PhD in Economics
Research Topics
Topics in Behavioral Development Economics
2nd Semester
Academic Year 2016/17
Instructor: Dr. Danila Serra
Short Biography: Danila Serra is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Southern
Methodist University, in Dallas, Texas. Dr. Serra holds an MSc in Economics from
the London School of Economics and Political Sciences and a PhD in Economics
from the University of Oxford. Her research explores the behavioral foundations of
corruption and accountability, using novel experimental methodologies. She has
collected data in a number of developed and developing countries, including Ethiopia,
Albania and Kenya.
Contacts: [email protected]
1.
COURSE AIMS
This course provides an in-depth analysis of current research in selected critical issues
in development economics using recent insights from behavioral and experimental
economics. The course will start with an overview of methodological issues relating to
field, lab and lab-in-the-field experiments. We will then critically examine recent
research conduct on a variety of topics, ranging from the preferences of the poor to the
formal and informal institutions prevailing in developing countries. We will conclude
by analyzing the concept and implementation of “community-driven development.”
2.
COURSE CONTENT
1. Introduction:

Intro to Behavioral Economics

Intro to Behavioral Development Economics

Intro to Experimental Economics
o Experiments in the lab and in the field.
o Estimation issues and data analysis.
o Classic games: DG, TG, UG, PG game, lottery games, punishment games.
o Internal validity and external validity

Internal and External Validity
2. Preferences and behavior of poor people

Cognitive problems

Affect

Aspirations
3.



Time preferences, self-control problems and saving behavior
Time inconsistency and present-bias: are the poor different?
How can the poor save more: commitment devices and mental accounting
Lottery-linked saving technologies
4.
Career choices and responsiveness to incentives, with applications to the health sector

Intrinsic motivations and choice of public sector vs. private sector job

The effectiveness of monetary and non-monetary incentives
5.
Social identity, gender differences and ethnic/caste/racial discrimination
 Gender differences in competitiveness and bargaining

The importance of role models

Discrimination
6.


