Do Foreign Shareholders Change Japanese Firms?
Shigeru Asaba
Faculty of Economics
Gakushuin University
1-5-1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku
Tokyo, 171-8588
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-5992-3649
Fax: +81-3-5992-1007
E-mail: [email protected]
6/15/2005
Paper prepared for the AAoM PDW in AoM Annual Meeting , 2005 in Hawaii.
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Do Foreign Shareholders Change Japanese Firms?
ABSTRACT
This paper examines foreign firms’ acquisition of established Japanese firms, and compares
the performance change and the conditions influencing performance of the acquired firms
between foreign firms’ acquisition and Japanese firms’ acquisition. Using a small sample
but systematic analysis, we found that established Japanese firms, which are acquired by
foreign firms, improved in profitability after the investment by reducing several expenses,
while their growth rate did not change. Moreover, we found that the share of the board
members from the acquiring firm has a positive association, while the size of acquired firms
has a negative association with improvement in profitability and growth. Such conditions
for profitability hold regardless of the nationalities of shareholders, however, foreign
acquiring firms that do not directly influence management by occupying the share of the
board members may have little emphasis on the growth of the acquired firm.
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1. Introduction
Foreign direct investments (FDI) have frequently changed domestic firms of the host
countries in several ways. Foreign firms with their distinctive competence might disturb
competitive forces, bring new foci of competition, and intensify competition.1
If foreign
firms introduce new products or processes to the domestic market, domestic firms may
benefit from the accelerated diffusion of new technology (Teece, 1977).2
Domestic firms,
competing with the foreign subsidiaries in the market, might imitate and adopt new
competitive strategies and management systems. If foreign firms enter the market of a
host country as greenfield startups or joint ventures, domestic firms may change
themselves by learning from foreign competitors in the market. This is FDI’s spill-over
effects to domestic firms (Harris and Robinson, 2003).
However, there is different way for FDI to change domestic firms in the host country if
foreign firms select another entry mode, namely acquisition3. Foreign firms which acquire
shares of an established domestic firm may be able to induce change directly within the
1
Inward FDI directly intensifies competition by increasing the number of suppliers and decreasing
market concentration. In response to foreign firms’ entry, domestic firms might increase advertising or
reduce prices (Williamson, 1986; Cubbin and Domberger, 1988; Yamawaki, 2002). However, domestic
firms might merge or exit in response to entry of foreign firms. For example, AEON, one of the largest
GMS acquired the equity of Inageya, a mid-sized superstore in response to the Wal-Mart’s entry into the
Japanese market. Therefore, inward FDI might indirectly weaken competition. Uekusa (1982) selected
32 industries where the foreign firms occup ied a certain market share in 1976. He compared market
concentration of these industries in 1966 with that in 1976, and concluded that market concentration did
not increase after entry of foreign firms. Further empirical analysis is needed to assess the impact of
entry of foreign firms on competition.
2
For example, Toys"R" Us has brought changes to the distribution system in Japan, and sells toys and
other goods at lower prices than its Japanese competitors (Negishi and Tamehiro, 2001). Coca Cola became
the top drink manufacturer with its distinctive products and superior marketing strategies (Oketa, 1988).
For more comprehensive discussion on technology transfer of multinational enterprises, see for example,
Caves (1982) and Dunning (1988).
3
There are a number of studies on entry mode selection. However, this paper examines if the change of
ownership influence the performance of domestic firms, and entry mode selection is beyond the scope of
this paper. As to entry mode selection, see for example, Kogut and Singh (1988), Hennart and Park
(1993), Hennart and Reddy (1997), and Brouthers and Brouthers (2000).
3
acquired domestic firm, because of their position as major shareholders. The foreign
shareholders may change strategies and management systems, and send executives to sit
on the board of directors of the acquired firm.
However, the results of empirical studies on post-acquisition performance are mixed.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) surveyed the empirical studies on the relationship between
M&A and performance in the US and concluded that cumulative abnormal returns of
acquired firms were significantly positive, while Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) provided
little evidence that mergers result in a systematic improvement of company performance.
Moreover, it is sometimes argued that cross-border acquisition is difficult. The
institutional environment and the historical path of development of a firm generate the
routines and repertories that are the sources of a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney,
1986). Therefore, a foreign firm that acquires a domestic firm in the host country needs
to engage in “double layered acculturation” (Barkema et al., 1996). That is, a foreign
investor has to adjust the target’s corporate culture as well as foreign national culture.
Consequently, cross-border acquisition may show poor performance4.
There are a number of studies on the performance of the firm in various countries such
as U.K., France, Mexico, China, and so on, acquired by the foreign firm. Some of them
examine the effect of foreign acquisition on productivity of the acquired plant (Aitken and
Harrison, 1999; Harris and Robinson, 2002; 2003).
The others study use development of
high-tech products and new products, security returns, or evaluation of foreign subsidiary’s
performance by its manager, and so on, as a performance measure (Buckley et al., 2002;
4
On the other hand, several researchers consider that different routines and repertories can be utilized to
transform a firm’s business strategy, structure and operation in order to improve performance (Ghoshal,
1987). Morosini et al. (1998) find that a positive association between national cultural distance and
cross-border acquisition performance.
4
Seth et al., 2002; Very et al., 1997; Robins et al., 2002).
These empirical studies find mixed results, and that post acquisition performance of
the acquired firms are influenced by various factors such as relative size and ownership
structure of the target, and motives for acquisitions5.
On the other hand, there are few systematic studies on inward FDI in Japan. It is
probably because inward FDI in Japan had been in quite a low level. Several researchers
studied foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures in Japan (Yoshihara, 1994; Yamawaki,
1999; Asaba and Yamawaki, 2005). Fukao and Amano (2004) is an exceptional study on
the impact of M&A by foreign firms in Japan on the performance of acquired Japanese
firms. However, they found no significant improvement of profitability after M&A.
