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http://intersectionproject.eu//article/russia-europe/nato-russia-failed-strategy-and-opportunistic-tactics
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Author: Tatiana Stanovaya
NATO-Russia: failed strategy and opportunistic tactics
The NATO summit, regarded by many as a landmark event because of the decisions strengthening the position
of the Alliance on its Eastern borders, and its new approaches taken in relation to Russia, took place in
Warsaw on July 8-9. Of greater significance, however, is the new Western strategy for post-Crimean
geopolitical conditions formulated two years after the annexation of Crimea, and the tactical games aimed at
deterring Russia. Observers agree that we are not talking about a cold war here. The world has to deal with a
new political situation the development dynamics of which thus far remain unclear to many. Russia’s reaction
and statements of the Russian authorities indicate that Moscow has not developed a response strategy to date
and all actions taken by the West are perceived as irrational abuses of power directed at Russia.
Russia’s current reaction to the NATO summit differs from the reaction voiced during Putin’s second term in
office and Putin’s traditional rhetoric in which he assumes the role of “the offended” in general. Aggression
and profound negative emotions have given way to deep disappointment and withdrawal. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to reiterate the same simplistic assertion in different variations: Russia does
not pose a threat, and “NATO continues to exist in some sort of military-and-political ‘mirror-world’”. The
alliance focuses on “deterrence” as regards the non-existent “threat coming from the East” – Maria
Zakharova, spokesperson of the MFA of the Russian Federation, asserts. In her opinion, “the Alliance
increasingly shifts its focus away from the truly urgent need to protect and ensure the security of citizens of
NATO member states” and tries to “demonize” Russia. The MFA is convinced that the Alliance is shifting the
balance of power in Europe which will bring about “long-term negative consequences and risks for EuroAtlantic security on the whole”.
The question arises: why is the Kremlin underestimating the effects of its own actions with regard to Crimea
and the Donbas? Why does it ignore the repeated statements made by Angela Merkel in which she states that
Russia is destroying the European security system and jeopardizing the post-war security architecture? How
does the Russian elite perceive its own policy from a strategic point of view?
One must admit that the Russian elite and the president, too, share an extremely ambivalent attitude when it
comes to their own actions. They are justified by the psyche “of a cornered rat”. Putin’s favorite metaphor
clearly defines that which was felt by Russia in early 2014 during the fervor of the new Ukrainian revolution.
The subsequent annexation of Crimea and the establishment of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic and
Donetsk People’s Republic with Moscow’s direct military and material involvement are akin to the desperate
leap of a disturbed rat unable to plot any other route towards “salvation”. It was precisely the manifestation of
despair which completely eradicated rational logic borne out of two post-Soviet decades of difficult, yet
nevertheless, partner relations with the West. At the same time, this situation led to the adoption of a
mechanism of a different, this time destructive, logic of Russia under which the culprit is inclined to blame the
victim for their deeds although often identifies and acknowledges the lawlessness of one’s own actions. “We
were not the ones who started this” – Putin has said repeatedly throughout the last two years.
Hence comes the most important thing: the post-Crimean occupation geopolitical crisis has led Russia into a
deadlock from the point of view of its strategic vision concerning future developments in relations with the
West. As director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin, said during a panel discussion at the NATO
summit, first of all, the West has left Russia behind now in almost all respects except in terms of size of
nuclear arsenal. Secondly, the West “respected” the USSR during the Cold War. “There is no trust or respect
now”. Russia has no adequate, well-conceived and long-term strategy for building relations with the West
following its occupation of Crimea since everything went wrong in the aftermath, and the previous strategy no
longer has any relevance.