3.
Accountability, corruption and community-driven development
Experiments on corruption and lessons from the lab
Bottom-up accountability
o Advantages and limitations
o Existing evidence
o Are citizens willing to hold providers accountable?
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
On successful completion of this course students should be able to:
A. Knowledge and Understanding.
•
Evaluate and critique papers using lab or field experiments.
B. Subject-Specific Skills:
•
•
Explain the added value of behavioral economics to a number of topics in
development economics.
Explain the principles behind experimental economics.
C. General Skills:
•
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Critique and summarize existing literatures.
4.
TEACHING AND LEARNING METHODS
After the first introductory lecture, the course each day will cover a different topic, or
course module. Each day, students will have assigned readings (1 or 2 papers) and,
starting from day 3, they will have to hand in short assessments of the readings. The
same papers will be then discussed in class the day they are due. The course will end
with a short final test, which will take place on the last day of classes.
5.
ASSESSMENT
Grades will be computed as follows:
Participation
First paper written assessment
Second paper assessment
Third paper assessment
Final test
40%
10%
10%
20%
20%
Students are required to actively participate in all classes. In order to be able to
actively engage in class discussions, students will need to read the required papers
before class. The reading list may change and is likely to be updated during the
semester.
6.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Subject to change)
1) Introduction
-
Banerjee and Duflo (2007) “The Economic Lives of the Poor”, Journal of Economic
Perspectives.
Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir (2004) “A behavioral economics view of poverty”,
American Economic Review.
Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn (2013) “Experimental methods: Extra-laboratory
experiments-extending the reach of experimental economics”
Croson (2003) “Why and how to experiment: methodologies from experimental
economics”
Mullainathan (2005) “Development economics through the lens of psychology”
Rabin (2002) “A perspective on psychology and economics”, European Economic
Review.
Viceisza (2015) “Creating a Lab in the Field: Economics Experiments for Policymaking”
Journal of Economic Surveys.
2) Cognitive problems, affect and aspirations:
-
Bernard, Dercon, Orkin, Tafesse (2014): “The Future in Mind: Aspirations and ForwardLooking Behaviour in Rural Ethiopia” working paper.
Fehr and Haushofer (2014) “On the Psychology of Poverty”, Science.
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Fehr, Haushofer and Schunk (2013) “Negative Income Shocks Increase Discount Rates”
working paper.
Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, Zhao (2013). “Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function.”
Science.
McBride (2010): “Money, Happiness, and Aspirations: An Experimental Study,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization.
3) Time Preferences and Savings
-
Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rustrom (2008) “Eliciting risk and time preferences”
Econometrica.
Ashraf, N., D. Karlan, W. Yin (2006), ‘Tying Odysseus to the mast: Evidence from a
commitment savings product in the Philippines', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2),
635-672.
Duflo, E., M.l Kremer, and J. Robinson (2011), ‘Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer:
Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya’, American Economic Review, 101(6),
2350-2390.
Dupas and Robinson (2013): Why don’t the poor save more? Evidence from health
savings experiments” American Economic Review.
Karlan, McMillan, Mullainathan and Zinman (2014) “Getting to the Top of Mind: How
Reminders Increase Saving”. Management Science.
Tanaka, T., C. Camerer and Q. (2010), “Risk and Time Preferences: Linking
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam.” American Economic Review,
100(1): 557-71.
4) Career Choices and Responsiveness to Incentives (Health)
-
-
Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack (2014) “No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on
Incentives for Public Services Delivery”
Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee (2016): “Do-gooders and go-getters: career incentives,
selection, and performance in public service delivery”
Banerjee, Baul and Rosenblat (2014): Does unethical behavior affect choice of
profession: public vs. private?”
Banuri, Sheheryar and Philip Keefer. 2016. “Pro-social motivation, effort, and the call to
public service.” European Economic Review, Forthcoming.
Chaudhury, N.; Hammer, J.; Kremer, M.; Muralidharan, K. & Rogers, F. H. (2006)
Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 91-116.
Hanna and Wang (2014): Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from
India” working paper.
Serra, Packard and Barr (2012) “Intrinsic motivations and the non-profit health sector:
Evidence from Ethiopia”. Personality and Individual Differences.
5) Social identity, preferences and discrimination
-
Beaman, Duflo, Pande and Topalova (2012) Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and
Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India (with Esther Duflo,
Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova) Science.
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-
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Bohnet, van Geen and Bazerman (2015) “When Performance Trumps Gender Bias. Joint
Versus Separate Evaluation.” Forthcoming: Management Science, 2015.
Duflo (2012) “Women Empowerment and Economic Development”, Journal of
Economic Literature.
Hoff and Pandey (2006): “Economic consequences of social identity: Discrimination,
Social Identity and Durable Inequalities” American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings.
Jensen, R. (2012). “Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women’s Work and
Family Decisions? Experimental Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Niederle, Muriel and Lise Vesterlund (2007). Do Women Shy Away from Competition?
Do Men Compete Too Much?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3): 1067- 1101
Gneezy, U., K.L. Leonard and J.A. List (2008). Gender Differences in Competition:
Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society. Econometrica.
Rigdon (2013) “An Experimental Investigation into Gender Differences in Wage
Negotiations”, working paper.
6) Governance, corruption and accountability
-
Abbink and Serra (2012) “Anticorruption policies: Lessons from the lab.” Book chapter.
Barr and Serra (2009) “Corruption and Culture: An experimental analysis” Journal of
Public Economics.
Abbink, Dasgupta, Gangadharan and Jain (2014) “Letting the briber go free: An
experiment on mitigating harassment bribes” Journal of Public Economics.
Abbink and Wu (2015) “Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: an experiment on
mitigating collusive bribery” working paper.
Fisman and Miguel (2007) “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from
Diplomatic Parking Tickets” Journal of Political Economy.
Olken (2006): “Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from
Indonesia.” Journal of Public Economics.
Reinikka and Svensson (2004): “Local capture: evidence from a central government
transfer program in Uganda”, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
7) Community-driven development
-
-
Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani (2010) “Pitfalls of Participatory
Programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in India." American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
Barr, Packard and Serra (2014) “Participatory accountability and collective action:
Experimental evidence from Albania” European Economic Review.
Bjorkman and Svensson (2010) “When is community-based monitoring effective?
Evidence from a randomized experiment in primary health in Uganda.” Journal of the
European Economic Association.
Mbiti and Serra (2017): “Can patients’ reports improve health providers’ performance?
Experimental evidence from Kenya”
Olken (2007) “Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia.”
Journal of Political Economy.
Salmon and Serra (2016) “Corruption, social judgment and culture: An experiment”
working paper.
Ryvkin, Serra and Tremewan (2017) “I paid a bribe: Information sharing and extortionary
corruption” European Economic Review.
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