MODELLING RENEWABLE ENERGY MANAGEMENT INEFFICIENCY IN EUROPE WITH PANEL DATA STOCHASTIC FRONTIER MODELS Angeliki N. Menegaki, Department of Languages, Literature and Culture of Black Sea Countries, Democritus University of Thrace, 69100, Komotini Abstract The paper employs three stochastic frontier inefficiency configurations to categorize European countries according to their inefficiency in renewable energy management. The results come from an empirical application of a panel with 32 European countries over a 14 year old period using a translog type production function. In particular the paper focuses on results from the Alvarez et al. (2006) fixed management model and compares results with the conventional stochastic frontier model and the random coefficients model with inputs such as renewable energy, fossil fuel energy, employment, capital and carbon emissions. The results suggest that renewable energy deployment does not significantly affect growth in Europe, wherein management inefficiency becomes eloquent with the aid of the management adapted frontier model. Keywords: Europe; fixed management model; inefficiency; renewable energy; stochastic frontier; 1. Introduction Renewable energy sources (RES) are currently unevenly and insufficiently exploited in the European Union, EU (Menegaki, 2011, Menegaki, 2012) with a small contribution of about 7.8-8% (Eurostat, 2012) to the overall gross inland energy production. In spite of the various European directives for the promotion of RES Tel.fax. +30 2531072886 Email address: [email protected] 1 being the 2001/77/EC on electricity production from RES (European Commission, 2001), the 2002/91/EC on energy performance of buildings (European Commission, 2002), the 2003/30/EC on the promotion of biofuels and other bioliquids (European Commission, 2003) and the 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from RES (European Commission, 2009), which demanded that RES in final gross energy consumption in Europe doubled from 6 to 12% and achieving 22% electricity production from RES by 2010, also a reduction in primary energy use by 20% and a reduction of greenhouse gases by 20% below the 1990 levels, still no-long run relationship between RES consumption and growth has been confirmed providing evidence for the neutrality hypothesis (Menegaki, 2012), namely evidence that no dependence of the two magnitudes exists or that renewable energy does not play a significant role in European growth. Moreover, the share of imported fuels remains high and is estimated to reach 70% of total energy consumption by 2020 (Loyning, 2010). EU Directive 2009/28/EC repeals EU Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC and paves the way for an effective management of RES across member states in order to pursue their RES 2020 goals. The overall 2020 potential for RES in the EU corresponds to a share of 28.5% of the overall current gross final energy demand. Member States possessing large RES potentials are France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK, while Austria, Finland, Portugal and Sweden had already by 2005, fulfilled their 2020 planned potential. Sweden is the leader with 44.4% of gross final consumption while Malta is a laggard with a minor 0.2% (Loyning, 2010). A breakdown of the RES potential in Europe reveals that the highest target has been set for the heat sector wherein the largest progress has been made (Ecofys, 2011). 2 The vast majority of member states are confident they will reach their 2020 RES goals and 60% of them expect to exceed them while Italy and Luxemburg plan to resort to co-operation mechanisms to achieve their goals (EREC, 2011) and smooth national discrepancies. Furthermore, the relevant industry forecasts a share in final energy consumption of about four percentage units above the share forecasted in their national renewable energy action plans (EREC, 2011) despite the financial crisis. By 2020 wind energy will represent 14.1% of the electricity consumption, hydropower 10.5%, biomass 6.5%, photovoltaics 2.35%, solar power 0.5%, geothermal energy 0.3% and ocean energy 0.15% (Eurostat, 2012). The share of RES in heating and cooling will increase from 10.2% in 2005 to 21.3% in 2020. Renewable energy in transport would amount to 12.2% by 2020 (EREC, 2011). There also hopeful estimates that by 2050 renewable electricity will provide 100% of the European power demand (Zervos et al., 2010). RES supporting instruments There are various categories of support instruments: feed-in tariff, premium, quota obligation, investment grants, tender schemes, tax exemptions and fiscal incentives. The number of the employed instruments by each country is presented in Figure 2 with data taken from Ecofys (2011). Feed-in tariffs guarantee the price and a secure demand thereby creating certainty to investors. There is always the possibility of a large profit for RES producers when the cost of renewable energy has been overestimated, but this can be alleviated when the cost is regularly updated. Boomsma et al. (2012) provide evidence of investment behavior under RES support schemes. They find that feed-in-tariffs encourage earlier investment while as the investment proceeds, certificate trading creates incentives for larger projects. As regards quota obligations, they entail the imposition of minimum shares of renewable electricity on 3 suppliers or producers that increase with time. They are often combined with tradable green certificates. Tender schemes, provided usually for large off-shore projects, draw attention to the competitive element incorporated in renewable energy projects. Tax incentives appear either in investments or the production of RES. Fiscal incentives also include soft and low interest loans with longer repayment periods or tax exemptions from CO2 or energy taxes. They are attractive because of their direct message transmitted to final energy consumers about the added value of RES (OPTRES, 2007). For a detailed overview of the supporting instruments applied in each country, interested readers should consult Ecofys (2011). 4,5 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 0,5 Au str Be ia lgi u Bu m lga ria Cz C ec ypr hR us ep u Geblic rm a De ny nm ar Es k ton ia Sp ain Fin lan d Fra nc Gr e ee Hu ce ng ary Ire lan d It Lit aly hu Lu ania xe mb urg La tvi a Ne Malt the a rla nd s Po lan Po d rtu Ro gal ma n Sw ia ed Slo en ve n Slo ia va kia UK 0 Figure 1: Number of RES supporting instruments in European countries (data taken from Ecofys, 2011). As far as the structure of this paper is concerned, after the introduction, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part 2 explains the constituents of an effective and efficient management of renewable energy resources by countries. Part 3 presents the fixed management stochastic frontier approach for inefficiency measurement. Part 4 deals with data description and results and last, part 5 is the conclusion. 4 2. Effective and efficient management of renewable energy resources by countries The management that countries need to perform, focuses on increasing RES penetration (at least according to 2009/28/EC Directive demands) in the market while at the same time minimising public costs. Management must be applied as such so as to keep RES industry consumers and producers interested. One of the biggest challenges is to bring the above three groups into a joint agreement and reconcile their different interests. Table 1 addresses all the RES management defaults noted today and proposes solutions consistent with the 2009/28/EC Directive. For the industry agents, a guarantee of a continuous demand of their applied technology is crucial to keep them in the game. Investors, depending on their risk attitudes, are interested in as much high a producer surplus as possible. Consumers are interested in low prices. Today and until 2010, most countries have performed Business-as-Usual (BAU) policies and they worked towards a harmonization of European objectives. Assuming that energy consumption grows with time and that CO2 prices pass directly to energy prices, increased RES deployment will decrease CO2 prices. It is crucial to know the potential domestic and realistic supply of energy from each technology: biogas, biomass, biowaste, on-shore/off-shore wind, small/large scale hydro, solar, thermal, photovoltaic, tidal, wave and geothermal energy. Costs are adapted by endogenously technology-specific learning rates and estimate the long-run marginal social cost. Policy makers must decide whether they will remain at BAU solutions leading to the most cost-effective technology which however excludes expensive in the short-run novel technologies. Existing and new plants should be distinguished and handled differently by support mechanisms. Support should be stable but limited upto a certain time and might as well become 5 integrated with other policies such as climate change or agricultural policy. Technological learning must be reflected in the feed-in-tariff sytem by taking into account and correct any overcompensation produced by uniform tariffs, namely introducing tariff degression based on the technological progress made. Local electricity stations must be lawfully bound at buying green energy at priority. Tariff levels can vary depending on local conditions, the size or fuel type of the plant. The idea of setting a plant as a reference point increases transparency, so that not only the most favourable conditions in a country are exploited and the risk of over-subsidizing very efficient plants is lowered. Premium tariffs paid on top of the electricity market prices are a move towards a more market based support instrument. It leads to a more efficient allocation of the grid costs and gives producers an incentive to feed electricity into the grid at times of peak demand. Penalty payments for noncompliance can ensure quota fulfillment. Abolishment of subsidies for fossil and nuclear energy will re-distridute investment interest on RES. Markets need to be deregulated at a higher degree, so that consumers will not bear the burden of RES development while producers will go free. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) must be provided the possibility of acting independently so that this leads to the development of the transmission infrastructure capable to integrate RES. The intermittent nature of wind or solar energy and the seasonality of biomass and hydropower are important to take into account and incorporate in the demand. According to Zervos et al. (2010), until EU has a fully liberalised electricity market, RES must have priority access to the grid. In particular Jamasb and Politt (2005) suggest some interesting form of electricity liberalization which consists of a combination of competitive energy and retail markets with regulated transmission and distribution activities. 6 Countries which develop RES, also increase employment (2 million full time jobs will be created by 2010; Lins, 2008, projecting at 4.4 million jobs by 2030 and 6.1 million jobs by 2050; Zervos et al., 2010) and industrial development and at the same time decrease local pollution (728 million tons/year of CO2 emission reduction in 2020, representing 17.3% of the total GHG emisions in 1990; Lins, 2008). Crossborder power trading through the building of grid infrastructure can be enhanced. The creation of a single power market based on RES also imposes the need for a super and smart grid to interconnect all RES installations both in a centralised and decentralised way. New power capacity equal to 42% of current EU capacity must be built by 2020 (Zervos et al., 2010). Co-operation among countries is imposed for a variety of reasons one of which being the interaction among the different support schemes which for example can have an impact on the price of CO2 permit trading system or the price of power in these regions and across borders. Each country must take into accout its political, technological and market risks in whose context a RES plan must be built or adapted for the country. All countries together need to work for an EU-wide carbon tax reflecting all costs incurred when using conventional energy sources. Good management entails the establishment of a one-stop shop which assigns only to one authority the permit and support related procedures of RES projects, while at the same time will reduce lead times and lack of the co-ordination among authorities. Moreover, apt RES management must concentrate urgently on grid matters giving priority to a pan-European grid system. Sufficient and reinforced capacity has to be built. Transparent and swift procedures for grid connection must be established. 7 Campaigns must lower public opposition and disseminate the hidden benefits from RES. Emphasis must be placed to sustainable development through job creation. Participation of local public, the authorities and other stakeholders in large projects in their area through co-operation programmes is crucial and will not jeopardise the implementation of the projects. A stable and transparent environment will uphold other financial barriers such as the lack of trust from banks because of subsidies' unpredictability due to the vague administrative framework. Table 1: Management defaults and solutions for renewable energy sources. RES Management default Solution 1. Planning delays and restrictions often caused by - Establish preclusion effect (i.e. objections reaction to objection and issuance. can be raised only withing a given time). 2. Lack of co-ordination between authorities - One-stop shop (through a central agency). because of their large number being involved and the unclear administrative framework (e.g. broad margins of descretion, lack of transparency, corruption etc). 3. Lengthy procedures in obtaining authorization - One-stop shop. e.g. 3-6 years in Greece, France etc. - Provide a fast lane for RES projects. - Set obligatory limits for authorization provision; if not met, this will lead to tacit approval. 4. Costs of obtaining permission (e.g. 30% of the One-stop shop. overall costs for small PV projects). 