Theoretical Perspectives in Franchising : A Network Analysis
Autoria: Luís Fernando Varotto, Geraldo Cardoso de Oliveira Neto
Franchising is one of the fastest developing forms of business in the world, offering a rich
field for theoretical study. In this study we seek to extend the knowledge about Franchising
through an extensive research on its main theoretical perspectives showing the evolution of
the field, highlighting the principal issues, authors and methods. Through a selection of 117
articles ranging from 1966 to 2012, the study investigates the five most relevant theories in
franchising: Resource Acquisition, Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Analysis, Signaling
Theory, and Property Rights. Interrelationships among these theories, authors, journals,
variables, and methods are examined using network analysis.
1
INTRODUCTION
Franchising as a legal or marketing concept was not new. It arose as a structured business
system in the US, around 1860´s when The Singer Company established a network of
resellers for sewing machines (ANTONOWICZ, 2011; MARQUES, 2006). In Brazil
franchising surges in 1963 with the establishment of the Yazigi language schools network,
and with the growth of malls contributing to the expansion of the system during de 80´s and
90´s (MARQUES, 2006).
Nowadays franchising is one of the fastest developing forms of business in the world. It can
be conceptualized as a system of marketing goods and/or services and/or technology, which is
based upon a close and ongoing collaboration between legally and financially separate and
independent undertakings, that is, the franchisor and its individual franchisees, whereby the
franchisor grants its individual franchisee the right, and imposes the obligation, to conduct a
business in accordance with the franchisor’s concept (ANTONOWICZ, 2011).
Franchising also combines decentralized ownership of physical assets with centralized brand
name ownership and provision of operational know-how, and can be seen as facilitating
growth by younger business chains, as it eases constraints on the supply of factors. Rapid
initial growth may be necessary because promotion and advertising of a brand image is likely
to be subject to both real and pecuniary economies of scale and almost all services and most
physical outputs provided by the franchised business are difficult to protect from imitation,
and this can involve expansion to preempt a rival´s entry (THOMPSON, 1994).
Franchising is a rich field for studies not only in the Marketing arena, but also in another
relevant areas such as economics, law, management, finance and entrepreneurship (GREWAL
et al., 2011), thanks to its varied possibilities of governance formats and studies about interorganizational behaviors (DANT et al., 2011). This plethora of perspectives has been inspired
academic research in several areas – franchising as a vehicle for entering business ownership
(entrepreneurship), as distribution channel (marketing), as a leading venue for understanding
the structure of contracts (economics), as an important organizational form (strategic
management) (COMBS, J. et al., 2004a) - mainly focusing in such facets as contractual
arrangements, pricing strategies, franchised chain advertising, ownership patterns, territorial
encroachment implications and internationalization (CHABOWSKI et al., 2011).
These issues are investigated on the lenses of many perspectives according DANT et al
(2011), principally resource acquisition theory (OXENFELDT; KELLY, 1969), agency
theory (FAMA; JENSEN, 1983a, 1983b), transaction cost analysis (WILLIAMSON, 1985),
signaling Theory (GALLINI; LUTZ, 1992; GALLINI; WRIGHT, 1990) and property rights
theory (DEMSETZ, 1966; HART; MOORE, 1990; MANESS, 1996) - although scholars have
been using many other theoretical perspective approaches as well – stakeholder theory
(ALTINAY; MILES, 2006), tournament theory (COMBS, JAMES G. et al., 2011; GILLIS et
al., 2011) , institutional theory (ALTINAY; MILES, 2006), RBV (BARTHÉLEMY, 2008;
COMBS, J. et al., 2004b; FLADMOE-LINDQUIST, 1996), upper echelons theory (COMBS,
J. et al., 2004b), learning theory (COMBS, J. G. et al., 2010); plural theory (DANT;
KAUFMANN, 2003), risk-sharing theory (HSU et al., 2010), social exchange theory
(COMBS, JAMES G. et al., 2011), resource dependence theory (DANT; GUNDLACH,
1999), among other perspectives.
THEORETICAL EVOLUTION IN FRANCHISING
Oxenfeldt and Kelly published in 1969 an article entitled “Will successful franchise systems
ultimately become wholly-owned chains?” which states franchising as part of a life cycle,
where this system is adopted by firms to overcome scarce resources in their effort to growth,
2
reverting in the future toward company ownership (GILLIS et al., 2011). Oxenfeldt and Kelly
were the first to formulate the termed resource scarcity view, which asserts that a nascent firm
builds a brand in order to create economies of scale in advertising and purchasing (COMBS,
J. G. et al., 2010; OXENFELDT; KELLY, 1969). New ventures need faster growth in
comparison to established firms in order to compete successfully. Franchising is a method
which permits new firms to rapidly penetrate the market and achieve access to key resources
(OXENFELDT; KELLY, 1969)
Franchising, therefore, would be an alternative to overcome constraints to growth, as lack of
trained managers and financial capital (MICHAEL, S. C., 2003). According to the resource
scarcity view, franchisees are seen as an inexpensive source of capital, enabling the franchisor
to raise capital at a lower cost than other possible arrangements (NORTON, 1988). Another
prediction of the resource scarcity view is that franchisors will maintain the ownership over
new outlets and will tend to repurchase the old ones in the extent to which economies of scale
are achieved (COMBS, J. G. et al., 2010), in a phenomenon known as ownership redirection
(DANT et al., 1996).