Recently, however, inward FDI in Japan have been increasing, and cases of foreign
firms’ acquisitions of existing Japanese firms have also been increasing. Such cases
attract much attention, because foreign firms are one of the most likely investors to
Japanese firms suffering in the serious recession in the 1990s and are expected to help the
Japanese firms restructure themselves successfully.
Therefore, the following questions are very important in Japan today. Can foreign
shareholders change an established Japanese firm? How can they change it? Under
which conditions can foreign shareholders effectively re-create an established domestic
firm? This paper explores such questions.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 examines background and
examples of foreign direct investment into Japan, especially foreign firms’ acquisition of
established Japanese firms, and proposes several hypotheses6. Section 3 describes the
5
Unclear results of the existing studies may be due to any problems in performance measures they used
(Meeks and Meeks, 1981).
6
Acquisition in this study includes not only more than 50% share of equity acquisition but also minor
5
data and methods. Section 4 reports the results of the statistical analysis. Section 5
summarizes the main findings and concludes the paper.
2. Foreign Direct Investment in Japan and Hypotheses
(1) Situation of Foreign Direct Investment in Japan
It is well-known that the flow and stock levels of inward FDI in Japan had been
significantly low (Yoshitomi, 1996). For most of the postwar period, the Japanese
government sought to severely restrict inward FDI. Liberalization began in the late
1960s and culminated in the rewriting of the Foreign Exchange Control Law in 1980. The
growth of FDI into Japan had been rapid over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
however, FDI levels in Japan relative to GNP were still quite low (Weinstein, 1996). The
ratio of FDI inflow to GNP in Japan was 0.1 to 0.2 per cent, which was one-tenth that of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The ratio of stock of FDI to GNP showed
almost the same trend as the FDI flow ratio (Wakasugi, 1996).
Recently, however, the situation of FDI is gradually changing. Figure 1 shows the
transition of outward and inward FDI in Japan. Looking at the transition of FDI in terms
of the amount of investment, inward FDI in Japan has always been at a lower level than
outward FDI. However, while outward FDI has varied greatly, inward FDI increased a
little in the mid 1980s and has been growing since the mid 1990s. Consequently, the ratio
between outward and inward FDIs has rapidly decreased from 10.0 in 1983 and 23.6 in
1989 to 2.0 in 2002. Moreover, the number of cases of outward and inward FDIs peaked in
acquisition or capital participation, and examine if the share of ownership has a significant impact on
post-acquisition performance.
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1989 and 1990 respectively, and then decreased rapidly. While outward FDI is still
sluggish, inward FDI has been gradually increasing since the mid 1990s. Therefore, in
terms of the number of cases, inward FDI has recently become almost comparable to
outward FDI.
As to entry modes of foreign firms, wholly owned greenfield start-ups and joint
ventures have occupied the majority of foreign subsidiaries in Japan, however, the ratio of
acquisitions is increasing (Figure 2). Among acquisitions, there are fewer cases of foreign
firm’s acquisition of established Japanese firms. Kigyo-betsu Gaishi Donyu Soran (A
Comprehensive Directory on Introduction of Foreign Capital by Firm), each year version
from 1995 to 2002, reports only forty one instances of foreign firm’s acquisition of publicly
listed Japanese firms between 1970 and 2002. Two such investments took place in the
1970s, nine in the 1980s, eleven in the 1990s, and nineteen in 2000 and 2001. Foreign
firms’ acquisition of Japanese firms shows an increasing trend. It is probable that
declining stock prices and the poor condition of Japanese firms in the recently stagnant
economy has led Japanese business to ask foreign firms for assistance in the form of
investment. Other institutional change such as reform of corporate governance and
deregulation of M&A might promote foreign firms’ acquisition (Fukao and Amano, 2004).
Among the recent cases, Renault’s acquisition of Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. is most
notable.7
Nissan suffered as a result of a huge debt burden and the serious post-bubble
recession in the late 1990s. The company’s formerly second place market position in the
Japanese automobile market was taken by Honda in 1997, and Nissan reported a 14 billion
yen net loss in 1998. Nissan looked for a foreign partner to rescue the company, and
7
This description o f Nissan is based on Ghosn (2001) and “Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 2002,” Harvard
Business School Case, 9-303-042.
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consequently Renault purchased 1,464 million newly issued shares of Nissan common
stock, representing 36.8% ownership and entered into a partnership with the Japanese
automotive firm.
Renault recruited Carlos Ghosn, its 45-year-old executive vice president, to turn
Nissan around. After interviewing several hundred employees at all levels, Ghosn
identified Nissan’s problems in terms of what was lacking: a profit orientation, customer
focus, cross-functional management, cross-border orientation, a sense of urgency, and a
shared vision and long-term strategy. At the shareholder meeting a new board of directors
was elected and Ghosn was appointed COO. Nissan’s new board included Ghosn and two
executives representing Renault.
Ghosn formulated the Nissan Revival Plan and implemented many policies to re-create
the company: forming cross-functional teams in key areas, cutting purchasing costs,
reducing the number of consolidated affiliates (keiretsu companies), closing three plants,
rebuilding the sales organization, creating a global organization, modifying the personnel
system (to include performance linked wages and stock options), and strengthening new
product development.
The plan succeeded; Nissan revived dramatically. In May, 2002, operating profits
and net profit had jumped 68% and 12.4% respectively, from the previous year. Carlos
Ghosn proudly announced, “We have achieved the goal set in the Nissan Revival Plan a
year ahead of schedule.” The description of Nissan’s case suggests how foreign acquisition
promotes restructuring of an acquired Japanese firm.
(2) Hypotheses
The motivation for ownership change has been intensively discussed in economics and
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finance. The neoclassical approach assumes that takeover and mergers are a form of
natural selection. Poor management is replaced as inefficient firms are taken over, and
consequently, long-term survivor will show higher performance (Jensen, 1988)8.
Studies on the impact of cross-border acquisition in terms of productivity at plant level
found that foreign ownership has a positive effect on productivity (Aitken and Harrison,
1999; Harris and Robinson, 2002; 2003). Aitken and Harrison (1999) summarized that
since foreign firms have the competitive advantage such as specialized knowledge about
production, superior management and marketing capabilities, export contracts and
coordinated quality-oriented relationship with suppliers and customers, foreign owned
firms are more productive than domestic counterparts9.
