The Forgotten Colony
Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Conflict Irresolution in the Western Sahara
Razane Cherk
GOVT 370: IPOL Honors
April 7, 2016
Abstract
The durability of the Moroccan narrative on the Western Sahara combined with the complementary
narratives and strategic interests of its closest allies, the United States and France, have contributed
to the monarchy’s ability to continue committing human rights violations in the Western Sahara with
little opposition. The Western Sahara has been the battleground of competing narratives since the
1970s. The United States, France, Morocco, and the Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saquia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro) are the main actors whose narratives have shaped how the conflict
has unfolded over the past forty years. The Moroccan narrative emphasizes that the Western Sahara
is a historical part of Morocco and that Sahrawis are simply Moroccans, completely denying the
Polisario’s narrative. The Moroccan monarchy has been so successful at promoting this idea that
even those Moroccans who do not understand the conflict chant about the Western Sahara being
Moroccan and always Moroccan (al-sahra maghribiya, dima maghribiya). Furthermore, while the
narrative has usually been portrayed as representing the views of the monarchy, embodied in the
monarch himself, since 1975, King Hassan II extended it to make it become a part of each
Moroccan’s identity. On the other hand, the Polisario has an opposing, also nationalistic narrative
that emphasizes its desire for an independent Western Sahara for the Sahrawi people. These
competing narratives have contributed to Morocco’s ability to continue committing human rights
violations in the Western Sahara with little backlash by its closest allies and the international
community.
1
The Western Sahara conflict has been unresolved for four decades now, with little hope of a
resolution any time soon. In early March of 2016, in an unprecedented move, Secretary-General of
the United Nations (UN), Ban Ki-moon visited the refugee camps near Tindouf in southwestern
Algeria, characterizing the situation of the Sahrawi refugees as “unacceptable.”1 Ban also said that
the parties to the conflict have not made sufficient progress in forging a resolution, prompting his
decision to visit the area to encourage resuming negotiations.2 The Moroccan government’s response
to Ban’s visit illustrates how the monarchy views the conflict as tied to its very identity and
legitimacy. On March 13, 2016, thousands of Moroccans marched in Rabat, protesting Ban’s visit
and his alleged “bias” against Moroccan sovereignty.3 Some marchers even said that they were
provided with transportation to the march by bus and that trains were free on the day of the event.4
The source of the monarchy’s anger was Ban’s alleged use of the word “occupation” to describe the
conflict, illustrating how powerful words can be in the Moroccan state’s view. Initially, the
Moroccan government threatened to reduce the number of staff working for the UN Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and even to bring back its troops working for UN
peacekeeping missions in other countries.5 While deciding against bringing back its troops from
other missions, eighty-four MINURSO members were given a three-day warning to leave the
United Nations (UN), “In Algeria, the United Nations Chief Calls to Ease ‘Unacceptable’ Plight of Sahrawi
Refugees,” UN News Center, March 05, 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53377#.Vu-pCJ97IV.
2
Aomar Ouali, “UN Chief to Send Envoy to Restart Western Sahara Talks,” Washington Post, March 6, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/un-chief-to-send-envoy-to-restart-western-saharatalks/2016/03/06/255d181e-e3d1-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html.
3
Aziz El Yaakoubi, “Moroccans Protest over U.N. Ban's West Sahara Position,” Reuters, March 13, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-protests-idUSKCN0WF0KK.
4
Ibid.
5
Kayla Ruble, “Morocco Boots UN Diplomats over Western Sahara Spat,” VICE News, March 18, 2016,
https://news.vice.com/article/morocco-boots-un-diplomats-over-western-sahara-spat.
1
2
Western Sahara.6 The strongly-held belief that the Western Sahara is Moroccan is not only
propagated by the monarchy, but also by Moroccans themselves, with one protestor saying
Moroccans were rallied at the march “to tell Ban and the world that the Sahara is a red line for us,
and we would die for it.”7
Competing discourses by the different actors involved in the Western Sahara dispute have
had a major influence on how the conflict has unfolded and been perceived since 1975. These
differing narratives have also contributed to the marginalization of the human rights situation in the
territory and to Morocco’s ability to evade punishment for its violations. This paper will examine
these competing narratives in order to analyze how the different actors involved understand the
conflict and how these understandings have shaped the human rights situation in the territory up to
the present day. Furthermore, by looking at the conflict through an examination of human rights and
narrative, it is possible to better understand the underlying issues that have led to the dispute’s lack
of resolution after four decades. While most academics have focused on the strategic and political
aspects, namely the roles of the U.S. and France, this paper will look at the situation through all three
lenses: human rights violations, competing narratives, and strategic interests. This will give a more
well-rounded view of the conflict that, as will be discussed later, is missing from the current
literature on this topic.
The U.S. and France have supported Morocco since the beginning of the conflict in Western
Sahara, as illustrated by the continued increase in trade and investment throughout the years, in spite
of the human rights situation. Since 9/11, American and French relations with Morocco have been
bolstered by the countries’ cooperation in the global fight against terrorism. The U.S. does not
readily support the independence of the Western Sahara due its fear of the territory becoming a
6
7
Ibid.
Ibid.
3
terrorist safe haven. France has similar concerns. To ensure that Morocco continues to support the
Americans and the French by providing them with the intelligence and access they need in the
Maghreb, the U.S. and France have shaped their narratives to oppose Sahrawi self-determination and
any attempts to pressure Morocco about its violations in the Western Sahara.
The monarchy’s narrative of the conflict has evolved over time, utilizing different strategies
depending on the political situation. As William Zartman notes, throughout different periods,
Morocco has adopted three different strategies: aggressive claiming, defensive confirming, and
offensive bargaining.8 These strategies will be examined in depth later on in the paper. This shaping
and reshaping of the narrative has helped the monarchy ensure its legitimacy and undermine the
Polisario. Morocco has also been proactive about ensuring support for its position through forging
and maintaining diplomatic ties with various countries. When there is a crisis or a country hinting at
recognizing the Western Sahara, the monarchy goes on the offensive and uses any tools it can to
ensure that it has the upper hand. For example, in 2015, the Moroccan government decided to shut
down IKEA in response to the Swedish government’s discussions about possibly recognizing the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).9 This consistent diplomatic action on the part of
Morocco has made it very difficult for the Polisario to be able to effectively garner as much political
support as it needs.
The Polisario has diplomatic ties with many countries and has certainly succeeded in earning
much support for its cause. Since its inception, over eighty countries, most of them located in Africa
and South America as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or African Union (AU)
William Zartman, “Morocco’s Saharan Policy,” in Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and
Geopolitics, eds. Anouar Boukhars and Jacques Roussellier (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 55-6.
9
Reuters, “Morocco Blocks Ikea Store in Row over Swedish Support for Breakaway Republic,” The Guardian,
September 29, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/moroccan-authorities-block-ikea-storeopening-in-row-over-swedish-support-for-independent-republic-in-western-sahara.
8
4
today, recognized the SADR.10 However, this success has been rather limited because of Morocco’s
offensive strategy, which has led to about thirty of these countries cancelling or suspending their
recognition and/or freezing their relations with the SADR since the 1990s, most likely due to being
pressured to do so by the monarchy or one of its allies.11 The Polisario’s narrative focuses on the
independence of the Western Sahara, which goes directly against the monarchy’s belief in the
territory being an integral part of Morocco. As Khadija Mohsen-Finan puts it, both sides want “all or
nothing,” either independence or integration/autonomy, which has made it very difficult for the
conflict to be resolved thus far.12 In addition to irresolution, the Polisario’s inability to adequately
back its narrative of self-determination, nationalism, and democracy has led to Morocco being able
to act with impunity in the Western Sahara, committing human rights violations that continue to this
day.
Before delving into an examination of the dispute itself, a literature review will be presented
to illustrate the gaps that exist in the discussion about human rights in the Western Sahara and
explain how this paper will contribute to the existing work done on the conflict. The paper will then
offer a historical overview, followed by a theoretical framework on the study of human rights and
norms. This theoretical framework will guide the subsequent discussion about Morocco’s human
rights violations. The later sections will focus on analyzing the involved actors’ competing narratives
and providing an examination of how these competing discourses have affected the human rights
situation in the Western Sahara.
ARSO (Association de Soutien à un Référendum Libre et Régulier au Sahara Occidental), “Countries that
recognize the SADR,” http://www.arso.org/03-2.htm.
11
Ibid.; Also see Zartman, “Morocco’s Saharan Policy,” 65.
12
Khadija Mohsen-Finan, “Sahara Occidental: Divergences Profondes Autour d’un Mode de Règlement,” L'Année
du Maghreb, no. V (2009): 1-16.
10
5
Literature Review
While the history of the Western Sahara conflict has been extensively discussed in books and
articles, the human rights situation has not. In-depth discussion concerning Morocco’s violations in
the Western Sahara has been mostly conducted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.13 However, there is little examination of the
human rights situation in the territory in the academic discourse on human rights violations. Many
sources focus on the situation of the Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf, but not on the situation of
Sahrawis within the territory itself.14 Looking at the conflict through the lens of human rights will
give a much needed insight into a situation that has usually been examined through the lens of
political and strategic interests. In addition to the history of the dispute, related political and
diplomatic issues, such as the effect of Morocco’s alliances with the U.S. and France on the
continuation of the conflict, have also been analyzed. A thorough examination that looks at the
effects of alliances and competing narratives on the human rights situation in Western Sahara is
needed. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the role of alliances, the
selectivity of the application of human rights norms, and competing narratives in the Western Sahara
conflict.
Analysis of the history of the dispute is found in most sources dealing with the situation.
Scholars, such as John Damis, Erik Jensen, and Tony Hodges, focus on presenting a historical
overview of the conflict and the reasons for its stalemate.15 Other scholars examine the progression
Amnesty International, “Morocco/Western Sahara,” Amnesty International,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco/; Human Rights Watch (HRW),
“Morocco/Western Sahara,” Human Rights Watch (HRW), https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/nafrica/morocco/western-sahara.
14
See Pablo San Martín, Western Sahara: The Refugee Nation, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010).
15
John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,
1983); Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012);
Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill Books, 1983).
13
6
of Morocco’s relations with the various actors involved. Geoffrey Jensen and Leo Kamil examine
Morocco’s relations with the U.S. since the beginning of the conflict and how these relations have
evolved.16 Scholars such as Akbarali Thobhani focus less on the changes in alliances over the history
of the conflict and more on Morocco’s political and infrastructural contributions to the Western
Sahara or “the southern provinces” (les provinces du sud) as the monarchy refers to it.17 Many
French language sources also delve extensively into the history and dynamics of the conflict, but do
not discuss the human rights situation in depth.18 Abdelkhaleq Berramdane looks at the conflict
during different time periods and includes a historical analysis of Morocco’s relationships with the
different actors involved, with an emphasis on Algeria.19 On the other hand, Hassan ‘Alaoui
investigates the internal situation, taking a pro-Moroccan stance on the issue and discussing
Algeria’s role in supporting the Polisario.20 In general, Arabic language sources also examine similar
themes, such as the history of Morocco’s relations with the Polisario, the Western Sahara conflict’s
effect on international relations, and the evolution of Morocco’s policy towards the territory under
King Hassan II.21
Other sources examine the political views and strategies of various actors with vested
interests in the conflict such as the U.S. and France. Anthony Pazzanita’s article on Morocco and
the Polisario, for example, centers on how the relationship between the two entities has affected the
16
Geoffrey Jensen, War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013);
Leo Kamil, Fueling the Fire: U.S. Policy & the Western Sahara Conflict, (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987).
17
Akbarali Thobhani, Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan Administration: Social, Economic, and Political
Transformation, (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).
18
Robert Rézette, Le Sahara Occidental et les Frontières Marocaines, (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1975).
19
Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, La Sahara Occidental: Enjeu Maghrébin, (Paris: Karthala, 1992).
20
Ḥassan ‘Alaoui, Guerre Secrète au Sahara Occidental, (Paris: Encre d'Orient, 2010).
21
Ṭāhir Saʻūd, Nizāʻ Al-Ṣaḥrāʼ Al-Gharbīyah Bayna Al-Maghrib Wa-al-Būlīsāriyū, (Dimashq: Ṭ. Saʻūd, 1998);
ʻUmar Ṣadūq, Qaḍīyat Al-Ṣaḥrāʼ Al-Gharbīyah Fī Iṭār Al-qānūn Al-dawlī Wa-al-ʻalāqāt Al-dawlīyah: Dirāsah
Qānūnīyah Wa-siyāsīyah, (Al-Jazāʼir: Dīwān Al-Maṭbūʻāt Al-Jāmiʻīyah, 1986); Bin ʻĀmir Tūnisī, Taqrīr Al-maṣīr
Wa-qaḍīyat Al-Ṣaḥrāʼ Al-Gharbīyah, (Al-Jazāʼir: Al-Muʼassasah Al-Jazāʼirīyah Lil-Ṭibāʻah, 1978); Muḥammad
Abu Al-ʿAz Bouriyala, Al-Ṣaḥrāʼ Al-Maghrībīyah min khilal Al-Tarikh Wa-al-Diblomasiya Al-Hassaniya, (Oujda,
Al-Maghrib: Maktabat Al-Talib, 2002).