In this view, franchising would be advantageous to a franchisor mainly during the early years,
when fundamental resources as financial capital, information regarding advantageous places
for business, labor supply and managers to implement the system at dispersed locations would
be necessary to implement and develop the business concept and achieve economies of scale.
Along with the success of the chain other sources of financing will be available to franchisors,
as well as their abilities and competencies in managerial labor training and site searching
(Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Dant, Kaufmann, & Paswan, 1992; Michael, 2003). Once
economies of scale have been reached and the need for rapid expansion reduces, new
franchises should come to a halt, and the franchisor will tend to recover its most profitable
franchised outlets (COMBS, J.; JR., 2003).
Resource scarcity theory along with the agency theory try to explain why franchisors decide
to franchise varying proportions of outlets (CASTROGIOVANNI, G. J. et al., 2006a).
Differently the predictions of resource scarcity theory, franchisors do not repurchase all their
franchised outlets when the system achieves maturity (LAFONTAINE; KAUFMANN, 1994),
having important evidences of a stable balance between franchised and owned outlets over
time, whose proportion may varies between different franchise chains (TRACEY; JARVIS,
2007). This aspect opens the way to other theoretical perspectives in franchising, such as
agency theory.
Agency theory has its roots in the theory of the firm – designed by Coase in his seminal
article entitled "The Nature of the Firm" published in 1937. In this work, he questions the role
of the firm in the neoclassical perspective, arguing that the economic system is not controlled
solely by the price mechanism. Under this view, there are at least two coordination
mechanisms: under the market, pricing system indicates the best allocation of resources, and
in the firm, under the principle of hierarchy, the Authority (entrepreneur) is responsible for
the reallocation of resources. Agency theory is grounded on the principal-agent relationship,
having the information transfer process, the information asymmetry problem and associated
monitoring costs as its basis (QUINN; DOHERTY, 2000).
Efficiency in delivering products demanded by customers – at lowest prices and covering
costs – is a basic condition of surviving for organizations, and efficiency under the premises
of agency theory is tied to the control of agency problems. Agency problems arise with the
separation between ownership and control, that is, when decision process in the firm is under
control of professional managers whose interests are different, and often divergent, from those
of residual claimants – separation of ownership and residual risk bearing from control and
decision functions. According agency view this problem could be managed through decision
systems separating management (initiation and implementation) and control (ratification and
3
monitoring) (FAMA; JENSEN, 1983b). Face the divergent interests the principal is obliged to
mobilize resources in order to ensure that the agent acts in the best interests of the principal.
(JENSEN; MECKLING, 1976). Principals can assure agents´ cooperation mainly through two
ways: monitoring or incentives for agents´ behavior in accordance to the principals´ interests
(CASTROGIOVANNI, G. J. et al., 2006b; EISENHARDT, 1989).
Agency theory offers an alternative explanation in comparison the resource scarcity
arguments for adoption of franchising with focus on the concept of efficiency (RUBIN, 1978).
According this view, franchisees, as owners of the businesses, have an incentive for enduring
their best efforts into the activities, with less need of monitoring, therefore, reducing
monitoring cost in franchising arrangements (COMBS, JAMES G. et al., 2004). One of the
most studied factors which enable franchising to reduce monitoring costs is geographic
dispersion (CASTROGIOVANNI, G. J. et al., 2006b), what is especially relevant when
operations are in foreign countries (FLADMOE-LINDQUIST, 1996) and rural locations
(NORTON, 1988).
Although franchising is an alternative in reducing need of monitoring, this does not occur
without potential costs to franchisors. Examples of potential costs are risk of franchisees free
riding and transference of specific knowledge from franchisors to franchisees. Franchisees
can be tempted to maximize their outlet´s profits at the detriment of the franchisor´s
reputation by reducing the quality of the product or service offered, for example, what
commits negatively the franchisor brand value (BRICKLEY; DARK, 1987; COMBS, JAMES
G. et al., 2004). Specific knowledge transference is also more complex in franchising
arrangements than within firms because franchisees are not obliged sharing competitive
practices or techniques developed or engaging in additional trainings, for example (COMBS,
JAMES G. et al., 2004).