As described later, many acquired Japanese firms in the sample of this paper show
poor performance before acquisition. They may be unsuccessful or slow in the
restructuring of the unsuccessful firms and replacement of inefficient management because
of the Japanese “silent” and stable shareholders due to mutual stock holding (Horiuchi,
1990).
Therefore, there is a large room for ownership change to improve the performance
of the Japanese firms.
In contrast to Japanese shareholders, foreign shareholders put more pressure upon the
acquired firm to hasten change. They often elect foreign executives to the board of
Japanese firms, and hire executives who implement restructuring policies. Since foreign
stockholders and executives are free from conventional views of the firm and the industry,
8
The theory of “managerial discipline” predicts that inefficient firms are more likely to experience a
change in ownership, while an alternative theory by Mcguckin and Nguyen (1995) assumes that
ownership changes are motivated by a desire to acquire operating efficiency, and predicts that plants with
higher productivity are more likely to change ownership.
9
Aitken and Harrison (1999) also pointed out “market steeling effects,” which make foreign owned plants
superior. Because of Increased competition in the markets with economies of scale, domestically owned
plants lose market share and reduce productivity level.
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they can objectively diagnose problems, and take drastic measures (Fukao and Amano,
2004). They can introduce new strategies and management systems into the acquired
firm. Thus, we have a hypothesis that established Japanese firms, acquired by foreign
firms, can improve their performance.
However, it is often pointed out that foreign firms tend to care about their profitability,
while Japanese firms tend to pursue growth (Kagono et al., 1985; Asaba, 2002). Foreign
shareholders might have a bias to direct change in the acquired Japanese firm away from a
growth-orientation toward a profit-oriented strategy. Therefore, we have two hypotheses
as follows:
H1a: Established Japanese firms, acquired by foreign firms, improve
their performance in terms of profitability.
H1b: Established Japanese firms, acquired by foreign firms, lower
performance in terms of growth.
Muramatsu and Miyamoto (1999) pointed out the four factors for success in
management restructuring by M&A. The three factors among them are changes in
business portfolio, integration and rationalization of the operation, and improvement of
financial structure. As the case of Nissan also shows, foreign shareholders and the
executives they appoint can improve the performance of established Japanese firms in
several ways. In the same way that Ghosn strengthened new product development at
Nissan to develop more attractive cars, foreign shareholders might stress that performance
of acquired Japanese firms be improved by increasing value added. In the same way that
Ghosn also cut purchasing costs, foreign shareholders might require the management of
acquired firms to lower costs of good sold. Ghosn also changed the wage system at Nissan.
10
Japanese firms owned by foreign firms often lay off their employees10. Therefore, acquired
Japanese firms might lower personnel costs. Moreover, foreign shareholders might seek
to improve the financial structure of the acquired Japanese firm by mitigating its
dependence on debt.11
Thus, we have the following hypotheses:
H2a: The value added of established Japanese firms increases after
foreign investment in equity.
H2b: The labor productivity of established Japanese firms increases
after foreign investment in equity.
H2c: The cost of goods sold of established Japanese firms declines
after foreign investment in equity.
H2d: The sales, general, and administration costs of established
Japanese firms declines after foreign investment in equity.
H2e: The net interest costs of established Japanese firms declines
after foreign investment in equity.
While foreign shareholders might put more pressure upon the Japanese firms they
own than Japanese shareholders, the degree of pressure varies depending upon the share
of ownership. Moreover, Muramatsu and Miyamoto (1999) pointed out reorganization of
top management team as the fourth factor for success in management restructuring by
M&A. A foreign firm which has purchased a large stake in a Japanese firm tends to
condition the investment on board level representation in order to instigate change within
the Japanese firm12. Therefore, we have the hypotheses as follows:
10
Of course, several Japanese firms gave up life time employment and laid off their employee. However,
foreign firms do so more drastically than Japanese counterparts.
11
One of the successful alliances in the automotive industry is the alliance between Ford and Mazda.
While Ford learned manufacturing and product development from Mazda, the latter learned international
marketing and financial management from the former. See “Partners,” Business Week, February 10, 1992.
12
Increase in foreigners’ share of the board sometimes means departure of the highest ranking executives.
While new foreign top management may be able to accomplish drastic restructuring of the acquired firm,
departure of the executives may deteriorate the acquired firm’s resource base. Cannella Jr. and
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H3a: The larger the share of equity purchased by a foreign firm is,
the more likely it is that the established Japanese firm will improve
its performance.
H3b: The higher the ratio of foreign executives on the board of
directors of the Japanese firm owned by a foreign firm is, the more
likely it is that the established Japanese firm will improve its
performance.
We argued before that an executive dispatched from a foreign firm can be free from
conventional views prevalent in Japanese enterprise and thus implement more drastic
reform than managers promoted from within the Japanese firm. However, the foreign
executive might face resistance from other organizational members who cling to
conventional ways of thinking when he or she re-creates the firm. Foreign investors have
to adjust the target’s corporate culture as well as foreign national culture. In other words, a
foreign acquiring firm needs to engage in “double layered acculturation” (Barkema et al.,
1996).
The conventional ways of thinking, routines, and repertories that are the sources of a
firm’s competitive advantage are generated in the historical path of development of a firm
(Barney, 1986). Therefore, large firms with a long tradition tend to have strong culture
and routines, and resist drastic change. Clark and Ofek (1994) found that the smaller the
target is relative to the acquiring firm, the more likely the restructuring of the target is to
succeed. Aitken and Harrison (1999) found that the positive relationship between
increased foreign equity participation and plant performance is only robust for smaller
plants. Thus, we have the following hypotheses:
Hambrick (1993) found negative relationship between executive departures and post-acquisition
performance of the acquired firm.
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H4a: The larger an established Japanese firm acquired by a foreign
firm is, the more difficult it is to change.
