SECURE SIMPLE EFFICIENT Jakob I. Pagter USING MARKET DESIGN AND CRYPTOGRAPHY TO ENABLE NEW BUSINESS Cryptography meets Economy Economists looking for a ”social planner” HEUREKA! Cryptographers looking for a problem 5 (five!) years later • Three PC’s on LAN computes clearing price based on apx. 2400 encrypted bids which are never decrypted. • Finally – a market clearing price and the amount of quota that each farmer must sell/ buy – the result is decrypted • Following, the production rights (quota) for 25000 tons of sugar changes hands Public-key cryptography ! "#$%#&'($%'&#)#*+#&',(-'.#/'0(*&1'2$#' 32&'#$)&/04$5'($%'2$#'32&'%#)&/04$5' ! 671'0(%82).' 6+#&/92%/')($'-,:;';,#'82).'<#$)&/0;=' 9:;'2$8/';,#',28%#&'23';,#'>(;),*$5'.#/' )($'20#$';,#'82).'<%#)&/0;=' “Shallow” confidentiality *$0:;?' 60.<*$0:;?=' ?F G#)&/0;' @F H2>0:;#' *$0:;@' 60.<*$0:;@=' *$0:;A' 60.<*$0:;A=' D&:-;#%'D,*&%'E(&;/' 60.<*$0:;B=' *$0:;B' *$0:;C' 60.<*$0:;C=' &#-:8;' “Deep” confidentiality *$0:;?' *$0:;@' *$0:;A' 60.<*$0:;?=' 60.<&#-:8;(;=' 60.<*$0:;@=' 60.<*$0:;A=' DDE?' DDE@' 60.<*$0:;B=' *$0:;B' 60.<*$0:;C=' DDEA' *$0:;C' DDEC' &#-:8;' DDEB' Back to the sugar beets • Grown and sold to Danisch based on EU quotas (like fish, milk, etc.) • • Untill 2007/2008 trading of quotas has been done by bilateral trades facilitated through paper ads, personal connections etc. One out three factories shut down and guaranteed prices lowered => a lot of growers near shut down factory who wishes to sell • Theoretical analysis indicate that a central exchange could – Increase turnover with as much as 400% – Ensure almost full use of entire national quota (less than 50% use without re-allocation) An exchange (double auction) • All growers submit one or more bids on the form – Buy (maxprice, volume) – Sell (minprice, volume) • Aggregated demand (supply): Total volume bought (sold) at given price • Market Clearing Price: the price where supply equals demand • This auction design and market size makes it optimal to bid truthfully, which ensures that all preferred trades are realised. Tillidsproblem • Optimalt for dyrkerne at byde ”sandfærdigt” i henhold til deres indtjeningsevne • Danisco kan potentielt udnytte viden om dyrkernes indtjeningsevne • Danisco ønsker samtidigt at kontrollere handlen med kvoter, pga. udestående gæld mv. Modstridende interesser!! – Dyrkerne ønsker ikke at Danisco kan se bud – Danisco har behov for at kontrollere budene • Hvordan kan gevinsterne ved en central børs realiseres?! Trust problem Growers do not want Danisco to see bids How can market potential be realised?! Danisco needs to see and verify bids Systems architecture Us Danisco SIMAP webserver session DB DB LAN log-in Java-applet DB Grower representative Encrypted bid(s) grower bidding Danisco DB clearing Enabling new business with SMC Shallow confidentiality Deep confidentiality Small administrative overhead Every decrypted by TTP Insider access = > problems No insider threat No confidential data decrypted In practice used to realise “good enough” security Cloud computing Cloud Computing • Cheap (economies of scale/pay-by-the-drink) • Elastic • Innovation catalyst • Maybe more secure…? Types (NIST) • IaaS – Infrastructure-as-aService • Amazon Web Services • PaaS – Platform-as-aService • Microsoft Azure • SaaS – Software-as-aService • Google Apps Auctions-as-a-Service (“SaaS”) Cloud A 2. Submit bids 1. Define auction Cloud C Cloud B 4. Make the deal 3. Find winner Cloud D Mechanism design with SMC Security • Confidential data never decrypted • “Good enough”security Simplicity • Security policy reduced to “protect your key” • Small TCB! Efficiency • Manuel procedures replaced by computers • Cloud-enabled Cloud brokering (a CFEM-topic?) Cloud Provider A Cloud Provider B Cloud Provider C properties properties properties Cloud Broker preferences recommendation Job Security, price, performanc e, stability, … Questions? [email protected] www.partisia.com
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