Respecting the foundations of neoclassical economic behaviors, there is the emergence of
contractual approaches of the firm, represented not only by the theory of agency, but also for
the theory of transaction costs and by the theory of property rights. The theory of transaction
costs or transaction-cost analysis (TCA), whose main exponent is Williamson, is a theory of
firm governance with the transaction as unit of analysis, and transaction costs as opposed to
production costs as focus of analysis. (SEGGIE, 2012).
Williamson (1975) develops the hypotheses that there are three forms of organizational
governance - market, hybrid and hierarchy – being each one supported by a different form of
contract (SPINELLI; BIRLEY, 1996). Market governance has the letter of the contract as the
main source for solving conflicts, that is, the classical contract law, where formal terms
overlaps less formal terms (SPINELLI; BIRLEY, 1996). Hierarchy governance relies on the
control over the use and disposition of assets, that is, ownership and integration in the same
organization (CROCKER; MASTEN, 1996). Finally, hybrid governance is associated to
parties that maintain autonomy but are interdependent, which is the form of governance in
franchising contracts. The ideal form of governance will be that which permits the lowest
transaction costs (SEGGIE, 2012).
TCA presuppose that parties engaged in a transaction, seek to maximize their returns,
sometimes making use of opportunistic behavior (WILLIAMSON, 1979). Franchisors as well
franchisees may behave opportunistically. Franchisors may overrun franchisees´ markets,
terminating contracts before the time assigned or misrepresenting costs, and franchisees may
pursuit their private goals in detriment franchisor goals, misrepresent revenues, withhold
royalties, and deviate from franchisor patterns, among other possibilities (GASSENHEIMER
et al., 1996).
Other assumptions under TCA are bounded rationality and risk neutrality, besides four
dimensions of transactions – asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, environmental
uncertainty, and transaction frequency (SEGGIE, 2012). Asset specificity is a central tenet in
4
TCA, what links this theory directly to the central theme in franchising – trademark, as an
intangible asset (SPINELLI; BIRLEY, 1996).
Transaction costs analysis under the perspective of franchising has at least two significant
implications to the question of ownership redirection. One of them is related to the possibility
of opportunistic behavior as a driver for ownership redirection hypothesis, and the other,
based in the governance structures of specific transactions, related to the prediction of
ownership of particular outlets around the combination of transaction and production costs
(DANT et al., 1992).
Finally, the theory of property rights that considers the firm as a set of contracts that
constitute a structure of property rights. Property rights involve the notion of control and
ownership over the use of scarce resources, and the rights of sales and transferences related to
this control. According to this theory approach, the assignment of property rights is important
to achieve an efficient resource allocation (DEMSETZ, 1966). Any contract will be fully
complete, since specification of all relevant circumstances in contracts would be too costly
and difficult to establish, so every contract will remain some sort of not included residual
rights.
Residual rights are responsible for the creation of large fraction of residual incomes, and
under the property rights perspective they originate from assets not specified in the contract.
Its main characteristics, and that which determines the ownership structure of the asset, is its
intangibility (HART; MOORE, 1990; MANESS, 1996). Intangible assets are difficult to be
codified and put in contracts, since they are tied to knowledge, skills and know-how. In the
franchising system, franchisors as well as franchisees are holders of intangible assets.
Franchisors intangible assets are related to brand name and system specific know-how
(NORTON, 1988; WINDSPERGER; DANT, 2006), while franchisees intangible assets are
related to the local know-how - customer service, quality control, human resource
management, product innovation (SORENSON; SORENSEN, 2001; WINDSPERGER;
DANT, 2006; WINDSPERGER, 2001).
The appropriation of the residual incomes generated from the residual rights will be directed
to the party that owns the residual rights, whose asset is relevant for the success of the
network (WINDSPERGER, 2001), encouraging that party to invest in those intangibles
assets. Therefore, if the franchisor system-specific know-how or brand name value is the most
critical asset to generate the residual income, then the franchisor should have a larger part of
ownership rights, reflected in high initial fees and royalties. Otherwise, if the franchisee local
know-how is the most relevant asset to the success of the network, then the larger part of the
ownership rights should be put upon him, reflected in low initial fees and royalties
(WINDSPERGER; DANT, 2006; WINDSPERGER, 2001).
An alternative theoretical view to franchising is offered by signaling theory. While prior
theories have focus into internal constraints facing firms, signaling theory focus on the
externalities of market imperfections and knowledge asymmetries to explain franchising
(DANT; KAUFMANN, 2003). In an environment where there is asymmetric information,
firms may use several signs to provide information about themselves and their products, as
pricing, advertising and warranties (LAFONTAINE, 1993). According this perspective, two
primary forces drive such asymmetries: the nature of the subject under information search and
the inability of individuals to assess informational cues. In franchising, due to the intangible
nature of the assets (knowledge, brand, operational know-how), signaling is a relevant
characteristic (DANT; KAUFMANN, 2003).