H4b: The older an established Japanese firm acquired by a foreign
firm is, the more difficult it is to change.
3. Data and Methods
(1) Data Sample
The data sample for this study was collected from Keizai Chosa Kyokai, Kigyo-betsu
Gaishi Donyu Soran, Jojo Kigyo-hen (Association of Economic Inquiry, A Comprehensive
Directory on Introduction of Foreign Capital by Firm, Listed Company version) for each
year from 1995 to 2002. This directory lists foreign firms’ acquisition of the stock of
Japanese firms publicly listed on the Tokyo stock exchange and their subsidiaries, and
foreign firms’ establishment of joint ventures with Japanese listed firms in the past. The
directory also lists large contracts between foreign and Japanese listed firms such as
import and domestic sales of products and transfers of technology.
As pointed out before, for the period we investigated, only forty one cases of foreign
firms’ acquisition of Japanese firms were identified. Among these, we selected twenty
eight cases for which sufficient quantitative information of the acquired Japanese firms
could be obtained (Table 1) 13. Seven cases of acquisition took place before 1990, nine in
the 1990s, and thirteen were consummated in 2000 and 2001.
Ten cases were in the Motor Vehicle and Parts industry and three were in each of
Drugs, Precision Instruments, and Services. As to the nationality of foreign investors,
13
Quantitative data of the acquired firms are collected from Zenkoku Jojo Kaisha Nikkei Keiei Shihyo
(Nikkei Financial Analysis, Listed Company version) and the financial report of each firm. The former
source is available since 1982, observation period in this paper is from 1982 to 2001.
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thirteen cases were U.S., followed by European countries. Six cases were Germany, and
three were France and Netherlands. Korea and China are the only investors from Asia.
Many acquired Japanese firms were suffering from poor performance before
acquisition. Ten acquired firms showed deficit in the previous year of acquisition. It is
considered that the foreign firms invested to help these firms. Moreover, in some cases,
technological capability and distribution channel of the acquired Japanese firms attracted
the foreign investors according to the newspaper article on the acquisition at that time.
Foreign investors were not financial institutions but most of them were manufacturers in
the same industry as the acquired firm.
(2) T-Tests
To see whether an established Japanese firm improves its performance after a foreign
firm’s acquisition, we performed paired two sample t-tests for difference. For performance
measures, this study adopted profitability (net income divided by total assets) and growth
(annual sales growth rate). We calculated these two types of measures for each fiscal year
designated t-1 (for the one fiscal period preceding the period of acquisition) and t+1, t+2,
t+3 (the three respective following the period of acquisition), and took the average among
the latter three years. To control for industry effect, we calculated adjusted profitability
and growth rate, using the difference between the value of the firm and that of the industry.
Then, we compared the adjusted measures for matched pair of t-1 and t+1, t+2, t+3, or
three year average after acquisition. H1a predicts that the mean difference of the
adjusted profitability between before and after acquisition is not 0, that is, the mean for
post acquisition profitability is higher than the mean for profitability in t-1. On the other
hand, H1b predicts that the mean of the adjusted growth rates for the period t-1 is higher
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than the mean for the post acquisition periods.
Next, to see how the foreign shareholders change and improve the performance of
Japanese firms in which they invest, we examined the five indicators: value added divided
by sales, labor productivity (value added per capita), costs of good sold divided by sales,
personnel costs, and net interest costs divided by sales (net interest cost = interest and
discounts paid – interest and dividends received). Comparisons of matched pairs of the
five indicators for the fiscal periods t-1 and t+1 were made. H2a through H2e predict that
mean difference of each indicator pair for periods between t-1 and t+1 is not 0 and the
mean for t+1 is better than that of t-1.
(2) Regression Analysis
Next, to investigate under what conditions foreign shareholders can effectively change
the Japanese firms which they acquire, we ran several regressions. The dependent
variables are PROFITCHANGE and GROWTHCHANGE, the difference in firm
profitability and growth rate between t-1 and the three year average after acquisition
defined as follows:
PROFITCHANGE = (average of net income/sales of firm i among the three years after
acquisition) - (net income/sales of firm i in year t-1)
GROWTHCHANGE = (average of sales growth rate of firm i among the three years
after acquisition) - (sales growth rate of firm i in year t-1)
Independent variables are as follows: First, FSHARE is the foreign firm’s share of the
Japanese firm to test H3a, which stated that a higher share of ownership would more likely
lead to better performance of the partially acquired Japanese firm. The coefficient of this
15
variable is expected to have a positive sign.
Second, to examine H3b which described the relationship between improvement of
performance and foreigners’ representation on the board of directors, we constructed
FBOARDSHARE, the number of foreign board members divided by the total number of
board members. This variable is expected to have a positive sign.
Third, H4a described the relationship between improvement of performance and the
size of the established Japanese firm. We adopted sales of the firm in year t-1 as a
measure of firm size (SALES). The coefficient of SALES is expected to have a negative
sign.
Fourth, to test H4b, which stated that it is difficult for foreign firms to instigate change
in Japanese firms that have a long tradition, we constructed the variable AGE as the
difference between the year of establishment of the Japanese firm and year t.
The
coefficient of this variable is expected to have a negative sign. The data sources used for of
the independent variables were the financial reports of each firm.
Finally, to control industry effects, we constructed INDPROFIT and INDGROWTH, the
difference in industry profitability and growth rate between t-1 and the three year average
after acquisition defined as follows:
INDPROFIT = (average of net income/sales of the industry among the three years
after acquisition) - (net income/sales of the industry in year t-1)
INDGROWTH = (average of sales growth rate of the industry among the three
years after acquisition) - (sales growth rate of the industry in
year t-1)
The data source used for the independent variables was the financial reports of each
firm and that for the control variables is Nikkei Financial Analysis. The mean, standard
16
deviations, and a correlation matrix of these variables are described in Table 2.
