HARRY HELSON’S ADAPTATION-LEVEL THEORY, HAPPINESS
TREADMILLS, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
BY
JOSÉ EDWARDS*
Abstract
Psychologist Harry Helson [1898-1977] developed Adaptation-Level (AL) theory
during the 1930s-70s, while economics was being refined through ordinalism and
expected utility theory. This essay accounts for the process of transmission of AL theory
from psychophysics, to behavioral psychology and eventually economics. It explains
how the concept of adaptation reflectance, originally intended to explain color vision,
developed into an experimental approach that caught the attention of both
psychologists and economists working on welfare analysis and behavioral research. It
also argues that the history of AL theory – so far absent from narratives about
economics and psychology – is worth exploring in order to gain a better understanding
of the relationship between the two disciplines.
*Escuela de Gobierno, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile. Email:
[email protected].
This “preprint” is the peer-reviewed and accepted typescript of an article that is
forthcoming in revised form, after minor editorial changes, in the Journal of the
History of Economic Thought (ISSN: 1053-8372), volume 40 (2018), issue TBA.
Copyright to the journal’s articles is held by the History of Economics Society
(HES), whose exclusive licensee and publisher for the journal is Cambridge
University Press (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-historyof-economic-thought ). This preprint may be used only for private research and
study and is not to be distributed further.
The preprint may be cited as follows:
Edwards, José. “Harry Helson’s Adaptation-Level Theory, Happiness Treadmills, and
Behavioral Economics.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 40 (forthcoming).
Preprint at SocArXiv, osf.io/preprints/socarxiv
HARRY HELSON’S ADAPTATION-LEVEL THEORY, HAPPINESS
TREADMILLS, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
BY
JOSÉ EDWARDS1
Psychologist Harry Helson [1898-1977] developed Adaptation-Level (AL)
theory during the 1930s-70s, while economics was being refined through
ordinalism and expected utility theory. This essay accounts for the process of
transmission of AL theory from psychophysics, to behavioral psychology and
eventually economics. It explains how the concept of adaptation reflectance,
originally intended to explain color vision, developed into an experimental
approach that caught the attention of both psychologists and economists
working on welfare analysis and behavioral research. It also argues that the
history of AL theory – so far absent from narratives about economics and
psychology – is worth exploring in order to gain a better understanding of the
relationship between the two disciplines.
1
Escuela de Gobierno, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile. Email:
[email protected]. I wish to thank Annie Cot, Harro Maas, Wade Hands, Philippe
Fontaine, Richard Arena, John Davis, Gilles Campagnolo, Andrea Repetto, and two
anonymous referees for their comments on previous versions of this paper. Financial
support for this project came from CONICYT (FONDECYT N°11130072). Remaining
errors are all mine.
1
“we can regard a theory or concept as accepted when it has found its way into the
literature, particularly into elementary texts, without being labeled with any one
person’s name. We no longer speak of Hartley’s or Bain’s associationism,
Watson’s behaviorism, or Wertheimer’s concept of Gestalt. We speak of
association, stimulus-response (S-R) theory, and Gestalt theory. So it is happening
with AL theory […]. Since we are primarily interested in the advancement of
knowledge, and only secondarily in creating eponyms, reference to concepts
rather than names is a natural development in the growth of a science”
– Harry Helson (1971)
I. INTRODUCTION
Harry Helson [1898 Chelsea, MA - 1977 Berkeley, CA] was an American psychologist
known for his work on Gestalt psychology, color vision, and Adaptation-Level (AL)
theory: a Gestalt-type theory that quantitatively takes into account stimulation and
context to explain behavior. He initiated graduate studies with E. G. Boring at Harvard
in 1924, and worked in a series of institutions, including E. Titchener’s department in
Cornell (1925), Bryn Mawr College (1928-51), Kansas State University (1961-8), and
the University of Massachusetts, from which he retired in 1971 (Bevan 1979). His main
contributions to experimental psychology are his doctoral dissertation on Gestalt theory
(Helson 1925a-b, 1926a-b), his studies of color conversion (Helson 1938, 1942), and a
series of influential writings on AL theory (Helson 1947, 1948, 1964).
AL theory developed after Helson’s psychophysical experiments in the field of vision
(1930s). Influential among psychologists, he was recognized with the Distinguished
Scientific Contribution Award of the American Psychological Association in 1962, for
2
developing research “which is relevant to a broad range of problems from color vision
to social process” (Harlow et al. 1962, p. 895). His theory eventually travelled to
economics, where it was mobilized by Scitovsky (1976), Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
and Frank (1989), and later on by several other writers in both happiness and behavioral
research2.
Despite this impact, Helson’s theory is overlooked in most of the literature relating
psychology and economics. That fast growing literature includes retrospectives by/of
behavioral economists (e.g. Rabin 1998, Kahneman 2011, Angner and Loewenstein
2012, Heukelom, 2012), narratives about whether psychology has remained “in” or
“out” of economics (e.g. Lewin 1996, Bruni and Sugden 2007), and critical reviews
about the historiography of the two disciplines (e.g. Maas 2005, Hands 2011, HOPE
special issue 2016). This essay contributes to this third critical strand of literature.
While the origins of this history have been tracked back to (at least) the influence of 19th
century authors like G. Fechner, W. Wundt and J. Sully (founders of experimental
psychology) on W.S. Jevons, F.Y. Edgeworth and their neoclassical followers, there are
2
A quick bibliometric survey reveals over 5,000 citations to Helson’s writings on AL
theory and over 4,000 to Brickman and Campbell (1971) and Brickman et al. (1978),
the main applications of Helson’s theory to happiness research (Google Scholar).
Scopus shows over 800 citations to Helson’s writings (i.e. not all of them). These
citations appear mostly in The American Journal of Psychology, Journal of Consumer
Research, Social Indicators Research, Journal of Marketing Research, Marketing
Science, and Journal of Marketing. A smaller portion appears in economics journals
like The Economic Journal, The American Economic Review, Journal of Economic
Literature, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Econometrica (JSTOR).