7
ability of the UN and other NGOs to help resolve the dispute.22 Other sources focus on one aspect of
the conflict and expand upon it. Yahia Zoubir analyzes the role of alliances and “power politics” in
the conflict.23 Finan also looks at the effects of other countries’ interests on the Western Sahara
conflict while emphasizing the importance of domestic issues in Morocco’s refusal to cede the
territory.24 Laurence Ammour examines external interests and analyzes who is profiting from the
prolongation of the conflict.25 Another source goes another route, comparing the Western Sahara
conflict with East Timor and examining the role of natural resources in the dispute.26 Stephen Zunes
and Jacob Mundy examine the relations between Morocco and the other countries involved in the
conflict as well as the Polisario and offer their take on possible solutions.27 There is also some
discussion on the tactics the Moroccan government has utilized to repress Sahrawi selfdetermination.28 While all of these sources delve into the political and diplomatic aspects of the
conflict, there is little examination of the human rights situation.
Other sources examine the history and political issues mentioned above as well as other
aspects such as internal dynamics, demography, and the Polisario’s role. The book, Perspectives on
Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and Geopolitics, examines various aspects of the conflict
such as Sahrawi identity, the roles of the U.S. and other countries in the dispute as well as the recent
Anthony G. Pazzanita, “Morocco versus Polisario: A Political Interpretation,” The Journal of Modern African
Studies 32, no. 2 (1994): 265-78.
23
Yahia H. Zoubir, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality,” Middle East Policy 14, no. 4
(2007): 158-77.
24
Khadija Mohsen-Finan, “Trente Ans de Conflit au Sahara Occidental,” Ifri (2008): 2-16.
25
Laurence Ammour, “À Qui Profite le Gel du Conflit du Sahara Occidental?” Collège De Défense De L’OTAN:
Academic Research Branch, no. 30 (2006): 1-8.
26
Claes Olsson, ed., The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization, (Uppsala,
Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006).
27
Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 2010).
28
Ibid.
22
8
tensions between Sahrawis and Moroccans in the territory.29 Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, on the other
hand, focuses more on the situation of Sahrawi refugees in the camps near the city of Tindouf in
Algeria and on the effect of the Polisario’s “westernized” narrative concerning Sahrawi women and
religion on Sahrawi society.30
Some sources do examine some aspects of the human rights situation, but not in adequate
depth. Only one source, Endgame in the Western Sahara, was found to actually go into detail about
the human rights situation in the territory itself.31 Anna Khakee explores the drawbacks of
MINURSO, namely its lack of a human rights monitoring mechanism, and argues that Morocco
should accept the introduction of this mechanism.32 F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam similarly examines the
ethical dilemma that the U.S. faces by supporting Morocco’s position in Western Sahara, but does
not go in depth about the actual human rights situation in the territory either.33 Much of his article
focuses on the history of the conflict, which a number of other sources also explore in depth. What is
missing from these two sources is a thorough account of the situation on the ground and how
competing narratives have played a role in the marginalization of the human rights situation in the
territory.
In sum, while there are many sources on the conflict, few even touch upon the issue of
human rights in the Western Sahara or Morocco’s violations. Exploring the human rights situation in
the territory has been left mostly to human rights organizations and advocacy groups, which is a
29
Anouar Boukhars and Jacques Roussellier, eds., Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and
Geopolitics, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).
30
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival, (Syracuse,
NY: Syracuse University Press, 2014).
31
Toby Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony, (London: Zed Books,
2004).
32
Anna Khakee, “The MINURSO Mandate, Human Rights and the Autonomy Solution for Western
Sahara,” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 3 (2014): 456-62.
33
F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, “Ethical Issues in U.S. Policy on the Western Sahara Conflict,” Mediterranean
Quarterly 13, no. 4 (2002): 88-115.
9
problem because the topic deserves objective analysis and understanding. There is also little on the
effects of different narratives on the human rights situation specifically. This paper bridges this gap
by examining how competing narratives as well as strategic interests have affected the human rights
situation.
Historical Overview of the Conflict
Before delving into the history of the Western Sahara conflict, a few comments must be made about
Morocco, the main actor in this dispute. After the French withdrew in 1956, the Moroccan state had
to consolidate its power and formulate Moroccan identity. During this time, there was an ongoing
power struggle between the monarchy and the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which was calling for a
constitutional monarchy.34 The monarch at the time, King Mohammed V, prevailed in the struggle
by encouraging the fragmentation of the Istiqlal Party into separate parties. This led to the party
losing much of its original power.35 After the death of Mohammed V in 1961, his son, King Hassan
II, had very little support and developed various strategies to continue his father’s legacy.36
The idea of the Moroccan monarch holding the title of “Commander of the Faithful” (Amir
al-Mu’minin) is an old one in Moroccan history, but Hassan took this aspect very seriously.37 This,
combined with the belief in the Moroccan monarchs being Sharifian (Shurafa’) or descendent from
Prophet Mohammed himself,38 gave the Moroccan dynasty and the ‘Alaoui family much control
over the state. In the first Moroccan constitution, introduced in 1962, Hassan specified that Morocco
was to be “ruled by the eldest son of the ‘Alaoui family, who would not only be king, but
34
C. R. Pennell, Morocco: From Empire to Independence, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 163-6.
Ibid.
36
Ibid., 166-7.
37
Ibid., 167.
38
This emerged during the Sa’dis’ rule. See C.R. Pennell, “Sharifian Morocco,” in Morocco: From Empire to
Independence, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 78-96.
35
10
Commander of the Faithful.”39 This had huge implications for the nature of the Moroccan state and
the role of the monarch. Like his father, Hassan wanted to keep political parties fragmented in order
to impede their ability to directly challenge the monarchy. This led to him implementing a multiparty
parliamentary system, which exists to this day.40 This type of system was key in giving an
appearance of a democratic process, but the Moroccan state was and, even after the new constitution
implemented after protests in 2011, still is an absolutist monarchy.41
This combination of the monarch being Sharifian and Commander of the Faithful gave the
Moroccan monarch even more power, making him sacred in the eyes of the Moroccan populace. The
use of Islam to bolster his position and the multiparty system that continues to this day has
contributed to Hassan’s stance on the Western Sahara conflict. As will be discussed in more detail
below, the narrative of the Western Sahara’s “Moroccanness” was inscribed in the monarch, a
monarch who is descendent from the prophet and who is to be respected by all Moroccans, no matter
what. In effect, the discourse on the Western Sahara is imbued with religious connotations that have
given it the power that it now has over both the monarchy and the Moroccan people. The Western
Sahara conflict was born partly out of these understandings, which King Hassan II took advantage of
in 1975 to rally Moroccans around the idea of a Moroccan Sahara.
In essence, the Western Sahara conflict is about a piece of land.42 However, as Zunes and
Mundy note, the conflict is imaginary in the sense that it is most fundamentally based on ideas—
more specifically, sets of ideas that clash. It is the Moroccan idea of a “Greater Morocco”43 that
39
Ibid., 167.
Ibid., 167.
41
See Ahmed Benchemsi, “Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 1 (January 2012):
57-69.
42
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, xxii-xxiii.
43
Originally, Greater Morocco was thought to comprise all of Mauritania and parts of Algeria and Mali.
40
11
contends with the Sahrawi idea of independence.44 This “‘imaginary’” condition that underlies the
essential issue is what has made the conflict so difficult to resolve.45 Contrary to popular belief, this
idea of Greater Morocco was not put forth by the Moroccan monarchy, but by the Istiqlal Party,
mainly voiced by the party leader, Allal al-Fassi, during the independence movement of the 1950s.46
This led to the Western Sahara being seen as an integral part of Morocco after its experience with
colonialism under both France and Spain, elements of which are still present today.47 Because the
idea was initially put forth by the “nationalist elite” and gained traction in the discourse of Moroccan
nationalism, the monarchy, under King Mohammed V at the time, incorporated it into its agenda as
well, taking the already formed narrative and making it his own.48 The idea of Greater Morocco was
the main justification for the fierce fight to incorporate the Western Sahara into Moroccan territory.
After independence, Morocco had gained back other territories from Spain—Tarfaya in 1958 and
Sidi Ifni in 1969—so the incorporation of the Western Sahara into the kingdom was seen as only
natural following the incorporation of other territories that Spain had controlled.49
Sahrawis (Sahrawa) claim their right to independence also on the basis of historical evidence
and their own narrative of self-determination. Morocco defines Sahrawis as Moroccans
(Maghariba), but Sahrawis who reject Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, claim that
“they are not and never will be Moroccans.”50 It is understandable why these two ideas clash and
why this clash has not allowed for a resolution to be realized. However, as will be discussed below,
there is more to the conflict than just a clash of Sahrawi nationalism and Moroccan irredentism.
44
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, xxii-xxiii.
Ibid.
46
John Damis, “The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and Realities,” The Middle East Journal 37, no. 2 (Spring,
1983): 173.
47
Spain still controls Ceuta and Melilla, two cities in northern Morocco.
48
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, xxiii.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid., xxiv.
45
12
External involvement has proven especially important when it comes to this conflict because of the
long-lasting effects it has had on several issues, especially the human rights situation. While this
forms the foundation for understanding the conflict, it will be necessary to examine the main events
that took place from 1975 onwards to comprehend the reasons why the conflict is at a stalemate
today.
In 1975, after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave its advisory opinion on the
Western Sahara at Morocco’s request,51 King Hassan II called on Moroccans to unite in a “Green
March” (Al-Massira Al-Khadraa/La Marche Verte) to the territory to claim it for Morocco.52 The
march’s goal was to force the Spanish to leave the territory. Hassan’s call to action is significant due
to his use of Islamic symbols. He claimed that Moroccans must go to the Western Sahara to “rejoin
[their] Sahrawi brothers,” in effect rendering any call for self-determination invalid in the eyes of the
Moroccan monarchy.53
The use of religion as justification was especially influential because it inspired the
Moroccan people and has contributed to the monarchy’s unwillingness and fear of accepting the
independence of the Western Sahara. Hassan claimed that inspiration for the march came from a
Quranic surah that addresses a difficult time that Prophet Muhammad had endured.54 He even went
as far as to call the 350,000 marchers “pilgrims” in order to further strengthen its religious
Morocco had requested that the ICJ answer two questions: “Was the Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Saquia alHamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?” and “What were the
legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?” The answer to the first
question was no because there were tribes present in the territory while the answer to the second question was more
complex: Morocco and Mauritania had some authority over some of the tribes present in the territory, but not all.
This second, ambiguous answer was used by Morocco as justification for seizing control of the territory (Morocco
took the northern section of Saquia al-Hamra and Mauritania took the southern section of Rio de Oro). Original
document available from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6197.pdf.
52
Thobhani, Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan Administration, 54.
53
Ibid., 55.
54
Ibid., 55.
51
13
symbolism.55 In light of the belief that the Moroccan monarch is a descendent of the prophet and, in
extension, Commander of the Faithful, the Moroccan populace saw this religious symbolism as very
powerful and was easily attracted to it. There were concerns that conflict might break out between
Morocco and Spain, but this was avoided since Spain agreed to hand the territory over to joint
Moroccan-Mauritanian control before the march progressed further into the Western Sahara.56 By
the day of the march on November 6, 1975, “Morocco experienced an immense surge of nationalism
and patriotism.”57 This led to more requests to join the march and showed how effective Hassan’s
call to action had been. Other than religious inspiration, many believe that another reason for
Hassan’s call to action was his attempt to protect his rule after two coup attempts in July 1971 and
August 1972.58 However, John Damis claims that this was not entirely true because, as noted above,
it was not the Moroccan monarchy that was behind the idea of incorporating the Western Sahara.
Hassan just utilized it like his father, Mohammed V, had done earlier after it was introduced by the
Istiqlal Party during independence.59 The coup attempts were certainly significant events that
contributed to changes in Hassan II’s rule, but they did not contribute directly to him initiating the
Green March.
After the march and the departure of Spain from the Western Sahara on February 28, 1976,60
Morocco sent military and civilian personnel into the territory to assume joint control with
Mauritania.61 After Spain’s withdrawal by 1976, the Polisario, a group of Sahrawis who joined in
55
Ibid., 55-6; According to King Hassan II, this number was chosen because it was the number of births per year in
Morocco at the time. See King Hassan II and Eric Laurent, La Mémoire d'un Roi: Entretiens avec Eric Laurent,
(Paris: Plon, 1993), 190-1.
56
Thobhani, Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan Administration, 56.
57
Ibid., 57.
58
Ibid.
59
Damis, “The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and Realities,” 173.
60
For a very thorough and insightful discussion on the intricacies of Spain’s decision to cede the Western Sahara to
Morocco and Mauritania, see Jacob Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan
Takeover of the Spanish Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 3 (2006): 275-306.
61
Thobhani, Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan Administration, 58.
14
1973 to rally for a Western Sahara independent from Spain, declared the Western Sahara to be an
independent state called the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).62 The war lasted sixteen
years, oscillating between Moroccan and Sahrawi victories.
The Polisario was very effective in the war due to its use of guerilla tactics. The first clashes
between it and Moroccan troops occurred in October 1975. After a partition agreement between
Morocco and Mauritania, Morocco gained control of the northern two-thirds of the territory (Saquia
al-Hamra) while Mauritania controlled the southern one third (Rio de Oro).63 This partition was not
accepted by Algeria, which continued to support the Polisario financially and diplomatically.64
During this time, thousands of Sahrawis fled from the Western Sahara, especially as atrocities were
being committed by the Moroccan and Mauritanian soldiers against them.65 Zunes and Mundy cite
the observation of an American scholar who said that “‘there was a decided attempt by the Moroccan
invading forces to eliminate these people.’”66 Sahrawis were bombarded indiscriminately and
napalm was also used against them.67
Morocco managed to continue the war, mainly due to its sustenance by Saudi Arabia, France,
and the U.S., but Mauritania had difficulties and withdrew its claim to the Western Sahara by 1979
after the Polisario managed to infiltrate the country and reach the Mauritanian capital of
Nouakchott.68 Morocco then went in to occupy the southern one third of the territory that Mauritania
had given up. After Mauritania’s withdrawal, Polisario focused all of its energy on fighting
62
Ibid., 59.
For an up-to-date map of the territory, see United Nations (UN), Map of the Western Sahara, Digital image,
United Nations, December 2015, http://www.un.org/depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/minurso.pdf. Everything west of
the berm/sand wall (red line on the map) is controlled by Morocco and everything east of the berm is administered
by the Polisario.
64
Thobhani, Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan Administration, 60.
65
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 112-4.
66
Ibid., 114.
67
Ibid.
68
Thobhani, Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan Administration, 60.
63
15
Moroccan troops in the area. Throughout this period, Morocco was facing great financial difficulties,
but it concentrated its efforts on fighting in order to keep the Western Sahara under its control,
illustrating the ideological importance of the fight for Morocco.69
During the 1980s, Morocco built a “berm” or sand wall around the phosphate-rich territories
the monarchy controlled to fight the Polisario much more effectively. At the time, this tactic was
hailed as an innovative approach to dealing with a guerrilla movement. Separate berms were
constructed around important parts of the territory such as a mining area called Bu Craa and the city
of Dakhla. Eventually, some eighty percent of the Western Sahara was off-limits to the Polisario.70
This made it difficult for the Polisario to effectively fight the Moroccan army, otherwise known as
“les Forces Armées Royales” (FAR), using its guerilla tactics. However, after the building of the
berm, the Polisario concentrated more on delivering heavy assaults, resulting in heavy casualties on
both sides.71
Diplomatically, Morocco was not faring well during this time as the SADR was beginning to
garner attention and even support from other countries. The admission of the SADR to the OAU in
1984 angered Morocco and led to its withdrawal. By this time, the SADR had been recognized by
most African states and over twenty others in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Oceania.72 In
the face of these setbacks, King Hassan II’s famous visit to the territory in March 1985, the first visit
after King Hassan I’s in the 1880s, was seen as an attempt by the king to show the world, especially
members of the opposition, that Morocco will never cede the Sahara.73
69
Ibid., 60-1.
Ibid., 61-2.
71
Ibid., 63.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
70
16
Even though Morocco was succeeding in the war against the Polisario, Hassan made two
important concessions during this time. He agreed to the idea of a referendum and to meet with the
Polisario, which was unprecedented since Morocco had viewed negotiating with the Polisario as a
form of recognition. These two concessions helped lead to the United Nations-organized cease-fire
and peace plan mentioned above called MINURSO in 1991.74 During this period, the Polisario
suffered several setbacks, including a number of defections to the Moroccan side. The most high
profile defection was by Omar Hadrami in 1989. Hadrami was one of the six founders of the
Polisario in 1973 and served in many positions, including director of military security.75
Throughout the 1990s, many attempts were made to ease negotiations between the two sides
and realize the goal of implementing a referendum to determine the territory’s fate. The UN had
been sending representatives since the 1980s to meet with the two sides and decide on terms to an
agreement. Pérez de Cuéllar, the first secretary-general sent to the territory, was supposed to help
implement MINURSO and, it was hoped, a referendum. However, Cuéllar was unable to do so, each
side involved set in the goal it wanted to achieve. After rounds of talks since 1997 headed by James
Baker, personal envoy to the Western Sahara at the time, and the failed attempts to implement the
“Baker Plan,”76 disagreements and disputes continue to this day.77 The date of the referendum keeps
getting pushed every year by the UN, with little hope of resolution in sight. The main issue has been
deciding on who can vote, with Morocco wanting to include Moroccan settlers that had moved to the
territory throughout the 1990s and the Polisario wanting to ensure that only Sahrawis are included.78
74
Ibid. See Security Council Resolution 690, The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara, (29 April 1991),
available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/.
75
Ibid., 67.
76
Plan offering autonomy for the Western Sahara within the Kingdom of Morocco. See Thobhani, Western Sahara
since 1975 under Moroccan Administration, 90-95 and Zunes and Mundy, “The Baker Plan and the End of the
Peace Process,” 219-253, in Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution.
77
Thobhani, Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan Administration, 90.
78
Ibid., 86-7.
17
The brief history outlined above helps shed light on some of the details of the conflict and
will guide the later discussion on the role of Morocco’s relations with the U.S. and France. These
relations have also contributed to the formulation of competing discourses that have contributed to
the undermining of the Sahrawi goal of self-determination. The following section will present the
theoretical framework on human rights and norms, which will guide the analysis of the Sahrawis’
human rights situation.
The Universality of Human Rights and Norms
The divide between human rights norms in theory and their application in practice is a highly
contested issue with which several academics have grappled. While the norm of human rights has
been generally recognized by the international community, as codified by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), which was signed by 192 countries, actually upholding and promoting
these rights has had a checkered past. Many countries, such as the U.S., pay attention to human
rights violations on a selective basis, illustrating the norm’s limitations in practice. The Western
Saharan case is an example of how other interests outweigh the upholding of international human
rights norms and play a role in valorizing one actor’s narrative over others in disputes. In order to
further understand the idea of norms as well as their successes and failures, a discussion will follow
focusing on what norms are, how they come about, and how human rights norms specifically are
either upheld through intervention or ignored.
The most referred to definition of a norm is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors
with a given identity.”79 Norms can also be divided into different categories as regulative,
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International
Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 891.
79
18
constitutive, and evaluative or prescriptive.80 Regulative norms “order and constrain behavior” while
constitutive norms “create new actors, interests, or categories of action.”81 Evaluative or prescriptive
norms, on the other hand, give a “quality of ‘oughtness’ that sets norms apart from other kinds of
rules.82 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink go on to note that “norm-breaking behavior” incites
wide disapproval while more internalized norms incite little reaction.83 Another issue is the idea of
“norm strength” and the effects of time on norms, which leads to the concept of the “‘life cycle’” of
norms. When there is agreement on a norm that is held by “a critical mass of actors,” a “tipping
point” emerges and the norm becomes a widely held belief.84
This norm life cycle consists of three main stages: norm emergence, norm acceptance or
“‘norm cascade,’” and internalization. The first stage is mainly done through “norm entrepreneurs”
who try to persuade others to uphold the norm they are trying to propagate. The second stage focuses
on “imitation” as state leaders want to uphold the norm for various reasons such as pressure to
conform, enhancement of state legitimacy in the international arena, and leaders wanting to increase
their self-esteem.85 By the third stage, the norm is internalized and takes on a “taken-for-granted”
quality, which can lead to it being side-tracked or ignored.86 This cycle varies and does not always
mean that every state will take the norm seriously and protect the human rights of its citizens or its
neighboring countries. As Finnemore and Sikkink note, domestic norms, within the state itself, can
affect international norms in how they are interpreted and whether they are actually upheld or not.87
When it comes to actually promoting international norms, Finnemore and Sikkink note that it
is necessary for an organizational structure that the norm entrepreneurs can use to promote the norms
80
Ibid.
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid., 892.
84
Ibid., 892-3.
85
Ibid., 895-6.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid., 893.
81
19
and garner support by states.88 Human rights norms can be promoted by various NGOs, such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. International organizations, such as the UN, can
both promote and, to a limited degree, enforce them. However, the UN’s role is limited because, as
David Forsythe argues in his book, it is the states that make up the international organizations that
have to make the move and enforce the promotion of the norm, whether it concerns women’s rights,
human rights, or conduct during wartime.89
In the third chapter of her book, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the
Use of Force, Finnemore argues that it is necessary to look at any norm as being a part of “a fabric
of interlocking and interwoven norms” rather than as a free-floating concept that is separate from
other norms.90 In this way, human rights norms can be connected to self-determination norms, state
sovereignty norms, and humanitarian intervention norms as well as women’s rights norms in some
cases. This helps explain why human rights norms end up being upheld in some cases and not in
others: changes in connected norms can change both norms and practices.91 While Finnemore shows
how there has been a definite increase in states intervening to uphold human rights throughout
history, she also asserts that this does not mean that states will intervene all the time. Geostrategic
interests among other reasons can certainly affect the upholding of any norm, depending on the
situation. The following with examine human rights norms in more depth through definitions and a
survey of different scholars’ views of the concept.
Louis Henkin, a scholar of international law, defines “human rights” as the idea that “every
individual has legitimate claims upon his or her own society for certain freedoms and benefits.”92
88
Ibid., 899.
David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
90
Martha Finnemore, “Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Purpose of Intervention: Changing
Beliefs about the Use of Force, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 57.
91
Ibid.
92
Louis Henkin, “The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 506, no. 1 (November 1989): 11.
89
20
These rights, which each individual is meant to have, have been outlined in the UDHR and its related
documents. Human rights are divided into two categories: civil and political rights (rights to life and
physical integrity); and economic and social rights (the right to “an adequate standard of living”).93
The term “human rights” itself connotes rights for everyone, anywhere, and anytime. This
“universality” is claimed and prescribed by the UDHR. However, throughout history, some states
have rejected the idea of human rights, arguing that it is a Western concept and that “imposing it on
others is cultural imperialism.”94
Jack Donnelly, a human rights expert, examines the universality and relativity of the
aforementioned claims an individual has on his or her society. Donnelly argues for the “relative
universality” of human rights, claiming that the concept of universality is limited.95 By claiming that
there are so-called “universal values” states, such as the U.S., can justify attacking other countries
when these values, in its view, are not being upheld.96 Donnelly notes that while human rights, by
definition, are rights with which every human being is born, the universality of human rights norms
does not specify enforcement.97 Because states implement and enforce certain laws depending on
their will and cannot be forced to do so, human rights are relative. 98 The conception of what
constitutes human rights has also changed over time, illustrating again how it is relative, fluid, and
heavily dependent on time and place.99
Makau Wa Mutua, a law professor, discusses the issue of adopting human rights language
and not its practices, poignantly noting that “the seduction of human rights discourse has been so
93
Ibid.
Ibid., 12.
95
Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2007): 281-2.
96
Ibid., 282.
97
Ibid., 283.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid., 284-5.
94
21
great that it has…delayed the development of a critique of rights.”100 Mutua argues that while the
concept of human rights is not foreign to other cultures, the “current” concept of universal human
rights is European.101 Like Donnelly, Mutua also sees the concept of the universality of human rights
as problematic because of the lack of a standard understanding of human rights norms.
Forsythe discusses the development of international law and how there is an “enormous gap
between legal theory and political behavior.”102 While some governments support others through
beneficial trade agreements and military aid, in spite of on-going human rights violations, others,
such as Sudan, Syria, and Myanmar, are punished through sanctions. This unequal application of
international human rights law has been debated and discussed for decades, and even today, after the
UN announced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle in 2005, this uneven application of the
law persists.103 Human rights laws and norms have proven inadequate. A powerful state, such as the
U.S., can still defy the law in order to protect its economic, political, and geostrategic interests. The
Western Sahara presents a situation where there was a failure to protect the Sahrawis because of the
interests and decisions of two Western states, namely the U.S. and France.
In sum, the case of the Western Sahara is an example of the issue of uneven application of
human rights norms and laws that many academics have discussed. Trade between the U.S. and
Morocco has continued to grow in spite of human rights violations in both Morocco proper as well
as the Western Sahara. Because of its political weight and position on the UN Security Council
Matua Wa Mutua, “The Ideology of Human Rights,” Virginia Journal of International Affairs 36, no. 3 (19951996): 591.
101
Ibid, 592-3.
102
Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 6.