(3) Comparison with Japanese Firms’ Acquisition
Even if we find some statistical evidence to support any hypotheses above, it does not
necessarily mean that we find some characteristics of a ”foreign” firms’ acquisition. For
example, even if we find a significant difference in performance between before and after
acquisition by foreign firms, foreign shareholders may not help acquired firms improve
performance but acquisition (whether it is by foreign firms or by Japanese firms) may
cause improvement of the acquired firm’s performance. Thus, we collected the data on
Japanese firms’ acquisition and performed the same t-tests as those for foreign firms’
acquisition.
The data sample was collected from Data Book of M&A of Japanese Firms (Nihon Kigyo
no M&A Data Book) by Recof. This data book reports M&A of Japanese firms by Japanese
firms between 1988 and 2002. We selected one hundred and fifty eight M&A cases of
publicly listed Japanese firms. Among them, we investigated forty nine cases for which
sufficient quantitative information of the acquired Japanese firms could be obtained.
As to the regression analysis, we tested if the impact on the performance of each factor
for the sample of foreign firms’ acquisition is different from that for the sample of Japanese
firm’s acquisition. To do so, we constructed foreign firms’ acquisition dummy (FDUM)
which is equal to 1 if the observation is foreign firm’s acquisition and 0 otherwise, and
interaction terms between FDUM and each dependent variable.
17
4. Results
(1) T-Tests
The results of paired two sample t-tests for difference are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
The test in the left of Table 3 is comparison of profitability before and after acquisitions. If
the profitability of established Japanese firms improves after foreign investment, the
means of the measures should be higher in the later periods except for the pair of t-1 vs. t+2.
The result shows that the mean of profitability is higher after acquisition than before.
The mean difference between t-1 and t+1 is significant at the 1 % level of the two-tailed test.
The mean difference between t-1 and t+3 is significant at the 5% level of the one-tailed test
and at the 10% level of the two-tailed test. The mean difference between t-1 and the three
year average is significant at the 5% level of the one-tailed test and at the 10% level of the
two-tailed test. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero can be
rejected.
The test in the right of Table 3 is comparisons of growth rates before and after
acquisitions. If foreign shareholders emphasize profitability rather than growth, the
means of the measures should either not be different between the pair or should be higher
before acquisition than after. The result indicate that the mean of the growth rate is
higher after acquisition for the pairs of t-1 vs. t+1 and t-1 vs. the three year average, while
it is lower for the pairs of t-1 vs. t+2 and t-1 vs. t+3. However, the tests do not give
statistical evidence that the growth rates before and after investment are significantly
different. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the difference in mean values is zero cannot
be rejected for the composite set of pairs.
Moreover, in order to see if there is any difference in the performance change between
the nationalities of acquirers (foreign firms vs. Japanese firms), we performed the same
18
t-tests for the sample of the acquisition by Japanese firms. The results reported in Table 4
indicates that the mean of profitability is higher after acquisition than before and the mean
difference is significant at the 5% or 10% levels of the one-tailed test in any pairs.
However, the mean difference is significant at the 10% level of the two-tailed test only for
the pair of t-1 vs. t+3. Thus, the difference in profitability between before and after
acquisition is clearer for the acquisitions by foreign firms than for those by Japanese firms.
The test in the right of Table 4 is comparisons of growth rates before and after
acquisitions by Japanese firms. The results indicate that the mean of the growth rate is
higher after acquisition except for the pair of t-1 vs. t+1, although the mean difference is
not significant, and the null hypothesis that the difference in mean values is zero cannot be
rejected. However, in comparison with the acquisition by foreign firms, a consistent
increase of sales growth is observed for the sample of the acquisitions by Japanese firms.
These results indicate that established Japanese firms, acquired by foreign firms,
improve their profitability. Profitability tends to rise after investment and improvement
is clearer than that for the acquisition by Japanese firms. On the other hand, growth rate
does not seem to change, while there is a consistent increase of growth rate for the
acquisition by Japanese firms. These results suggest that foreign shareholders emphasize
profitability rather than growth rate and are consistent with hypotheses H1a, but do not
support H1b.
Next, Table 5 reports paired two sample t-tests for differences of value added, labor
productivity, and cost indicators previously mentioned for the sample of foreign firms’
acquisition. The results show that labor productivity improved, while value added
declined. Each of the costs decreased after acquisition, and the mean difference in net
interest cost divided by sales is significant at the 5% level of two-tailed test.
19
The results of the same tests for the sample of the acquisitions by Japanese firms are
reported in Table 6. The results show that labor productivity improved, while value added
declined. Cost of goods sold decreased, while personnel costs and net interest cost
increased. However, the mean difference in any indicators is not significant.
Thus, acquired firms by foreigners decreased several kinds of costs, and especially
significant decrease in net interest cost divided by sales suggests that foreign shareholders
improved the financial structure of the acquired Japanese firm by mitigating its
dependence on debt. Therefore, H2e are supported, while H2a, H2b, H2c, and H2d are not
supported.
(2) Regression Analysis
Next, we examined the conditions under which foreign shareholders can improve the
performance of their acquired Japanese firm. The regression results are shown in Table 7.
The dependent variable of Model (1) and (2) is PROFITCHANGE, the difference in net
income divided sales between before and after acquisition, and that of model (3) and (4) is
GROWTHCHANGE, the difference in annual sales growth rate between before and after
acquisition.
Let’s first look at the impact on profitability.
FSHARE, foreign firm’s share of the
Japanese firm, has a (insignificantly) negative coefficient. Therefore, H3a is not
supported. On the other hand, FBOARDSHARE, the foreign firm’s share of seats on the
board of the Japanese firm, is significantly positive at the 5% in model (1) and at the 10% in
model (2). This result indicates that the more seats on the board of the acquired firm that
are occupied by foreigners, the more likely the acquired Japanese firm is to improve its
performance, thus H3b is supported.
20
SALES, the sales (in millions of yen) of the acquired firms are always negative, and are
significant at the 1% in the two models. This result suggests that the larger the
established Japanese firm acquired by foreign firm is the more difficult it is to change, thus
H4a is supported.
