JIALIANG ZHU
(703)· 401 · 6136 [email protected] https://sites.google.com/site/jialiangzhu1987/
Department of Economics The George Washington University
2115 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20052
EDUCATION
The George Washington University, Washington, DC
Anticipated
Ph.D., Economics
The George Washington University, Washington, DC
M.A., Economics
Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai
B.A., International Economics and Trade
Northern State University, Aberdeen, SD
Student Exchange Program
July 2017
May 2014
July 2009
Fall 2008
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Primary: Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics, and Econometrics
Secondary: Health Economics, Environmental Economics
WORKING PAPERS
“Earning the Grade or Just Window Dressing? The Effects of Information Disclosure on Restaurant
Hygiene Quality” (under review at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics)
“Inspection in Disguise: A Study of Repeated Restaurant Inspections”
“Do Restaurants Bunch at the Kink Point?”
WORK IN PROGRESS
“Consumer Search in Credence Goods Market”
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Short-Term Consultant, The World Bank Group
Investment Climate Analysis, Bhutan Project
December 2015–Present
Washington, DC
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant, The George Washington University
International Trade Between China and United States Project, School of Business
Fall 2011
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Lecturer, The George Washington University
Summer 2016
Principles of Macroeconomics
Course Evaluation: 4.5/5 (Department Average: 3.9)
Teaching Assistant, The George Washington University
International Finance (MBA)
Fall 2011
Principles of Macroeconomics
Spring 2012, 2013 & 2015, Fall 2012
Principles of Microeconomics
Spring 2014 & 2016, Fall 2013, 2014, 2015
CONFERENCE & SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS
“Inspection in Disguise: A Study of Repeated Restaurant Inspections”
· The 43rd Annual Conference European Association for Research in Industrial Economics,
Lisbon, Portugal
· Econometric Society Conference, Kyoto, Japan
· The 42nd Annual Conference, Eastern Economic Association, Washington, D.C.
Aug 2016
Aug 2016
Feb 2016
“Earning the Grade or Just Window Dressing? The Effects of Information Disclosure on
Restaurant Hygiene Quality”
· Microeconomics Seminar, Economics Department, GWU
· The 85th Annual Conference, Southern Economic Association, New Orleans, LA
· The 42nd Annual Conference European Association for Research in Industrial Economics,
Munich, Germany
· Singapore Economic Review Conference, Singapore
· The Society of Government Economists Annual Conference, Washington, D.C.
Dec 2015
Nov 2015
Aug 2015
Aug 2015
May 2015
Software Technical Seminar
· Stata Technical Seminar for Graduate Students, SUIBE, Shanghai
· Stata Technical Series Seminars, GWU
June 2014
Feb 2014
FELLOWSHIPS & RESEARCH GRANTS
Conference Travel Grant, GWU
University Fellowship & Graduate Teaching Assistantship, GWU
Outstanding Graduate, SUIBE
Scholarship for Academic Excellence, SUIBE
Aug 2015
Jan 2012–May 2016
2009
2005-2009
LANGUAGE & SKILLS
Computer Skills: SAS (Certified Advanced Programmer ), Stata, MATLAB, R, LATEX
Language: Chinese (native), English (fluent)
REFERENCES
Prof. Wallace P. Mullin (Chair)
Department of Economics
The George Washington University
T 202-994-8087
B [email protected]
Prof. Arun S. Malik
Department of Economics
The George Washington University
T 202-994-5471
B [email protected]
Prof. Robert F. Phillips
Department of Economics
The George Washington University
T 202-994-8619
B [email protected]
Prof. Irene R. Foster
Department of Economics
The George Washington University
T 202-994-2318
B [email protected]
RESEARCH PAPER ABSTRACTS
Earning the Grade or Just Window Dressing? The Effects of Information Disclosure on
Restaurant Hygiene Quality
This paper explores New York City’s new mandatory information disclosure policy of posting hygiene
quality grade cards on restaurant windows. I find that the dual inspection process (initial inspection
and re-inspection) has been exploited by restaurants. In particular, after getting an A card in the
re-inspection, restaurants frequently revert back to the previous bad hygiene conditions by the time
of a subsequent initial inspection. As a result, there is no significant overall hygiene improvement in
NYC. Furthermore, I use random effects and ordered logit models to find that the reduction in asymmetric information by hygiene letter grades narrows the difference of hygiene score between chain and
non-chain restaurants, which was previously due to greater consumer knowledge of chain restaurants’
reputations.
Inspection in Disguise: A Study of Repeated Inspections
This paper examines collusive behavior within a three-layer hierarchy: principal, supervisor, and agent.
Using restaurant hygiene inspection data from 2006 to 2015, I track the relationship between inspectors
and restaurants in repeated hygiene inspections in King County including Seattle, WA. The key finding
shows that for a restaurant that has been inspected repeatedly by the same inspector, the arrival of an
unexpected inspector uncovers 28% more critical violations, with a higher (worse) hygiene score by 2
points. However, if this unexpected inspector has visited the restaurant before–defined as acquainted
inspector–he reports only 10% more critical violations, 18% less than a brand new, or unacquainted
inspector. This acquaintance effect suggests that personal familiarity and mutual respect between the
inspector and restaurant owner may decrease objectivity during inspections.
Do Restaurants Bunch at the Kink Point?
This paper uses hygiene inspection data in New York City to investigate bunching at the kink point
of different hygiene inspection policies. From the empirical hygiene inspection score distributions in
different policy periods, I find restaurants bunch around the hygiene score threshold and estimate the
elasticity of hygiene scores with respect to the hygiene violation fine. I also estimate the monetary
value of reputation created by posting the highest hygiene letter grade–letter A. The highly elastic
result suggests the pecuniary incentive can still be an effective tool to encourage restaurants to reduce
hygiene violations and maintain good hygiene conditions.