103
The three clauses of the R2P assert that the state is the primary entity responsible for protecting its citizens from
infringements on their human rights, that the international community also has the responsibility to respond to any
violations that a state commits, and that the international community must be prepared to use collective action to
protect populations whose human rights are being violated; Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 60/1,
World Summit Outcome (2005), available from
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/World%20Summit%20Outcome%20Document.pdf#page=30;
Also see Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 4.
100
22
(UNSC) alongside France, the U.S. has managed to protect Morocco against accusations of human
rights violations. The U.S. has treated Morocco differently compared to a number of other countries
that have committed violations such as Sudan or Myanmar, both of which have been subject to
sanctions by the U.S. and its European allies. In effect, the universality of human rights norms that is
promulgated by the international community is not a reality. The practice that is supposed to follow
the adoption of human rights norms is not consistent and other factors—political, economic, and
geostrategic—play a crucial role in which countries are punished for violations and which are not.
The following section examines how the Moroccan government continues to violate human rights in
the Western Sahara by presenting some examples and offering an explanation as to why it continues
to engage in this behavior in the territory.
The Monarchy versus Human Rights
The Moroccan government has committed several human rights violations, namely enforced
disappearance, torture in prison, holding Sahrawis without trial, and criminalizing speech calling for
the independence of the Western Sahara.104 The reasons for these actions are numerous, but the
Moroccan government’s main goal in committing these violations is to instill fear in the Sahrawi
population still living in the territory and to justify its narrative that focuses on the Sahara being
Moroccan.105 This fear-mongering is used to undermine the Sahrawi nationalist movement directly
and encourage Sahrawis to give up their hope of an independent Sahrawi nation. As Toby Shelley, a
journalist who visited the Western Sahara reports, many Sahrawi families who had no direct
connection to the Polisario or the Sahrawi nationalist movement had witnessed Moroccan security
104
Most of the following information will be obtained from reports by Amnesty International, a non-governmental
organization (NGO), which can be problematic due to bias. However, Amnesty was chosen over another
organization (Human Rights Watch) because of its use of verifiable sources.
105
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 145-6, 149.
23
forces showing up at night randomly and taking one of their family members, who is never seen
again after that.106 These random visits by the police are used to pressure, to instill fear, and, finally,
to break the will of the Sahrawi people to continue fighting. Furthermore, these actions are seen as
justified. The security forces see it as just doing their duty, protecting Morocco’s sovereignty by
punishing the traitors and “separatists,” as the king and other Moroccan officials have referred to
Sahrawis who believe in self-determination.
In a concentrated attempt to exhibit its support for human rights and for improving its
reputation on the matter, Morocco has signed and ratified many conventions and treaties with the
UN concerning all of the above violations.107 However, when it comes to the human rights situation
in the Western Sahara, the UN has not been very successful at helping curb violations since
MINURSO does not even include a human rights monitoring mechanism.108 It is the only UN
mission in the world that lacks this feature.109 While Morocco has attempted to rectify its past
mistakes, as will be seen, it has not been very successful at doing so.
Under King Hassan II, the Moroccan government was implicated in several instances of
human rights violations against not only its own people, but also Sahrawis. The years of Hassan’s
rule, from 1960 to 1999, became known as the “‘years of lead’” (les années de plomb) because of the
rise in the violations committed by Moroccan security forces.110 The violations committed included
106
Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara, 97-99.
See “Reporting Status for Morocco,” United Nations Human Rights,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=MAR&Lang=EN.
108
Khakee, “The MINURSO Mandate, Human Rights and the Autonomy Solution for Western Sahara,” 456-7.
109
Stephen Zunes, “The Last Colony: Beyond Dominant Narratives on the Western Sahara Roundtable,” Jadaliyya,
June 3, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11992/the-last-colony_beyond-dominant-narratives-on-the-.
110
Amnesty International, Broken Promises: The Equity and Reconciliation Commission and its Follow-Up,
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 2010), 4.
107
24
the “systematic use of torture…the enforced disappearance of hundreds of individuals and the
arbitrary detention of thousands.”111
The Moroccan state had been attempting to rectify its past actions since the mid-1990s, but it
was not until the early twenty-first century that substantial changes were made.112 These changes
came with King Mohammed VI, who ascended to the throne after his father’s death in 1999. In
2003, the King approved the creation of the “Instance Équité et Réconciliation” (Equity and
Reconciliation Commission, IER) in an effort to bring to light the human rights violations that had
been committed and allow victims to tell their stories.113 However, there were two major issues that
impeded the success of the commission: not all violations that took place from 1956 to 1999 were
included, and the perpetrators were not named.114 In addition to these two problems, Sahrawis were
not given as much of a chance to share their stories publicly like other Moroccan victims. There was
no public hearing in the Western Sahara, while in other regions there were even televised sessions.115
The Western Sahara was also excluded from the “reparation program” that existed for other
regions of Morocco, illustrating how the government’s attempts to make-up for the human rights
violations that it committed were not as thorough as they could have been. The IER’s work was
impeded because it had a limited mandate and could not force officials to cooperate fully.116 Also,
even though the IER did bring to light many of the monarchy’s violations in the past, the
commission has not been enough to actually end the violations. The violations, especially police
brutality and torture in prison, continue to take place, just at a lesser scale than before.117 This is
111
Ibid.
Ibid.
113
Ibid., 4-5.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid., 5.
116
Ibid., 27.
117
Anouar Boukhars, “Dynamics of Intergroup Conflicts in the Western Sahara,” in Perspectives on Western
Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and Geopolitics, 198.
112
25
especially true for the Western Sahara, where restrictions on speech prevail and the Moroccan police
uses excessive force against protestors who call for independence.118
The main human rights violation that Morocco committed against the Sahrawis was enforced
disappearance. While the IER examined enforced disappearances in both Morocco and the Western
Sahara, the majority of the cases involved Sahrawis. These disappearances, which occurred after
Morocco’s annexation of the territory in 1975 and continued until the 1990s, involved Polisario
supporters as well as women and children whose family members were in some way implicated in
the conflict. Moroccan authorities placed victims in detention centers for years and never informed
relatives of their whereabouts.119 In 1991, in an effort to improve its record, the monarchy released
about 300 Sahrawis who had been kept in secret detention centers.120 King Hassan II also created a
Moroccan human rights group in 1990 called le Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (The
National Human Rights Council, CNDH), followed by the establishment of a Ministry of Human
Rights in 1993.121
In spite of these and other similar efforts, many Sahrawi families have not been sufficiently
compensated by the Moroccan government and many still do not know their relatives’ fates. As will
be demonstrated later, one of the reasons that the human rights situation has not improved is due to
little pressure being put on Morocco by its American and French allies to make substantial changes.
Moroccan officials have also been unwilling to compromise or share details about certain cases to
concerned relatives.122 The government has also made it very difficult for journalists and human
118
Amnesty International, Broken Promises: The Equity and Reconciliation Commission and its Follow-Up, 7.
Ibid., 10.
120
Ibid., 11.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid., 28.
119
26
rights groups to even enter the territory, causing the IER to emphasize the need for more media
attention in the Western Sahara “to spread a culture of human rights.”123
Today, arbitrary detention of Sahrawis, especially those known to be working for Sahrawi
human rights organizations, continues to be a common occurrence. For example, Yahya Mohamed
al-Hafed Aaza, a member of the Sahrawi human rights group, Collectif des Défenseurs Sahraouis
des Droits de l’Homme (Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders, CODESA), was arrested in
February 2008 following his participation in protests a few days earlier.124 In 2009, Ennaama Asfari,
co-president of another human rights group, Comité pour le Respect des Droits de l’Homme au
Sahara Occidental (Committee for the Respect of Human Rights in the Western Sahara, CORELSO),
was arrested and held for four months after an argument with a policeman.125 Moroccan police
officers have also interrupted planned meetings between Sahrawi human rights activists and lawyers
involved in investigations of human rights violations. Other activists have been detained numerous
times at Mohammed V Airport during their travels to and from Sahrawi refugee camps near the
Algerian city of Tindouf.126
However, it is not only Sahrawi human rights activists who are targeted. In 2013, several
under-age Sahrawi boys claimed they were beaten and tortured by police officers in different
situations, some during demonstrations calling for independence for the Western Sahara, others
during random clashes with the police.127 Sahrawi children have even reported being given electric
shocks during their detention by Moroccan officials.128 In addition to this, Moroccan authorities deny
123
Ibid., 66.
“Regional Analysis: North Africa and the Middle East,” Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders, 2010, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/OBSUK2010north_africa_human_rights_defenders.pdf, 472-3.
125
Ibid., 472.
126
Ibid., 472-3.
127
Amnesty International, Shadow of Impunity: Torture in Morocco and Western Sahara, (London: Amnesty
International Publications, 2015), 20.
128
Ibid., 31.
124
27
such occurrences regularly, claiming that many of such torture allegations are “unfounded.” 129
Complaints by Sahrawis of these events are also regularly ignored.130
Thirty-seven-year-old Mohamed Lamine El Bakkari shared the numerous torture techniques
that were used by the Moroccan police who had arrested him during a protest calling for
independence in November 2013 in the city of Boujdour in the Western Sahara.131 He said he was
tied to a plank and beaten while being questioned about his political loyalties.132 Twenty-year-old
Hamza Ljoumal, who was arrested on June 4, 2013 in Smara, Western Sahara, reported he was
forced to sign confession papers that he was not even allowed to read while being beaten. When in
court, the judge ignored that the papers were signed forcefully and his confession was used against
him as evidence.133 Salouh Mailass, who was at the same protest as Ljoumal, reported being beaten
while suspended from the ceiling of an interrogation room. He also reported that the police staged a
“photo-shoot” to show that his detention was humane, giving Mailass clothing and food, but taking
them away ten minutes later once the shoot was completed.134
Other Sahrawi men have reported Moroccan police officers threatening to rape them with
various objects.135 These humiliation tactics have been key in Moroccan officials’ attempts to instill
fear in the Sahrawi people. Two of these men, Mohamed Ali Saidi and Mohamed Garnit, were
arrested in May 2013 after peaceful demonstrations calling for self-determination in Laayoune, the
capital of the Western Sahara. These men were not arrested for a specific offense. Rather, they were
arrested and tortured to set an example to other Sahrawis who might think of protesting. A third
129
Ibid., 21.
Ibid.
131
Ibid., 23.
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid., 28.
134
Ibid., 29.
135
Ibid., 41-42.
130
28
Sahrawi man, Abdelmoutaleb Sarir, reported he was raped with a glass bottle during his detention in
February 2014.136 As per usual, his request for a medical examination to prove his story was ignored
and he was convicted of various charges such as attacking police officers and damaging public
property.137
Morocco has signed on to several treaties and conventions with stipulations on the protection
of human rights. The Convention against Torture obliges Moroccan officials to investigate torture
allegations.138 However, as the above examples show, this has not been done. Most Sahrawis who
were tortured reported that their testimonies about their experiences were ignored. Youssef
Lembidae reported that the judge during his court trial refused to acknowledge his complaint that
Moroccan officers had beaten him even though he still had bruises and cuts on his face after the
incident. His brother, Karim Lembidae, experienced the same treatment.139
However, it is not only Moroccan officials who abuse Sahrawis, but Moroccans settlers
living in the territory as well. In November 2010, in a camp called Gdim Izik, set up near Laayoune
by Sahrawis protesting about their disadvantaged socioeconomic status, Moroccan officials and
settlers engaged in violent methods to dismantle the camp leading to several deaths on both sides.140
By November 8, the protests had spread to Laayoune where Moroccans and Sahrawis beat each
other and set fire to each other’s homes and businesses for days. Officials arrested about 200 people
in connection with the unrest, all of them Sahrawi.141
136
Ibid., 42.
Ibid., 43.
138
Ibid., 46-7.
139
Ibid., 45.
140
Amnesty International, Right Trampled: Protests, Violence, and Repression in Western Sahara, (London:
Amnesty International Publications, 2010), 5-6, 8.
141
Ibid., 6.
137
29
Several of those detained reported that they were beaten after refusing to “pledge allegiance
to the King of Morocco or to confirm they were Moroccan nationals,” illustrating that the manner in
which they were treated was connected to their belief in self-determination.142 Several Sahrawi
women, young and old, were beaten as well.143 A 31-year-old woman reported that she was sexually
harassed by Moroccan security forces when they stormed the camp. She was also ordered to say
“long live the king” and was called names.144 Another woman was questioned about her political
activities and beaten when she said she was Sahrawi, not Moroccan.145 Many of these incidents show
that Moroccan security forces punish Sahrawis for their beliefs, rather than for actual crimes. In
addition, the fact that women were beaten and sexually harassed illustrates how indiscriminate the
officials are about who they abuse. Furthermore, many of the Sahrawis involved in the Gdim Izik
Protests reported being scared to file complaints because of their concern of possible reprisal.146
While these similar allegations and experiences are also shared by Moroccans who have been
tortured, especially student protestors, the reasons behind this treatment differ depending on whether
the person is Moroccan or Sahrawi. For the Sahrawis, the reason is to strike at the nationalist
movement as illustrated by the fact that many are questioned about their relationship with the
Polisario.147 Moroccan officials act with impunity against Sahrawis in the territory because they
distrust them and question their loyalty to the state. Sahrawis are seen as a security threat, a threat to
Morocco’s sovereignty. They are seen as something that has to be dealt with in as brutal a manner as
possible to instill fear and curb their nationalist dreams. The ability of the Moroccan government to
commit violations with little to no punishment illustrates the power of competing narratives and how
142
Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 11-2.
144
Ibid., 12.
145
Ibid., 12-3.
146
Ibid., 16.
147
Amnesty International, Shadow of Impunity, 49.
143
30
the Moroccan narrative of the Sahara being Moroccan has been used as justification by the state to
torture Sahrawis indiscriminately.
The Gdim Izik Protests and the violence that ensued later, in which both Moroccans and
Sahrawis were involved, illustrate the tensions that exist in the territory. Even though the Sahrawi
nationalist narrative emphasizes non-violent resistance, the divide that will be discussed later
between the philosophies of resistance between older and younger Sahrawis has been a source of
contention. During the protests, Sahrawi youths attacked a school and tried to take students hostage,
showing that non-violent resistance may not be how the younger generations want to proceed in
attempting to resolve the dispute.148 On the other hand, the cooperation that took place between
Moroccan security forces and Moroccan settlers in attacking Sahrawi homes and shops illustrates the
power of the belief in the Moroccan narrative.149 This cooperation between security forces who just
stood by, allowing Moroccan nationals to beat Sahrawis and loot their shops, demonstrates the way
that Sahrawis are viewed: traitors to the state and undeserving of protection. This view is what has
contributed to these violations continuing, in addition to its support by the American and French
narratives on the conflict.
The Franco-American Consensus
Morocco’s ability to succeed militarily against the Polisario was primarily due to the economic and
military aid that it was provided with by the U.S. and other countries.150 In addition to economic and
military aid, strong diplomatic support during the 1980s from both the Mitterrand presidency in
148
Amnesty International, Rights Trampled, 18-9.
Ibid., 19-20.
150
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 79.
149
31
France and the Reagan administration in the U.S. also helped Morocco subdue the Polisario.151
However, at the same time, the U.S. has not recognized the annexation of the Western Sahara by
Morocco and is now supporting the monarchy’s autonomy plan. France, on the other hand, has been
against the formation of an independent state in the Western Sahara since 1975.152 This pressure by
France is related to its desire to maintain strong relations with Morocco, but also its direct
implication in the conflict in various instances.153 In effect, this “Franco-American Consensus” has
helped Morocco maintain control over the Western Sahara and be protected from facing
consequences for its actions by the UNSC.154 As will be demonstrated, while American and French
support of Morocco in the Western Sahara dispute has changed from predominately militarily to
politically, the very nature of the countries’ relationships with each other has not.
The United States
Morocco was the first country to recognize the young United States in 1777 and the relationship
between the two has only strengthened ever since.155 Morocco is an important strategic ally of the
U.S. due to its geographical location, being close to Europe while sharing ties with the Middle East
and due to its long-term stability compared with other states in the region.156 In addition, Morocco
has had an intimate relationship with the U.S.’s closest ally, Israel, especially under King Hassan
II.157 In effect, the U.S. has balanced its silent acceptance of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over
the Western Sahara with its own interests in order to ensure Morocco’s support for its various
endeavors in the region.
151
Ibid., xxix.
Ibid.
153
Ibid., 79-80.
154
Ibid., xxv.
155
Ibid., 71.
156
Ibid.
157
Ibid., 73.
152
32
After Africa’s decolonization by the Europeans throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S.
focused more of its attention on Africa because it realized its strategic value.158 However, according
to Kamil, the U.S. did not necessarily offer a better alternative to the Africans than the Europeans
did, since rather than focusing on helping develop the continent economically, it offered military
cooperation instead.159 Morocco absorbed one-fifth of the rising military aid that was given to Africa
and that helped fuel many conflicts at the time, especially under the Reagan administration.160 In
effect, as noted above, the provision of military equipment and aid by the U.S. to Morocco was one
of the most important factors in Morocco’s success in the war against the Polisario. In addition to
providing arms and military expertise, the U.S. also maintained four military bases in Morocco: Sidi
Slimane, Nouasser, Boulhaut, and Benguerir. Kamil even claims that nuclear warheads were stored
at some of these bases.161 In 1960, the U.S. had 20,000 troops stationed in Morocco, which was the
largest contingent of troops in Africa.162 In addition, since 1975, the U.S. had also maintained a
permanent squadron of fighter planes in the city of Laayoune.163 As these numbers show, U.S.
support for Morocco has been very significant and contributed to Morocco’s success in subduing the
Polisario from the start of the conflict to the present day. Even though the U.S. claimed neutrality in
the conflict, many of its actions contradicted this stance.
Today, the U.S. and Morocco enjoy strong economic ties that have contributed to the U.S.
turning a blind eye to the monarchy’s human rights violations and its opposition to the referendum.
In 2006, the two countries signed a free trade agreement. After the entry into force of the agreement,
the U.S.’s goods trade surplus with Morocco increased from $79 million in 2005 to $1.8 billion in
158
Kamil, Fueling the Fire: U.S. Policy & the Western Sahara Conflict, 1.
Ibid., 2.
160
Ibid.
161
Ibid., 6.
162
Ibid.
163
Ibid., 28.
159
33
2011. 164 In addition, the U.S.’s exports to Morocco increased by 45 percent since the signing of the
agreement.165 Coincidentally, the free trade agreement came during a time when the U.S. was trying
to strengthen its relations with Morocco and also bolster its presence in the region to fight the threat
of terrorism through various initiatives and partnerships. The U.S. has free trade agreements with
only four other countries in the wider region (Israel, Jordan, Bahrain, and Oman), further illustrating
the importance it gives to Morocco as an ally.166
The U.S.’s narrative on the Western Sahara conflict has experienced some changes since the
1970s, but its basic principle has not: support Morocco quietly at the sidelines and pressure the
monarchy when the UN or other states raise concerns, especially if it has to do with human rights
violations. For example, according to a 2009 diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Rabat, the
U.S. government was involved in pressuring the monarchy to accept the recognition of a Sahrawi
human rights organization called Association Sahraouie des Victimes des Violations Graves des
Droits de l’Homme Commises par l’État du Maroc, ASVDH (Sahrawi Association of Victims of
Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State).167 This organization was just
recently recognized in 2015 after a decade since its leaders first applied.168 In contrast to this
involvement, at the beginning of the conflict, the Americans were focused on not getting themselves
overly involved in the dispute. For example, according to a comment on a 1978 diplomatic cable by
the U.S. mission to the UN, the Americans supported letting the OAU assume decision-making on
“Morocco Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta.
165
Ibid.
166
“Free Trade Agreements,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements.
167
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara: Activist Confirms Human Rights Improvements,” 8 July 2009, 09RABAT584.
168
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Morocco/Western Sahara: Rights Group Legalized,” August 24, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/24/morocco/western-sahara-rights-group-legalized.
164
34
resolving the conflict, claiming the “jubilation” of the Moroccans over the organization’s
intervention.169 However, as the conflict continued, the U.S. became much more directly involved.
In a 2006 diplomatic cable containing summaries and comments on the dispute, the U.S.’s
views towards the conflict are well demonstrated. Twice, it was stated that an independent Western
Sahara was “unviable.”170 It was also emphasized that the Moroccan government must make the
autonomy option “real and credible to the Sahrawi people.”171 Autonomy goes against the Sahrawi
narrative and does not guarantee fulfilling their right to self-determination. In a 2009 diplomatic
cable by the U.S. Embassy in Rabat on the dispute, the U.S. shows optimism concerning Morocco’s
autonomy plan, claiming that the Polisario is more focused on geopolitical matters rather than
nationalistic ones, even going as far as to say that, at least in the territory itself, “support for
independence is waning.”172 Another comment, in line with part of the Moroccan narrative, says that
this supposed drop in Sahrawi nationalism goes to show that the conflict is just “linked to the much
older dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the case for an independent state.”173
The cable also commented on Spain’s offer to grant nationality to Sahrawi refugees, saying that this
would be “a simple way of resolving the plight of the refugees.” There is even a comment on
elections in the Western Sahara, saying that they seemed “far more open than the Cuba-like Polisario
system.”174
These comments illustrate the U.S.’s stance on the situation and their continued support for
Morocco’s autonomy plan, rather than independence. The American narrative revolves around a
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic
Review 20 Mar 2014,” 10 November 1978, 1978USUNN04901.
170
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara: Preparing the GOM for Autonomy and Negotiations with the Polisario,” 2 March
2006, 06RABAT389.
171
Ibid.
172
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara Realities,” 17 August 2009, 09RABAT706.
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid.
169
35
general distrust of the Polisario and its objectives. While in office, President George W. Bush had
also voiced his support for autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty, claiming that independence was
unrealistic. Under the Obama administration, there was very little discussion about the conflict and
hardly any attempt at supporting negotiations or attempting to work towards a resolution.175 With
some verbal support, but hardly any action, the stalemate between Morocco and the Polisario
continues.176 France is also a very important ally to Morocco and, like the U.S., has contributed
greatly to Morocco’s efforts in the conflict through political, economic, and diplomatic support.
France
The ties between Morocco and France are complex due to several factors. Morocco was a French
protectorate from 1912 until its independence in 1956.177 After independence, personal ties were
forged between members of the Moroccan royal family and prominent officials in the French
government, which helped expand France’s support for the Moroccan monarchy and its goals in the
Western Sahara.178 France’s rocky relationship with Algeria also contributed to strengthening the ties
between the two countries. Unlike Morocco, Algeria had fought a bloody war for independence,
which had strained its relationship with France.179 In addition to their already strong relationship,
France was the only third party to intervene militarily in the Western Sahara, though its intervention
was mostly due to the Polisario directly challenging it by killing two French nationals and taking
others hostage in 1977.180
Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel and Robert M. Holley, “The Evolution of US and Moroccan Policy on Western
Sahara: From Conflict to Cooperation,” in Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and Geopolitics,
176-182.
176
Ibid.
177
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 75.
178
Ibid., 77-8.
179
Ibid.
180
Ibid., 76.
175
36
After the Green March, King Hassan II found a reliable ally in Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the
conservative French president at the time, who openly declared his opposition to “microstates” and,
by extension, was against the Western Sahara becoming an independent state.181 In 1975, the two
leaders agreed on the “Marrakech Plan” to help fast-track arms to Morocco to fight the Polisario.182
France’s military aid eventually added up to about $1.5-2.0 billion and came at a time when the
Carter administration was not very forthcoming with its aid. Like the U.S., France also had troops
stationed in Morocco during this period, just on a lower scale at about 250 out of the 14,000 it had
stationed in Africa at the time. 183
It is interesting to note, however, that France actually opposed the Moroccan monarchy on
many more occasions than the U.S. did.184 A possible reason for this is the rise to power of a
socialist government in France in 1981 under President François Mitterrand. However, even though
Mitterrand was initially against France’s direct involvement in the conflict and was trying to repair
relations with Algeria, a plan to increase aid to Morocco, including military, from $192 to $266
million was agreed upon in 1982.185 During Morocco’s war with the Polisario, 50 percent of its
military aid, at about $4 billion, was from France.186 Also, when France encountered financial
difficulties and could not provide Morocco with the military aid it needed, the U.S. stepped in to do
so in its place, illustrating the high level of support given by both sides. Like the U.S., even though
France provided Morocco with extensive military aid, it was against implicating itself too deeply in
the conflict. Therefore, it did not try to work towards a resolution of the dispute during this period.187
181
Ibid., 75.
Ibid.
183
Ibid., 76.
184
Ibid., 77.
185
Ibid.
186
Ibid., 78.
187
Ibid.
182
37
When the UN began trying to solve the conflict, France used its position on the Security
Council to protect Morocco from sanctions and support its endeavors in the Western Sahara. This
was especially due to the election of the conservative president, Jacques Chirac in 1995.188 As noted
above, both European and American diplomats determined that the biggest reason for this support
was the personal ties that existed between the French president and the Moroccan royal family.
According to a 2005 diplomatic cable from the U.S. embassy in Algiers, Chirac had told Algerian
President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, “that he considered himself a ‘member of the Moroccan royal
family.’”189 Reportedly, Bouteflika responded by congratulating Chirac on his “descent from the
Prophet Muhammad.”190 French support continued after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007
with him proclaiming that “‘France will stand shoulder to shoulder’ with Morocco on the question of
Western Sahara.” 191 France’s economic support for Morocco, in spite of its actions in the territory,
has amply illustrated this proclamation.