On the other hand, AGE, the time period (100 years) from the
establishment of the Japanese acquired firm to acquisition is unexpectedly positive, and it
is not statistically significant. Therefore, H4b is not supported.
INDPROFIT in model
(1) and (2) as a control variable is significant and positive as we expected.
Next, let’s look at the impact on growth. FSHARE is unexpectedly negative, and it is
not significant. Thus, H3a is not supported. FBOARDSHARE is positive as we expected
and significant at the 10% level in model (4). Therefore, H3b is partially supported.
SALES is negative and significant at the 10% level in model (3) and at the 5% level in
model (4). Therefore, H4a is supported.
AGE is unexpectedly positive, and it is not
statistically significant. Therefore, H4b is not supported. INDGROWTH in model (3)
and (4) as a control variable is significant and positive as we expected.
The result of the regression for the sample of acquisition by foreign firms are reported
above, however, the significant impact of FBOARDSHARE and SALES on the performance
of the acquired firms are not necessarily distinctive for foreign firms’ acquisition. Thus,
we ran the regression for the combined sample of foreign and Japanese firms’ acquisition
including interaction terms between FDUM, the dummy variable of foreign firms’
acquisition and each independent variable.
The results are indicated in Table 8. In models (3) and (4), which are the regressions
with PROFITCHANGE as a dependent variable, none of the interaction terms are
significant. Especially, neither FDUM*FBOARDSHARE nor FDUM*SALES is
21
significant14.
Therefore, significant impacts of FBOARDSHARE and SALES on
profitability of the Japanese acquired firms are not distinctive for foreign firms’ acquisition.
Models (5) through (8) are the regressions with GROWTHCHANGE as a dependent
variable. In model (8), FDUM*FSHARE is negative and significant at the 10% level15.
That is, FSHARE has a different impact on growth of the acquired firm between foreign
firms’ acquisitions and Japanese firms’ acquisitions. Comparing with Japanese firms’
acquisition, acquiring firm’s share of the acquired firm is negatively correlated with growth
of acquired firm in case of foreign firms’ acquisition.
FDUM*FBOARDSHARE in model (8) is positive and significant at the 5% level. That
is, FBOARDSHARE has a different influence on growth of acquired firm between foreign
firms’ acquisitions and Japanese firms’ acquisitions. Comparing with Japanese firms’
acquisition, the more members from acquiring firm occupy the seats on the board, the more
the acquired firm grows. On the other hand, FDUM*SALES is not significant. Thus,
while SALES is significantly negative correlation with growth for foreign firms’ acquisition
as reported in Table 7, the impact of SALES is not distinctive for foreign firms’ acquisition.
5. Conclusion
The various kinds of foreign direct investment in Japan have had significant impact on
Japanese firms in a number of ways. This paper focused specifically on foreign firms’
acquisition of established Japanese firms. When encountered with difficult problems
14
FBOARDSHARE for the observation of acquisition by Japanese firms is the number of board members
from the acquiring (Japanese) firm divided by the total number of board members of acquired firm.
15
FSHARE for the observation of acquisition by Japanese firms is the ownership share of the acquiring
(Japanese) firm.
22
Japanese firms may turn to foreign firms for rescue. Other Japanese firms that have
introduced technology and products originating from foreign firms might want to build
closer linkages. In either of these cases, the foreign firms may acquire shares (of stock) in
the Japanese firms. A foreign firm that owns a Japanese firm can directly influence it by
requiring the acquired firm to change strategies and management systems as a
shareholder and by having executives elected to the board of the Japanese firm.
Anecdotes exist of established Japanese firms, being purchased by foreign firms, and then
experiencing revival, yet to the best of our knowledge, there is quite a few systematic study
of this topic.
First, this study has found that the performance of Japanese firms when acquired by
foreign firms improved their performance after acquisition. Profitability was higher after
investment than before, after controlling for industry effect, while the sales growth did not
change significantly. While it is also insignificant, Japanese firms’ acquisition shows a
consistent increase of the growth of the acquired firms. This suggests that foreign
shareholders are less concerned with sales growth rate but rather attempt to improve
profitability when they acquire a Japanese firm.
Second, we examined if there is any difference in value added, labor productivity, and
several cost indicators between before and after acquisition. While the firms acquired by
Japanese firms increased some costs, those acquired by foreigners decreased all the costs
we examined, and especially they significantly reduced net interest cost divided by sales.
Therefore, it seems that foreign shareholders improved profitability of the acquired firm
not by increasing value added but by decreasing costs.
On the other hand, since Japanese
shareholders are concerned with growth as well as profitability of the acquired firm, they
might not reduce several expenses.
23
Third, we examined the conditions under which Japanese firms, owned by foreign
firms, tend to improve their performance. The number of foreigners who sit on the board
of the Japanese firm had a positive association with improvement in profitability and
growth while the size of the Japanese firm had a negative association with improvement in
profitability and growth.
However, such influence of acquiring firms’ share of the board members and acquired
firms’ sales on profitability is not different between the acquisitions by foreign firms and
those by Japanese firms. In other words, acquiring firms’ commitment improves
profitability of acquired firms and large acquired firms are difficult to change regardless of
the nationality of shareholders.
On the other hand, there is a difference in the impact of acquiring firms’ commitment
on growth between foreign firms’ acquisition and Japanese firms’ acquisition. A positive
correlation between acquiring firm’s share of the board members and growth rate is
stronger in foreign firm’s acquisition than in Japanese firm’s acquisition. Taking foreign
shareholder’s less emphasis on growth into account, it can be interpreted that foreign firms
that dispatch few executives to the board of the acquired firm do not much emphasize
growth, while Japanese acquiring firms always try to promote the growth of the acquired
firm.
In sum, strong commitment of the acquiring firms helps acquired Japanese firms to
improve their profitability, and large Japanese firms are resistant to change by acquisition.
This can be true regardless of the nationalities of acquiring firms. Foreign shareholders
that do not directly influence management by occupying the large share of the board
members may have little emphasis on the growth of the acquired firm.
