Basic Principles of Antitrust Economics:
Selected Readings1
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
April 2014
This bibliography contains selected readings on the basic principles of antitrust analysis for
lawyers with little formal training in economics. As a result, we rely extensively on antitrust law
casebooks co-authored by economists, which typically have introductory sections on basic
analysis and intuitive discussions of specific topics. There are a number of such texts, and the
reader need not limit themselves to the three listed below. We supplement these basic readings
with somewhat more technical treatments in economics texts and journal articles. For readers
wishing to go further, we also provide citations to more advanced treatments, which are indicated
by asterisks. Finally, we plan to revise, update, and expand this list over time, and we would
appreciate suggestions for additional readings or substitutes that provide solid, intuitive
explanations.
General References
Antitrust Law Casebooks
PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, CASES (6th ed. 2004).
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY (2002).
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2003).
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST (4th ed. 2011).
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE (4th ed. 2011).
Industrial Organization Texts
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (4th
ed. 2005).
F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (3rd ed. 1990).
1
The following individuals contributed to developing this reading list: Jonathan Bowater, Eric Emch, Marc Huntley,
Jeffrey Klenk, Michael Lovinger, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Glenn Mitchell, Serge Moresi, Nadezhda
Nikonova, Jeffrey Prisbrey, Loren Smith, and Donald K. Stockdale, Jr..
ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
I.
Market Power
A.
Overview
PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 553-575 (6th ed. 2004).
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
788-804 (2002).
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 169-184, 722-723 (5th ed. 2003).
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION
LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 71-102 (2005).
B.
Theories and Models
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 88-121 (4th ed. 2005).
Alan J. Daskin & Lawrence Wu, Observations on the Multiple Dimensions of
Market Power, 19 ANTITRUST 53, 53-58 (Summer 2005).
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARVARD L. REV. 937, 937-996 (1981).
Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
363, 376-84 (1998).
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION
LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, Ch. 3 (2005).
*Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering
Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 346 (1982).
Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS, Ch. 15, 1078-97 (Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds. 2007)
C.
Measurement
Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying
and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992).
David T. Scheffman, Statistical Measures of Market Power: Uses and Abuses, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 901 (1992).
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ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
Gregory J. Werden, Assigning Market Shares, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (2002).
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION
LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, Ch. 5 (2005).
*Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of
Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (1983).
II.
Cartels
A.
Overview
Material in Books
PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 165-182, 297-332 (6th ed. 2004).
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 123-149 (4th ed. 2005).
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
220-242 (2002).
ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 192-313 (2004).
ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:
CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS 31-54, 81-142 (2012).
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 197-207 (5th ed. 2003).
GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 14-517 (1946).
WOUTER P.J. WILS, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 113-154 (2008).
Journal Articles
Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 27 (2003).
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White,
Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L.R. 393 (2011).
George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
-3ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion:
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719 (2004).
European Commission Decisions
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html.
B.
Factors that Facilitate or Hinder Collusion
Material in Books
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST 69-79 (4th ed. 2011).
Journal Articles
Peter Asch & Joseph J. Seneca, Characteristics of Collusive Firms, 23 J. INDUS.
ECON. 223 (1975).
Andrew R. Dick, If Cartels Were Legal, When Would Firms Fix Prices?, in HOW
CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW THEY FAIL (Peter Z. Grossman ed. 2004).
Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure and Price Collusion: An
Empirical Analysis, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21 (1977).
George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price-Fixing
Conspiracies, 17 J. L. & ECON. 13 (1974).
Stephen Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination, in
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (J. Stiglitz & G.F.
Mathewson eds. 1986).
F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 235-276, 277-316 (3rd ed. 1990).
*Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal
Mergers, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds. 1989).
C.
Overview of Empirical Work
John M. Connor & Yuliya Bolotova, Cartel Overcharges: Survey and MetaAnalysis, 24 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1109 (2006).
Yuliya Bolotova, Cartel Overcharges: An empirical Analysis, 70 J. ECON.
BEHAVIOR & ORG. 321 (2009).
-4ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
James M. Griffin, An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics
of International Cartels, ABA Spring Meeting Presentation (2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4489.htm.
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Studies of Cartel Stability: A
Comparison of Methodological Approaches, in HOW CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW
THEY FAIL (Peter Z. Grossman ed. 2004).
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?,
44 J. ECON. LIT. 43 (2006).
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do:
Determinants of Cartel Duration., 54 J. L. & ECON. 455 (2011).
III.
Monopolization
A.
Overview
PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 508-524, 686-784 (6th ed. 2004).
