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Theory and Practice Again: Challenges from Pinto
and Toulmin
Ralph H. Johnson
University of Windsor
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Theory and Practice Again: Challenges from Pinto and Toulmin
RALPH H. JOHNSON
Department of Philosophy.
University of Windsor.
401 Sunset Avenue
Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4
(519) 253-3000
[email protected]
ABSTRACT: In Argument, Inference and Dialectic (2001) Pinto argues that critical practice can furnish us with the
necessary guidance to answer our questions about argument and inference; we do not need to develop a theory of
argument/inference. Pinto’s provocative remarks raise questions about the appeal to practice, and recall problems
that Toulmin encounters in development of his innovative theory in The Uses of Argument (1958). In this paper, I
juxtapose and reflect on these developments.
KEYWORDS: theory of argument, practice, critical practice, Toulmin, Pinto
1. INTRODUCTION
Most argumentation theorists take themselves, naturally enough, to be engaged in the task of
theory construction. Toulmin’s theory, for example, has been enormously influential in the
development of the theory of argument1 in the latter half of the 20th century. But his theory
encounters certain problems, some of which I have discussed in other places (Johnson, 1981). I
begin this paper by discussing a criticism of Toulmin developed in Manifest Rationality that
concerns how Toulmin frames his theory in relation to practice. Recently Pinto (2001) has
expressed doubts about the possibility of a theory of argument. His position raises important
issues and thus warrants examination which I undertake in Section 3. That sets the stage for
Section 4--additional reflections on theory, practice, and the relationship between them. In
Section 5, I attempt to suggest a stance on theory-practice issues that I believe avoids the
difficulties in Toulmin’s theory-oriented approach and Pinto’s practice-oriented approach.
2. TOULMIN ON THEORY AND PRACTICE
Toulmin’s theory of argument ranks as one of the outstanding developments in argumentation
theory and logic in the latter half of the 20th century.2 Toulmin begins from what to my way of
thinking is an insightful read on the problems that have beset the theory of argument in the 20th
century. These problems stem from developments in logic in the 20th century that Toulmin
relates to what he calls the geometrical model. (In my terms, logic became mathematicized
(2000, p. 104ff.) He puts it this way: ‘The ambition to cast logic into a mathematical form is as
old as the subject itself.... Since the seventeenth century the subject has, if anything tended to
1
Myself, I distinguish between argumentation theory and theory of argument. See my (2000, Chapter 2).
As far as I can determine in The Uses of Argument, Toulmin never refers to his work as ‘a theory of argument.’ For
him, it is an attempt to revise ‘logical theory.’
2
THEORY AND PRACTICE AGAIN
223
become more mathematical rather than less...’ (p. 177). Later Toulmin writes: ‘... we must be
careful before we allow any formal calculus to assume the title of 'logic.' There may be room to
treat a limited range of problems mathematically in logic, as in physics; ... Symbolic logic may
accordingly claim to be a part of logic--though not so large a part--as mathematical physics is of
physics. But can it claim to be more?’ (p. 209) From what Toulmin has said earlier, it seems
clear that it cannot: ‘So far as formal logicians claim to say anything of relevance to arguments
of other than analytic sorts, judgement must be pronounced against them: for the study of other
types of argument fresh categories are needed, and current distinctions--especially the crude
muddle commonly marked by the terms ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’--must be set on one side’ (p.
147).3
Clearly, then, Toulmin believed that an intervention was needed: ‘If all were well (and
clearly well) in philosophical logic, there would be no point in embarking on these
investigations: our excuse lies in the conviction that a radical re-ordering of logical theory is
needed in order to bring it more nearly into line with critical practice,…’ (p. 253) [Toulmin says
‘philosophical logic’ but I suspect he really means ‘logic’ and more likely he means something
like the theory of argument, or what I would refer to as informal logic.] In effect, Toulmin has
called attention to a gap between theory and practice. His own work can be seen as one attempt
to achieve the radical re-ordering needed to bring logical theory in line with practice by
developing a new theory.
