisoners.
• Strategies = confess, Don’t confess.
• Utility or Payoff functions = years in gail.
Game-theoretic Rough Set Approach
• Utilizing a game-theoretic setting for analyzing
multiple criteria decision making problems in
rough sets.
• Multiple criteria as players in a game.
– Each criterion enters the game with the aim of
increasing its benefits.
– Collectively they are incorporated in an interactive
enviroment for analyzing a given decision making
problem.
Probabilistic Rough Sets and GTRS
• Determining an (α, β) pair with game-theoretic
analysis.
C1
The Need for GTRS based Framework
• The GTRS has focused on analyzing specific
aspects of rough sets.
– The classification ability.
• Further multiple criteria decision making
problems may be investigated with the model.
– Multiple criteria rule mining or feature selection.
• A GTRS based framework is introduced for
such a purpose.
Components of the Framework
•
•
•
•
Multiple Criteria as Players in a Game.
Strategies for Multiple Criteria Analysis.
Payoff Functions for Analyzing Strategies.
Implementing Competition for Effective
Solutions.
Multiple Criteria as Players in a Game
• The players are multiple influential factors in a
decision making problem.
– Including measures, parameters and variables that
affect the decision making process.
• Different criteria may provide competitive or
complimentary aspects.
– Accuracy versus generality: Providing competitive
aspects of rough sets classification.
Strategies for Multiple Criteria Analysis
• Strategies are formulated as changes in
variables that affects the considered criteria.
– Changes in probabilistic thresholds may be
realized as strategies for different criteria in
analyzing PRS.
Payoff Functions
• The utilities, benefits or performance gains
obtained from a strategy.
• When measures are considered as players.
– A measure value in response to a strategy may be
realized as payoff.
Implementing Competition
• Expressing the game as a competition or
corporation in a payoff table.
• Payoff tables.
– Listing of all possible actions and their respective
utilities or payoff functions.
• Obtaining effective solution with gametheoretic equilibrium analysis.
– For instance, Nash equilibrium.
A Payoff Table
• A two player game with n actions for each
player.
Confidence vs Coverage Game Example
• Considering positive rules for a concept C.
• The measures may be defined as,
• The Pawlak model can generate rules with
confidence of 1 but may have low coverage.
– By weakening the requirement of confidence being
equal to 1, one expects to increase the coverage.
Probabilistic Information for a Concept
• Information about a concept C with respect
to 15 equivalence classes.
The Measures in Case of Pawlak Model
• This means that Pawlak model can generate
positive rules that are 100% accurate but are
applicable to only 19.55% of the cases.
Different Thresholds versus Measures
α
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Confidence(PRSC)
0.9724
0.9507
0.9055
0.8554
0.8212
Coverage(PRSC)
0.5422
0.6182
0.7248
0.8370
0.9049
• Utilizing the GTRS based framework to find a
suitable solution.
A GTRS based Solution
• The players.
– Confidence(PRSC) versus Coverage(PRSC) .
• The strategies.
–
–
–
–
Possible decreases in threshold α.
N = no change or decrease in α.
M = moderate decrease in α.
A = aggressive decrease in α.
The Game in a Payoff Table
• Payoff table with a starting value of (α = 1).
• Cells in bold represents Nash equilibrium.
– None of the players can achieve a higher payoff given their
opponents chosen action
Repeating the game
• The game may be repeated several times
based on updated value of α.
– The game may be stopped when the measures
fall in some predefined acceptable range.
Conclusion
• A key issue in probabilistic rough sets.
– Determination of effective probabilistic thresholds.
• The GTRS model.
– Incorporating multiple criteria in a game-theoretic
environment to configure the required thresholds.
• The GTRS based Framework.
– Introduced for investigating further multiple criteria
decision making problems in rough sets.
– The framework may enable further insights through
simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects.