Threat Modeling and the Zero Day Problem A quick look at how methodical threat modeling could combat an enterprise’s security problem Christopher Lee 1 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Agenda 2 Software Vulnerabilities are Out of Control! The Basic Vocabulary of Risk Management What is Threat Modeling How does Threat Modeling help, even in the face of Zero-day vulnerabilities? Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Coping with Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities are being reported at an alarming rate, despite vendors’ focus on writing secure code. Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 – Q1-Q3 # of vulnerabilities 2,437 4,129 3,784 3,780 5,990 8,064 5,568 CERT/CC Statistics 1988-2007 3 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Cost of Reacting to Those Vulnerabilities… Two major reactionary response to Software Vulnerabilities Patching System –or- Software Reconfiguration “10% of machines will need to patched manually at a cost of $50/machine”. - Marc Donner, executive director, Morgan Stanley $50 * 500 = $25,000 (plus the cost of patch management software and patch testing). …and this is only for one patch in a 5000-node network… Major software vendors have published their own “Hardening Guidelines” 4 In essence, accept no system defaults and remove everything that you don’t need. However, the operating system vendor’s harden recommendation could also prevent some application from working… More importantly, system and/or software reconfiguration tend to cost even more than applying patches. Reactive measures are not the answer! Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Let’s be Proactive… 5 More Firewalls? More IDS/IPS? More Heuristics? More Security Widgets? More Consultants? Where is the end to this Madness! Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Establish the Language… 6 Asset Control Threat Vulnerability Risk Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Establish the Language - Asset Asset 7 Something an organization has determined to be valuable and must be protected. e.g. Resource, Process, Product, Infrastructure, Engineering Diagrams, and etc Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Establish the Language - Safeguard Control 8 Product and/or processes employed to mitigate a specific threat( or a group of threats) to an acceptable level e.g. Firewall, Locked Doors, Smart Cards, DRP/BCP Processes, Insurance, and etc. Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Establish the Language - Threat Threat 9 Activity that represents possible dangers to the Assets e.g. Unexpected Destruction of Buildings, Loss of Power, Destructive Virus, Departure of key Technical Staff Not possible to protect against all threats Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Establish the Language - Vulnerability Vulnerability 10 Weakness that allow threats to materialize Absence of sufficient safeguard e.g. Poorly Designed Network, Improperly Configured Equipment, Poor Choice of Passwords, Lack of Redundancy, and etc. Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Establish the Language - Risk Risk 11 = Threat * Vulnerability * Assets Values The degree for which the vulnerability can be exploited by one or more previous identified threats Assessed either Quantitatively or Qualitatively Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling Overview of the methodology: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 12 Identify Assets Identify Asset Access Mechanism Create Architecture Overview Identify Threats Document Threats Qualify Threats Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough ACME Inc. 13 Financial Data Services Migrate from Global Dialer to Internet Client-Server application • Client: Visual C++ on Win32 platforms • Server: C++ on AIX • Middleware: WebSphere MQ-Series • Database: DB2 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough Step 1, Identify the Assets 14 The financial data Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough Step 2, Identify Asset Access Mechanism 15 The data is stored in database. And is created, modified, and queried by the end-user through the application server Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough Step 3, Create Architecture Overview Application Client MQ Client Application Server Request Queue 0 Windows 2000/XP/ME Request Queue 1 Request Queue 2 Request Queue 3 Client Request Queue 4 Firewall Request Queue 5 Queue Manager MQ API Application Server Request Queue 6 Request Queue 7 Request Queue 8 Input Messages Request Queue 9 Reply Queue Output Messages AIX Financial Data DB2 Database Query Firewall AIX Database 16 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough Step 4, Identify the Threats 17 Eavesdropping Data during Transit Data Modification/Injection during Transit Single Points of Failure at • Firewall • Application Server • Database Server Lack of communication control / physical separation to the DB2 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough Step 5, Document the Threats Threat Description Eavesdropping Data during Transit Threat Target Message between Client and Server 18 Risk ????? Attack Technique Traffic Capturing Countermeasure IPSEC