It must be said that the previous strategy was largely naïve, which was not at all associated with the stupidity
of Russian leaders but with the incommensurability of the desired and the actual: Russia lacked sufficient
resources and gravitas to force the West to reckon with its interests. Therefore, Moscow made trivial attempts
to appeal to Western Europe and – to a lesser extent – to the United States, calling for historic justice and
decency (a deep ineradicable belief in promises of Western leaders in the late 1980s not to expand NATO and
the subsequent “betrayal” as it was perceived by Putin). What has happened since Russia’s occupation of
Crimea? To begin with, Russia has lost its truly strategic and historically strong partnership with Germany
which has resulted in impotent relations with Western Europe in general. Secondly, Russia has lost its moral
right to appeal to decency: having seized Crimea, Moscow violated the very principles it actively promoted
under the UN Charter on non-intervention and inviolability of territorial integrity.
Currently, the Russian elite follows the NATO summit whilst in a state of stupor. A few vaguely outlined
limiting factors are significant here: First of all, the desire not to make things worse, as Russian hysteria about
NATO aggression no longer impresses anyone, and saber rattling exacerbates mistrust and strife, not to
mention the costliness of war games. Secondly, attempts are still being made to cling on to the remnants of
Western pragmatism which pushes the West to cooperate with Russia on the Syrian issue, and combating
international terrorism in general. The Kremlin is entirely convinced that a safe world cannot be built without
Russia. Hence, any subsequent challenge to security, any major terrorist attack affecting the Western
countries will inevitably push the West towards Russia. “You will not do without us” is Putin’s core belief and
he is not about to give up on it.
Note that Putin’s regime, which is genetically incapable of acting strategically in terms of domestic policy, has
always had a relatively clear understanding of the seeming nature of relations with the West and Russia’s
place in the world in terms of its foreign policy: Russia is a fully-fledged member of the G8, a respected world
superpower, one of the poles of influence, and other world leaders settle global issues alongside it. But now
that this is a thing of the past, there is no new strategy, and there can be no new strategy since confrontation
with the West is too costly, and partnership is an unattainable luxury. Hence, strategy is replaced by
opportunistic tactics which practically follow the same logic as domestic policy.
Moscow’s new tactics are based on continuous efforts aimed at forcing the West into a limited pragmatic
partnership at least when it comes to local issues of regional conflicts despite the fact that this partnership is
to be an unaffectionate one. And for Russia, this is seen as an insurance policy against a decline into mutual
irrational measures. Moscow also feels that, through its actions in Crimea, it triggered a kind of an
“avalanche” and therefore it is advisable to halt its advance.
However, there are two factors which enhance the unpredictability of Russia. To begin with, there is a marked
increase in the role of the military and siloviki. While diplomats are hopelessly trying to convince the world not
to demonize Russia, the military flexes its muscles, and boost political gravitas and ambitions. The role of
Sergey Shoygu is being underestimated. In the future, this persona could lead to a tightening of Moscow’s
policy, a new arms race, and the emphasized importance of the military component of Russia’s retaliatory
policy.
Second is a political reaction. The conservative vector has gradually grown since 2012. At the same time, on
the contrary, conditions for liberalization narrow significantly despite the current crisis, and some - though
very small - involvement of systemic liberals. The conservative, regressive parliament, the “preservative”
political class, limited number of the independent media, the crisis of real opposition and formation of quasistate ideology – all of these phenomena contribute towards the development and growth of complexity of
authoritarian tendencies within the country. Thus, Russia’s own historical inhibitions will only come to the
fore.
Against this backdrop, the new NATO strategy, perceived as a threat in Russia, may have unexpected
consequences: instead of traditional, retaliatory saber rattling, the Kremlin may resort to quickly and
uncompromisingly tightening the screws within the country. Russia is at risk of turning inwards, of focusing on
its own vulnerabilities, and any outside influence is perceived as such, and hence it will prove even more
difficult to conduct a dialogue with NATO under such conditions. It is noteworthy that in the run-up to the
meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, Maria Zakharova said that the build-up of military presence of the NorthAtlantic Alliance “on the Eastern flank” and their consequences for security in Europe would be the major
topic for discussion, whereas Brussels believed that it would rather be Moscow’s failure to implement the
Minsk Agreements. By imposing its own agenda, each party understands that there would be no dialogue as a
result. Russia is being gradually cornered again which could prove dangerous for both international and
domestic policy.
Tags
NATO
Category
Russia / Europe