Normativism
A phenomenon is normative if it cannot be
adequately described in merely
descriptive terms (but must instead be
described using such terms as ‘ought’ or
‘should’).
Normativism about mental phenomena
can take various forms: it can be a thesis
about empirical psychology, about folk
psychology, or about a specific property
or phenomenon, such as intentional
content or meaning.
Normativism and Rationality
Normativism about meaning is often
discussed in connection with
rationality because
(1) rationality is thought to be
normative (“you ought to draw this
conclusion, not that one”)
and (2) a concept’s meaning or content
has often thought to be a function of
the inferences one is prepared to draw
when reasoning with it.
The Roots of Normativism
Quinean-Davidsonian-style argument:
The meaning of any statement is
constituted by its method of
verification.
The method of verifying the application
of an attribution of meaning is
normative.
Thus, the meanings of sentences that
attribute meanings are normative.
(Thus meaning itself is normative.)
Attributions of meaning
An attribution of meaning to someone’s
statement: “Tammy means that both
candidates are unqualified.”
Questions about the method of
verification become especially clear
when we think of radical translation:
the attribution of meanings to
statements in a language wholly new
to us (as in anthropological study).
Simple Case (Quine)
A local native utters ‘gavagai’ as a rabbit
hops past. To what does ‘gavagai’
refer? Rabbits? Collections of
undetached rabbit parts? Time slices
of rabbits? Differentiated units of the
essence of rabbithood?
To resolve the issue, we project our way
of referring onto the native. ‘Gavagai’
refers to rabbits.
Is Meaning Therefore
Normative?
There a difference between saying,
(1) “I’m going to attribute to the native
what I would be referring to if I were
she,” and saying,
(2) “The native should be referring to
rabbits,” where ‘should’ is supposed to
express a normative property that is
beyond the merely physical realm.
Questioning the Argument’s
Verificationist Basis
Even if the interpretive process is
heavily loaded with normative
judgments about what other people
should mean, this need not constitute
the very meaning of attributions of
meanings.
Nor does it tell us what meanings
actually are, if they exist
independently of our attributions of
them.
Normativism and the
Explanation of Behavior
The folk explanation of people’s behavior
presupposes that people are rational
(Dennett).
We attribute to people the beliefs and desires
that would make their behavior rational –
such that what they did do is what they
should have done given the beliefs and desires
we attribute to them. (In the first instance, we
attribute the beliefs and desires people
should have given their environment and
biological needs).
Semantic Externalism Again, and
Semantic Atomism
At one point, Rey contrasts Wedgwood’s
view with Fodor’s (and Horwich’s).
What view does Rey have in mind?
Semantic atomism: All of the (cognitively)
indivisible conceptual units – the
conceptual atoms – have an externalist
semantics. And, all meaningful thoughts
are composed entirely out of conceptual
atoms.
Simple version of Fodor’s Asymmetric
Dependence Theory of Content: A
semantic atom A represents (refers to,
is about) natural kind or property K if
-K’s cause the tokening (i.e., the
activation) of A, in accordance with
laws of nature
-For any other kind H that causes the
tokening of A, the “laws” that allow
H’s to cause A are asymmetrically
dependent on the laws in keeping
with which K’s cause A’s.
Asymmetric dependence of laws:
The law “H’s cause A’s” is a.d. on the law
“K’s cause A’s” if, and only if, if the
first were to go out of effect, the
second would remain in effect, but
not vice versa.
Cashed out in terms of possible worlds:
in the nearest possible worlds in
which H’s no longer cause A’s, K’s still
do; but in the nearest possible worlds
in which K’s no longer cause A’s, H’s
don’t cause A’s.