Encryption Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough Step 6, Qualify the Threats 19 The DREAD Model (4) High = 3 Medium = 2 Low = 1 Damage Potential The attacker can subvert the security system; get full trust authorization; run as administrator; upload content. Leaking sensitive information Leaking trivial information Reproducibility The attack can be reproduced every time and does not require a timing window. The attack can be reproduced, but only with a timing window and a particular race situation. The attack is very difficult to reproduce, even with knowledge of the security hole. Exploitability A novice programmer could make the attack in a short time. A skilled programmer could make the attack, then repeat the steps. The attack requires an extremely skilled person and in-depth knowledge every time to exploit. Affected Users All users, default configuration, key customers Some users, non-default configuration Very small percentage of users, obscure feature; affects anonymous users Discoverability Published information explains the attack. The vulnerability is found in the most commonly used feature and is very noticeable. The vulnerability is in a seldomused part of the product, and only a few users should come across it. It would take some thinking to see malicious use. The bug is obscure, and it is unlikely that users will work out damage potential. Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling – a Walkthrough Threat: Eavesdropping Data during Transit Damage Potential = 2 Reproducibility = 3 Exploitability = 2 Affected Users = 3 Discoverability = 2 RISK = 2 + 3 + 2 + 3 + 2 = 12 20 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Apply the Results of Threat Modeling Application Client VPN Dialer Application MQ Client Application Server VPN Client Request Queue 0 Windows 2000/XP/ME Request Queue 1 Request Queue 2 Request Queue 3 Client Request Queue 4 Firewall Queue Manager Request Queue 5 MQ API Application Server Request Queue 6 Request Queue 7 Request Queue 8 Input Messages Request Queue 9 Reply Queue Output Messages IPSec VPN AIX VPN Gateway Financial Data Database Query DB2 Firewall AIX Database 21 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Upcoming Advisories? 22 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Time between Vulnerability Discovery and Patch Release 23 Microsoft Security Bulletin MS05-014 Vendor Notified on Feb-16-2004 (6) Patch released on Feb-08-2005 (Previously released on Nov-2004) Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD The Zero-Day Problem… So is Anti-Virus signatures… So is Intrusion Prevention Signatures… 24 Patches and workarounds are released after the fact What happens between an exploit for a vulnerability is discovered and when one of the above is released? Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling for the Zero-Day Threat Modeling gives us: 25 Identification of information assets Identification of threats and associated qualifications Basis for Risk Assessment • Risk Mitigation Strategies • Basis for implementation of Products & Processes No more surprises, no more scrambling, and no more crisis. Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Threat Modeling ≠ Silver Bullet 26 You can’t always eliminate the Risks! Effectiveness depends on Subject Matter Expertise on the implemented technology Evolution of Technology Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Conclusion 27 Race between Reactive Countermeasures and Vulnerability Discovery is a fact of life Systematic defense, build on thorough Threat Modeling methodology, is your best protection There is still no silver bullet! Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD References 1. CERT Statistics: http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html 2. Marc Donner, “Bits, Bad Guys, and Bucks”, Volume Three, Issue Two, Secure Business Quarterly, http://www.sbq.com/sbq/patch/sbq_patch_mdonner.pdf 3. Dana Epp, “Dana Epp's ramblings at the Sanctuary: Understanding Threat Modeling”, retrieved on May 22, 2005, http://silverstr.ufies.org/blog/archives/000611.html 4. 28 J.D. Meier, Alex Mackman, Michael Dunner, Srinath Vasireddy, Ray Escamilla and Anandha Murukan, Microsoft Corporation, “Threat Modeling”, retrieved on May 22, 2005, http://msdn.microsoft.com/security/securecode/threatmodeling/default.aspx?pull=/library/enus/dnnetsec/html/thcmch03.asp 5. Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, “Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) Framework, Version 1.0”, retrieved on May 22, 2005 http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/documents/99.reports/99tr017/99tr017figures.html 6. Jouko Pynnonen (February, 2005). Posting to the BugTraq mailing list RE: “Internet Explorer zone spoofing with encoded URLs”, retrieved on May 22, 2005, http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/389859/2005-02-03/2005-02-09/0 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD Questions? 29 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. Used under license. / Utilisé en vertu d’une licence. MTS Allstream Inc. proprietary. Use pursuant to company instructions./ Information exclusive à MTS Allstream Inc. Utiliser conformément aux directives de la société. ® MD
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