Toulmin's theory had a significant impact on thinking about arguments, far too much to
go into here. But his theoretical intervention suffers, in my view, from certain problems. In a
revealing passage early on in The Uses of Argument, Toulmin writes: ‘In tackling our main
problems about the assessment of arguments, it will be worthwhile clearing our minds of ideas
derived from existing logical theory and seeing by direct inspection what are the categories in
terms of which we actually express our assessment, and what precisely they mean to us’ (pp. 6-7,
emphasis added). I see two problems here. First, Toulmin thought we could clear our minds of
the ideas derived from existing logical theory. Toulmin saw clearly enough that the old way of
looking at arguments (as premises plus an inference to a conclusion where the conclusion
followed necessarily) was inadequate and needed changing, and that is why he proposed his new
model for the layout (data, warrant, backing, etc). Yet Toulmin retained many elements of the
geometrical model he sought to displace. For instance, in defining the notion of a field – a notion
that is crucial for his theory (for both analytic and evaluative components)--Toulmin leaned
heavily on the notion of logical type. Other termsalso imported from the lexicon of the
geometrical modelthat continue to loom large in Toulmin's theory are ‘logical form,’ ‘logical
possibility,’ and ‘validity.’ In other words, Toulmin’s own theory has significant indebtedness to
the theory he seeks to replace.
A second problem with Toulmin's approach is the idea that we can come up with the
appropriate categories by direct inspection. If the history of philosophy since Descartes
demonstrates anything, it is how unlikely it is that anyone can pull this off. For it seems that any
indexing of categories will owe some debt to existing theory. Thus although Toulmin declared
his intention to minimize, if not exclude, the role that concepts like ‘logic,’ ‘logically necessary,’
‘deductive,’ and ‘demonstrative’ (p. 7) play, and is perhaps partially successful on that front, we
have seen that terms such as ‘logical form,’ ‘logical type,’ not to mention ‘argument’ and
‘premise’ and ‘modal term’ all continue to do heavy duty in Toulmin's theory (Johnson, 2000,
3
In spite of the enthusiasm with which his theory was received, the deductive inductive-distinction continues to
attract followers.
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RALPH H. JOHNSON
pp. 355-358). These are all carryovers from the vocabulary of existing logical theory, elements
of which Toulmin retains.
The lesson here seems to be that we cannot just wipe the slate clean. At least Toulmin
does not appear to have been able to do so, even if we take it that his project was not necessarily
to banish such terms altogether but rather to remove them from a substantive role in his theory.
Indeed the lesson from modern philosophy, played out all over again here, is that we will have to
retain something of the practice/tradition we wish to leave behind. The customary way of
expressing this realisation is by invoking the Neurath metaphor: we are in the situation of a boat
at sea; we cannot take the boat out of the water; we have to repair while at sea (Neurath, 1937/19
83).
If Toulmin intended to retain components of traditional vocabulary (which seems clearly
to be the case) while casting out others--e.g., retain modal terms like ‘can’ and cast out others,
such as ‘premise’ and ‘deductive,’ it seems to me he should have done two things, neither of
which he has done in any self-conscious fashion. First, he should have stayed with his idea that
this is in fact a reordering (as the text from p. 253 suggests) and not a wiping clean of the slate
(as the text from pp. 6-7 suggests). Second, Toulmin should have developed some policy to
guide the process of selection, some way of answering the question of which elements of prior
theory get selected for significant work in the new theory, which will get pushed to the
background, and which are to be eliminated altogether, and why these choices are proper ones-else the process appears ad hoc.
Toulmin was absolutely right to call attention to the gap that had developed between
critical practice (his term) and logical theory. He attempted to bridge the gap by developing a
new theory of argument. From the problems Toulmin encounters, we can learn that it may not be
possible to make the Cartesian move of starting over, and that faute de mieux, we must in our
efforts make use of prior theory.
But perhaps the problem lies equally in the view that what is needed is a new theory. I
want next to have a look at a challenge that emerges from the writings of R. C. Pinto.
3. PINTO ON THEORY AND PRACTICE
In ‘Logic, Dialectic and the Practice of Rational Criticism,’ Pinto (2001) is reflecting on the sort
of work with which he has been engaged. He is aware that many writers see their task as
providing a theory of argument, or at least the elaboration of a theoretical foundation on which
the evaluation of arguments and inference could be based’ (p.128) and mentions a number of
those working in the area of argumentation and informal logic, including me. (As an aside, I
agree with this observation and note that it represents a marked shift from the days in which
Mark Weinstein complained about the seeming obsession that informal logicians had with
textbooks at the expense of theory).4 Indeed, he once saw himself as engaged in a theorybuilding exercise. However, Pinto reports that while he thought the points he was developing
were valid and important, ‘they did not add up to the elaboration of a theory’ (p.128); they
remain ‘fragmented and incomplete.’ Recently he has come to a different view of the matter:
‘…I now hold that our judgments about arguments and inference are guided by a tradition of
critical practice rather than by an over-arching theory’ (p.129). Indeed, Pinto says that he is not
sure whether it is possible to elaborate a theory that ‘might ground a future critical practice.’
4
I find it more than passing strange that in his recent review of Pinto’s book Weinstein (2002) did not take up the
skeptical challenge served up by Pinto.
THEORY AND PRACTICE AGAIN
225
Instead, he has come to see these papers as ‘attempts to illuminate existing critical practice.’ In
terminology somewhat reminiscent of Wittgenstein, Pinto now wishes to characterize his work
as ‘assembl[ing] a set of observations or reminders’ (p. 129). Pinto then turns to a discussion of
the payoff of this way of looking at his own work. It will not, he says, result in ‘a set of
propositions about argument inference whose truth is proved and which constitutes a theory of
inference or argument.’5 Rather the only possible payoff is ‘an altered way of looking at the
phenomena this paper discusses—an alteration induced by observations and reminders set forth
in them’ (p. 129).
In making critical practice his theme, Pinto is not suggesting that it is the final court of
appeal when it comes to the business of evaluating specific arguments and inferences. Critical
practice is, he says now quoting me, sometimes ‘all over the place, it has tensions within it, it has
arguably sometimes gone astray; often stands in need of enhancement, emendation or correction’
(p.129).
For those of us who work in informal logic, Pinto’s remarks about the role of practice are
certainly welcome. Historically, informal logic found its first expression in an attempt to remedy
a certain kind of defect in existing practice (e.g., using artificial examples of argument) by
changing that practice. The question of whether a theory of argument is possible was first raised
by Govier (1987) who claimed that while such a theory was possible, none of the extant theories
was adequate. Though there have been those who, like Pinto, expressed reservations about the
role of and need for theory in informal logic (Weddle, 1985; Doss, 1985), the last twenty years
have witnessed a number of attempts to develop a theory of argument.
I interpret Pinto as taking a skeptical position on the possibility of theory and its potential
role in our study, and see him as offering an alternative. I want to press him on two fronts: I think
that (a) clarification of his skeptical position is needed; and (b) some fleshing out of his
alternative is needed.
But before doing that, I want to note that Pinto presents a challenge which may have clear
advantages. First, there is a kind of looseness that attends the way the term ‘theory’ has been
used.6 The term is often used without it ever being made clear just what the requirements are. To
cite but one example: Walton’s A Pragmatic Theory of Argument (1997) never undertakes to say
exactly what the requirements for a theory of argument are. Second, Pinto’s alternative might
help resolve issues in informal logic and argumentation theory. For example, the problem of
relevance. Many theorists have tried to work out a theory of relevance but general opinion is that
none has worked (Woods 1995). In his review of my The Rise of Informal Logic (1996),
Hitchcock makes the point that although the theory of argument evaluation that Blair and I
advocate makes use of a relevance criterion, there are many difficulties in our account of this
criterion. In effect, I take Hitchcock to be saying that our account is vulnerable because we do
not have a viable theory of relevance. If we were to take Pinto’s suggestion seriously, then it
could be argued that perhaps no theory of relevance is needed. We might be able to appeal to our
critical practice of making judgments about relevance and find in that practice the materials we
need to answer the question. Similarly with respect to the issue of dialectical obligations, I have
been attempting to develop such a theory but we have, the argument from Pinto might go, a
critical practice that seems for the most part to be working; attention to critical practice
5
In an earlier version of this paper, I attempted to use this text to extrapolate Pinto’s view about the nature of a
theory of argument. In private correspondence, however, Pinto indicated his dissatisfaction with this text.
6
In my (2000) I did sound a cautionary note. See note 9 on p. 171.
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RALPH H. JOHNSON
combined with reminders and fruitful suggestions may well suffice. Hence the belief that we
need a theory is unfounded, and quite possibly misguided.
That said, I do have some concerns about Pinto’s skeptical position that I can best
articulate by posing questions that divide naturally around three topics: (1) about theory; (2)
about critical practice; and (3) about the relationship.
4. THEORY, PRACTICE AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM
I found Pinto’s position challenging in two respects. First, as indicated above, it has prompted
me to stop and think about my own use of ‘theory’ and whether it is justified. Second, it has been
a challenge because Pinto’s position seems somewhat ambivalent. That might be because the
papers in which Pinto’s views are found were written over a period of time, and only at the end
does Pinto offer us his characterization of his own views in the course of which he presents the
views about theory that I am focusing on here.
It is clear that Pinto thinks his own remarks do not add up to a theory. Pinto also holds
that ‘no adequate general there currently exists or is in the offing’ (p. 127). On the surface, this
remark seems to suggest that while Pinto thinks there are theories, they just are not adequate. But
Pinto’s skeptical challenge is not about whether the various theories that have been proposed are
adequate, but whether they are in fact theories at all. Speaking for myself, I certainly thought
what I was developing in MR was a theory. I used the word ‘theory’ to describe my work, and I
spent a great deal of time in Chapter 2 stating just what I thought a theory of argument consisted
in, and what the adequacy conditions for a theory of argument were. I could be wrong in any or
all of these respects. Perhaps what I offered was not a theory at all; perhaps my attempt to spell
out what a theory of argument is was wrong; perhaps the distinction I drew between a theory of
analysis and a theory of argument was wrong or misguided, though I do not think so. My
conjecture is other erstwhile theorists would have a similar reaction. All of them use the word
‘theory’ to describe what they are doing, though none of them have made an explicit attempt to
spell out just what they believe constitutes a theory of argument. Now we must suppose that
these writers are competent users of the language. If they say they are putting forth a theory, the
presumption would seem to be that they/we were right in so describing our work. Hence, the
burden of proof would seem to fall to Pinto to give reason to think that we in fact were wrong.
It’s a strong claim that requires some fairly strong support.
So Pinto takes a skeptical position with respect to the possibility of a theory of argument.
But it is a modest scepticism in that he stops short of asserting that no such theory is possible:
‘Personally I don’t know whether it is even possible to elaborate a theory,’ he says.
Let me turn to the three crucial issues that have emerged: (1) the nature of and role of
theory; (2) critical practice; and (3) the relationship between theory and practice.
4.1 About theory
Pinto reports he found himself headed toward a theory but not able to develop one. This remark
occasions two questions: First, what was he headed towards? What exactly does he think is
required for a theory of argument (inference)? Second, what basis does Pinto offer in support of
his skeptical views?
As to the first: Pinto never does state exactly and explicitly what he means either by a
theory generally or a theory of argument/inference, specifically: ‘The points I was developing
THEORY AND PRACTICE AGAIN
227
were valid and important; …it bothered me that they did not seem to add up to the elaboration of
a theory’ (p.128). This remark suggests that Pinto does have a particular conception of theory,
though he does not tell us what it is.7 There are indications that, for Pinto, a theory would have to
aspire to being complete, systematic, and foundational; he characterizes his own remarks as
fragmented and incomplete. But having raised this issue of whether a theory of argument is
possible, it seems to me that Pinto owes us an account of exactly what a theory of argument
would consist of.