This study has several limitations. Firs, the sample of foreign firms’ acquisition is
24
quite small. However, acquisition by foreign firms has recently shown an increasing trend,
so we expect to expand the sample in near future.
Secondly, the full range of changes that foreign shareholders can instigate in Japanese
firms and the conditions in which change can occur have not yet been fully explored.
Foreign shareholders, for example, may encourage changes to existing organizational
processes such as methods of decision making and communication within Japanese firms
that ultimately improve performance. Further, the characteristics and competencies of
foreign firms might exert influences which cause change in partially acquired Japanese
firms. These are future agendas for research.
25
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29
Figure 1: Transition of Outward and Inward FDI
$ Million
Cases
80000
7000
6000
Outward(cases)
Inward (cases)
Outward($million)
Inward ($million)
70000
60000
5000
50000
4000
40000
3000
30000
2000
20000
1000
10000
0
0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance and Statistics
Year
30
Figure 2: Entry Modes of Foreign Firms into Japan
100%
Acquisition
90%
80%
70%
Joint
Venture
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
100% Owned
(Greenfield)
10%
0%
1980
1990
2000
Year
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Trend of Foreign Firms
31
Table 1: Partial Acquisitions in the Sample
Industries
Foods
Chemicals
Drugs
Petroleum
Machinery
Electric & Electronic Equipment
Motor Vehicles & Parts
Precision Instruments
Other Manufacturing
-1989
1990-1999
1
1
2000-2001
Total
1
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
2
1
3
2
1
1
5
2
10
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
Construction
Real Estate
Telecommunication
1
Services
1
2
3
9
2
3
1
1
13
5
2
2
2
1
1
29
13
6
3
3
1
1
1
1
Total
United States
Germany
France
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Korea
China
7
6
1
1
1
32
Table 2: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation Matrix
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 PROFITCHAGE
2 GROWTHCHANGE
0.425
3 FSHARE
0.101
0.008
4 FBOARDSHARE
0.144
0.142
0.718
5 SALES
-0.413
-0.188
0.159
0.386
6 AGE
0.165
0.119
0.144
0.111
0.206
7 INDPROFIT
0.263
0.252
-0.142
-0.052
0.024
-0.012
8 INDGROWTH
0.070
0.565
0.018
0.042
0.073
0.132
0.197
Mean
1.940
0.776
23.180
0.119
389037.154
0.501
-0.145
0.194
Standard Deviation
5.719
17.674
15.798
0.133
788925.556
0.143
2.913
9.713
33
Table 3: Paired Two Sample t-Tests for Difference
of Profitability and Growth Rate (Foreign Firms’ Acquisitions)
Net Income/Assets
t- 1
t+ 1
Sales Growth
t- 1
t+ 1
Mean
-4.56
1.94
Mean
-3.78
0.41
Variance
51.36
32.71
Variance
211.74
220.54
29
29
29
29
Observations
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
28
Degree of Freedom
28
t Stat.
-2.93
t Stat.
-1.16
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.00
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.13
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.01
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.26
Net Income/Assets
t- 1
t+ 2
Mean
-4.56
-3.78
Mean
-3.78
-4.37
Variance
51.36
76.62
Variance
211.74
246.56
29
29
29
29
Observations
Sales Growth
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
t- 1
t+ 2
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
Degree of Freedom
0
Difference
28
Degree of Freedom
0
28
t Stat.
-0.41
t Stat.
0.17
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.34
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.43
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.69
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.86
Net Income/Assets
t- 1
t+ 3
Mean
-4.56
-1.69
Variance
51.36
115.39
29
29
Observations
Sales Growth
t- 1
t+ 3
Mean
-3.78
-5.62
Variance
211.74
257.68
29
29
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
Degree of Freedom
0
Difference
28
Degree of Freedom
0
28
t Stat.
-1.70
t Stat.
0.49
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.05
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.32
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.10
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.63
three year
Net Income/Assets
t- 1
ave.
Mean
-4.56
-2.48
Variance
51.36
23.38
29
29
Observations
three year
Sales Growth
t- 1
ave.
Mean
-3.78
-3.19
Variance
211.74
75.13
29
29
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
28
Degree of Freedom
28
t Stat.
-1.97
t Stat.
-0.21
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.03
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.42
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.06
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.83
34
Table 4: Paired Two Sample t-Tests for Difference
of Profitability and Growth Rate (Japanese Firms’ Acquisitions)
Net Income/Assets
t- 1
t+ 1
Mean
-3.62
-1.03
Mean
-0.38
-1.52
Variance
123.51
22.54
Variance
181.64
163.03
49
49
49
49
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Sales Grwoth
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
0
Difference
Dgree of Freedom
t- 1
0
Difference
48
t+ 1
Dgree of Freedom
48
t Stat.
-1.46
t Stat.
0.41
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.07
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.34
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.15
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.68
Net Income/Assets
t- 1
t+ 2
Mean
-3.62
-1.06
Mean
-0.38
2.33
Variance
123.51
27.77
Variance
181.64
235.89
49
49
49
49
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Sales Grwoth
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
0
Difference
Dgree of Freedom
t- 1
0
Difference
48
t+ 2
Dgree of Freedom
48
t Stat.
-1.47
t Stat.
-1.05
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.07
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.15
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.15
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.30
Net Income/Assets
t- 1
t+ 3
Mean
-3.62
-0.71
Variance
123.51
10.63
49
49
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Sales Grwoth
Dgree of Freedom
Mean
-0.38
2.51
Variance
181.64
424.27
49
49
Observations
0
Difference
48
t Stat.
t+ 3
Hypothesized Mean
0
Difference
t- 1
Dgree of Freedom
-1.85
48
t Stat.
-1.08
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.04
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.14
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.07
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.29
Net Income/Assets
three year
t- 1
ave.
Sales Grwoth
three year
t- 1
ave.