Gallini and Lutz (1992) describe franchising system evolution for observing dual distribution,
with chains opening company-outlets until the point the firm is able to signaling the quality of
their concepts, and, after that, establish a strategy tending toward franchising. This vision is
opposite that of resource acquisition view, which defends franchising as a way to overcome
5
scarcity of resources until the company grows and acquire enough resources for moving it
toward the preferred strategy of company owned-outlets (DANT; KAUFMANN, 2003).
Signaling theory also offer an explanation for franchisors´ choices about royalties and fees.
Royalties and fees, as well as company ownership can be used as a cue about the profitability
of the business for potential franchisees interested to join the chain (GALLINI; LUTZ, 1992).
Finally, a relevant insight from the signaling literature in relation to franchising is that
franchisors (at least those with a high-value trade name) who have not yet established their
reputation can offer a contract that ties their revenues to the performance of the outlets, as a
sign of confidence and quality (LAFONTAINE, 1993).
METHODS
This work was developed from the findings of Rajiv. P. Dant, Marko Grunhagen and Josef
Windsperger in its article Franchising Research Frontiers for the Twenty-First Century,
published in the Journal of Retailing 87, issue 3, 2011, which identifies that theoretical
research in franchising has been examined mainly under five lenses - resource constraints or
resource acquisition theory, agency theory, transation cost analysis, signaling theory and
property rights theory, although there are a myriad of other perspectives in the literature.
Each of these theoretical perspectives has one or more seminal authors, whose works were
used as a starting point for the literature search. Using the database Web of Science were
sought to each of these seminal works indicated into the article Franchising Research
Frontiers for the Twenty-First Century,(DANT et al., 2011), later works published up to the
year 2012, which used them as a reference. This research pointed to a huge amount of work
and proportional to the importance of the work of each one of those authors. For each of the
working groups associated with a particular author or authors of the five representatives’
theoretical currents, a refinement was made to select only those works that possess references
to franchising, franchise, franchisor and franchisee.
From this filter remained 155 references. As one of the goals of this work is to analyze the
incidence of this theme in academic journals, chapters of books and articles not related to
franchise were eliminated from the sample, which led to a final number of 117 articles in
academic journals. From this selection, after reading the articles, it was registered the names
of the periodicals, authors, year of publication, variables analyzed in the study, measures,
methodology and theoretical orientation.
After tabulating the data, we applied descriptive statistics to know the principal authors who
have published, the most used methods, the journals that published more on this topic, the
evolution of these publications a year, the theories used and the dependent and independent
variables pointed out by the most relevant authors on the topic.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Between 1966 and 2012, seminal works tied to the 5 theoretical perspectives examined under
the field of franchising, generated:
- 117 articles, in 53 journals, by 143 authors, using 29 different theoretical perspectives;
- 38 different dependent variables, being the most used “ownership” (19 times),
“performance” (14 times) and “ ownership proportion” (12 times);
- 82 different independent variables, being the most used “ age/experience” (31 times),
“size” (21 times), “growth” (16 times), “royalties” and “internationalization” (12
times each);
6
-
Authors with more number of publications: J.G Combs (10), R.P.Dant (9), S.C.
Michael (8), F. Lafontaine (7), J. Windsperger (7), G.J. Castrogiovanni (6), P.J.
Kaufmann (5), D.J. Ketchen (5), and J.C.Short (3);
Theoretical perspectives most used in the articles: agency theory (27%), resource
scarcity theory (13%), signaling theory (11%), property rights theory (5%),
institutional theory (5%), RBV (4%), plural theory (4%) and other theories (23%).
Based on the most relevant authors it was established a social network analysis to quantify the
degree of centrality and cohesion of the relationship between (i) authors, journals and
methods, (ii) authors and theories, focusing the analysis in 40 articles. The data analysis was
done by UCINET 6 (BORGATTI et al. 2002). Graphs were constructed by Draw-Net system,
represented by a network that contains nodes (nodes) and connections (WASSERMAN;
FAUST, 1994; EMIRBAYER; GOODWIN, 1994). The graphical representation became
important in this case due to the nature and multiplicity of relationships that established
different degrees of influences (DYER; SINGH, 1998). The specific metrics of this study are
intended to quantify:
- Measure of cohesion – it aims to present which are the strongest ties of relations, allowing to
know the collective behavior (DE NOOY et al, 2005);
- Centrality measures – it aims to assess the centrality of degree (power), in which if an actor
has many connections to other points, he will be globally central (Scott, 2000). The centrality
of degree is measured by the number of ties that an actor has with other actors in a network
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
The figure 1 shows the most relevant relationships between authors, methods and periodicals.