3
different projects exploring subsequent developments in that story. On one side, those
focused on riskless utility theory, like Hands (2010, 2011), have found interesting
connections between behavioral economics and the work of ordinalists like V. Pareto,
E. Slutsky and P. Samuelson, especially in relation to the “integrability problem”
(Hands 2011). On the other side, those studying expected utility theory like Giocoli
(2003), Mongin (2009) or Moscati (2016), explain the relationship between the two
disciplines through the work of J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, M. Friedman, L.
Savage and H. Markowitz, among others, and later on Kahneman and Tversky’s
prospect theory. The recent rise of behavioral economics has motivated much of this
research, which includes the impact of experimentation on economics (e.g. Svorenčík
2016).
This essay explores yet another story. Although Helson’s theory influenced welfare
analysis and behavioral economics, it remains absent from the historiography of
economics and psychology. AL theory originated in psychophysics (like Edgeworth’s),
and developed into a broad approach to behavior. Its history is intertwined with
concepts like “hedonic treadmills”, “relative happiness” and “reference dependence”, all
of which had an impact on economics, especially during the 1960s-70s. This history
involves economists who were critical about using utility theory to approach well-being,
which led to new forms of happiness and behavioral research3. It gives a perspective
which is different from that in most of the literature available. By analyzing how
Helson’s theory developed from psychophysics into a tool for welfare analysis and
3
See Edwards and Pellé (2011) for an analysis of some of that critical literature by
Mishan (1960, 1967), Scitovsky (1976), Galbraith (1958, 1967, 1977), Hirsch (1977)
and Frank (1989).
4
behavioral research, it reveals new paths of influence of psychology on economics. In
line with writings by Helson and his associates, it argues that Helson perhaps “never
fully received the recognition he deserved” (Bevan 1979, p. 158).
In the following text, Section II presents the origins (1930s-1940s) of Helson’s theory
and explores elements of psychology, which add new perspectives to the history of the
two disciplines. Influenced by Gestalt theory, Helson developed the concept of
“adaptation reflectance” into a general principle governing different phenomena related
to color vision. From there, his Gestalt-type project extended to study of the relativity of
perception, joining more general (and interdisciplinary) discussions about “frames of
reference” and human judgment.
Section III explores the process by which AL theory reached its full development in
psychology (1950s-1970s), as Helson extended the scope of his research from
perception and judgment, to the study of affectivity and motivation. Intertwined with
theories by psychologists McClelland et al. (1953) and Haber (1958), Helson’s theory
was redefined as an experimental approach to behavior (Helson 1964), and used to
discuss socioeconomic problems of the American society (Helson 1971).
Section IV explains the process of transmission of AL theory from experimental
psychology to happiness research (1970s). It shows how Brickman and Campbell
(1971) developed the concept of “hedonic treadmill” from a symposium honoring
Helson, and how that concept related to those of economists J. Duesenberry (1949), J.K.
Galbraith (1958) and E. Mishan (1960). While these psychologists proposed using AL
theory outside the lab for “planning the good society”, other economists like namely R.
Easterlin (1974) and T. Scitovsky (1976), explored the relative character of
incomes/consumption, leading to new forms of welfare analysis.
5
Finally, Section V studies AL theory in its relation to behavioral economics. It shows
how Helson’s theory was, at first, explicitly referred to by D. Kahneman, A. Tversky,
but then dropped in favor of accounts framed as expected utility theories, which explore
purposive (instead of adaptive) behavior. A short final discussion concludes that the
history of Helson’s theory – from psychophysics, to welfare analysis and behavioral
research – perhaps deserves additional recognition from economists (and
psychologists).
II. ORIGINS (1930s-1940s)
While adaptation and learning theories were failing to emerge within mainstream
economics (Mirowski 2002, Giocoli 2003), different approaches to those subjects were
being developed by psychologists working on psychophysical experimentation. Unlike
economists who explained behavior as resulting from marginal utilities, substitution
rates or preferences, Helson extended his Gestalt-type research from psychophysics, to
studying the role of frames of reference on perception, and the relativity of human
judgment. Helson’s Gestalt approach led to AL theory, according to which behavior is
adaptive (i.e. explained by past outcomes) rather than purposive (i.e. explained by
future prospects). By studying Helson’s theory, this section explores paths of influence
of psychophysics on behavioral research, which are different from those known by
economists (i.e. like Edgeworth’s mathematical psychics).
Gestalt theory and color perception (1930s)
AL theory originated from Helson’s study of visual perception, to which he applied the
Gestalt approach elaborated in his graduate research (Helson 1925a-b, 1926a-b, 1933).
6
His PhD thesis: “The configurational theory of perception”, claimed that “all the parts
of the environment combine to influence the responses that are observed, and that the
form in which the parts are combined may be crucial” (Judd 1971, p. 305). This Gestalttype theory challenged traditional psychophysics as initiated by G. Fechner4.
Unlike the traditional approach, which considered perception as a simple mediating
process between a single stimulus and its corresponding sensation (Bevan 1958),
Helson refused to “analyze the environment into parts, each to be studied separately”
(Judd 1971, p. 305). This sort of “configurational psychophysics” showed that
perception was not only a function of present, but also of past and background stimuli
(more below), and that responses depended on the state of adaptation of an organism to
all such stimuli5.
Initially, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Helson’s program related to visual
perception and focused specifically on aspects of vision like eye-movement theory
(Guilford and Helson 1929), color illusion (Helson 1930), clearness-context theory
(Helson 1932), light perception (Helson and Fehrer 1932), photopic adaptation (Helson
and Judd 1932) and after-image (Helson 1936). These specific studies, treating different
4
See Edwards (2012, 2014) for an analysis of Gestalt psychology as applied to
(behavioral) economics by George Katona.
5
AL theory was an important contribution to psychophysics, comparable to Thurstone’s
“law of comparative judgment”, Stevens’ “power law”, and Swets, Tanner, and
Birdsall’s “theory of signal detection” (Avant, 1971, p. 19). See Michels and Helson
(1949), Bevan (1958) and Stevens (1958) for a better understanding of Helson’s
contributions to psychophysics.
7
topics, developed into a unified approach during the late-1930s and 1940s as Helson
developed a single general framework able to explain all fundamental problems of color
vision (Helson 1938, Helson and Jeffers 1940).
Unlike most research done at that time, which focused on the constancy of color,
Helson explored “color conversion” – i.e. “changes in any attributes of color which
occur with changes in illumination, background or any of the conditions of viewing”
(Helson 1938, p. 440). During the late-1930s, while working at Bryn Mawr College, he
elaborated a set of experiments to be performed in a “color booth”, the design of which
created an environment that allowed for studying all of the main properties of color
vision under chromatic illumination changes (i.e. color conversion).
The experiments took place in a “light-tight” booth (Figure 1), inside of which
participants observed the hue (color), saturation (purity) and lightness of a series of
nineteen gray samples (“S” in Figure 1), under four different illuminations (red, green,
blue, yellow) and against three different backgrounds (white, gray, black). The
experiment’s design allowed for controlling the composition and intensity of the four
colors (through the light source in Fig. 1), the reflectance of the nineteen samples and
three backgrounds (i.e. the percentages of light reflected or brightness), and the state of
the eye and mode of viewing the samples during the experiments (ibid., p. 449). Helson
could thus manipulate all relevant aspects of the environment in which the color
conversion experience took place: a Gestalt-type study considering all possible stimuli.
PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1: the “color booth” (Helson, 1938, p. 444)
8
The observations obtained from each one of the twelve settings (i.e. twelve
combinations between four color illuminations and three backgrounds), revealed that in
the process of conversion there was always at least one of the nineteen samples that
remained achromatic (i.e. perceived gray). Samples with reflectances above that level
took the color of the illuminant, and samples below took the complementary color
(ibid., p. 449). Reflectances of the achromatic samples could be mathematically
obtained by calculating the average reflectance of all surfaces in the field of vision.
They were labelled as “adaptation reflectances”, which were capable of explaining all
phenomena related to color vision:
“Our use of strongly chromatic illumination, at first apparently ‘unnatural’
and restrictive, proves the best means for demonstrating the existence of an
adaptation reflectance and its dependence on ‘average’ reflectance with its
resulting effect on constancy and conversion. Chromatic illumination thus
furnishes the key to the essential unity of all the phenomena of vision”
(ibid., p. 471)6
Helson’s main contribution to the “psychology of color” consisted of manipulating
chromatic illumination to unveil the principle of adaptation reflectance, which was of
6
The booth experiments showed that background reflectance (the brightness of each of
the three backgrounds) was the most important factor explaining the adaptation
reflectance (including reflectances of all surfaces in the field of vision, taking into
account all past eye-movements, modes of viewing, etc.). Based on such finding,
Helson proposed a mathematical formula that simplified the whole context by
considering only the weighted logarithmic average of background and sample
reflectances (more below).
9
great importance as it brought unity to the study of vision. All color perceptions could
be explained from Helson’s concept of adaptation level.
From perception, to the relativity of judgment and frames of reference (1940s)
During the decade following his research on color vision, Helson extended his project to
include the study of levels underlying “all judgments, regardless of the type of object
being considered” (Helson 1947, p. 1). He moved beyond psychophysics to study the
relativity of judgment, and the general role of the frames of reference “constantly at
work in molding behavior” (ibid., p. 2).
As he got involved with broader behavior, Helson redefined the AL concept as stimuli
configurations eliciting neutral responses. That shift shows how important Gestalt
theory still was for Helson:
“For every excitation-response configuration there is assumed a stimulus
which represents the pooled effect of all the stimuli and to which the
organism may be said to be attuned or adapted. Stimuli near this value fail
to elicit any response from the organism or bring forth such neutral
responses as indifferent, neutral, doubtful, equal, or the like, depending
upon the context of stimulation. Such stimuli are said to be at adaptationlevel […]. There is an AL for every moment of stimulation, changing in
time and with varying conditions of stimulation.” (ibid., pp. 2-3)
Helson’s mathematical formula (more below) was operationally defined from behavior
(as the concept of “neutral response” was key), and tested through experiments on
weight-lifting and sound (Helson 1947).
10
In 1948, Helson advanced a “quantitative theory of frames of reference” (Helson 1948,
p. 297), giving “concrete definition” to a concept that was of current use in many
different areas: from psychophysics, to motivational and social psychology. In doing so,
he articulated different studies about frames of reference (i.e. reference dependence),
by, namely, Koffka (1922), Guilford (1936), Woodrow (1937), Hunt (1941), Rogers
(1941), and Sherif & Cantril (1945). This synthetic approach was similar to the one
previously applied by Helson to color vision (i.e. the booth experiments).
Finally, in 1949 Michels and Helson’s “reformulation of Fechner’s Law” refined the AL
formula even further, by classifying all stimuli acting upon an organism into three
different categories:
“The first class includes only the stimulus which is being judged; the
second, all stimuli previously experienced, i.e. temporally separated from
the stimulus under judgment; the third, all stimuli, other than that being
judged, which are presented […]. These will be called the stimulus, the
residual stimulus, and the background stimulus, respectively.” (Michels and
Helson 1949, p. 360)
This quantitative treatment of frames of reference was at the immediate origin of AL
theory in its full version. It was throughout this historical process that Helson’s theory
developed from the study of color vision into a “quantitative extension of the classical
notion of perceptual relativity” (Corso 1971, p. 27). That notion, which had been
present in psychophysics since at least Fechner’s research, was reformulated according
11
to Gestalt theory and extended to a much broader inquiry about human judgment
(Stevens 1958)7.
III. BROADENING, ESTABLISHMENT AND EXTENSIONS (1950s-1970s)
Affectivity, motivation and behavior (1950s)
After developing into a quantitative theory of frames of reference, AL theory was
applied by different authors to a myriad of subjects including learning, cognitive
processes, motivation and affectivity, personality, intelligence testing and social
psychology (Appley 1971). During the 1950s and early 1960s, the impact of AL theory
in these and other fields of psychology gave wide recognition to Helson, who received
the “Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award” from the American Psychological
Association in 1962:
“for his sustained commitment to the problems of sensation and perception,
his empirical contributions to our knowledge of visual and other sensory
activities, and his generalized theory of adaptation level which is relevant to
7
According to Michels and Helson (1949), the “fixed reference point in the Fechner
law” (the concept of threshold), was probably “responsible for its failure to fit certain
types of data and also for certain paradoxes in psychophysics” (Michels and Helson
1949, p. 367). The importance of AL theory came from proposing dynamic reference
points instead (i.e. the ALs).
12
a broad range of problems from color vision to social process.” (Harlow et
al. 1962, p. 895)8
Among the variety of influences, critiques, and applications involved in the rise of AL
theory, theories of motivation are important for understanding how Helson’s approach
developed into a tool for behavioral research and welfare analysis. It is also important to
realize that at this point (during the 1950s and early 1960s) Helson’s theory did not only
influence, but was also influenced by the work of psychologists who mobilized AL
theory, like McClelland et al. in The achievement motive (1953).
The achievement motive “leaned heavily on Helson’s formulation of the concept of
adaptation level” (McClelland et al. 1953, p. 44), and challenged most of the available
theories of motivation by introducing an “affective arousal model”. Instead of
considering behavior as motivated by biological survival needs (survival models), or
aroused by different kinds of stimuli (stimulus models), the affective model explained
“goal oriented ‘free’ choice behavior” as resulting from the pleasure or pain (i.e. affect)
aroused by discrepancies from adaptation levels (ibid., p. 14). Based on a series of
experiments (similar to Haber’s, Figure 2), McClelland et al. argued that small
8
The Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards of the American Psychological
Association honor three of its members each year since 1956. In 1962, the 5-member
Committee for the Award was chaired by B.F. Skinner. The recognized impact of
Helson’s theory was also evidenced in many important contributions by, namely,
McClelland et al. (1953), Bevan (1958), Haber (1958), Stevens (1958), Parducci (1959)
and Berlyne (1960).
13
discrepancies from adaptation levels arose positive affect (pleasure), while larger ones
arose negative affect (pain), and both motivated purposive behavior.
PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2: Haber’s discrepancy theory experiment (Haber 1958, p. 373)
In subsequent discussions about the affective arousal model, Haber (1958) validated
McClelland et al.’s (1953) theory through a now renowned experiment (more in the last
Section), that evaluated discrepancies from ALs by observing people’s “hedonic
choices” between water buckets at different temperatures9. The hedonic choices
observed were represented as in Figure 2 and used to explain how pleasure arose from
“small discrepancies from sensory adaptation levels”, while displeasure from “larger
discrepancies” (ibid., p. 382).
AL theory thus became foundational of a “two-factor theory of motivation”, according
to which individuals approach pleasurable objects (small discrepancies), while avoiding
displeasure (larger discrepancies) (ibid., p. 375). Haber’s findings were later on
borrowed by Helson himself as their “butterfly curves” (Figure 3) – stylized
9
Haber (1958) defined an AL based on the skin temperature of the subjects’ hands
(usually 33°C). The experiment consisted of setting an AL bucket together with 10
other water buckets at discrepancy temperatures of 0°, ±1°, +2°, ±3°, ±7° and ±15° from
the AL. All buckets were judged by 8 subjects from 80 to 135 times, who were asked to
make hedonic choices (i.e. reveal preferences) between comparison buckets at different
temperatures.
14
representations of the discrepancy theory of affect – spread throughout experimental
psychology10.
PLACE FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Figure 3: a “butterfly curve” (Haber 1958, p. 371)
AL theory: an approach to behavior (1960s)
In 1964 Helson published the full version of his theory, a book articulating decades of
research by many authors in different subfields. That research was synthesized into a
general theory built around the AL concept, and presented as an “experimental and
systematic approach to behavior”11.
10
The butterfly curve was basically a double (mirror-like) representation of Wundt’s
feeling curve, which was originally “used by psychologists to denote merely the
decrement in sensory responses following prolonged exposure to stimulation” (Helson
1971, p. 5). However, unlike Wundt’s, the origin of the butterfly curve was not the
“absolute threshold” (i.e. the lowest detected stimulus), but instead Helson’s concept of
adaptation level.
11
Helson’s argument developed as follows: The Concept of Adaptation (Helson 1964,
pp. 36-63), Seven Basic Characteristics of Behavior (ibid., pp. 64-124), Psychophysical
Judgment (pp. 125-231), Perception (pp. 232-327), Affectivity and Motivation (pp. 328390), Learning and Performance (pp. 391-452), Cognition and Thinking (pp. 453-520),
Personality (pp. 521-582), and Interpersonal Behavior (pp. 583-660).
15
Helson highlighted the relativistic character of AL theory as one of its main features.
While considering Fechner’s analysis as a “first step in the direction of a relativistic
psychophysics” (Helson 1964, p. 30), he presented his own theory as the first “truly
relativistic approach to behavioral phenomena” (ibid.)12. For Helson, AL theory was
fully relativistic as it considered the study of both the “quantities defining the stimulus”,
and those “specifying the state of the organism” or adaptation level (ibid., p. 31). Based
on that description, he then redefined his theory once again, this time as a general theory
capable of handling an even wider variety of topics:
“The basic premise of this book is that an individual’s attitudes, values,
ways of structuring his experiences, judgments of physical, aesthetic, and
symbolic objects, intellectual and emotional behavior, learning, and
interpersonal relations all represent modes of adaptation to environmental
and organismic forces. These forces do not act willy-nilly upon the
organism from without, nor do they erupt spontaneously from within.
Stimuli impinge upon organisms already adapted to what has gone before,
and internal states depend upon previously existing internal conditions as
well as external inciters to action.” (ibid., p. 37)
In continuity with his previous research, Helson gave a mathematical formulation of the
concept of “behavioral adaptation level” (A), which was the pooled effect of three
classes of stimuli: focal (X), background or contextual (B), and residual or past (R).
That level was then formally described as the weighted product (p+q+r=1) of all these
12
Fechner’s Law was not “fully relativistic” as it was based on the concept of “absolute
threshold” (i.e. the lowest stimulus detected): a “fixed zero for all magnitudes within a
given sensory modality” (Helson 1964, p. 30).
16
stimuli:
=
, and in log form: log
=
log
+ log
+ log . This
version of the theory was then shaped into behavioral sciences in an attempt to explain
virtually all living phenomena. However, that attempt implied conceiving of organisms
as “space-time averaging mechanisms” (ibid., p. 63), a prospect that became less
successful than the narrower (and less ambitious) project of applying the AL principle
to just perception and human judgment.
AL theory and the social problem (1970s)
In 1970 there was a symposium held to honor Helson, who would soon retire from his
Professorship at the University of Massachusetts (Appley et al. 1971). The symposium
participants were Helson’s closest co-workers, associates, and other invited
psychologists who had used the theory in different areas. Discussions at these meetings
are interesting to explore, as they involved “political-economic-social” implications and
applications of AL theory connecting with the history of economics13.
Helson’s own talk at the symposium addressed the main critiques raised against AL
theory. He claimed that his program was compatible with (rather than an alternative to)
other approaches like Gestalt psychology. He also proposed additional extensions and
13
There were 32 invited contributors to the Helson symposium, including Helson’s
closest friends, associates and colleagues J. Guildford, D. Judd, W. Bevan, M. Appley,
D. McClelland, P. Brickman, and D. Campbell. The Helson Papers Collection at the
Archives of the History of American Psychology also shows close connections between
Helson and Gestalt psychologists K. Koffka and W. Kohler, as well as between Helson
and E.G. Boring (his advisor).
17
applications of the theory, this time to the formation of “classes” (i.e. norms or
standards) around adaptation levels, a topic related to developmental psychology (the
study of human development from childhood through aging)14. By analyzing the
establishment of such internal norms, AL theory would also become capable of
explaining learning mechanisms (Helson 1971, p. 15).
Useful for understanding phenomena such as the “the liking for foods”, the
“appreciation of art” and “striving for goals” (ibid., p. 16), Helson also considered AL
theory as a means for elucidating the “ethical and moral bases” of behavior, including
the laws by which they emerge and develop. These late extensions of AL theory were
Helson’s own expression of a Zeitgeist, which involved many other critiques of western
affluent societies during the late-1960s and 1970s (see Yarrow 2010, Edwards 2014).
Those critical views were influenced by Cold-war issues, and written by behaviorists
like B.F. Skinner, and economists like J.K. Galbraith, E. Mishan and T. Scitovsky
(below).
For Helson, society was in a time of crisis, the causes of which were “rooted in
psychological mechanisms” that had been studied “for years in both human and
subhuman subjects” (ibid., p. 17). Like other academic critics of affluence, he proposed
his theory as helpful for solving such socioeconomic problems. He interpreted
American society as affected by “extreme contrasts” (i.e. like in color vision), which
14
The formation of “classes” was essential for understanding human judgment. By
applying AL theory to this process, one would be able to clarify the establishment of the
“normal limits of a class” (e.g. human height), leaving out whatever exceeded the limits
of the AL “pooling process” (like “giants” or “dwarfs”) (Helson 1971, p. 13).
18
amplified through mass media could easily develop into great “dissatisfactions and
disequilibria”:
“Contrast the superabundance of wealth with extreme poverty almost side
by side […]. The perception of these contrasts in modern media of
communication, most of them visual, affects every individual who watches
television, goes to the movies, or looks into the popular magazines. The
facts learned about the role of anchors and much else concerned with
internal norms carry directly over to our perception of social, political, and
economic conditions. Using this knowledge rightly may show that
psychology is more than a purely academic subject and that our experiments
and theories can enable us to understand what is going on in the world about
us as well as in the contrived world of the psychology laboratory.” (ibid.)
These thoughts by Helson eventually led the whole AL theory symposium to discuss
“outside the laboratory”, about the usefulness of the theory for planning the “good
society” (ibid.). In other words, to make Helson’s theory relevant (Appley 1971, Helson
1972).
IV. AL THEORY AND HAPPINESS (1970s)
The hedonic treadmill
P. Brickman and D. Campbell’s “Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society”
(1971) was the immediate product of discussions within the Helson symposium on
transforming “laboratory-derived principles into possible real-world practices” (Appley
19
1971, p. 285)15. The essay was prepared after the meeting and was, in a sense, the joint
product of all the symposium participants during a “highly spirited 2-hr discussion” led
by Campbell (ibid.). The transcript of that session became the base for the now
renowned paper that introduced the “hedonic treadmill”.
Happiness – defined as a state of “subjective pleasure” – was naturally considered as
subject to the “fundamental postulate of AL theory”, and a happy society attainable only
through understanding AL phenomena: something past planners had lacked (Brickman
and Campbell 1971, pp. 287-8). Unlike welfare economists – who had traditionally been
“gloomy about measuring and comparing the subjective satisfactions that people derive
from goods” (ibid., p. 288) – they followed those who had “long been committed to
trying to assess such satisfactions in laboratory settings” (ibid.). Their discussion was
organized around two general themes:
15
Philip Brickman [1943-1982] was a social psychologist receiving his PhD from the
University of Michigan in 1968. Faculty member at Northwestern University (19681978) and psychology professor at the Institute for Social Research of the University of
Michigan (1978-1982). His career ended tragically when he took his own life at the age
of 38 (Wortman and Coates, 1985). In line with Helson, Brickman believed that
psychology should be a “conceptual servant for society”, used to help people “think
about important things like happiness or power in a way that illuminates what is
involved in their pursuit” (p. 1051). Donald T. Campbell [1916-1996] is well known for
his methodological and epistemological work in the social sciences (Brewer and Cook
1997). His career developed during a 26-year tenure at Northwestern University (19531979), when his work on “evolutionary epistemology” became influential in philosophy
and sociology of science (ibid., p. 268).
20
“The pessimistic theme is that the nature of AL phenomena condemns men
to live on a hedonic treadmill, to seek new levels of stimulation merely to
maintain old levels of subjective pleasure, to never achieve any kind of
permanent happiness or satisfaction. The optimistic theme is that regardless
of this ultimate impossibility, there are still wise and foolish ways to pursue
happiness, both for societies and for individuals, and, from a planner’s point
of view, there are certain distributions of goods over time, persons, and
modalities that will result in greater happiness than others.” (ibid., p. 289)
Planning for the good society, “a task for optimists”, they claimed, would not succeed
unless designed by those thoroughly understanding of the “relativistic and elusive
character of subjective pleasure” (ibid.). The two possibilities for keeping stimulus
levels above ALs (i.e. to get pleasure) were to systematically increase stimuli, or to
prevent ALs from continually rising. But because systematically increasing stimuli was
impractical – due to the hedonic treadmill – they focused instead on specifying
“situations in which AL phenomena either do not hold or can be modified” (ibid.).