5. Insufficient or hostile spatial planning affecting Include stakeholders financially, e.g. large projects caused by deliberate actions, ensure that municipalities directly benefit social opposition and environmental effects. from RES projects in their area. Involve local population and encourage their participation in the project. Teach them to make the trade-off between the additional local impact and the avoided import of fossil fuels. 6. No exemption of small-scale systems from - Adapt legislation as such. authorization. 7. Number of permits required is going up to 40 One-stop shop. (wind energy in Greece and Cyprus). 8. Grid connection and access problems (both - Extension of existing electricity networks within the country and within neighbouring and their development into smart countries), because they are not ensured by law, networks. there is resistance by TSOs and DSOs Enhance cross-border trade in electricity (Distribution system operator) and the fact that between member states by increasing the existene of old infrastructure demands huge interconnection capacity. financial support. Establish a priority grid access for electricity by RES. Deregulate energy markets more. Introduce an efficient sanction scheme for TSOs and DSOs. 8 RES Management default Solution 9. Limited information and awareness on RES Prepare the public to accept the impact on benefits, on support measures, pilot projects and landscape from large RES projects. insufficient funding for information campaigns. Dissemination of best practice projects. 10. Barriers for build environment (40% of final Exemplary role of public buildings. energy demand in Europe is consumed in Establish renewable energy obligations for buildings), because of lax energy performance, new buildings. requirements by national laws, conservativeness Make clear that areas under monument of construction industry, lack of financial motives, protection will be useless derelicts if they problems in tenancy and property laws. do not have modern provisions of energy and water. 11. Lack of certification schemes for installers due - Mandate member states to appoint such a to lack of certification bodies, lack of training and body both at a national and european guidelines. level. 12. Lack of market transparency and market prices - Establish a monitoring body both at not including the external costs of energy. national and international level. - Promote deregulation. 13. Old fashioned legislation tailored to use fossils Adapt legislation. instead of RES. 14. Non-intentional barriers such as complete lack Adapt legislation. of administration procedures because there is no demand for them. 15. Heterogeneous application of laws: Adapt legislation and provide one-stop shop contradictory fragmentation of political at a cental agency. competences (region, provinces and municipalities). 16. Delay or lack of promotion in biogas because of - Introduction of subsidies. lack of infrastructure, equipment and incentives - Develop legislation with regard to access and due to the precence of bureaucracy. and grid codes etc. 17. Delays in establishing district heating or cooling. - Disseminate examples from Scandinavian countries and provide the know-how. - Create incentives. Note: The table has been summarized from ECORYS (2010). 3. The fixed management stochastic frontier approach for ineffieciency measurement The concept of technical efficiency has been widely used in a variety of benchmarking applications; in the banking sector (Behr, 2010), dairy firms (Yélou et al., 2010), manufacturing firms (Bhaumik et al., 2011), sawmill industry (Helvoigt et al., 2009), container ports (Cullinane, 2006), oil and gas industry (Managi et al. 2006), fisheries (Tingley et al., 2006), pig finishing farms (Van Meensel, 2010), wind farms (Iglesias, 2010) to quote only a few of the most recent. However, none, to the best of the author’s knowledge has applied the frontier analysis and more specifically the 9 fixed management stochastic frontier (Alvarez et. al., 2006) or the management adapted efficiency frontier from now on, method country-wide or particularly in the European countries growth framework with an emphasis on renewable energy as an input. Typically studies across countries perform cointegration and causality analyses between GDP, renewable energy and other factors (Menegaki, 2011; Apergis and Payne, 2011) and they do not perform any benchmarking, except for cases where a country is evidenced to contribute to heterogeneity and therefore it can be included as a dummy variable for a more precise reflection of the long-run relationship among the variables. The main advantage of the stochastic frontier approach over fixed effects panel regression models (Bhaumik et al., 2011) is that it can provide evidence not only on whether