EAWAG-Surrey Collaboration - Centre for Policy Modelling

EAWAG-Surrey Collaboration
FIRMA Project Meeting
Barcelona, Spain
13-16 March 2001
Unanswered Questions
How do institutions change?
How can we predict when an institution
will change?
What are the factors which drive change?
Why are institutions important
to the Zürich case study?
 Water supply locked-in to sub-optimal overcapacity
– Institutional reasons for lock-in and inability to
change system easily
• informal institution - supply engineers must always
build build build for security!
• formal institutions
– funding link between city and utility
– referenda required on change
 System hit by “shocks” - water saving,
politically motivated calls for supply
efficiency
Institutions - definitions
Institutions are
– Rules, norms, strategies
– Formal, informal
Institutional research
– Institutional enforcement
– Institutional change
– Institutional self-enforcement
Research on Institutions
 Enforcement
– Co-operation through competition
– Decision making under institutional constraints
 Change
–
–
–
–
Evolutionary adaptations
Disruptions such as shocks
Self-enforcement preventing change
Punctuated-equilibrium change through communication and
learning (North, 1994)
– Norm combination as conflict resolution (Amblard &
Ferrand, 1999)
– Alliances and new norm generation
A proof-of-concept model
Interpreter
A
Environmental
states
C
D
B
Stakeholders
E
State A
State B
State C
Agents
For all rules
Test each term
If all true,
Assert action
Condition-action rules
Stakeholder agent
Implementation
In Lisp
– Only as proof of concept
6 stakeholders (Utility, Politicians,
Housing associations…)
37 rules
The model running…
Just to prove that it works…
Limitations
But:
 Propositional logic
– (no variables)
 Canned text
 No stakeholder ‘cognitive’ model (no planning)
– No aggregation and no sub-agents
 No learning
 No user interface
What next?
 Option One
– More sophisticated agents
• Goals, strategies, beliefs, competences
– Meta-norms and modelling institutional change
• Rules about how rules change
– More powerful rule interpreter
• Could be provided by SDMLor Quicksilver
– Model could be a better representation of institutional
change
What next?
 Option Two
– Develop a tool for stakeholders to use
– Get stakeholders to develop the rules (as a ‘game’ or
‘policy exercise’)
– Develop the user interface for non-technical users.
– Keep rule logic simple
• So that userscan understand what is going on
– Model helps stakeholders understand the implications
of their and others’ strategies
A story-board
Imagine travelling in time
about one year from now…
Users have selected key indicators in scorecard - shocks begin... View
Events
Edit
Rules Navigator
Shock: water-saving
becomes trendy ...
Rule 5 Reduce Capacity 1
Rule 6 Reduce Capacity 2
Rule 7 Call for efficiency
Rule 8 Decide to reduce ..
Rule 9 Advertise water sa
Shock: water-utility
no longer thought of
as efficient...
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
yes
Water demand
high
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
yes
Water price
low
Different actors respond to shocks … rules show up on Navigator
Events
View
Edit
Rules Navigator
Rule 26: Council:
subsidises water saving
technology
Rule 25 Change WST stan
Rule 26 Subsidise water
Rule 27 Alter behaviour
Rule 28 Improve billing fo
Rule 29 Lobby for improv
Because: professional
associations lobby and
council not in debt
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
yes
Water demand
high
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
yes
Water price
low
Consumers respond and first indicators change ...
View
Events
Rules Navigator
Rule 12: Consumers:
lower water demand
Edit
Rule 11 Alter behaviour
Rule 12 Lower water dem
d
Rule 13 Lower water dem
Rule 14 Increase producti
Rule 15 Advertise water s
Because: more water
saving technologies and
desire to save water
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
yes
Water demand
low
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
yes
Water price
low
Water utility suffer a loss in profit ...
View
Events
Edit
Rules Navigator
Rule 18: Water Utility: no
longer in profit
Rule 17 Submit price incr
Rule 18 Not in profit
Rule 19 High standing tim
Rule 20 Poor water quality
Rule 21 Poor water taste
Because: over capacity
and low water demand
and low water prices
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
no
Water demand
low
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
yes
Water price
low
Natural physical events are monitored …
View
Events
Edit
Rules Navigator
Rule 19-20: Natural
Event: water quality
reduced
Rule 17 Submit price incr
Rule 18 Not in profit
Rule 19 High standing tim
Rule 20 Poor water quality
Rule 21 Poor water taste
Because: over capacity
and low water demand
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
no
Water demand
low
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
no
Water price
low
View
Events
Edit
Rules Navigator
Rule 17: Water Utility:
requests price increase
Rule 17 Submit price incr
Rule 18 Not in profit
Rule 19 High standing tim
Rule 20 Poor water quality
Rule 21 Poor water taste
Because: not in profit and
over capacity
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
no
Water demand
low
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
no
Water price
low
View
Events
Edit
Rules Navigator
Rule 22: Council: calls a
referendum
Rule 21 Poor water taste
Rule 22 Call referendum
Rule 23 Say No
Rule 24 Alter behaviour
Rule 25 Change WST stan
Because: water utility not
efficient, SVP in power
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
no
Water demand
low
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
no
Water price
low
Indicators have shown the outcome of these shocks...
View
Events
Edit
Rules Navigator
Rule 23: Consumers: say
NO in referendum
Rule 21 Poor water taste
Rule 22 Call referendum
Rule 23 Say No
Rule 24 Alter behaviour
Rule 25 Change WST stan
Because: water utility not
securing the water quality
and not efficient
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
no
Water demand
low
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
no
Water price
low
Users can query why an expected event did not happen by
navigating to and then clicking on appropriate rule …
Options include deactivating, editing and priority setting...
View
Events
Rule 35: If a price increase request
Rule
23: Consumers:
say is efficient
is submitted
and the utility
NOthen
in referendum
the council will not offer a
referendum
and utility
will agree
Because: water
not to price rise.
FAILEDthe
because
securing
waterutility
qualityis not seen as
EFFICIENT.
and not efficient
Rules Navigator
Deactivate
Edit
Rule 34 Develop demand
Rule 35 Accept price rise
Rule 36 Reduce debt
Rule 37 Desire water savi
Set Priority
Scorecard
Utility: Profit
no
Water demand
low
Secure water supply
yes
Capacity
high
Good water quality
no
Water price
low
Edit
And back to reality…