On comparisons and (finally) economics
Comparisons (i.e. temporal, spatial and social discrepancies from ALs) were identified
as processes that could be manipulated to influence happiness (ibid., p. 290). They were
analyzed through economic approaches, especially J. Duesenberry’s (1949) theory of
relative incomes, and The affluent society by J.K. Galbraith (1958). Galbraith’s “squirrel
21
wheel” model was one among the variety of topics considered within the AL theory
framework16.
Social comparisons, in particular, were indicated as “perhaps the most potent
mechanism for establishing hedonic AL” (ibid., p. 294). Like many other critics of
affluence, participants at the Helson symposium pointed out how the individuals’
expected reward levels established against the reward levels of other people (ibid.).
They claimed that the unrestricted range of comparisons, made available through mass
media (especially movies and television), had enlarged the universe of unfavorable
comparisons, with its “detrimental effects on hedonic AL” (ibid., p. 296). Social
planners, they claimed, should be aware of the importance of allowing people to
“maintain favorable comparisons”, while at the same time being careful about
restricting their freedom (ibid.).
By eroding traditional controls on comparisons, the modern industrial society was
pointed out as responsible for the “revolution of rising expectations” (ibid.). Like
Galbraith (1967) or Mishan (1967), these psychologists saw a “highly explosive”
phenomenon, which was “shaking the world” (ibid.), and they urged economists to
better look at the welfare effects of their proposed social programs. As shown below,
these issues discussed at the Helson symposium were also explored by Scitovsky in The
16
Galbraith’s “squirrel wheel”, where “expectation rises with attainment” (Galbraith
1958, pp. 126-7), was a form of “temporal comparison” (i.e. discrepancy between
present and past rewards). Spatial comparisons (i.e. discrepancy between different areas
of competence) and social comparisons (i.e. discrepancy between self and similar others
– like Duesenberry’s), were the two other proposed categories.
22
Joyless Economy (1976), and by Brickman et al. (1978) in an empirical study of relative
happiness.
The Joyless Economy
Tibor Scitovsky’s The Joyless Economy (1976) was an attempt to translate The affluent
society into the academic language of economists (Edwards 2014), and it did so by
proposing a “psychology and economics of motivation” that reformulated consumer
demand theory. Scitovsky drew heavily from motivational psychology – especially that
in D. Berlyne’s Conflict, arousal and curiosity (1960) – and advanced two motives
explaining consumer behavior in affluent contexts: the “pursuit of novelty”, and the
“seduction of comfort”. Once enjoying the comfort of having wants satisfied (like
people in affluent households), organisms supposedly behaved by seeking additional
stimulation in new experiences. Interestingly, Scitovsky explained the attractiveness of
such new experiences through a discrepancy theory of affect (remember McClelland et
al. 1953):
“New and surprising sensations are sometimes frightening and shunned, at
other times attractive and sought after. The apparent conflict is resolved
when we distinguish differences in degree. The new and surprising is
always stimulating, but it is attractive only up to a limited degree, beyond
which it becomes disturbing and frightening. Attractiveness first increases,
then diminishes with the degree of newness and surprisingness. That kind of
relation is common in psychology, and will recur so often in later pages that
it is worth illustrating here.” (ibid., p. 34)
23
Scitovsky’s illustration was a butterfly curve borrowed from Berlyne’s (1960) theory of
exploratory behavior. Unlike Berlyne, however, Scitovsky developed his own theory
around the AL principle, creating a sort of variation of the theories of motivation of
McClelland et al. (1953), Haber (1958) and Helson (1964):
“Experiments measuring the arousing effect of such simple sensory inputs
such as light and sound have shown that the point of origin, that is, the level
where there is no arousing effect, is not the absence of light or sound, but
whatever level of it the organism is already experiencing and has adapted to.
This point of origin has been called the adaptation level. It is divergences
from the adaptation level that are arousing, and equal divergences in either
direction are, within a quite wide range, equally arousing […]. Sometimes
this is graphically expressed by a so-called butterfly diagram, which is
obtained by drawing two inverted U-shaped curves, one to the right and one
to the left of the adaptation level as the point of origin.” (Scitovsky 1976, p.
40)17
By analyzing the pursuit of novelty as one of his two motives, Scitovsky warned his
readers that they required learning to actually enjoy that pursuit (i.e. to systematically
create new discrepancies from the attained ALs). To that “skilled” form of
consumption, he opposed “want satisfaction”, the comfort of which was responsible of
creating “more occasions and larger areas of satiation” in the lives of affluent
17
Scitovsky’s (1976) description of the butterfly diagram corresponds to Haber’s
(1958) and Helson’s (1964), represented in Figure 3. Helson’s AL theory (1964) is also
explicitly referred to in The Joyless Economy.
24
consumers (ibid., p. 71). Unfortunately, he claimed, that kind of comfort was always
achieved “at the sacrifice of pleasure” (ibid.).
After shaping his two motives into a trade-off between “the pleasure of enjoying
novelty” and the “comfort of having wants satisfied” (ibid.), Scitovsky turned to
challenging both consumer demand theory and the American lifestyle of the 1970s:
“The economist, in his model of the consumer, does not include that part of
the consumer’s need. And, more important, the consumer himself, at least in
America, also seems reluctant to recognize his need for stimulus. That is
reflected in the bias of our consumption pattern. Our American life-style
provides much comfort, but little stimulation. That statement is so simple
and so sweeping that one might hold it suspect, but it can be documented
and explained.” (ibid., p. 150)
Like other economists critics of affluence – like Galbraith (1958), Mishan (1967),
Linder (1970), Schumacher (1973), Easterlin (1974) or Hirsch (1976) – Scitovsky
thought the solution came from improving (rather than increasing) consumption. For his
specific problem (the joylessness of consumers), the remedy was “culture” allowing
American households to develop consumption skills necessary to release “society’s
accumulated stock of past novelty” (ibid., p. 235). That released flow of novelty, would
then become available for consumers to choose whatever they considered “the most
enjoyable and stimulating” (ibid.).
Is happiness relative?
In 1978 (the year after Helson died), psychologists P. Brickman et al. produced and
analyzed new data in order to explore the hedonic treadmill effects of winning a lottery
25
or suffering a crippling accident. According to these psychologists, “the limits of the
proposition that happiness is relative” had not yet been tested (Brickman et al. 1978, p.
