Political Economics of Conflict and International Relations
Spring 2017
Professor: Massimo Morelli
Contact: [email protected], office 3b1-06.
• Course Description:
The first part of the course will be on the rationalist explanations of bargaining breakdown and bilateral conflict; on the analysis of leaders’ selection, strategic militarization,
and other variables at the boundary between domestic and international choices; and
on the recent working papers on multilateral conflict and dynamics of power and wars.
The second part will be on the relationship between conflict risk and economic structure, with particular focus on the role of natural resources. I will also present some
models and useful frameworks to study the functioning of international organizations
and their development in an anarchic system.
• Prerequisites: Basic game theory knowledge is required. This means having the basic
knowledge of key concepts like Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium,
plus basic notions of Bayesian updating.
• Requirements: The students are expected to do the readings in advance, in order
to facilitate class discussion. The main two requirements (equal weight) will be (1) a
take-home problem set in the middle of the course and (2) a proposal of a paper, by
the end of the semester. The paper proposal will be graded on the basis of its potential
and feasibility.
Early discussions about the research paper are strongly encouraged.
• Weekly plan:
1. Lecture 1: Introduction and exchange of research ideas.
Readings:
– Fearon, James (1995): “Rationalist Explanations of War,” International Organization;
– Jackson M.O. and Massimo Morelli (2010): “The reasons for War”.
2. Lecture 2: cost-benefit analysis of conflict from Leaders’ point of view. Agency
models of war. Political bias theory and selectorate theory. Jackson and Morelli
“Political Bias and War,” American Economic Review, and works on selectorate
theory by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita.
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3. Lecture 3: Information asymmetries, uncertainty and war. Schelling, Baliga and
Sjostrom RES.
4. Lecture 4: Entire lecture on all the other conflict related papers by Baliga and
Sjostrom that relate to uncertainty and information communication.
5. Lecture 5: Political regimes and conflict: some papers on democratic peace and
Baliga, Lucca and Sjostrom paper on transition democracies.
6. Lecture 6: Strategic militarization: Meirowitz and Sartori, Powell 93, Jackson and
Morelli 2009, Meirowitz, Morelli, Ramsay and Squintani (2014).
7. Lecture 7: Commitment based theories of war. Powell 2004, 2006. Chassang and
Padro QJPS and Morelli and Rohner 2015.
8. Lecture 8: Natural resources, geography, factionalization and conflict: Caselli,
Morelli and Rohner (2015) and recent paper by Ethan Bueno de Mesquita.
9. Lecture 9: Multilateral conflict: Niou and Ordeshook on ISQ 38-2;
Hodler on ethnic fragmentation, Esteban and Ray 2012.
10. Lecture 10: Dynamic models of war Powell AJPS 2012, Slantchev’s papers, Yared
2012, Theory of Power Wars.
11. Lecture 11: International cooperation without enforcement. Maggi Morelli and
Harstad.
12. Last lecture: presentation and discussion of paper proposals by students.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi, and A. Vindigni (2009) “Persistence of Civil Wars,” mimeo:
[2] Acemoglu et al, Coalition Formation in Political Games
[3] Baliga, Sandeep and Tomas Sjöström (2004): “Arms Races and Negotiations,” Review
of Economic Studies, 71(2), 351-69.
[4] Baliga, S. and T. Sjstrm (2009) ”The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict,”
[5] Bevia, C. and L. Corchon (2009) ”Peace Agreements without commitment
[6] Baliga,
S.,
D.
Lucca
and
T.
Sjöström
(2007): “Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good
for Peace?” http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/baliga/htm/research.htm
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[7] Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, 2009, ”The Logic of Political Violence”, mimeo,
London School of Economics and Stockholm University.
[8] Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2010): “State capacity, conflict, and development.
Econometrica, 78 (1):1-34.
[9] Blainey, Geoffrey. (1973): The Causes of War, New York: the Free Press.
[10] Bloch, F., S. Sanchez-Pages, and R. Soubeyran (2006) ”When does Universal Peace
Prevail? Secession and Group Formation in Conflict,” Economics of Governance, Vol. 7,
3-29.
[11] Brito, D.L. and M.D. Intriligator (1985) “ Conflict, War, and Redistribution, ” The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, 943-957.
[12] Bueno de Mesquita, B., J.D. Morrow, R.M. Siverson and A. Smith (2003): Logic of
Political survival, MIT Press.
[13] Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., and Randolph M. Siverson (1995): ”War and the Survival of
Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability,”
American Political Science Review, 89(4), 841-55.
[14] Caselli, Francesco, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner (2015): “The Geography of
Interstate Resource wars”, Quarterly Journal of Economics;
[15] Chassang, Sylvain, and Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2010, ”Conflict and Deterrence under
Strategic Risk,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4): 1821-1858, November.
[16] Chassang, S. and G. Padr i Miquel (2009) ”Economic Shocks and Civil War,” Quarterly
Journal of Political Science.
[17] Clausewitz, Carl von (1832)[1976]: On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press.
[18] Conconi, P., N. Sahuguet, and M. Zanardi (2009) ”Democratic Peace and Electoral
Accountability,” mimeo: ECARES and CEPR.
[19] Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke (1994): ”Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for
Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,” American Journal of Political
Science, 38(2), 362-80.
[20] Ellingsen, T., and T. Miettinen (2008), ”Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining”, American Economic Review 98, 1629-1635.