Today, France is the biggest investor in Morocco, ahead of both the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and Singapore.192 In 2013, Morocco’s secondary exporter was France at 12.9 percent,
following Spain as the first at 13.5 percent.193 Morocco’s primary importer was France at 21.4
percent, followed by Spain at 18.9 percent.194 In sum, Morocco has continued to benefit greatly from
its economic relationship with France despite allegations of human rights violations. Historically,
French support for Morocco had its ups and downs but, like the Americans, the French have
188
Ibid.
Wikileaks, “Polisario Ambassador urges U.S. ‘Gesture’ following Prisoner Release,” 11 September 2005,
05ALGIERS1910.
190
Ibid.
191
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 79.
192
“Maroc,” France Diplomatie: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et du Développement International,
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/diplomatie-economique-et-commerce-exterieur/lafrance-et-ses-partenaires-economiques-pays-par-pays/afrique-du-nord-moyen-orient/article/maroc-114207.
193
Ibid.
194
Ibid.
189
38
maintained very strong ties with the monarchy, allowing it to continue its illegal actions in the
Western Sahara.
Throughout the 1950s, the French were concerned about rising rebellions amongst its
colonial possessions in Africa. This led to France’s decision to fight with the Spanish against the
Sahrawis in Western Sahara to maintain overall stability in the region.195 This “solidarity of the
colonizers” laid the groundwork for the formation of the French narrative of the conflict. Throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, France was cautious in order not to disturb its relationship with Algeria and
Morocco. By doing this, the French attempted to maintain somewhat of a balanced approach to the
conflict.196 Most importantly, France prioritized its ability to take advantage of the region’s natural
gas, petrol, and minerals. After the Green March and the withdrawal of the Spanish, France’s
position on the conflict remained supposedly “neutral.”197
According to Olivier Quarante, during the 1970s, the French position on the dispute centered
on three elements: the nonexistence of the Sahrawi people, the devaluation of the idea of Sahrawi
self-determination, and the legitimacy of the Moroccan decision to unilaterally annex the territory in
1975.198 The combination of these three elements and, as discussed above, the position of President
Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981) against an independent Western Sahara, contributed to the French
rhetoric of neutrality during this period. After the election of François Mitterrand in 1981, FrenchMoroccan relations weakened. Mitterrand supported self-determination for the Sahrawis, even going
so far as to meet with the Polisario.199 However, as mentioned above, French military aid for
Olivier Quarante, “Le Rôle de la France: Une Fausse Neutralité,” Nouvelles du Sahara, April 27, 2015,
http://www.nouvellesdusahara.fr/role-de-la-france-une-fausse-neutralite/. For a more in-depth analysis, see Olivier
Quarante, “Le Rôle de la France,” in Lutter au Sahara: Du Colonialisme vers l'Indépendance au Sahara Occidental,
ed. Denis Vericel (Paris: APSO, 2015).
196
Ibid.
197
Ibid.
198
Ibid.
199
Ibid.
195
39
Morocco still increased during his presidency, illustrating the strength of the ties between the two
countries were. The relationship between the two states improved under both Jacques Chirac and
Nicolas Sarkozy. François Hollande, the current president, has explicitly assured King Mohammed
VI of France’s support of the monarchy in the conflict, continuing the tradition.200
A number of French officials, like their American counterparts, have stated that autonomy is
the only possible option for the Western Sahara.201 Also similar to the American position, the French
have emphasized the importance of compliance with international law, but show little desire in
upholding it in the Western Sahara by confronting the Moroccan government about its actions in the
territory. Sometimes, when one of Morocco’s allies pressures it to take a certain action, Moroccan
officials use diplomatic leverage on the other ally to continue holding its position. For example,
when the U.S. pressured Morocco about allowing the inclusion of a human rights monitoring
mechanism in MINURSO, the monarchy turned to France to pressure American diplomats to
withdraw the proposition.202 The combination of a strong political and economic relationship and
complementary narratives has contributed to the lack of resolution of the conflict, as well as the
Moroccan state’s failure to uphold human rights in the Western Sahara. Since 2001, the American
and French rhetoric concerning the Western Sahara has changed slightly, focusing more closely on
the effects of terrorism on the stability of the region.
The War on Terror
The 9/11 attacks served as a turning point in U.S.-Moroccan relations because they
strengthened the relationship further and even led to the difficulty of implementing a referendum to
200
Ibid.
Ibid.
202
Ibid.
201
40
resolve the Western Sahara dispute.203 One of the U.S.’s policies that dealt directly with combatting
terrorism in the region was the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). This initiative, started in 2004, was
initially meant to securitize the borders of weak African states such as Chad, Niger, Mali, and
Mauritania.204 In 2006, the U.S. not only increased the PSI’s budget, but also expanded the number
of states in it to include Morocco and Algeria. The PSI was also renamed the “Trans-Saharan
Counter Terrorism Initiative/Partnership.”205 As Zunes and Mundy emphasize, an independent
Western Sahara was not a threat to U.S. interests in the region, but rather “a threat in and of itself”
because of the growing fear that a new, independent Western Sahara would be too weak to control
terrorist cells from appearing.206 The concern of the territory becoming an Al-Qaeda base for
recruitment is what has contributed to both French and American attempts to strengthen their
relationships with Morocco. This is especially a source of concern for France and Europe as a whole
because many of the Al-Qaeda recruits come from North Africa or from suburbs of large European
cities.207
The terrorist attacks that took place on May 16, 2003 in Casablanca, which some claim were
perpetrated in response to Morocco’s close ties with the U.S., further contributed to the Americans
seeing Morocco as a crucial ally against the rise of terrorism in North Africa.208 As mentioned
above, in 2008, George W. Bush voiced support for autonomy for Western Sahara within Morocco
For an insight into the broader context concerning the “war on terror” and a discussion on how U.S. foreign
policy was affected, see James K. Oliver, “US Foreign Policy after 9/11: Context and Prospect,” in The War on
Terror in Comparative Perspective: US Security and Foreign Policy after 9/11, eds. Mark J. Miller and Boyka
Stefanova, 19-45, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
204
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 74.
205
Ibid.
206
Ibid.
207
Yahia H. Zoubir, “American Policy in the Maghreb: The Conquest of a New Region?” Real Instituto Elcano, no.
13 (2006): 9.
208
A series of suicide bombings that killed forty-one (including ten suicide bombers) and injured one hundred. See
Elaine Sciolino, “Suicide Bombs Kill Dozens in Casablanca,” The New York Times, May 17, 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/17/international/worldspecial2/17CND-CASA.html.
203
41
as the only option because of the uncertainty concerning how strong an independent state
administered by the Polisario could be.209
An interesting point that Zunes and Mundy make as well is that the U.S.’s actions throughout
the Western Sahara conflict were very similar to its actions during the Cold War when it created the
“Safari Club,” a group of Middle Eastern states that included Morocco to uphold U.S. interests in the
region and ensure that any Soviet influence was stifled.210 This “outsourcing” strategy was chosen by
the U.S. as a way to get other countries in regions of concern to uphold its interests without direct
intervention.211 In effect, these strategies illustrate that the U.S. was cautious and concerned about
developments in the region, which contributed to the lack of progress in resolving the conflict.
Some other issues concerning the development of an independent Western Sahara are related
to the developments over the last few years in the Sahrawi nationalist movement. For example, some
Sahrawis, especially the youth, have lost hope in the UN-sponsored peace process and see violence
as a viable option. This is evident in the rise in levels of violence between Sahrawis and Moroccans
living in the territory. These “intergroup conflicts” illustrate how Morocco cannot continue to
maintain its control over the territory.212 Additionally, the U.S.’s support for Morocco, specifically
its rejection of the implementation of human rights monitoring, has waned.213 Even France has been
pressuring Morocco to allow the inclusion of a human rights mechanism in MINURSO. However,
this pressure has not been sufficient to end the monarchy’s human rights violations against Sahrawis
as both countries have merely condemned Morocco verbally.214 Considering the weak condemnation
of the Moroccan government’s actions in Western Sahara by the U.S. and France despite the rise of
209
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 74.
Ibid., 72.
211
Ibid.
212
Boukhars, “Dynamics of Intergroup Conflicts in the Western Sahara,” 187-208.
213
Khakee, “The MINURSO Mandate, Human Rights and the Autonomy Solution for Western Sahara,” 457.
214
Ibid., 457-8.
210
42
violence and intergroup conflict since 2011, it is evident that the two states view a violent,
independent Western Sahara as more perilous to their interests than a violent Western Sahara that
remains a part of Morocco. 215
There is also concern that this violence could lead to radicalism. This could be a possible
choice, especially amongst elements found in the Sahrawi independence movement who do not
agree with pursuing a more peaceful path toward resolution.216 This is even more worrying
considering the presence of drug trafficking and smuggling in the region, with some evidence of
Sahrawi cooperation and the presence of Al-Qaeda in the region, known officially as Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).217 By extension, the fact that the Sahrawi self-determination
movement has split into those who are willing to continue negotiations and those who see the use of
force and going back to war as the only option, makes it difficult for the U.S. and other states to see
the viability of a Western Saharan state. However, at the same time, this violence exists and even
terrorist attacks could occur in a Western Sahara governed by the monarchy, showing the dilemma
all three states face. The viability of an independent state is not supported by Morocco, the U.S. and
France, but maintaining their positions against the Sahrawis’ wishes can also still lead to the same
issues they fear might occur under an independent Western Sahara.
Another issue is the fear of destabilization in Morocco and across the wider region if the
Western Sahara were given independence due to its importance to the Moroccan monarchy, which
sees the territory as an indivisible part of Morocco.218 The monarchy’s grasp on the territory has
Boukhars, “Dynamics of Intergroup Conflicts in the Western Sahara,” 189-190.
Ibid., 187, 189. Also see Anouar Boukhars, “Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara,” in Perilous Desert
Insecurity in the Sahara, eds. Frederic M. Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, 165-184, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2013).
217
Khadija Mohsen-Finan, “Western Sahara: A Conflict on the Fringes of New Regional Dynamics,” in
Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and Geopolitics, 292.
218
Ammour, “À Qui Profite le Gel du Conflit du Sahara Occidental?” 2.
215
216
43
been institutionalized into the Moroccan ideology of “God, the nation, the king” (Allah, al-Watan,
al-Maleek), and letting go of the territory is definitely seen by many in the Moroccan government as
destroying Morocco’s territorial integrity, which is an integral part of the monarchy’s claim to
legitimacy.
The U.S. is concerned about the emergence of terrorist cells or connections with Al-Qaeda in
the region and would not favor its closest ally in North Africa losing control over its territory and
legitimacy. In addition to the government’s vision, King Hassan’s specialized discourse on the
Western Sahara and the Green March of 1975 has led to the Moroccan people continuing to support
the monarchy’s vision of the Western Sahara as an indisputable part of Morocco. If the Western
Sahara were seen as being “given up” by the state, the Moroccan populace’s support for the
monarchy would deteriorate. These views of the situation have shaped Morocco’s narrative of the
conflict and its evolution depending on the political situation.
Morocco: The Power of Narrative and Myth
The Moroccan monarchy’s narrative of the situation is dependent on the principle of “existentiality,”
not expansion.219 The territory is seen as an integral part of Morocco and was understood as being a
colonial possession, just like the other pieces of land that were returned to the state after
independence. This is how the territory is spoken about by the elite (makhzen) and the Moroccan
populace. This understanding of the territory is what has made it especially difficult for the
Moroccan government to consider diverging from its narrative. This forms the “central pillar” of the
makhzen’s view of the conflict, which then branches out into different strategies depending on the
political situation the government finds itself in. Throughout different periods, Morocco has utilized
219
Zartman, “Morocco’s Saharan Policy,” 55.
44
three different strategies to realize its objectives: aggressive claiming, defensive confirming, and
offensive bargaining.220
The Western Sahara differs from the other colonial possessions that were returned to
Morocco after independence because it was a contested area with no clear indication as to who
controlled it.221 This meant that the government had to find a way to claim it, not only to uphold its
goals and principles, but also to gain legitimacy on the world stage. The monarchy went about
aggressively pursuing its vision of the territory for approximately two decades, from the country’s
independence in 1956 until Spain’s withdrawal from the territory in 1975.222 As discussed above, by
1975, King Hassan II had decided to enter the Western Sahara and declare it as Moroccan according
to his interpretation of the ICJ’s ruling, ignoring the international community’s disapproval.223 The
Green March was not just about claiming legitimacy. It was the first time that Moroccans were
directly involved in the monarchy’s narrative on the Western Sahara and in carrying out a part of the
“myth” of Greater Morocco.
When it comes to human rights, upholding the myth becomes paramount and the monarchy
would do anything to maintain it and protect its legitimacy. The myth is necessary “‘to justify the
power and policies of the ruling coalition,’” including human rights violations.224 The Green March
was Hassan’s brainchild. His explanation of the idea and how it came to him is also a part of the
myth and helps illustrate his own conviction in the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara.225 As noted
above, this idea of reasserting control over the Western Sahara had its roots in the independence
movement and was advocated for by its main leader, Allal Al-Fassi. This myth was passed to the
220
Ibid., 55-6.
