Philosophy of Mind
Revision Booklet
Eliminative materialism
Eliminative materialism (Churchland)
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Some materialists have started to consider the possibility of just denying that the mind
exists altogether.
This view of the mind is known as eliminative materialism. Its main advocate is Paul
Churchland.
Churchland’s defence of eliminative materialism can be broken down into two
arguments:
1. The argument that our common-sense understanding of mental states (which
Churchland calls folk psychology) is an empirical theory (i.e. a theory based on
experience, rather than a priori reasoning), and:
2. The argument that the empirical evidence for folk psychology is very poor.
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4.1
Section 4.1 explains the first of these arguments, section 4.2 explains the second and
the remaining sections evaluate Churchland’s defence.
Why folk psychology is an empirical theory (Churchland: section I)
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Churchland’s main argument for folk psychology being an empirical theory is based
on an analogy he draws between the ‘laws’ of folk psychology and the laws of
physics.
The laws of physics are broad generalisations about the relationship between certain
variables in nature, like force, mass and acceleration.
They can be stated in the following way (where ‘(x)’ means ‘For any object, x’, ‘(f)’
means ‘For any force f’ and so on):
The symbol ‘’ means ‘if…then’, so the above statement says: ‘For any object x,
force f and mass m, if x has mass m and x suffers net force of f, then x accelerates at
f/m.’
Churchland argues that the laws of folk psychology have a very similar structure to
the laws of physics, and gives examples of these laws like the following to support
this idea:
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4.2
Give the similarity between these two kinds of law, it is natural to say that folk
psychology, like physics, is an empirical theory.
The fact that we think of mental states as the causes of action also supports this idea,
since claims about causation seem to be contingent claims that are known empirically.
And arguments that mental states are logically rather than causally related to actions
can be convincingly attacked, as we saw in section 3.
Why the empirical evidence for folk psychology is poor (Churchland: section II)
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After arguing that folk psychology is an empirical theory, Churchland argues that the
empirical evidence for it is very poor, and hence that it should be abandoned as a
theory.
He argues for this by arguing:
1. That there are many aspects of our mental life that folk psychology can’t
explain – like the causes of intelligence, the purpose of sleep, and the nature of
non-linguistic learning.
2. That folk psychology has made no real progress since the ancient Greeks,
2500 years ago, and:
3. That folk psychology cannot be made to fit with other scientific theories,
especially in what it says about intentionality and consciousness.
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4.3
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On the basis of these points, Churchland argues that folk psychology is a
‘degenerating research programme’, like alchemy or Aristotelian cosmology.
He argues that it should be replaced with a theory like neuroscience, which seems to
have the potential to avoid problems like 1 to 3.
Replies to arguments 1-3
One way of attacking Churchland’s case for eliminative materialism is to challenge
his arguments for points 1 to 3 above.
Against point 1, we can argue that folk psychology was never intended to explain
phenomena like intelligence or the purpose of sleep, and so cannot be judged
negatively for failing to do so.
But this is a weak point. A good theory of the mind should explain all aspects of its
behaviour, and it seems clear from point 1 that folk psychology has no real prospect
of doing this.
Against point 2, we can argue that folk psychology has made some progress since the
ancient Greeks.
The Greeks used the idea of a fixed and unchanging ‘character’ to explain someone’s
actions, whereas now we appeal more to the situation that they find themselves in.
Ideas of unconscious beliefs and desires also were not used by the Greeks, but are
used widely now.
However, this too seems like quite a weak point. Although folk psychology has made
some progress, its progress has clearly been much slower than that of any reputable
scientific theory, and this alone is enough to show that it is a degenerating research
programme.
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4.4
Against point 3, we can argue that, if we endorse a functionalist account of things like
intentionality and consciousness, then we can make folk psychology compatible with
other scientific theories, since we can argue that properties from these theories play
the relevant functional roles.
But this too is weak. For functionalist accounts of intentionality and consciousness are
quite implausible, as arguments like the Chinese Mind and Chinese Room show (see
revision booklet 2).
Functionalist arguments of this kind also seem to prove too much. As Churchland
argues, if a functionalist account of this kind can save folk psychology, then it could
also have saved theories like alchemy (see section IV of Churchland for more details).
Eliminative materialism is incoherent
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Although Churchland seems on strong ground with respect to points like 1 to 3, there
is a very powerful objection to his theory which many think of as fatal.
The gist of this objection is that eliminative materialism is incoherent. More exactly:
the objection says that there is no way for the eliminative materialist to avoid
contradicting themselves in their ordinary talk and thought.
One way of making the eliminativist contradict themselves is to ask them the
following question:
o Do you believe that eliminative materialism is true?
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Since they endorse their theory, they must answer ‘Yes’. But if they do, then they
contradict what their theory says by implying that they have beliefs (which, according
to eliminative materialism, do not exist).
Problems of this kind will come up all of the time for the eliminative materialist. Folk
psychology is so entrenched in our ordinary language that we cannot avoid talking as
if there are beliefs, desires and other mental states.
What this means is that, like scepticism, eliminative materialism is not a practical
option. No-one can genuinely endorse the theory for long because their normal ways
of speaking and thinking will quickly lead them to contradict it.
Churchland’s reply to the incoherence objection (Churchland: section V)
4.5
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Churchland acknowledges that it is not possible to coherently endorse eliminative
materialism in ordinary language.
But he argues that this is because of a problem with ordinary language, rather than a
problem with eliminative materialism.
If we had an alternative form of communication in which folk psychology was not so
deeply entrenched, we would be able to state the theory with no problems.
To illustrate this, he describes three ways in which we could develop a new form of
communication which makes no reference to folk psychology:
The first of these involves the development of a new theory of the brain, in which its
states are represented as four or five-dimensional ‘solids’ whose behaviour is
governed by a set of simple and powerful laws.
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Churchland argues that, if a community of people were to master the vocabulary and
principles of this theory, they could replace folk psychology with it and would
consequently be able to reject folk psychology without contradicting themselves.
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The second possibility that Churchland considers involves the development of a
powerful new language which makes much better use of the innate structures for
language acquisition that Chomsky describes.
Churchland imagines that the grammatical structure of this language is very different
from our own. He calls the sentences of the new language ‘ubersatzen’ (meaning,
roughly ‘super-sentences’).
Ubersatzen are not true or false like ordinary sentences, and the relationships between
them are nothing like the relationships of entailment, contradiction and so on that hold
between the sentences that we use now.
Corresponding to them are ‘ubersatzenal attitudes’, which are related to ubersatzen in
the same way as our sentences are related to the propositional attitudes in folk
psychology.
Churchland imagines that, in the new language, everyone talks only of ubersatzenal
attitudes, and talk of propositional attitudes disappears.
If that were so, then it would presumably be possible, in the new language, to deny
the existence of propositional attitudes without contradiction.
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The third, and most radical possibility considered by Churchland involves the
development of an entirely new form of communication between minds.
We know that the left hemisphere of our brain communicates with the right
hemisphere via the corpus callosum – a giant cable of neurons that connects them.
Given that, it is surely possible in principle for two different brains to communicate
with one another in the same way. Churchland imagines them doing it via a system of
transmitters and receivers implanted in the two brains, with microwaves carrying the
information between them.
If we were to start to communicate with one another in this way, our communication
would be entirely non-linguistic, and hence, presumably, would not contain any
commitment to the truth of folk psychology.
Here too, then, it would be possible to reject folk psychology without contradiction.
Overall, it seems clear that, while there may not yet be ways of coherently rejecting
folk psychology, this is more a feature of our current methods of communication than
a sign of the incoherence of eliminative materialism.