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[21] Esteban, J. and D. Ray (2008) ”On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict,” American Economic
Review, 98, 2185-2202.
[22] Esteban, Joan and Debraj Ray, 2011, “Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization,”
American Economic Review, 101: 1345–74.
[23] Esteban, Joan, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner (2015): ”Strategic Mass Killings”,
Journal of Political Economy
[24] Fearon, J.D. (1995) “Rationalist explanations for war,” International Organization, 49:3,
379-414.
[25] Fearon, J.D. (1996) ”Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power,”
mimeo.
[26] Fearon, James, and David Laitin (2003): “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political Science Review
[27] Fearon, J.D. (2008) “A Simple Political Economy of Relations among Democracies and
Autocracies,” mimeo: Stanford University.
[28] Garfinkel, M. (1990): ”Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 80-4, 50-68.
[29] Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Stergios Skaperdas (2000): ”Conflict without Misperceptions
or Incomplete information: how the Future Matters,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 44-6, 793-807.
[30] Harstad B. “Majority Rule and Incentives;”
[31] Hess, G. and A. Orphanides (2001) “War and Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy,
2001, vol. 109, no. 4, 776-810.
[32] Hess, G. and A. Orphanides (2001b) “Economic Conditions, Elections, and the Magnitude of Foreign Conflicts,” Journal of Public Economics, 80:1, 121-140.
[33] Hodler Roland and Hadi Yektas, 2012, “All-Pay War,” Games and Economic Behavior,
74: 526–540.
[34] Humphreys, Macartan, 2005, ”Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution:
Uncovering the Mechanisms”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49: 508-37.
[35] Jackson, M.O. and M. Morelli (2007) “Political Bias and War,” American Economic
Review, 97:4, 1353-1373.
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[36] Jackson, Matthew O. and Massimo Morelli, 2011: “The Reasons of Wars - An Updated Survey,” in Handbook on the Political Economy of War, edited by Chris Coyne,
Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar Publishing.
[37] Jackson, M.O., and M. Morelli (2009): “Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars,”
Quarterly Journal of Political Science
[38] Jervis, Robert (1978): ”Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 30(2),
167-214.
[39] Jones, D.M., S.A. Bremer, and J.D. Singer (1996) “Militarized Interstate Disputes,
1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns,”Conflict Management and
Peace Science, VOL. 15, NO. 2, 163-215.
[40] Kydd, Andrew H. (1997). ”Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” World Politics Vol.
49(3), 371-400.
[41] Maggi, G., and M. Morelli (2006): “Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations” American Economic Review, Vol. 96-4, 1137-58;
[42] Manzini and Mariotti (2007): “Alliances and negotiations: An incomplete information
example.”
[43] Meirowitz, A.H. and A.E. Sartori (2007) ”Secrecy and War: The Origins of Private
Information”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
[44] Meirowitz, Adam, Massimo Morelli, Kris Ramsay and Francesco Squintani (2014): “Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Strategic Militarization,” mimeo;
[45] Morelli, M. and D. Rohner (2015) “Resource Concentration and Civil War,” Journal of
Development Economics under resubmission;
[46] Niou, Emerson M.S., Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose (1989): The Balance of
Power; Stability in International Systems. Cambridge University Press.
[47] Niou and Ordeshook, Alliances in Anarchic International Systems. ISQ 38-2.
[48] Padró i Miquel, Gerard, and Pierre Yared, 2012, “The Political Economy of Indirect
Control,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127: 947–1015.
[49] Powell, R. (1993) ”Guns, Butter and Anarchy,” American Political Science Review, 87,
115-132;
[50] Powell, Robert (1996): “Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement”, American
Political Science Review 90: 749-764.
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[51] Powell, R. (2004) ”The inefficient use of power: Costly conflict with complete information,” American Political Science Review 98(2), 231-242.
[52] Powell, R. (2006) ”War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization, 60,
169-203.
[53] Powell, Robert (2012): “Shifting Power and Persistent Conflicts,” American Journal of
Political Science, 56: 620-37.
[54] Powell, R. (2009) “Persistent Fighting to Forestall Adverse Shifts in the Distribution of
Power,” mimeo: UC Berkeley.
[55] Ray, D. (2009) ”Costly Conflict under Complete Information,” mimeo: NYU.
[56] Sanchez-Pages, S. (2005): ”Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process,” Economic
Journal.
[57] Schelling, Thomas C. (1963): The Strategy of Conflict, London and New York, Oxford
University Press.
[58] Schelling, Thomas C. (1966): Arms and Influence, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
[59] Schultz, K. (1998) ”Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises,” American
Political Science Review 92 (4), 829-844.
[60] Schwarz, M. and K. Sonin (2008) “A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 24(1): 161-183.
[61] Slantchev, B. (2003) ”The power to hurt: Costly conflict with completely informed
states,” American Political Science Review 97 (1), 123-133.
[62] Slantchev, B. (2005) ”Military coercion in interstate crises,” American Political Science
Review, 99 (4), 533-547.
[63] Smith, A. (1998): ”Fighting Battles, Winning Wars; Opening up the Black Box of War:
Politics and the Conduct of War.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 3,
301-20.
[64] Smith, A. and A. Stam (2003) “Bargaining and the Nature of War,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 20:10, 1-30.
[65] Wagner, R. H. (2000) ”Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science,
44(3), 469-84.
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[66] Yared, Pierre, 2010, ”A Dynamic Theory of War and Peace”, Journal of Economic
Theory 145, 1921–1950.
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