918). They proceeded through the hypothesis that if happiness was “completely
relative”, then groups receiving extremes of good and bad fortune, should differ from
one another in happiness “less than expected” (ibid.)18. Helson’s theory was proposed as
the best framework for considering that possibility, especially through Brickman and
Campbell’s (1971) discussion of the hedonic treadmill (ibid.).
The relative happiness test found significant effects of adaptation on happiness (i.e. the
hedonic treadmill), suggesting a series of implications. First: by ignoring the effects of
adaptation, people overestimated “the magnitude, generality, and duration of other
people’s feelings” (ibid., p. 926). Second: that bias had serious consequences as people
were likely to “cut off interaction” with the affected individuals, to either avoid
“potentially embarrassing” comparisons, or even respond to what they anticipate to be
“extremes of happiness or despair” (ibid.). Third: that reduced interaction, made it even
more difficult for the affected individuals to reach new adaptations to their social
environments (ibid.).
18
The study consisted of two parts: the first analyzed interviews with 29 accident
victims, 22 lottery winners, and 22 controls. It measured both “general happiness” and
“everyday pleasure”, and respondents were asked to rate how happy they were “at this
stage of their life”, “before winning”, “before the accident”, “6 months ago (for the
control group)”, “how happy they expected to be in a couple of years”, and to “rate how
pleasant they found each of seven activities or events”. The second part studied similar
interviews with “44 buyers and 42 nonbuyers of lottery tickets” to test happiness
differences between those two groups (Brickman et al. 1978, pp. 918-9).
26
Brickman et al. (1978) claimed that knowledge about AL theory could lead to a better
society, with people less threatened to interact with others. Their conclusions thus
joined McClelland’s (1971), about the importance of people being “taught the laws of
hedonic relativism”, to learn how to get greater satisfactions from life (McClelland
1971, p. 304). All contributions reviewed in this section, from Helson’s symposium to
Scitovsky’s The Joyless Economy and Brickman et al.’s study, are part of a growing
body of literature that developed during the 1970s. From there, and especially since the
late-1990s, it has been joined by many others, creating rich happiness research in both
psychology and economics19.
V. AL THEORY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (1970s-1980s)
As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, the rise of behavioral economics has
motivated much research about the history of economics and psychology. In addition to
retrospectives by behavioral economists and narratives on whether psychology has
remained in or out of economics, there is a recent trend towards rediscovering the
history of the two disciplines (e.g. Hands 2011, Heukelom 2012, HOPE special issue
2016). In that process, the history of behavioral economics has been enriched with
distinctions between current and past approaches, which are discussed here in relation to
Helson’s theory.
19
See Edwards (2010), for a detailed account of the history of happiness studies by
economists (and psychologists), including contributions by Easterlin (2001), Frank
(1989), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Kahneman et al. (2004), and Clark et al. (2008), all
explicitly referring to Helson’s theory.
27
AL theory and the “old” vs “new” behavioral economics
According to recent historical surveys, there are many different “psychologically
inspired” economists (Hands 2011) in the “tradition” leading to the establishment of
behavioral economics (Angner and Loewenstein 2012). In addition to the work on
utility of classical economists and early marginalists (like A. Smith, W.S. Jevons and
F.Y. Edgeworth), the list of precursors includes American institutionalists (T. Veblen,
W.C. Mitchell, J.M. Clark), macroeconomists (I. Fisher, J.M Keynes), those involved in
the ordinalist revolution (R. Allen, J. Hicks, P. Samuelson, E. Slutsky, V. Pareto), and
several others like T. Scitovsky, J. Duesenberry, H. Leibenstein and K. Boulding.
Historical connections between economics and psychology are indeed remarkably
frequent. This last section points out just the few episodes in which AL theory relates to
that story. As stated earlier, the specific connection between AL theory and economics,
happens mostly within behavioral economics, the other main thread being happiness
research (above).
The term behavioral economics has been used since the 1950s, but only became
frequent after the late-1970s, with the emergence of a new form of behavioral
economics (Sent 2004, Heukelom 2012). Unlike old behavioral economists – who
expressed a “dissatisfaction with mainstream economics” – the new ones respect the
rationality assumption and tend to follow the mainstream (Sent 2004, pp. 742-743)20.
20
Sent (2004) identifies four groups of old behavioral economists, some of their
members being respectively H. Simon, G. Katona, G. Schackle and P. Earl. The new
behavioral economics has been animated by D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, R. Thaler, M.
Rabin, G. Akerlof, R. Shiller, C. Camerer, D. Laibson, G. Loewenstein and many
28
Helson’s theory has travelled into the new (rather than the old) behavioral economics,
specifically though the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and some of their
closest followers.
“Prospect theory” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) is indeed the most influential article
ever referring to Helson in an economics journal. Its value function (i.e. the core of that
theory) evaluates gains and losses relative to dynamic reference points. Unlike previous
research, like Markowitz’ (1952) “level of customary wealth”, the new reference points
are explicitly defined as adaptation levels and explained through Helson’s theory21:
“An essential feature of the present theory is that the carriers of value are
changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states. This assumption is
compatible with basic principles of perception and judgment. Our perceptual
apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or differences rather than
to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes. When we respond to attributes
such as brightness, loudness, or temperature, the past and present context of
experience defines an adaptation level, or reference point, and stimuli are
perceived in relation to this reference point (Helson 1964) […] value should
be treated as a function in two arguments: the asset position that serves as
others. See Rabin (2002), Angner and Loewenstein (2012) and their references, for
exhaustive surveys about that subfield.
21
Unlike Kahneman and Tversky, Markowitz did not have a formula to calculate such
reference points: “It would be convenient if I had a formula from which customary
wealth could be calculated when this was not equal to present wealth. But I do not have
such a rule and formula” (Markowitz 1952, p. 157).
29
reference point, and the magnitude of the change (positive or negative) from
that reference point.” (ibid., p. 277)
Like Helson, Kahneman and Tversky applied the AL principle beyond mere perception
(i.e. to non-sensory attributes like health, prestige, and wealth). Unlike Helson,
however, they made their theory a model of choice, explaining individual decision
making under risk. Prospect theory was created in dialogue with the field of behavioral
sciences, including psychology, economics, operations research and decision theory
(Heukelom 2012)22. It was proposed from within (rather than opposed to) expected
utility theory, and shaped to “fit an economic audience” (ibid., p. 809). That process
took around four years, and was achieved by explicitly relating the new theory to work
by von Neumann and Morgenstern, Friedman and Savage, Allais, Ellsberg, Markowitz,
etc23.