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
257-267, 605-607 (2002).
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 847-876, 931-939 (5th ed. 2003).
B.
Pricing Strategies
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 351-367 (4th ed. 2005).
John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. &
ECON. 137 (1958).
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975)
Patrick Bolton, Joseph Brodley & Michael Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEORGETOWN LAW REVIEW, 2239-2330 (2000)
Donald J. Boudreaux, Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Supreme
Court’s Predation Odyssey: From Fruit Pies to Cigarettes, 4 S. CT. REV. 57
(1995).
-5ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
*Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds. 1989).
C.
Non-Price Strategies
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 367-379 (4th ed. 2005).
Thomas Krattenmaker & Steve Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
Michael Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837
(1990).
*Michael Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 345 (May 1988).
*Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2145-2220 (2007).
Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Economics of Vertical Restraints, in HANDBOOK
OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 353-90 (P. Buccirossi, ed. 2006)
MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, Ch. 4, 133-97
(2006)
*Stephen Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 267 (1983).
D.
Resale Price Maintenance
Gregory T. Gundlach, Overview and Contents of the Special Issue: Antitrust
Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance after Leegin, 55 ANTITRUST. BULL.1
(2010).
Benjamin Klein, Assessing Resale Price Maintenance after Leegin, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST 174-200 (E. Elhauge, ed. 2012)
Michael Lindsay, Resale Price Maintenance and the World after Leegin, 22
ANTITRUST 32 (2007)
Christine Varney, A Post-Leegin Approach to Resale Price Maintenance Using a
Structured Rule of Reason, 24 ANTITRUST 22-26 (2009)
E.
Bundling and Loyalty Discounts
Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman, & David Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of
Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1132 (2008)
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ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
Dennis Carlton & Michael Waldman, Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and
Bundling, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1231 (2008).
Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting,
5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 189 (2009).
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 387 (2009).
Bruce Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the
United States, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 115 (2005).
Joshua Wright, Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurate? The Case for
an Exclusive Dealing-Based Approach to Evaluating Loyalty Discounts, Remarks
Presented at the Bates White 10th Annual Antitrust Conference, (Washington, DC,
June, 2013) (http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2013/06/simple-wrong-orcomplex-more-accurate-case-exclusive-dealing-based)
F.
Switching Costs
Paul Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An
Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics and
International Trade, 62 REV. ECON. STUD 515 (1995)
David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Buyers’ Strategies, Entry Barriers, and
Competition, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 418 (1992)
IV.
Merger Analysis – Market Definition
A.
Basic Analysis
PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 557-569 (6th ed. 2004).
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
418-451, 461-495 (2002).
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 128-185 (5th ed. 2003).
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 644-648 (4th ed. 2005).
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
4-17 (1997).
-7ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
7-15
(2010).
Jonathan Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J.
129 (2007).
Dennis Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
(2007).
*Serdar Dalkir & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Prices, Market Definition, and
the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 3rd ed., 1999).
David Evans, Lightening Up on Market Definition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (E. Elhauge ed. 2010).
Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 107 (2011).
Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 HARVARD L. REV. 437 (2010).
John Lopatka, Market Definition?, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 69 (2011).
Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in
Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701 (2010).
Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets: An Answer to Prof. Kaplow, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (2012).
Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: A Tenth
Anniversary Retrospective, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (1993).
Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger
Guidelines, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 281 (1991).
*Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Correlation, Causality, and All That Jazz:
The Inherent Shortcomings of Price Tests for Antitrust Market Delineation, 8
REV. INDUS. ORG. 329 (1993).
B.
Geographic Markets
George Hay, John C. Hilke & Philip B. Nelson, Geographic Market Definition in
an International Context, 64 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 711 (1988).
David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition under the
U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J. L. & ECON. 123 (1987).
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ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
C.
Implementation and Techniques
Jonathan Baker & Timothy Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining
Markets and Measuring Market Power, in THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW
(Paolo Buccirossi ed. 2008).
Malcolm Coate & Jeffrey Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical
Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031
(2008).
*Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An
Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON 1935
(2010).
*Martin Gaynor, Samuel Kleiner & William Vogt, A Structural Approach to
Market Definition With an Application to the Hospital Industry, 61 J. INDUS.
ECON. 243 (2013).
D.
Critical Demand Elasticities
Barry Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much
Substitution is Necessary?, 12 RES. L. & ECON. 207 (1989).
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story. 17
ANTITRUST 49 (2003).
Joseph Simons & David Scheffman, The State of Critical Loss Analysis: Let’s
Make Sure We Understand the Whole Story, 3 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Nov. 2003).
Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
363, 384-396 (1998).
*Michael G. Baumann & Paul E. Godek, Could and Would Understood: Critical
Elasticities and the Merger Guidelines, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 885 (1995).
*Gregory J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: Tailored Application of the
Hypothetical Monopolist Test, 4 COMPETITION L.J. 69 (2005).
*Daniel O’Brien & Abraham Wicklegren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 161 (2003).
V.
Merger Analysis – Competitive Effects
A.
Market Shares and Concentration
-9ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 785-792 (6th ed. 2004).
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
455-530 (2002).
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 971-1034 (5th ed. 2003).
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION
LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS Ch. 5 (2005).
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 244-282 (4th ed. 2005).
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal
Mergers in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 234-60 (K. Hylton, ed., 2010).
Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L 2 (2007).
*R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Michael Williams, What is a Barrier to
Entry?, 94 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 461 (2004).
*Michael Salinger, The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 287 (1990).
B.
Unilateral Effects
Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis,
11 ANTITRUST 21 (Spring 1997).
Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23 (1996).
Jonathan B. Baker & David Reitman, Research Topics in Unilateral Effects
Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 25-52
(E. Elhauge, ed. 2012).
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80
AMER. ECON. REV. 107 (1990).
Jerry Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated
Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 321 (1997).
Daniel O’Brien & Steven Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership:
Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 559 (1997).
-10ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox
in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L. J. 49 (2010).
Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST
L. J. 671 (2000).
Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Competitive Effects in Horizontal Mergers I:
Basic Concepts and Models, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1319 (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008).
Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of
Horizontal II: Auctions and Bargaining, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1343 (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008).
Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Choosing Among Tools for Assessing
Unilater Merger Effects, 7 EUR. COMPETITION J. 155 (2011).
C.
Coordinated Effects
Joseph Harrington, Evaluating Mergers for Coordinated Effects and the Role of
`Parallel Accommodating Conduct', 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 651 (2013).
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie Marx & Steven P. Schulenberg,
Quantitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 397 (2009).
Wayne-Roy Gayle, Robert Marshall, Leslie Marx, and Jean-Francois Richard
Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 39 (2011).
Malcolm B. Coate, Alive and Kicking: Collusion Theories in Merger Analysis at
the Federal Trade Commission (January 2008) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030067)
Janusz A. Ordover, Coordinated Effects, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1359 (2008)
Olivier Compte, Frédéric Jenny & Patrick Rey, Capacity Constraints, Mergers
and Collussion, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (2002).
Andrew R. Dick, Coordinated Interaction: Pre-merger Constraints and Postmerger Effects, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 65 (2003).
D.
Efficiencies
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
540-550 (2002).
-11ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 69-73, 634-637 (4th ed. 2005).
Roger D. Blair & Jessica S. Haynes, The Efficiencies Defense in the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57 (2011).Malcolm B. Coate
& Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal Trade Commission
1997-2007 (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Working Paper,
2009) (<http://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/economicsresearch/issue-papers>).
Alison Oldale & Jorge Padilla, For Welfare’s Sake? Balancing Rivalry and
Efficiencies in Horizontal Mergers, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 953 (2010).
Gregory J. Werden, An Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger
Efficiencies, 12 ANTITRUST (Summer 1997).
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal
Merger Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 685 (2001)
William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71
ANTITRUST L. J. 207 (2003)* Michael G. Vita & Paul L. Yde, Merger Efficiencies:
Reconsidering the ‘Passing-On’ Requirement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 735 (1996).
*Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb & Steven Tschantz, The Effects of Merger
Efficiencies on Consumers of Differentiated Products, 1 EUR. COMPETITION J. 245
(2005).
*John E. Kwoka Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Efficiencies, Failing Firms,
and Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 431 (1986).
VI.
Vertical Restraints
PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, CASES 609-624 (6th ed. 2004).
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 562-680, 681775 (2002).
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION
CASES AND MATERIALS 620-648, 679-683 (5th ed. 2003).
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 395412 (4th ed. 2005).
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86
(1960).
-12-
ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Economics Committee
Lawrence J. White, Resale Price Maintenance and the Problem of Marginal and
Inframarginal Customers, 3 CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES 17 (1985).
* Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement
Mechanisms, 31 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1988).
*Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837
(1990).
*Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Control and Price versus Non-Price Competition, 108
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 61 (1993).
VII.
Empirical Methods in Antitrust Economics
Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Generating Evidence to
Guide Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 57 (2009).
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-13ABA Section of Antitrust Law
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