Mean
-3.62
-0.93
Mean
-0.38
1.11
Variance
123.51
9.96
Variance
181.64
108.94
49
49
49
49
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
Dgree of Freedom
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
0
Difference
48
Dgree of Freedom
0
48
t Stat.
-1.65
t Stat.
-0.76
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.05
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.23
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.11
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.45
35
Table 5: Paired Two Sample t-Tests for Difference of Other Indicators (Foreign Firms’ Acquisitions)
Value Added/Sales
t - 1
Personnel Costs
t + 1
Mean
25.89
25.19
Mean
Variance
268.82
259.16
Variance
29
29
Observations
Observations
t - 1
t + 1
10146.32
9472.00
255476404.52
184382303.11
29
29
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
28
Degree of Freedom
28
t Stat.
1.08
t Stat.
1.14
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.14
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.13
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.29
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.26
Labor Productivity
Mean
Variance
Observations
t - 1
t + 1
Net Interest Cost/Sales
1112.46
1146.39
393621.31
631045.83
29
29
t - 1
t + 1
Mean
0.42
-0.18
Variance
3.13
3.89
29
29
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
28
Degree of Freedom
28
t Stat.
-0.48
t Stat.
2.01
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.32
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.03
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.64
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.05
Cost of Good Sold/Sales
t - 1
t + 1
Mean
77.47
77.07
Variance
520.46
532.04
Observations
29
29
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
28
t Stat.
0.67
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.25
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.51
36
Table 6: Paired Two Sample t-Tests for Difference of Other Indicators (Japanese Firms’ Acquisitions)
t- 1
t+ 1
Mean
25.88
25.85
Mean
Variance
267.23
234.82
Variance
49
49
Value Added/Sales
Observations
Personnel Costs
Observations
t- 1
t+ 1
4292.71
4332.12
109816834.21
129331188.32
49
49
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
48
Degree of Freedom
48
t Stat.
0.03
t Stat.
-0.19
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.49
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.43
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.98
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.85
Labor Productivity
Mean
Variance
Observations
t- 1
t+ 1
1644.59
1793.23
15815696.89
17448264.02
49
49
Net Interest Cost/Sales
t- 1
t+ 1
Mean
0.88
1.14
Variance
2.40
23.49
49
49
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
48
Degree of Freedom
48
t Stat.
-0.57
t Stat.
-0.44
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.29
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.33
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.57
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.66
t- 1
t+ 1
Mean
81.27
80.78
Variance
226.78
178.22
Cost of Good Sold/Sales
Observations
49
49
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Degree of Freedom
48
t Stat.
0.45
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.33
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.65
37
Table 7: The Regression Results (Foreign Firms’ Acquisitions)
(1)
(2)
DV: PROFITCHANGE
Constant
1.70
(1.40)
FSHARE
FBOARDSHARE
SALES
-0.42
(-0.12)
-0.05
(-0.58)
-2.88
(-0.28)
-0.32
(-1.29)
16.22
(2.19)**
20.24
(1.92)*
32.14
(1.47)
61.16
(1.93)*
-4.10E-06
(-3.28)***
-4.61E-06
(-3.61)***
-7.25E-06
(-1.96)*
-8.62E-06
(-2.25)**
AGE
INDPROFIT
-2.81
(-0.83)
(3)
(4)
DV: GROWTHCHANGE
10.68
(1.65)
0.58
(1.86)*
14.06
(0.72)
0.56
(1.81)*
INDGROWTH
1.05
(3.80)***
1.03
(3.67)***
R2
0.37
0.44
0.42
0.47
adjusted R2
0.29
0.31
0.35
0.35
No. of Obs.
29
29
29
29
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The levels of significance for a two-tailed test are: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
38
Table 8:
(1)
Constant
-0.75
(-0.45)
FSHARE
FBOARDSHARE
36.67
(3.82)***
-4.55E-06
(-2.02)**
SALES
AGE
FDUM
The Regression Results (Whole Sample)
(2)
(3)
DV: PROFITCHANGE
-2.80
-2.70
(-0.72)
(-1.25)
-0.02
(-0.20)
38.11
49.38
(3.35)***
(4.12)***
-4.77E-06
-1.27E-06
**
(-2.07)
(-0.25)
4.42
(0.65)
4.39
(1.27)
FDUM*FSHARE
FDUM*FBOARDSHARE
-33.64
(-1.66)
-2.78E-06
(-0.48)
FDUM*SALES
FDUM*AGE
INDPROFIT
0.26
(2.70)***
0.25
(2.62)**
0.28
(2.83)***
(4)
(5)
-4.28
-0.93
0.05
(0.39)
47.25
(3.43)***
-1.46E-06
(-0.27)
2.16
(0.27)
1.60
(0.18)
-0.11
(-0.48)
-26.43
(-0.95)
-3.12E-06
(-0.51)
8.54
(0.51)
0.27
(2.72)***
-0.14
(-0.09)
INDGROWTH
R2
adjusted R 2
No. of Obs.
0.21
0.18
78
0.21
0.16
78
0.24
0.18
78
0.25
0.14
78
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
The levels of significance for a two-tailed test are: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
39
18.11
(2.05)**
-4.75E-06
(-2.24)**
(6)
(7)
DV: GROWTHCHANGE
-1.30
-0.10
(-0.36)
(-0.05)
-0.02
(-0.17)
19.24
12.33
(1.83)*
(1.11)
-4.87E-06
-1.84E-06
**
(-2.24)
(-0.38)
2.58
(0.40)
-0.49
(-0.15)
20.56
(1.08)
-4.88E-06
(-0.89)
0.43
(3.84)***
0.21
0.18
78
0.42
(3.74)***
0.21
0.16
78
0.41
(3.62)***
0.23
0.17
78
(8)
0.79
(0.19)
0.07
(0.61)
8.54
(0.69)
-1.24E-06
(-0.80)
-3.06
(-0.42)
-6.24
(-0.75)
-0.41
(-1.92)*
54.24
(2.14)**
-7.08E-06
(-1.27)
22.44
(1.45)
0.4
(3.56)***
0.29
0.18
78