Ibid., 56.
222
Ibid.
223
Ibid.
224
Sonia Cardenas, “Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State
Behavior,” International Studies Review 6, no. 2 (June 2004): 223.
225
King Hassan II and Eric Laurent, La Mémoire d'un Roi, 190-1.
221
45
monarchy with King Mohammed V and continued through Hassan and King Mohammed VI. In a
sense, the idea or myth has become embodied in the monarch himself, who Moroccans see as the
defender of their Sahara. This view is further substantiated by the idea that Hassan promoted of
being the Sharifian monarch and Commander of the Faithful whose word is final. Anyone who
denies the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara and, by extension, crosses the monarch, deserves to
be subjected to repression.
As Hassan himself said, “human rights stop at the question of the Moroccanness of the
Sahara” and “anyone claiming that the Sahara is not Moroccan cannot benefit from human rights.”226
He said this in response to the arrest of Abraham Serfaty, a Moroccan journalist who had spoken out
against the occupation of the Western Sahara. Today, this holds true for many Sahrawis living in the
territory, as was discussed in the section on Morocco’s human rights violations. Since Hassan, the
Moroccan people have taken it upon themselves to fight any calls for independence and have
assimilated this vision of the Western Sahara without much second thought. During the war with the
Polisario, the pressure of upholding this idea of the Western Sahara was seen as so important that the
Moroccan government denied not only casualties, but even Moroccan prisoners of war (POWs)
captured by the Polisario until years later.227
Defensive confirming was conducted after the annexation of the territory and consisted of
maintaining a strong military presence, spending significant sums on developing the inhospitable
environment of the Sahara, and trying to maintain diplomatic ties with the American and French
governments.228 During this period, the government also tried to influence the referendum process by
giving Moroccans incentives to move to the Western Sahara such as high salaries. Finan argues that
this was part of an attempt by the Moroccan government to encourage mixing amongst the two
226
Ibid., 293.
Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara, 56.
228
Ibid., 61-2.
227
46
populations, Moroccan and Sahrawi, in order to reduce the Sahrawis to a minority and, over time,
erase their identity.229 This “‘Moroccanization’” is also used to portray a “seamless integration” of
the Western Sahara with Morocco.230
Offensive bargaining began once King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne and mainly
consists of using diplomatic leverage through various methods, especially “world tours.”231
According to a 2006 commentary by the U.S. embassy in Rabat, Morocco had sent delegates to
numerous countries such as the United Kingdom, Peru, Argentina, China, Ghana, Russia, and the
Democratic Congo.232 These tours had several goals: garner support for the Western Sahara, try to
reduce support for the SADR, especially by African and South American countries, and ensure
lessened pressure on issues related to the human rights situation such as the addition of a human
rights mechanism to MINURSO.
Other 2006 diplomatic cables, containing discussions between Sahrawis who work for the
Moroccan government in the Western Sahara and American officials, illustrate both the intricacies of
Morocco’s narrative and American support for it.233 Rachid Rguibi, then Ministry of Interior
governor in the territory, reiterated the monarchy’s support for autonomy, characterizing
independence for the territory as an “‘unthinkable’” option for the monarchy. 234 Rguibi also
appealed to American concerns about terrorism, saying that the Moroccan government wanted to
“ward off potential terrorism emanating from the Sahel region.”235 Matching the monarchy’s
understanding of the dispute, Rguibi also emphasized the importance of Algeria, asking whether
Mohsen-Finan, “Sahara Occidental: Divergences Profondes Autour d’un Mode de Règlement,” 9.
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 158.
231
Zartman, “Morocco’s Saharan Policy,” 66-8.
232
Wikileaks, “Moroccan Road Show on Western Sahara Resolution fans out Around the Globe,” 20 October 2006,
06RABAT1979.
233
There are Sahrawis within the Western Sahara who support integration and work for the Moroccan government.
234
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara: Preparing the GOM for Autonomy and Negotiations with the Polisario,” 2 March
2006, 06RABAT389.
235
Ibid.
229
230
47
“Algeria [was] ready for a definitive political solution to the conflict,” not referring to the Polisario
as the main entity with which to negotiate.236 He went as far as to say that “a militarized Polisario
was a threat to Morocco” even though the Sahrawi population is very small compared to Morocco’s
and the front has little, high quality military equipment.237 He also commented on the demonstrations
that Sahrawis have held calling for self-determination, describing them as provocative.238
Throughout the cable, autonomy is repeated as the only option for the Western Sahara, which
directly undermines the Polisario’s call for self-determination and independence. In another 2006
diplomatic cable containing a discussion between U.S. ambassador to Morocco at the time, Thomas
T. Riley, and Khalihenna Ould Er-Rachid, President of the Royal Council for Saharan Affairs
(CORCAS), similar comments are made. Rachid said that CORCAS was willing to negotiate with
the Polisario, but “‘independence’ is off the table.”239 These views are still held to this day,
demonstrating the durability of both the Moroccan narrative and U.S. support for the monarchy in
the dispute.
In addition to these strategies and understandings, it is evident that King Hassan II has had a
lasting effect on the narrative that all Moroccans have absorbed concerning the Western Sahara. He,
and his son since 1999, emphasized referring to the Sahrawis as their “brothers” and to the refugees
in Tindouf as being held “captive” by the Polisario.240 Dissenting Sahrawis or anyone calling for the
independence of the Western Sahara are called “traitors.”241 This type of narrative was initially
utilized by King Hassan II in the weeks leading up to the Green March and, as will be illustrated
below, his son has espoused a similar attitude since coming to power. Similar views were also
236
Ibid.
Ibid.
238
Ibid.
239
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara: CORCAS seeks U.S. Mediation with Polisario,” 6 June 2006, 06RABAT1087.
240
Quarante, “Le Rôle de la France.”
241
Ibid.
237
48
expressed by French journalists covering the Green March. For example, François Ponchelet praised
the march, calling it “legitimate” and “noble.”242 It is therefore not surprising that a Sahrawi fighter
told Olivier Quarante that France was “the Sahrawis’ second enemy, after Morocco.”243
In his speech on the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Green March in November 2014, King
Mohammed VI reiterated the monarchy’s view of the Western Sahara emphasizing that all
Moroccans, no matter their background, including Sahrawis, are united. He also referred to the
Western Sahara as “our southern provinces,” rejecting any characterization of the territory as
anything else.244 In this speech, he repeated the monarchy’s stance on the dispute stressing the
viability of granting autonomy to the Western Sahara within Moroccan sovereignty.245 He added that
“the Sahara is a matter of existence and not a matter of borders...Morocco will remain in its Sahara,
and the Sahara will remain in its Morocco until the end of time.”246
He went on to list the Moroccan government’s investments in the territory and noted that
human development is at a higher rate there than in Morocco, a response to accusations that
Morocco was exploiting the Western Sahara’s natural resources.247 A 2009 diplomatic cable from
the U.S. Embassy in Rabat includes an observation that “the Government of Morocco (GOM) has
invested tremendous resources in the territory…the level of development and of social services
clearly exceeds the level in Morocco proper.”248 Mohammed also claimed that there was a
“dramatization of events in the southern provinces” and silence on what goes in Tindouf and
neighboring countries. He is most likely referring to the human rights situation, claiming that there is
242
Ibid.
Ibid.
244
King Mohammed VI, “SM le Roi Adresse un Discours à La Nation à l’Occasion du 39ème Anniversaire de la
Marche Verte (Texte Intégral),” Agence Marocaine de Presse (MAP), November 06, 2014,
http://www.mapnews.ma/fr/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-discours-la-nation-l’occasion-du-39eanniversaire-d.
245
Ibid.
246
Ibid.
247
Ibid.
248
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara Realities,” 17 August 2009, 09RABAT706.
243
49
too much attention on the actions of Moroccan police in the Western Sahara than on the Polisario’s
actions in the camps.249 This illustrates how the monarchy is quite adamant about admitting its
mistakes and focuses on blaming the other side.
The rhetoric of Sahrawis being Moroccans is repeated once again when the king says he
“negotiated with Moroccans in Tindouf” when he was crown prince. The monarch’s rejection of the
Polisario and the Sahrawi cause is also evident through his reference to the Polisario as a separatist
movement and to Algeria as the main actor in the dispute.250 In his speech commemorating the
fortieth anniversary of the Green March in November 2015, broadcasted live from Laayoune, King
Mohammed VI reiterated the same arguments about the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara,
highlighting the social and economic projects that the government was planning to improve the
livelihoods of the “sons of the Sahara.”251 When he first took the throne in 1999, the king had made
it his goal to end the conflict, but his emphasis on autonomy and nothing else as well as his rejection
of the Polisario and the entire Sahrawi movement has made reaching this goal difficult thus far. The
Moroccan narrative has evolved over the duration of Western Sahara conflict, but its basic
principles—that the territory is an inseparable part of Morocco, that the Sahrawis are just
Moroccans, and that the Polisario is illegitimate—have remained the same.
The Polisario: Nationalism, Democracy, and Women’s Rights
As discussed briefly earlier, the Polisario was founded in 1973 by a group of Sahrawis who were
against being ruled by Spain, Mauritania, or Morocco. In 1976, after the Spanish left, the Sahrawis
King Mohammed VI, “SM le Roi Adresse un Discours à la Nation à l’Occasion du 39ème Anniversaire de la
Marche Verte (Texte Intégral).”
250
Ibid.
251
King Mohammed VI, “SM le Roi Adresse un Discours à la Nation à l’Occasion du 40ème
Anniversaire de la Marche Verte (Texte Intégral),” Agence Marocaine de Presse (MAP), November 06, 2015,
http://www.mapnews.ma/fr/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-discours-la-nation-loccasion-du-40eme-anniversaire.
249
50
instituted the SADR to fill the political vacuum. From this time through the 1990s, the war that
ensued between the front, Morocco, and Mauritania led to thousands of Sahrawis fleeing to
neighboring Algeria, where 165,000 still live in four refugee camps near the city of Tindouf.252 The
Polisario/SADR administers these camps, where the core of the front’s nationalist narrative is
articulated and propagated.253 Additionally, the SADR considers itself “not as a government in
exile,” but “an independent state under illegal occupation.”254 This distinction is important because it
shows that the Sahrawi narrative is very much rooted in the idea of return to the Western Sahara,
which means having to shape the narrative to convince the international community of the viability
of a Sahrawi state and to keep Sahrawis, east and west of the berm, united in the nationalist cause.
The Polisario’s narrative started with a call for independence from the Spanish. Later, after
Spain had ceded the territory, the front continued its struggle against Morocco. Knowing that it could
not succeed against Morocco militarily, the Polisario focused on forging close ties with other states,
mostly in Africa and South America.255 The Sahrawis had to fight at the diplomatic level against the
Moroccan, American, and French narratives. For example, the monarchy, especially at the beginning
of the conflict, refused to recognize the Polisario as a separate entity that it was fighting against,
claiming that it consisted of “proxies for the Algerian government seeking to claim the Western
Sahara for itself.”256 Since the front had little military success, especially after Morocco built the
berm/sand wall in the 1980s, and depended on diplomatic support and recognition from other
countries, it was much more sensitive to these types of accusations.
UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, “2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Algeria,” UNHCR, 2015,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485e16.html.
253
Because the Polisario and the SADR have overlapping roles and many officials are part of both entities
(Mohamed Abdelaziz is President of the SADR and secretary-general of the Polisario), it was seen as necessary to
refer to both at once as “Polisario/SADR” in the following discussion.
254
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 123.
255
Stephen J. King, “The Emergence and Politics of the Polisario Front,” in Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths,
Nationalisms, and Geopolitics, 71.
256
Ibid., 78.
252
51
To prove the front was worthy of recognition, it had to fight notions that it lacked popular
legitimacy or was dependent on any one state. The main way the Polisario did this was by forming
an elaborate governmental structure in the camps in Algeria, complete with regular elections.257 The
Polisario focused on forming a Sahrawi government within these camps that could prove to the
international community that an independent Western Sahara governed by the front would not be a
threat to the region’s stability. Zunes’ 1987 article on the Polisario demonstrates that the front began
with a decentralized system and that decision-making was done from the base rather than the top.258
Zunes also noted that there were few pictures of party leaders and that “no official gets any salary or
special treatment.”259 He reports observing no division between the younger and older generations,
which might have been true then, but has changed today.260 During this time as well, the Polisario
had a large constituency, with a majority of the Sahrawi people supporting the nationalist cause. 261
However, as will be shown below, this support has decreased in recent years. King Hassan II’s
encouragement of the Sahrawis to return to their “Moroccan homeland” (la patrie) contributed to the
Polisario’s credibility weakening during the 1980s and 1990s as numerous high-level officials from
the front defected to Morocco.262 Over time, the Polisario’s narrative expanded from its focus being
mainly on nationalism and self-determination to trying to promote a democratic, “Western” image as
a way to survive.