For example, the most relevant author, who has published 10 articles, was Combs, who got 38
ties and degree centrality of 10,000 (Table 1). He published 4 articles in the Journal of
Management - JM (12 links and 3,158 GC), 2 articles in the Entrepreneurship in Theory and
Practice - ETP (10 ties and GC 2632), 1 article in the Strategic Management Journal - SMJ (3
loops and GC 0789), 1 article in the Journal of Small Business Management - JSBM (8 loops
and GC 2105), 1 article in the Journal of Business Venturing - JBV (7 ties and GC 1842) and
1 article in the Academy of Management Journal - AMJ (1 tie and GC 0263).
The measures used by Combs in his 10 publications were: 2 theoretical review - MTR (17
links and 4,474 GC), 2 logit regression analysis – MLRA, and 1 OLS regression analysis OLSMRA (10 ties and GC 2632); 1 regression analysis - MRA (15 links and 3,947 GC); 1
metanalysis - MM and 1 cluster analysis - MCLA (5 ties and GC 1316); 1 partial adjustment
model - MPAM (3 loops and GC 0789) and one survey MSV (7 ties and GC 1842).
7
MSEM
EIS
JEBO
1.0
EL
MCA
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
MNBR 1.0
1.0
2.0
J. Windsperger
1.0
2.0
1.0 1.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
SMJ
MSV
ETP
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0MPAM
1.0
1.0
2.0
4.0
1.0
Manova
1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0AMJ
1.0
1.0
J. C. Short
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
JAMS
JBV
JAS
1.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
F. Lafontaine
1.0
1.0
JEMS
JPE
1.0
1.0
4.0
1.0 OLSMRA
1.0
1.0
MLRA
MM
1.0
5.01.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
4.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
D. J. Ketchen
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
5.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.0 MTR
2.01.0
1.0 2.0
1.0
J.
G.
Combs
2.0
4.0 1.0
1.01.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
RJE
1.0
JPPM
2.0
2.0
2.0
R. P. Dant
1.0
1.0
4.0 1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
JM
1.0
2.0
1.0 1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
3.0 JR
1.0
1.0
3.0
P. J. Kaufmann
2.0
2.0
3.0 1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
G. J. Castrogiovanni
1.01.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.01.0
1.0
1.0
JSB
S. C. Michael
1.0
1.0 1.0
JSBM
1.01.01.0
1.0
JLEO
1.0JBR
1.0
MFA
1.0
MRA
1.0
MCLA
Figure 1 - Relationship between authors, journals and methodology.
The table 1 measures the ranking of authors, journals and relevant research methods. It was
found that the most important periodical was the Journal of Management - JM with 12 ties
and centrality of degree of 3,158 and the most used method was theoretical review - MTR,
with 17 ties in the network and the degree of centrality of 4,474.
Authors
Combs
Michael
Lafontaine
Ketchen
Castrogiovanni
Kaufmann
Perrigot
Short
Dant
Windsperger
Chinloy
Winkler
Benjamin
Paswan
Justis
Gallini
Zachary
Davis
Shaw
Wu
McKenny
Gonzalez Diaz
Gillis
McEwan
Shook
Crook
Jud
Gruenhagen
Hoover
Cliquet
Laços
38.000
24.000
19.000
19.000
19.000
17.000
16.000
15.000
13.000
11.000
9.000
9.000
9.000
8.000
8.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
4.000
4.000
4.000
GC
10.000
6.316
5.000
5.000
5.000
4.474
4.211
3.947
3.421
2.895
2.368
2.368
2.368
2.105
2.105
1.579
1.579
1.579
1.579
1.579
1.579
1.579
1.316
1.316
1.316
1.316
1.316
1.053
1.053
1.053
Journals
JM
JR
ETP
JSBM
JBV
RJE
JLEO
JAMS
JRER
SMJ
JPPM
JREFE
JPE
JSB
JEMS
EIS
CEDLE
JAS
AMJ
JEBO
EL
JBR
Laços
12.000
12.000
10.000
8.000
7.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
GC
3.158
3.158
2.632
2.105
1.842
1.316
1.316
1.316
1.053
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.526
0.526
0.526
0.526
0.526
0.263
0.263
0.263
0.263
0.263
Method
MTR
MRA
MLRA
OLSMRA
MSV
Manova
MM
MCLA
MEM
MFA
MCA
MPM
MPAM
MNBR
MSEM
Laços
17.000
15.000
10.000
10.000
7.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
1.000
1.000
GC
4.474
3.947
2.632
2.632
1.842
1.316
1.316
1.316
1.053
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.263
0.263
8
Fernandez
Barcala
Wright
Julian
Perryman
Gundlach
Solis-Rodriguez
Oxley
Lutz
Bercovitz
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.789