Did behavioral economists adapt to AL theory?
One of the main features of the new behavioral economics is its descriptive vs.
normative distinction that twists the traditional positive/normative dichotomy of
economics (see Thaler 1980, Hands 2012). Since Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
22
See Angner and Loewenstein (2012) and Heukelom (2012) for accounts about
Kahneman, Tversky and Behavioral Decision Research (BDR), another branch of
psychology.
23
Heukelom’s (2012) history of Kahneman and Tversky also emphasizes on the
connection between prospect theory and psychophysics, but without referring to Helson’s
influence.
30
behavioral economics is directed against only part of expected utility theory (its
descriptive aspect), while preserving the core of the standard approach (its normative
aspect, which means assuming rational behavior as a standard or norm). This position
remains one of the factors explaining why behavioral economists have been going
mainstream during the last decades (Rabin 2002).
In their strategy of supplementing (instead of replacing) the methods and assumptions
of mainstream economics, the different principles borrowed by behavioral economists
from psychology, tend to be “simply” translated as (just) new assumptions about
preferences (ibid., pp. 659-663). These variations are presented as “among the least
radical changes one can make to economics” (ibid., p. 663). Like all other elements
borrowed from psychology, Helson’s theory has travelled somewhere in the periphery
(i.e. not the core) of the new program. In other words, AL theory has been imported as a
“departure from” (ibid.) or anomaly of economic behavior, and is not as essential for
behavioral economists today, as it was in Kahneman and Tversky’s original theory24.
As noted by Rabin (1998), Helson’s theory inspires the reference-dependence category
including diminishing sensitivities, loss aversions, and endowment effects (Rabin 1998,
pp. 13-16). In addition to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), AL theory has been explicitly
referred to by Kahneman and Tversky (1984), Kahneman and Thaler (1991), Camerer et
al. (1997), Rabin (1998), and Loewenstein et al. (2003) to discuss these kinds of topics.
24
See R. Thaler’s “Anomalies” series in the Journal of Economic Perspectives,
especially Thaler (1987) and Kahneman et al. (1991) on the “endowment effect”, the
“status quo bias” and “loss aversion”.
31
However, this list remains remarkably short, compared to how often the concept of
adaptation is used by behavioral economists25.
Behavioral economics today rarely acknowledges Helson or AL theory, let alone their
history. In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman’s (2011) historical survey makes no
mention to what has been discussed throughout this essay. Instead, he sets up an easy
do-it-yourself experience with water-buckets (remember Haber 1958), to explain the
concept of adaptation level:
“Evaluation is relative to a neutral reference point, which is sometimes
referred to as an ‘adaptation level’. You can easily set up a compelling
demonstration of this principle. Place three bowls of water in front of you.
Put ice water into the left-hand bowl and warm water into the right-hand
bowl. The water in the middle bowl should be at room temperature.
Immerse your hands in the cold and warm water for about a minute, then dip
both in the middle bowl. You will experience the same temperature as heat
in one hand and cold in the other. For financial outcomes, the usual
25
Kahneman and Tversky’s “Choices, values, and frames” (1984), was presented as an
address to the American Psychological Association at the occasion of their
Distinguished Scientific Contributions Award (the same Helson received in 1962). In
the published version of the paper, they refer to Brickman and Campbell’s (1971)
version of AL theory. Some other contributions by Kahneman – like Kahneman et al.
(2004) and Dolan and Kahneman (2008) – refer to AL theory through the concept of the
hedonic treadmill, but relate better to happiness research than to behavioral economics.
32
reference point is status quo, but it can also be the outcome that you expect
[…].” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 282)
References to AL theory seem to be disappearing from behavioral economics, perhaps
because “reference to concepts rather than names” is indeed the “natural development in
the growth of a science” (Helson 1971, p. 5). Robert K. Merton (1949) described stories
like this one as “obliterations by incorporation”, which lead to ignoring the sources of
supposedly new ideas. Or perhaps Kahneman (2011) was just thinking too fast? While
the history of AL theory may be unnecessary to make behavioral economics, it is,
however, important in order to help us appreciate its history, as well as to understand
the broader relationship between psychology and economics.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Harry Helson’s Adaptation-Level (AL) theory began with a series of Gestalt-type
studies of color perception, but turned into a broad research program applying the AL
principle to a wide range of topics. Although recognized by the Distinguished Scientific
Contribution Award of the American Psychological Association in 1962, it has been
claimed that Helson “never fully received the recognition he deserved” (Bevan, 1979, p.
158). Helson himself, understood that lack of personal recognition was due to the
acceptance of AL theory as elementary/common knowledge (i.e. reference to concepts
rather than names). Something similar seems to be happening with his theory within
behavioral economics.
AL theory arose from experiments in a “color booth”, which were extended to the
analysis of new forms of stimulation, and then even further on to the study of human
judgment. It made its main impact during the 1950s and 1960s, as it involved the study
33
of affectivity, motivation and behavior, through the “discrepancy approach” developed
by McClelland et al. (1953), Haber (1958) and Helson (1964) himself.
Once shaped into motivational psychology, AL theory spread throughout literature as
did the “butterfly curves”, which travelled to welfare analysis (e.g. Brickman and
Campbell 1971, Scitovsky 1976). This happened along a broader discussion about the
problems created by mass production and affluence in America and other western
countries (e.g. J.K. Galbraith, E. Mishan, R. Easterlin, F. Hirsch), which initiated the
now fruitful happiness research (Edwards 2010).
A different case is that of Helson’s theory and behavioral economics. While originally
referring to AL theory, current work by behavioral economists tends to overlook
Helson’s contributions. While it may be right to present AL theory as sort of
elementary/common knowledge (e.g. Kahneman 2011), that should not hide its history,
nor the way it has travelled between disciplines. This essay intends to contribute to the
history of economics and psychology. By presenting the history of AL theory, it also
hopes to make Helson’s work accessible to those who may benefit from old solutions to
their new problems.
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FIGURE 2
FIGURE 3
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