or not the average country has GDP efficiency hysteresis in our example, but also it estimates a measure of the degree of the hysteresis for each country and ideally for each time period (however, time was not significant in the current application), and also the marginal impact of country characteristics on this measure. While incorporating heterogeneity in the conventional and random frontier models did not lead to the generation of significant models and therefore could not disentangle the contribution of specific inputs or countries to heterogeneity, the management adapted efficiency frontier model was significant and could provide some equivalent explanation for the disparate progress European countries have made on renewable energy resources penetration in their economies. To start with, observing the graph of RES and GDP (Figure 2), it becomes evident that there are factors other than wealth or the size of inputs an economy is using in its production process that affect the penetration of RES in it, because we observe countries with a high GDP and a very low attainment in RES and vice versa. 10 80 70 60 50 RE S 40 30 20 10 0 -10 200 100 0 300 GDP Figure 2: Renewable energy and GDP in European countries. Following the stylised specification in literature we will describe a production frontier uU model representing the maximum GDP attainable, namely y x v u with . Thıs is Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt’s (1977) normal-half model. Also note that U ~ N 0, u2 and v ~ N 0, u2 . As aforementioned, we employ the Alvarez et al. (2006) fixed management model, in a production frontier for European economies in order to push forward the hidden role of management in those economies and the size effect it bears on the contribution of renewable energies in European growth. Each country is supposed to encompass a time invariant factor labeled management so that the production frontier appears as: yit f xit ,1 , xit , 2 ,..., xit , K , mi EQ1 The functional form employed for the estimation is a stochastic frontier model of a translog type with five inputs is depicted in Equation 2 (Greene, 2007): 11 K log yit ai k ,i ln xit ,k k 1 m1 km ln xit ,k ln xit ,m vit uit K K k 1 EQ2 1 ai a a wi aa wi2 2 and k ,i k k wi where, wi ~ N 0,1, vit ~ N 0, 2 , uit N 0, u2 The second order terms in the translog allow for cross-relationships while the squares for non-linearities. The translog function allows elasticities to vary by the magnitude of the explanatory variable. However, regardless of the above mathematical niceties of this function, the reason it was deployed in the current empirical application, was its better fit to the data. Therefore we have neglected issues such as monotonicity and concavity. We have dropped elements that were deteriorating the model fit since our aim is not to use the frontier for predictions but to provide a snapshot of the management inefficiency across countries. It is understood that it vit uit and this will be conditioned on m . The i random parameters model relies on Mundlak approach (Greene, 2007) to incorporate the group means of the variables in the model as in Equation 3. Also with fi being the structural random variable that drives the random parameters, we write Equation 3 as: K wi k log xi ,k fi k 1 EQ3 To measure ui, we will use the Jondrow et al. (1982) estimator to estimate it. This is provided by Equation 4 z E u z , v u , z 2 1 1 z which, if conditioned on m, can be re-written as in Equation 5 / m / / m it i it i E u / , m it it i 2 1 / m / it i EQ4 EQ5 12 Since we are interested in the inefficiency of each country, we calculate it as suggested in Greene (2007), and described in Equation 6 y Eff Exp ( u ) Optimal _ y EQ6 4. Data description and results Annual data ranging from 1997 to 2010 for 31 European countries were obtained from Eurostat database. The multivariate frontier framework encompasses real GDP per capita in PPP terms (Variable: GDP), percentage of RES in gross inland energy production (variable: RES), final energy consumption in 1000 toe (variable: CON), greenhouse emissions on CO2 equivalents with base year 1990 (variable: GRE), employment rate (variable: EMP) calculated as the number of people with ages between 15 and 64 years old divided by the corresponding population size and capital being the real gross fixed capital formation (variable: CAPI). Summary statistics are listed for each of the variables across countries in Table 4 in the Appendix. Table 2. Estimated frontier models Variable Stochastic Frontier Constant -83.768 (10.980)* -0.788 (0.618) 3.488 (0.589)* 6.744 (2.211)* 24.872 (2.716)* -0.157 (0.067)* -34.972 (12.200)* 0.301 (0.564) 1.713 (0.775)* 2.923 (1.817)* 10.440 (3.273)* -0.010 (3.023) 