Let me turn now to the second matter: Pinto’s reasons for scepticism about the possibility
of a theory. It seems to me that Pinto provides two different considerations that might be
construed as providing support of for his skeptical position. One reason is hinted at on page 129
where, following Rorty, he says that he is ‘inclined to question the idea that our critical practice
must look to a theory of argument for a foundation and an anchor.’ Here Pinto echoes a remark
in Chapter 12 where he stated that ‘we do not have anything today that can claim to be a general
theory of criticism’ (p.118). In the footnote, we get a somewhat clearer understanding of a
possible basis for his scepticism: ‘The idea is that criticism must be based on an appropriate
theoretical discipline which elaborates truths capable of grounding our normative prescriptions. I
am suggesting that we do not have the luxury of grounding our critical norms in such a theory—
not, now, and perhaps not ever.’ It is clear that Pinto is rejecting a Husserlian view of the role of
theory as the ground (anchor, foundation) for critical practice (p.118, 129). A second reason may
be gleaned from remarks in Chapter 3 where Pinto discusses ‘The Relation of Argument to
Inference.’ Here Pinto seems more tolerant of the possibility of theory generally. He argues that
classical logic (which I think he would concede is a theory) cannot be a general theory of
inference or reasoning…’ (p.38). Then on page 40, he refers to Toulmin’s theory of argument
and in referring to ‘the causal theory of inference’ he suggests that there is ‘something
importantly right headed in this theory of inference.’ On page 44, he recognizes ‘the achievement
of the pragma-dialectical school in the elaboration of a normative model of theoretical discourse’
(p. 44). Nevertheless, he writes that ‘even there the supposition seems to be that a set of
straightforward procedures for determining validity are already available and can be
presupposed’—a supposition Pinto rejects, saying that ‘there needs to be a critical practice and a
set of techniques for evaluating the inferences that don’t fall under an articulable inference rule,
and these techniques cannot be defined or captured by any set of procedural rules either’ (p. 44).
Then in another passage that seems to countenance the possibility of theory, he states: ‘For
example, where simplicity emerges as a salient criterion of theory choice, one can rationally
consider…which of two theories is simpler, but no rule or algorithmic procedure will settle the
question.’ Such considerations function as grounds for scepticism about theory only if one thinks
that that’s what theories should accomplish. Very few theories can meet such requirements.
To summarize, I think that the basis for Pinto’s skeptical position regarding a theory of
argument stems primarily from his view of the role such a theory would have to play; i.e., it
would have to serve as a ground or foundation for critical practice. Secondarily, it stems from the
7
In private correspondence, Pinto writes: ‘A theory of X consists of set of propositions which purport to offer
account of X which (a) is a systematic account [i.e., it addresses the outstanding features of X and shows how those
features are connected with each other) and (b) is an account that has been defended by argument and the appeal to
evidence.’ If we follow this line of thought, then a theory of argument would consist of a set of propositions that
purport to offer an account of argument which is (a) systematic (it addresses the outstanding features of argument
and shows how these features are connected with each other) and (b) is an account that has been defended by
argument and/or appeal to evidence. If we accept this definition, then the focus shifts now to what is required for an
account.
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RALPH H. JOHNSON
view that no such theory could be complete, algorithmic. My preliminary response to this basis
for his scepticism (if I have interpreted Pinto correctly here) is to suggest that Pinto is operating
with too narrow, too rigid a conception of theory, and of the relationship between theory and
practice. And my countersuggestion will be to the effect that we do not need to see theory as the
foundation (anchor or ground) for critical practice, nor as sufficient in and of itself. I will later
suggest an alternative that I think gets around this view.
4.2. About critical practice
Pinto says that our judgements ‘are guided by a tradition of critical practice rather than an
overarching theory’ (p. 129). Because this idea plays a pivotal role in Pinto’s position, we need
clarification as to just what he means by ‘a tradition of critical practice.’ Now Pinto does not
offer any characterization of ‘practice.’ In private correspondence, Pinto says that he is thinking
of it along the lines of what MacIntyre calls a practice. MacIntrye’s definition is quite complex
but the core of it is ‘…any coherent and complex form of socially established human activity…’
The sort of practice to which MacIntyre (and by inference Pinto) intends to refer is thus social in
character, inter-subjective, shared. It refers us to a set of people who partake in that practice--a
community of inquirers. The particular practice in question here would seem to be the practice of
arguing, of giving and exchanging reasons—our argumentative practice (or practices). Examples
of this practice would be found on the Op-Ed page of most newspapers, in Parliament and other
deliberative bodies, in everyday conversations, in articles in journals etc.