0.789
Table 1 - Laces and degree centrality of the factors evaluated
The figure 2 shows the summary of the relationships between the most relevant authors and
theories. It is important to highlights that not all the relationships were used, because it would
harm the understanding of the graph. The data measure the author Combs got 82 relationships
with degree of centrality of 9,297 in the network (Table 2), considering the whole relationship
between research partners and theories. The most used theories by Combs, demonstrating
greater cohesion in the graph (strong lines), were:
- agency theory (AT) – 14 times referenced
- resource scarcity theory (RST) – 10 times referenced
OI
4.0
S
4.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
J. Windsperger
2.0
5.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
5.0
R. P. Dant
1.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
2.03.0
1.0
5.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
5.0
5.0
7.0
3.0
14.0
1.0
1.0 2.0
1.0
6.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
RG
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
IT
2.0
3.0
MI
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
SDT
1.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
CT
3.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
7.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
7.0
2.0
3.0 7.0
2.0
3.0
2.0 3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0 4.0
2.02.0
RBV 2.0
2.0
G. J. Castrogiovanni
2.0
2.0
2.0 2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
7.0
4.0
J. G. Combs
4.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
PT
2.0
7.0
5.0
S. C. Michael
5.0
3.0
1.0
2.0 2.0
5.0
10.0
14.0
5.0
D. J. Ketchen
10.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
7.0
AT
2.0
2.0
5.0
5.0
RST
2.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
PR
1.0
P. J. Kaufmann
2.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
TCA
4.0
2.0
3.0
OE
7.0
2.0
5.0
3.0
4.0
RDT
F. Lafontaine
1.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
J. C. Short
3.0
ST
4.0
4.0 IPT
4.0 N
LT
2.0
SET
2.0
TT
UET
Figure 2 - Relationship between the most relevant authors and theories
The table 2 quantifies the ties and degree of centrality of related factors in relation to authors
and theories, considering the entire network. In general Combs was the most relevant author
with 82 ties and GC 9602 and the most used theory was agency theory (AT), with 85 links
pointing to GC 9953 and so on.
Autores
Laços
GC
Autores
Laços
GC
Combs
82.000
9.602
AT
85.000
9.953
Short
78.000
9.133
RST
52.000
6.089
Davis
68.000
7.963
S
50.000
5.855
Ketchen
51.000
5.972
IT
44.000
5.152
McKenny
36.000
4.215
CT
32.000
3.747
Wu
36.000
4.215
PR
30.000
3.513
Kaufmann
33.000
3.864
RDT
22.000
2.576
Shook
30.000
3.513
IPT
20.000
2.342
9
Justis
28.000
3.279
N
20.000
2.342
Castrogiovanni
28.000
3.279
OE
20.000
2.342
Chinloy
21.000
2.459
ST
20.000
2.342
Gonzalez Diaz
17.000
1.991
OI
20.000
2.342
Windsperger
16.000
1.874
TCA
19.000
2.225
Lafontaine
16.000
1.874
TT
18.000
2.108
Michael
12.000
1.405
PT
16.000
1.874
Paswan
12.000
1.405
RBV
14.000
1.639
Dant
11.000
1.288
RG
12.000
1.405
Benjamin
10.000
1.171
MI
12.000
1.405
Winkler
10.000
1.171
LT
12.000
1.405
McEwan
8.000
0.937
SDT
6.000
0.703
Zachary
7.000
0.820
UET
6.000
0.703
Solis-Rodriguez
7.000
0.820
SET
5.000
0.585
Julian
7.000
0.820
Perrigot
7.000
0.820
Gallini
7.000
0.820
Crook
6.000
0.703
Jud
6.000
0.703
Fernandez Barcala
5.000
0.585
Shaw
5.000
0.585
Hoover
4.000
0.468
Cliquet
4.000
0.468
Perryman
3.000
0.351
Gillis
3.000
0.351
Lutz
3.000
0.351
Gruenhagen
3.000
0.351
Gundlach
3.000
0.351
Bercovitz
2.000
0.234
Oxley
2.000
0.234
Wright
2.000
0.234
Table 2 - Loops and degree of centrality of actors and theories
CONCLUSIONS
As can be seen from the extensive bibliographic research, five major theoretical perspectives
are highlighted in the last 50 years - the agency theory, resource-scarcity theory, signaling
theory, transaction costs analysis, and property rights theory. Although these perspectives
have been dominating the research in this area, other theoretical perspectives, some of them
with a less economical connotation than that traditional, have been increasing its prominence.
