Monopsony and Salary Suppression: The Case of Major League

University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Economics Faculty Publications
Economics
Spring 2011
Monopsony and Salary Suppression: The Case of
Major League Soccer in the United States
John Twomey
James Monks
University of Richmond, [email protected]
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Recommended Citation
Twomey, John, and James Monks. "Monopsony and Salary Suppression: The Case of Major League Soccer in the United States."
American Economist 56, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 20-28.
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