The term ‘critical practice’ also stands in need of clarification.8 Perhaps we can get a
better idea of what Pinto has in mind by looking at an earlier chapter where that term is doing
work. On page 42 ff. Pinto outlines a series of six steps toward a revitalized concept of inference
[‘which would make liability to criticism an essential component of the very concept of
inference’ (p. 42)].9 In Step 3, he says, ‘we teach those who make proto-inferences to identify
them as good or bad by reference to such patterns’ [the reference here is to patterns of logical
form, Toulmin warrants etc.]. As a consequence of doing this, we will have introduced them to
what Pinto calls ‘a practice of criticism.’10 In Step 5, Pinto writes: ‘Critical practice… was a
matter of discerning the pattern which the inference exemplifies and judging the extent to which
that is truth preserving.’
From these texts, I infer that by ‘critical practice’ Pinto means ‘a practice of criticism’
(rather than a practice that is itself critical or critically informed) which then is itself a moment
with the practice of argumentation/inference. For Pinto, then, ‘critical practice’ seems to refer to
that aspect of our argumentative practice concerned with evaluation. This strikes me an
unwarranted limitation: our argumentative practice is broader and includes the task of
construction, analysis and interpretation as well as evaluation. And some of the developments
that I would think of as theory have taken place here: Toulmin’s approach to analyzing the
structure of argument which is separable from his theory of evaluation.
Thus when Pinto
refers to critical practice, he is referring mainly to the evaluative dimension of what many would
8
I found myself a bit confused at times by the way Pinto refers sometimes to ‘practice’ (p.129) sometimes to ‘critical
practice,’ sometimes to ‘existing critical practice’ (p.129), but this is not I think a serious matter.
9
If I understand what Pinto is doing here, he is in effect attempting to make important revisions to our conception of
inference [he is doing with inference much the same as what I am doing with argument].
10
Pinto and I disagree here about the nature of criticism. He takes what goes on here identification of a pattern of
argument as good or bad by reference to normative patterns as criticism. In my approach, that would be and
evaluation; criticism requires an articulated judgement of the strengths and weaknesses. See my (2000, p. 219 ff).
THEORY AND PRACTICE AGAIN
229
call the practice of argument/ation which I take to have dimensions other than criticism (or
evaluation). Our existing practice includes the techniques as well for the analysis, interpretation,
and construction of arguments. His conception is critical practice is too narrow.
Pinto’s reminders about the importance of (critical) practice are timely and welcome. But
the appeal to critical practice, however we understand it, has limits. It seems to me that the
appeal has its greatest potential for enlightenment when there is a more or less coherent, widely
shared and acknowledged practice.11 The appeal to critical practice will run into trouble when
that practice is unclear or silent about an issue, which happens not infrequently; or when that
practice is conflicted ‘all over the place’ (my words); and when there are tensions or
contradictory impulses in the practice; or when practice is in need of correction, or when it has
(in some sense) ‘gone astray.’ But if the above view is anywhere near correct, the appeal to
practice will be in trouble most of the time, because one or the other of these conditions is almost
always satisfied. I am skeptical, then, that the appeal to critical practice can provide the sort of
leverage Pinto seems to envisage.
Let me illustrate. In addressing the issue of the arguer’s dialectical obligations, I have
come to the conclusion that it would be useful to make a distinction between a criticism and an
objection in order to be able to develop a prioritizing principle that would help clarify the
arguer’s dialectical obligations. But if we look at critical practice, we will not find much if any
support for such a distinction. Instead we will find the terms used interchangeably (see, for
example, Johnson and Blair (1993), Govier (1999) both of which are discussed in Johnson
(2000)). I do not think the distinction I have in mind could be classified as a reminder, nor does it
strike me as an observation, though it originates in an ‘observation’ (in an extended sense—a
kind of realization) about what is not represented in existing practice. I believe such a distinction
can be made, that it needs to be made, and that making it will result in greater clarity and will be
useful in thinking about the arguer’s dialectical obligations. However, to do this, I must go
beyond existing critical practice. I would need to draw a clear distinction between a criticism and
an objection, and that in turn would to require that these be distinguished from an alternative
position—so that some further elaboration is necessary. All of this work to me would fall
naturally intowhat I call a theory whose role is not to provide a foundation for existing practice
but rather an improvement. (Maybe Pinto would regard all this as a fruitful suggestion.)