The emergence of new theoretical perspectives also opens space for the study of new
constructs, which ultimately further enrich the field of research in franchising. The analysis of
networks shows an innovative perspective and helps to highlight the strongest links existing,
in the case of this article, between authors and theories, and authors, journals and methods.
From the perspective of SCOTT (2011) authors who belong to the same network tend to
embrace similar theoretical perspectives, conditioning their studies to related research
10
questions. From the analysis emerges interesting aspects that stand out, such as the connection
of certain groups of authors to certain theoretical perspectives - e.g. Combs, Castrogiovanni,
Ketchen, and Short with strong connections with agency theory, and Kaufman and Lafontaine
with signaling theory.
Through the analysis is possible to realize a great degree of centrality of five periodicals Journal of Marketing, Journal of Retailing, Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, Journal of
Small Business Management and Journal of Business Venturing, that seem to be the main
influential journals in the field of franchising. The degree of centrality also on methodological
issues is quite relevant, prevailing quantitative studies with intensive use of several techniques
of regression analysis, although theoretical reviews also occupy an important space in the
research of the field.
This paper contributes to deepen the knowledge about the theory in franchising, as well as
identifying trends and new perspectives of study. By showing the link and the centrality of
authors, theories, periodicals, and methodologies contributes to show which are the main
pillars where the theory in franchising is built, and shows the possibilities and perspectives of
research in the area.
APPENDIX A.
Table 1 - Abbreviations used for data analysis
Periódicos
Academy of Management Journal
Cuadernos De Economia Y Direccion De La Empresa
Economic Institutions of Strategy
Economics Letters
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
Journal of Business Research
Journal of Business Venturing
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Journal of Law & Economics
Journal of Law Economics & Organization
Journal of Management
Journal of Political Economy
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
Journal of Real Estate Research
Journal of Retailing
SIGLAS
AMJ
CEDLE
EIS
EL
ETP
JBS
JBV
JEBO
JEMS
JLE
JLEO
JM
JPE
JPPM
JREFE
JRER
Journal of Small Business Management
JSBM
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science
JAMS
Rand Journal of Economics
RJE
Strategic Management Journal
SMJ
Metodologia
JR
Anova
SIGLAS
Anova
cluster analysis
MCLA
correlationship analysis
MCA
Econometric model
MEM
Factor analysis
MFA
logit regression analysis
MLRA
Manova
Manova
metanalysis
MM
Multiple discriminant analysis
MMDA
11
negative binomial regression
MNBR
OLS regression analysis
OLSMRA
partial adjustment model
MPAM
probit model
MPM
regression analysis
MRA
sample selection regression
MSSR
structural equation modeling
MSEM
survey
MSV
theoretical review
MTR
Teorias
Siglas
social exchange theory
SET
agency theory
AT
Contingency Theory
CT
Information Processing Theory
IPT
Institutional Theory
IT
learning theory
LT
Momentum Individual Motivation
MI
Networks
N
Organizational Ecology
OE
Organizational Identity Theory
OI
property rights
PR
plural theory
PT
Resource Based View
RBV
resource dependence theory
RDT
Relational Governance
RG
resource scarcity theory
RST
signalling
S
strategic deviance theory
SDT
stakeholder theory
ST
transaction cost analysis
TCA
tournament theory
TT
upper echellons theory
UET
12
Table 2 - Journals, Year and Authors
Journal
Ano
Autores
Journal of Financial Economics
1987
Brickley, James A.; Dark, Frederick H.