0.077 (0.013)* 0.416 0.041 (0.009)* 0.000 Model 1 Renewable Energy (RES) Energy Consumption (CON) Carbon Emissions (GRE) Employment (EMPLO) Capital (CAPI) Random Coefficients Model Means of Random Parameters Management Inputs Model 2 Model 3 Management RES RES RES CON 0.172 (0.923) 0.019 (0.018) 0.028 (0.007)* -0.181 (0.046)* 0.183 (0.194) 0.053 (0.135) 0.092 (0.019)* 13 RES GRE RES EMPLO RES CAPI CON GRE CON EMPLO CON CAPI GRE EMPLO GRE CAPI EMPLO CAPI CAPI CAPI (0.012)* 0.289 (0.507)* -0.299 (0.179)** -0.034 (0.048) 0.356 (0.037)* -1.205 (0.142)* -0.050 (0.034) -2.599 (0.512)* 0.149 (0.098) 0.620 (0.205)* -0.530 (0.103)* (0.011) -0.213 (0.050)* 0.157 (0.100) 0.003 (0.072) 0.136 (0.034)* -0.491 (0.168)* 0.024 (0.1086) -1.025 (0.417)* 0.072 (0.220) -0.112 (0.856) 0.000 (0.000) Variable means in unobserved management -0.712 (0.058)* CON -0.441 (0.179) GRE 0.800 (0.358) EMPLO 1.492 (0.729) CAPI -1.840 (0.222) λ 0.766 2.039 (0.128)* (0.991) σ 0.266 (0.000)* 0.111 (0.014)* LogL 15.839 393.052 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * and **indicate 5% and 10% significance respectively RES We have estimated a stochastic production frontier with five inputs (time effects were not significant). First order coefficients are typically interpreted as output elasticities evaluated at the mean of the sample. However, as aforementioned we will omit all these technical niceties (Christensen et al. 1973), because the purpose of the paper is not to compute elasticities or make predictions which would presuppose special handlings of the data, e.g. be corrected by their geometric mean before estimation (See and Coell, 2011). The paper aims to highlight the differences across the three inefficiency types and make evident the management hysteresis in RES. 14 In model 1, all inputs are significant except for RES. Capital has a negative sign. Next, in model 2, we estimate the random coefficients model with 1000 Halton draws in each replication. RES remains insignificant. Also capital is non significant in this version of frontier model. In model 3, the coefficients of management (βkm) are significant only for energy consumption and carbon emissions but not for renewable energy and capital. The separate coefficient of management (βm) is significant. The positive sign of management can be interpreted as evidence that management has a positive sign with an increasing effect on production (growth). We have applied the Wald test with one restriction on whether all betas are commonly zero to find out that the estimated function does not collapse to a Cobb-Douglas frontier since the χ2 test was not significant (p=0.94). Noteworthy is the fact that while the constant term was high and significant in the conventional and random parameters models, this term is not significant in the management adapted frontier model (Model 3), while the independent term accounting for management becomes significant. Last, RES is the only significant variable in the means of unobservable management. After applying Equation 6, mean inefficiency has been estimated to be 0.98 (st.dev.=0.0007), min=0.9807 and max=0.9882. Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for the inefficiency estimates produced from the conventional stochastic frontier model, the random coefficients stochastic frontier model and the management adapted frontier model (Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively). Apparently in the latter case, is both the mean and the standard deviation smaller, providing evidence that if management is not taken into account, then inefficiency is biased, producing thus an inaccurate estimation of the overall amount and its constituents. 15 Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the three inefficiency models. Conventional Stochastic frontier model Random coefficiens stochastic frontier model Management adapted frontier model Mean 0.121 0.084 -1.010 St.deviation 0.054 0.068 1.299 Min 0.000 0.000 -3.570 Max 0.392 0.443 4.192 4 3 2 Managementadaptedinefficiency 1 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 -1 -2 -3 Figure 3. Management adapted inefficiency and RES It is interesting to observe Figure 3 with management adapted inefficiency (MAI), because observations have the largest range and it resembles a hyperbolic shape. The other two inefficiency measures, conventional stochastic frontier (CSF) and the random stochastic frontier (RSF) have small ranges and resemble almost straight lines. The hyperbolic shape of the graph means that as RES increase, inefficiency drops, initially at a larger rate and then at a smaller rate, because RES increase at a smaller rate, probably due to learning effects. Hence a critical difference between MAI and the other two