4.3 About the relationship between theory and practice
It seems to me that Pinto sees the relationship between theory and practice in fundamentally
Husserlian terms; and perhaps if we see it that way, he is correct to resist the idea that we need to
develop such a theory to serve as anchor. But is not correct to say (or imply) that I view my
theory ‘as a foundation for evaluation of inference/argument’ (p. 128). There are other ways to
view the relationship. I have in mind Dewey’s way of construing relationship between logical
theory and practice. In Dewey’s view, logic is an evolving inquiry; logical forms change and
develop. In The Pattern of Inquiry, Dewey writes:
Just as art forms and legal forms are capable of independent discussion and development, so are logical
forms … As in the case of these other forms, they originate out of experiential material, and when
11
Rorty’s remarks are premised on the assumption that we find our practice ‘more or less successful.’ But how are
such assumptions themselves to be made and justified? And, to be sure, if one seeks to challenge ‘the practice’ (or
‘aspects of the practice’), then the appeal to practice will itself be potentially question-begging.
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constituted introduce a new way of operating with prior material, which ways modify the material out of
which they develop. (1938, p.103)
In Dewey’s view, the standards and techniques that are part of logical theory are extracted from
the practice and feed back into it. (This is Dewey as interpreted by Bernstein (1971, pp. 216218).) In this type of account, a theory of argument would not be seen as providing the anchor or
foundation for practice. The relationship between them would be reciprocal—in much the way
that Pinto describes on page 122 where he writes that ‘critical practice is itself something that
evolves over time…’
In sum, while I regard Pinto’s skeptical position as a welcome addition to the literature,
his views are not without problems. In my remarks, I have focused on his position on theory and
practice and have argued that (i) his position on just what is required for a theory needs
clarification, and the basis for his skeptical position needs elaboration; (ii) there are problems
with the way he construes both the idea of critical practice and the role his account assigns to it;
and (iii) his view of relationship between theory and practice is too limited.12
5. CONCLUSION
I began this paper by revisiting Toulmin’s groundbreaking theoretical intervention which aims to
provide a better model for our critical practice, but which runs into problems in the way in which
Toulmin seeks to carry out his reform. The lesson I drew from Toulmin is that our attempts to
improve theory must to some degree depend on prior theory, though ways of reducing the
unwanted influence of prior theory must be sought. Next I looked at what I called Pinto’s
skeptical position with respect to the need for theory. That turned out to involve Pinto’s view of
the relationship between theory and practice which is Husserlian in character; I suggested an
alternative that comes out of Dewey.
It seems to me that both Toulmin and Pinto’s efforts are, in the last analysis,
compromised by tacit reliance on Cartesian ideas, though different aspects. The remedy, in my
view, is to lean more heavily on insights available to us from the pragmatists, particularly
Dewey. In another context, Quine (1963, p.46) has said:
Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the
considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit the continuing sensory promptings
are, where rational, pragmatic.
In the present context, I propose the following adaptation of Quine's formulation:
Each [logical] theorist is given a logical heritage plus a continuing barrage of phenomena [in the form of
critical practice]. The considerations that guide him in warping his logical heritage to fit the continuing
barrage (or vice-versa) are, where rational, pragmatic.
12
Too late in the process of writing this paper, it occurred to me that another limitation in Pinto’s position is that it
fails to take into account the contribution of theory to the development of critical practice. Just think of the role that
Toulmin’s concept of warrant has had on the practice of analyzing arguments. ‘Had I the time…and words…’
THEORY AND PRACTICE AGAIN
231
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I am grateful to Bob Pinto for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I hope I have
eliminated some of the shortcomings, though likely others will have taken their place. I also want to thank my
Research Assistant, Michael Baumtrog (Bommer!), for his assistance both in preparing the content and especially
for handling the formatting.
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