Journal of Business
1988
S. W. Norton
Applied Economics
2002
L. Affuso
International Marketing Review
2000
B. Quinn and A. M. Doherty
Journal of Business Venturing
2002
S. C. Michael
Journal of Business Venturing
2003
S. C. Michael
Journal of Management
2004
J. G. Combs, S. C. Michael and G. J. Castrogiovanni
Journal of Business Research
2004
J. Windsperger
Service Industries Journal
2006
L. Altinay and S. Miles
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
2007
P. Tracey and O. Jarvis
Strategic Management Journal
2008
J. Barthelemy
Journal of Small Business Management
2008
O. Cochet and V. K. Garg
D. Campbell, S. M. Datar and T. Sandino
Accounting Review
2009
Economic Institutions of Strategy
2009
S. C. Michael and J. E. L. Bercovitz
Journal of Retailing
2011
R. P. Dant, M. Gruenhagen and J. Windsperger
Proceedings of 7th International Strategic Management
Conference
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
2011
V. Baena and J. Cervino
2011
W. E. Gillis, E. McEwan, T. R. Crook and S. C. Michael
Strategic Management Journal
2012
A. A. Perryman and J. G. Combs
Urban Affairs Review
2012
D. Malatesta and C. R. Smith
Service Industries Journal
2012
M. Peris-Ortiz, M. Willoughby and C. Rueda-Armengot
Journal of Business Venturing
1996
STEVEN C. MICHAEL
Journal of Retailing
1969
A. R. Oxenfeldt and A. O. Kelly
Strategic Management Journal
1991
M. Carney and E. Gedajlovic
Rand Journal of Economics
1992
F. Lafontaine
Journal of Retailing
1994
F. Lafontaine and P. J. Kaufmann
Journal of Small Business Management
1995
S. D. Julian and G. J. Castrogiovanni
Journal of Business Venturing
1996
K. FladmoeLindquist
Applied Economics
1996
M. R. Kehoe
Journal of Retailing
1996
R. P. Dant, A. K. Paswan and P. J. Kaufman
Journal of Management
1998
S. Shane
Academy of Management Journal
1999
J. G. Combs and D. J. Ketchen
R. P. Dant and G. T. Gundlach
Journal of Business Venturing
1999
Journal of Small Business Management
2001
I. Alon
Strategic Management Journal
2001
O. Sorenson and J. B. Sorensen
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsZeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft
Health Policy and Planning
2002
D. Chakrabarty, A. Chaudhuri and C. Spell
2002
D. Montagu
Journal of Management
2003
J. G. Combs and D. J. Ketchen
Journal of Retailing
2003
R. P. Dant and P. J. Kaufmann
Journal of Business Venturing
2004
J. G. Combs, D. J. Ketchen and V. L. Hoover
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
2006
G. J. Castrogiovanni, J. G. Combs and R. T. Justis
Journal of Small Business Management
2006
G. J. Castrogiovanni, J. G. Combs and R. T. Justis
J. Windsperger and R. P. Dant
Journal of Retailing
2006
Journal of Marketing
2006
R. Srinivasan
Management Science
2006
S. Shane, V. Shankar and A. Aravindakshan
International Journal of Service Industry Management
2007
A. M. Doherty
Proceedings of International Symposium on China
Hospitality Management and Business Information 2007
Service Industries Journal
2007
B. Lin and Z. Qiao
2007
J. Cox and C. Mason
Service Industries Journal
2007
L. Vazquez
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
2007
P. Tracey and O. Jarvis
International Small Business Journal
2007
S. Weaven and L. Frazer
Service Industries Journal
2009
C. T. Tsai and C. S. Su
Journal of Management
2009
J. G. Combs, S. C. Michael and G. J. Castrogiovanni
L. M. De Castro, J. Mota and S. Marnoto
Service Business
2009
International Journal of Hospitality Management
2009
L. T. Hsu and S. Jang
European Journal of Marketing
2009
R. Peretiatko, A. Humeniuk, M. Humeniuk, C. D'Souza and A. Gilmore
Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research
2010
L. T. Hsu, S. Jang and D. D. Canter
Service Business
2011
V. Safon and A. Escriba-Esteve
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science
2011
M. A. Zachary, A. F. McKenny, J. C. Short, K. M. Davis and D. Wu
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
2011
J. G. Combs, D. J. Ketchen and J. C. Short
Journal of Business Venturing
2011
J. Barthelemy
Journal of Management
2011
J. G. Combs, D. J. Ketchen, C. L. Shook and J. C. Short
International Small Business Journal
2012
O. Dada, A. Watson and D. A. Kirby
Journal of Business Venturing
2012
M. Gonzalez-Diaz and V. Solis-Rodriguez
Service Industries Journal
2012
F. J. Rondan-Cataluna, A. Navarro-Garcia, E. C. Diez-De Castro and C. J. Rodriguez-Rad
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
1992
R. P. Dant, P. J. Kaufmann and A. K. Paswan
Journal of Small Business Management
1995
P. J. Kaufmann and J. Stanworth
Journal of Regulatory Economics
1996
K. J. Crocker and S. E. Masten
Journal of Business Venturing
1996
H. Leblebici and C. E. Shalley
Journal of Business Research
1996
J. B. Gassenheimer, D. B. Baucus and M. S. Baucus
Journal of Business Venturing
1996
S. Spinelli and S. Birley
Journal of International Marketing
1998
F. J. Contractor and S. K. Kundu
Journal of Law Economics & Organization
2001
B. Arrunada, L. Garicano and L. Vazquez
Journal of Law & Economics
2006
J. A. Brickley, S. Misra and R. L. van Horn
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
Cuadernos De Economia Y Direccion De La Empresa
2006
Z. Peng
2008
M. Fernandez Barcala and M. Gonzalez Diaz
Management International Review
2010
B. Petersen, L. S. Welch and G. R. G. Benito
Journal of World Business
2011
L. C. Leonidou, D. Palihawadana, S. Chari and C. N. Leonidou
Journal of International Marketing
2012
S. H. Seggie
13
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16