measures, CSF and RSF, is that MAI allows various inefficiency grades based on RES attainment level by each economy. The largest correlation between RES and the three inefficiency measures is borne by MAI, equal to -0.52. Countries with positive MAI are Ireland, Luxemburg, Cyprus and Malta also being some of the RES laggards in Europe. Above the mean MAI but below the 16 horizontal axis are: Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovenia, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands and the UK. The rest of the countries are below the mean MAI with the following ranking from first to last: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Switzerland, Portugal, Finland, Germany, Italy, Poland, Estonia, France, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Romania and Latvia. Of course it must be pinpointed that this ranking does not come solely from inefficiency on RES but it is rather the combined inefficiency from all inputs but with a high correlation with RES. 4 Management adapted Random Conventional 3 1 0 Be lg Bu ium C lg ze a ch ria D Rep en . m G ar er k m a Es ny to n Ir e i a la G nd re ec Sp e a Fr in an ce Ita C ly yp ru L s Li atvi th a Lu ua xe ni m a b H urg un ga ry N et Ma he lta rla n Au ds st Po ria l Po and rt R uga om l a Sl nia ov e Sl nia ov a Fi kia nl Sw and ed en U C K ro a Ic tia el a N nd Sw or itz way er la nd Mean Inefficiency 2 -1 -2 -3 Country Figure 6. Comparison of mean inefficiency measures across European countries. Figure 6 includes the graphs of all three types of inefficiency examined in this empirical application. The CIF does not have large fluctuations and differences among countries. The RSF has larger fluctuations while the MAI, has the largest fluctuations and has differences among groups of countries. Conventional and Random inefficiencies are positively correlated with each other with correlation equal to 0.447. 17 80 70 Mean management adapted inefficiency 60 50 40 30 20 10 ro U K at i Ic a el an N d Sw orw itz ay er la nd -10 C Be lg iu Bu m C lga ze r ch ia R D ep en . m G ark er m an Es y to ni Ire a la n G d re ec e Sp a Fr in an ce Ita C ly yp ru s La t Li via th Lu uan x e ia m bu H rg un ga ry M N et a he lta rla nd Au s st r Po ia la Po nd rtu R ga om l a Sl nia ov e Sl nia ov ak Fi i a nl a Sw nd ed en 0 RES Figure 7. Mean management adapted inefficiency, and mean RES across European countries. Based on Figure 7, we can arbitrarily distinguish several groups of countries. RES and MAI opposite co-movements become more evident in one group of countries, where clearly a kind of elliptic circle is formed by the two graphs. These countries are Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and Cyprus. This argument is further strengthened by the fact that the correlation between RES and MAI is -0.52. Moreover, this almost perfectly elliptic pattern encompasses most Mediterranean countries. Other groups observed with distinctive opposite co-movements in the two magnitudes, are; Group 1: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Group 2: Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Group 3: Latvia, Lithouania and Luxemburg, Group 4: Hungary, Malta, Group 5: Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Group 6: Finland, Sweden, UK, Group 7: Croatia, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. The full ranking of all European countries is listed in Table 5 in the Appendix. 18 5. Conclusion European economies need to adopt managerial strategies consistent with the 2009/28/EC Directive in order to address all the relevant obstacles and bolster RES expansion Europe wide. Efficiency from a managerial point of view is crucial, due to the need of reaching the deadlines posed by the European Commission and stipulated by European countries participating in the EU. The deployment of renewable energy does not participate in the production and growth of European economies in a drastic way and there is a lot of way to be covered by many countries. This paper aims to unveil the management hysteresis in the deployment of renewable energy in Europe while at the same time it highlights the differences of three inefficiency models that aim to do that. In essence, the stochastic frontier approach is used for estimating efficiency scores and the consequent benchmarking. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first empirical application of management adapted frontier models, country wide, and with particular reference to European countries benchmarking for renewable energy levels in their economies. Observing the existence of countries with high GDP and low renewable energy levels, it becomes understandable that renewable energy penetration in European economies does not go on a pari passo with income. Renewable energies management in Europe defaults in many aspects and there is a lot of margin for their full potential to unfold in the majority of countries. Complying with the demands of the 2009/28/EC Directive, will be a major step towards the homogenization of energy policy in Europe, leading to energy supply security, climate change mitigation, industrial and employment growth. 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Denmark Germany Estonia Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxemburg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden UK Croatia Iceland Norway Switzerland GDP Mean 121.25 33.92 74.74 126.95 117.90 55.20 133.59 89.39 100.10 111.71 110.12 91.50 44.68 48.77 250.39 60.52 79.52 131.39 126.96 51.74 77.24 34.49 83.95 59.58 114.97 123.72 118.02 55.56 128.28 165.70 142.05 St.dev. 3.45 6.51 4.68 3.74 2.89 10.32 9.71 4.23 3.59 3.38 6.85 4.67 7.67 8.15 20.70 4.30 2.31 2.24 3.07 5.11 1.51 8.13 4.22 8.99 2.17 2.17 3.92 5.12 8.24 16.19 5.32 RES Mean 2.35 6.30 4.28 14.25 5.37 13.68 2.55 6.05 7.96 8.36 6.25 2.55 31.77 10.64 1.78 4.12 0.20 2.87 23.76 5.63 18.02 14.30 12.27 5.23 24.90 33.91 1.59 9.52 72.47 50.52 16.88 St.dev. 1.18 3.22 2.80 4.08 3.03 4.86 1.27 1.51 2.89 2.33 1.25 1.08 1.56 3.99 0.56 2.17 0.00 0.67 3.49 1.87 4.16 5.11 3.12 2.88 3.94 8.91 0.66 1.55 2.66 10.11 1.34 CON Mean 37989.60 9252.71 25105.60 15170.10 221350.00 2747.79 11320.40 19763.90 86743.60 154960.00 127471.00 1758.64 3846.71 4400.21 3930.79 16766.50 413.50 51143.80 25605.40 59474.50 17880.50 24189.30 4700.14 10713.90 25262.0 33960.10 150094.00 5908.21 2191.71 18418.90 20801.60 St.dev. 1680.90 555.35 989.02 343.57 4200.11 215.69 1335.42 1391.73 9997.28 3828.35 6141.97 157.47 348.24 406.99 462.98 849.34 65.47 1206.99 2035.48 3676.60 1064.24 1806.58 274.41 373.42 1103.65 1113.21 5024.63 528.87 195.04 515.87 560.09 GRE Mean 95.95 52.96 74.47 99.14 80.57 45.15 121.12 118.60 135.98 97.25 105.47 172.13 42.97 44.40 86.90 66.74 139.38 99.84 108.76 69.85 135.27 52.60 97.52 67.17 104.10 93.48 83.74 92.81 118.52 107.55 98.97 St.dev. 5.76 4.59 3.21 7.92 3.30 3.42 5.24 3.90 12.06 2.98 5.10 14.64 2.37 3.19 11.50 4.15 8.70 4.10 6.21 3.45 9.16 3.93 3.62 3.29 7.96 5.63 5.43 9.16 14.24 2.36 1.57 EMPLO Mean 60.31 55.07 65.55 75.87 66.72 64.01 64.85 58.67 59.02 62.95 55.85 68.35 61.85 61.31 62.98 56.03 54.44 73.75 69.45 55.75 67.60 60.10 64.90 58.82 67.87 72.63 71.06 54.61 82.78 76.52 78.34 St.dev. 1.56 5.24 0.94 1.14 2.47 3.09 3.02 2.26 4.67 1.52 2.47 1.93 3.56 2.25 1.45 1.17 0.64 2.15 1.58 3.21 0.95 2.63 2.20 1.81 1.83 1.26 0.69 1.57 2.03 1.08 0.65 CAPI Mean 20.63 20.20 27.00 19.85 18.98 29.63 21.74 17.71 27.01 19.00 20.18 19.19 26.35 21.86 19.94 22.29 19.95 20.36 22.46 21.03 24.04 22.83 25.17 26.88 19.72 17.78 16.80 NA NA 20.42 21.33 St.dev. 0.91 0.36 1.57 1.07 1.65 4.47 4.05 2.38 2.16 1.23 0.76 1.78 4.19 3.25 0.96 1.59 2.70 1.43 1.32 2.20 2.79 4.15 1.90 4.08 0.86 1.11 0.78 NA NA 2.39 0.74 N.A.=Not available. The sample of countries was dependent upon data availability by Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database. Data come from Eurostat database under the codes tec00114, tsdcc110, ten00095, tsien010, tsdec210 Table 5. Countries' ranking based on the three types of inefficiency Country Ranking 1 Conventional Inefficiency Ranking 2 Random Inefficiency Ranking 3 Management adapted inefficiency Belgium 30 1.007 4 0.065 22 -0.561 Bulgaria 25 1.690 11 0.097 19 -1.089 Czech Rep. 24 0.152 2 0.054 16 -1.216 Denmark 17 0.137 22 0.146 20 -0.951 Germany 2 0.084 9 0.078 11 -1.680 Estonia 22 0.144 17 0.110 8 -1.802 Ireland 3 0.100 7 0.068 27 0.204 Greece 16 0.136 3 0.062 23 -0.438 Spain 19 0.139 20 0.126 3 -2.029 France 11 0.115 6 0.066 7 -1.820 Italy 14 0.126 25 0.697 10 -1.709 Cyprus 23 0.150 26 0.715 29 1.649 Latvia 7 0.109 19 0.125 1 -2.577 Lithuania 26 0.175 15 0.106 15 -1.357 Luxemburg 29 0.577 18 0.114 28 0.775 Hungary 9 0.110 24 0.629 18 -1.126 Malta 18 0.138 29 0.881 30 3.425 Country Ranking 1 Conventional Inefficiency Ranking 2 Random Inefficiency Ranking 3 Management adapted inefficiency Netherlands 15 0.128 5 0.065 24 -0.309 Austria 4 0.102 10 0.082 6 -1.886 Poland 21 0.142 21 0.141 9 -1.716 Portugal 27 0.201 28 0.754 13 -1.558 Romania 28 0.203 23 0.192 2 -2.325 Slovenia 6 0.108 14 0.104 21 -0.938 Slovakia 5 0.107 13 0.102 17 -1.153 Finland 12 0.120 27 0.723 12 -1.680 Sweden 13 0.124 16 0.107 5 -1.895 UK 20 0.141 1 0.000 25 -0.190 Croatia 1 0.000 1 0.000 26 0.000 Iceland 1 0.000 1 0.000 26 0.000 Norway 8 0.109 12 0.099 4 -1.908 Switzerland 10 0.113 8 0.070 14 -1.369 Note: Rankings have been performed from smallest to largest and not based on mean inefficiency.
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