Since the early 2000s, the Polisario’s narrative has focused even more on promoting an
image of democracy and uniformity within the Sahrawi movement. However, the Twelfth General
Ibid., 78-9; Also see Zunes and Mundy, “Expressions of Nationalism,” in Western Sahara: War, Nationalism,
and Conflict, Irresolution, 128-130.
258
Stephen Zunes, “Nationalism and Non-Alignment: The Non-Ideology of the Polisario Front,” Africa Today 34,
no. 3 (1987): 38.
259
Ibid., 39.
260
Ibid., 40.
261
Ibid., 41.
262
King, “The Emergence and Politics of the Polisario Front,” 79-80.
257
52
Popular Congress (GPC) held in 2007, showed that this uniformity was not very realistic.263 The rise
of a militant organization calling for a return to national struggle within the camps called Khat asShahid (Path of the Martyr) illustrates that not all Sahrawis agree with the Polisario, as was seen
during the 1980s and that there are Sahrawis who believe in going back to armed struggle to realize
their goals.264 Interestingly, even though Khat as-Shahid accused the Polisario of corruption,
clientalism, and tribalism, it still did not label itself as an opposition movement, possibly trying to
avoid being shut down by the front.265 The group has, however, threatened to break from the
Polisario if its demands were not met, demonstrating the complications that exist within the
Polisario’s narrative and the Sahrawi nationalist movement.266
The issue of tribalism amongst Sahrawis does not only exist in the refugee camps, but also
within the Western Sahara itself. According to a 2009 diplomatic cable containing a discussion
between U.S. officials and a Sahrawi activist, Saleh el-Bachra, there was a riot amongst Sahrawis in
the Western Sahara after the successful election of a governor who did not come from a dominant
Sahrawi tribe.267 This issue of tribalism has been a contentious one for the Polisario because it
clashes with its claims that Sahrawis are egalitarian and democratic.268 In sum, while the Polisario’s
narrative has a divided constituency, Morocco’s narrative on the Western Sahara is seen as valid by
most Moroccans and even some Sahrawis living in the territory.
Recently, in a speech during the Fourteenth Congress of the Polisario Front on December 16,
2015, President of the SADR and secretary-general of the Polisario, Mohamed Abdelaziz
Madeline Otis Campbell, “Dissenting Participation: Unofficial Politics in the 2007 Saharawi General Congress,”
The Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 4 (2010): 574.
264
Ibid.
265
Ibid., 576-7.
266
Ibid., 577.
267
Wikileaks, “Western Sahara: Activist confirms Human Rights Improvements, Notes Political Evolution,” 8 July
2009, 09RABAT584.
268
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 118-9.
263
53
condemned the UN for the lack of progress on holding the referendum and called on the
international community to “put an end to Morocco’s obstructionism and procrastination for the sake
of peace, security, and stability in the region.”269 Abdelaziz went on to reiterate that the Sahrawis are
unified in their struggle for independence and asserted that the Polisario had garnered worldwide
recognition for the nationalist cause.270 He also emphasized the importance of education, women’s
rights, and democracy, all core pillars of the Sahrawi nationalist movement.271 He called on all
Sahrawis to continue the struggle against Moroccan occupation, saying that the younger and older
generations of Sahrawis may believe in pursuing different forms of resistance, but that “their
message is identical in substance.”272 As demonstrated, the Sahrawi narrative focuses very closely on
emphasizing unity and democracy, as well as seeing Morocco’s narrative as a direct threat to the
Sahrawi goal of self-determination. However, as will be seen, this narrative has not been as unifying
as Abdelaziz claims.
Qasmiyeh argues that the Polisario has used Sahrawi women and discourse on female
empowerment within the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria to garner political and diplomatic
support for the Sahrawi nationalist cause. The use of the portrayal of Sahrawi women as
“empowered and liberated” helps substantiate further the Polisario’s narrative, which emphasizes
democracy.273 This narrative is also used to portray the Sahrawi people as distinct from other Arabs
and Muslims in the wider region. This discourse that portrays the Sahrawi woman as unique, free,
and unlike her neighboring Arab and Muslim sisters is used as part of the Polisario’s “‘politics of
Mohamed Abdelaziz, “President’s Address to the 14th Congress of POLISARIO Front,” Sahrawi Mission in
Ethiopia, December 17, 2015, http://www.sadr-emb-au.net/presidents-adress-to-the-14th-congress-of-polisariofront/.
270
Ibid.
271
Ibid.
272
Ibid.
273
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees, 7.
269
54
survival.’”274 In other words, in order to get the political and humanitarian aid needed to survive and
continue fighting for the nationalist cause, the Polisario has had to portray a certain image that
matches more with Western expectations of democracy, women’s rights, open-mindedness, even
hiding their religion because of the negative views of the media towards Islam.275
The attempt to hide the fact that Sahrawis are Muslim is significant because it illustrates that
the Polisario/SADR is aware of the American and European views of a Sahrawi state being unviable
and their distrust of such a state being able to effectively counter terrorism in the region. This is also
interesting considering that article two in the SADR’s constitution asserts that “Islam is the religion
of the state and the source of law.”276 Qasmiyeh even highlights, through her interviews with
Polisario/SADR officials and Sahrawi youth studying in other countries, how the narrative about
nationalism and women’s rights is consistent amongst the different parts of Sahrawi society,
illustrating its roots in the official discourse.277 However, the “truth” of this image like the “truth” of
the Moroccan Sahara is not grounded in fact and shows how each side promotes a certain myth or
ideal to promote its cause.
In Morocco’s case, its myth of the Sahara being Moroccan has a larger constituency while
the Sahrawi myth of democracy and women’s rights has caused a schism between the Sahrawi
people and their representatives in the Polisario and SADR.278 This schism along with other issues
with the Polisario/SADR’s narrative such as having the same president since 1976, which is not seen
as democratic, especially by the Sahrawi youths living in the camps, illustrates how the Polisario’s
274
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 126.
276
The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), “Constitution de la RASD (The Constitution of the SADR),”
Association de Soutien à un Référendum Libre et Régulier au Sahara Occidental (ARSO), http://www.arso.org/03const.99.htm.
277
Ibid., 126-131.
278
Ibid., 81, 202-3, 219, 263.
275
55
narrative has not been able to truly include what the majority of Sahrawi people desire.279 Changing
circumstances in the refugee camps has also led to the development of socioeconomic differences
between Sahrawis, further compromising the Polisario’s vision of unity.280
Today, the Sahrawi narrative is changing, partly due to the increasing differences between
the younger and older generations. The senior members of the front still remember the nationalist
movement and fought in the war while the young are disillusioned with the Sahrawi struggle. While
the older generations may believe in fighting back peacefully, the younger generations are less
inclined to follow their lead. The youth has different experiences compared to older Polisario
members. Sahrawi youths in the camps, whom Qasmiyeh interviewed, had many suggestions about
changes they would like to see the Polisario/SADR implement such as “intergenerational
communication.”281 Qasmiyeh also demonstrated through her research that the older Sahrawis
(especially women) were much more active in projects in the camps while the youth (young women
and men) were quite marginalized.282 This poses a threat to the Polisario’s narrative because it can
lead to the youth resorting to other means to promote the cause, which could hurt the
Polisario/SADR’s strategy of “politics of survival.” Finan posits that these youths are comparable to
the jobless graduates in Morocco proper, except that the former can pressure the monarchy more
effectively using the language of “self-determination,” which can still attract the international
community to their cause.283 The young Sahrawis who protest and burn the Moroccan flag could
shape a different narrative, separate from the Polisario’s, capable of garnering even more attention
and support. However, for the time being, the Polisario’s narrative has not been able to effectively
counter those of Morocco, the U.S., and France.
Campbell, “Dissenting Participation,” 577.
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 136.
281
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees, 243.
282
Ibid., 232-3, 241-247.
283
Mohsen-Finan, “Sahara Occidental: Divergences Profondes Autour d’un Mode de Règlement,” 11.
279
280
56
Conclusion
Morocco’s narrative and strategies combined with strong support by the U.S. and France as well as
their complementary narratives have allowed the monarchy to continue committing human rights
violations in the Western Sahara to this day. These complementary narratives and strong alliances
have also undermined the Polisario’s core nationalist discourse. The Polisario’s narrative has not
matched the Moroccan narrative’s success due to many reasons, but the differences in the narratives
themselves have certainly played a role. The Moroccan narrative revolves around the monarch
himself, as Sharifian and Commander of the Faithful, which has contributed to its widespread
acceptance and popularity among most Moroccans. The Polisario’s narrative, on the other hand, is
not as consistent nor does it have as large of a constituency. As discussed above, there are many
divisions that have threatened the Sahrawi nationalist narrative, especially between the youth and the
older generations and between the core authority of the Polisario itself and the Sahrawi people as a
whole.
The imbedded belief in the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara has led to the monarchy
formulating a myth that most Moroccans have absorbed since 1975. This myth has made it
impossible for the monarchy to give up its claim to the territory due to its fear of losing its own
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The myth has also been used as justification to commit human
rights violations in the territory. It is seen, in a way, as protecting the very sovereignty of Morocco.
When the Moroccan police and settlers torture, harass, and beat Sahrawis calling for the
independence of the Western Sahara, it is because the Sahrawi narrative that denies the
Moroccanness of the Western Sahara is seen as a threat, a danger to the monarchy itself. The myth
has allowed human rights violations to continue because the Moroccan government has used it as
justification to act with impunity in the Western Sahara. The Moroccan narrative is seen as fact and
57
any questioning of it is seen as wrong. Combined with his powerful myth are the support of the U.S.
and France and the silence of the rest of the international community.
Morocco’s support by the U.S. and France due to their strategic interests has led to the
undermining of human rights norms, illustrating how, as Finnemore argued, norms are connected to
other developments in the international arena which can lead to even universal ones, like human
rights, being sidetracked.284 In addition to the lack of action by Morocco’s main allies, the UN has
also been unable to fully support the Sahrawis illustrating what Forsythe argues about international
organizations being unable to initiate changes and uphold human rights norms without the action of
the states making up these organizations.285 In addition, as Donnelly argues, and the Western
Saharan case demonstrates, the universality of human rights norms does not specify enforcement.286
Since 1975, Morocco has benefitted from its alliances with the U.S. and France by receiving
the military and diplomatic support that helped it subdue the Polisario. Morocco’s ties with the two
states have continued to expand throughout the 2000s as shown by increased economic cooperation
in spite of continuing human rights violations in the Western Sahara. The multinational cooperation
in the war on terror, mainly due to the U.S.’s fear of terrorist links or cells developing in an
independent Western Sahara, has contributed to the fortification of these alliances. This cooperation,
bolstered alliances, and competing as well as complementary narratives of the conflict have helped
fortify Morocco’s position vis-à-vis the Polisario. The gaps that exist in the upholding of
international human rights law have also played a major role in the ability of the U.S. and France to
support Morocco in spite of its well-known violations in the Western Sahara.
Finnemore, “Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” 57.
Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations.
286
Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” 283.
284
285
58
Morocco has attempted to improve its human rights record and has gone as far as to allow
human rights groups to operate in the Western Sahara. However, considering that violations
continue, it has been largely unsuccessful. This is because its support by the U.S. and France,
especially on the UNSC, has not given the monarchy any incentive to fully acknowledge and rectify
its mistakes. For the Moroccan government to take any steps towards resolution, only its allies can
apply significant pressure. While mostly adopting the language of human rights, Morocco has not
adopted the practices that would end its violations in the Western Sahara. Considering the increase in
the violent aspirations of Sahrawi youth, terrorism should not be seen as possible only in an
independent Western Sahara, but also in an integrated Western Sahara mired by clashes between
Moroccans and Sahrawis. This is the dilemma that all three countries will have to face.
The power of competing narratives in the framing of the Western Sahara conflict illustrates
the importance of examining them to thoroughly understand the dynamics of the dispute. The
Moroccan view of the Western Sahara as an integral part of its territory and as a core piece of the
monarchy’s legitimizing principle has strengthened its narrative compared to the Polisario’s
narrative. While the Moroccan government’s narrative is concentrated in the monarchy itself, even in
the monarch himself, the Polisario’s discourse on the dispute does not possess this type of
legitimacy. The Polisario is plagued by divisions and inconsistencies. This was alluded to in the
discussion on the differences between generations and how this has already shown signs of
drastically changing the Sahrawi course of action in the future. Unlike Morocco, the Polisario’s
narrative is not centralized or concentrated in a single person or entity, which has contributed to its
weakness.
In sum, the combination of strong alliances between Morocco, the U.S., and France, along
with the events of 9/11 that caused the U.S. to launch the “war on terror,” have contributed to the
59
two countries’ complacency towards the status quo in the Western Sahara. The addition of more
extensive economic relations between the three countries helped bolster the states’ unwillingness to
solve the conflict. This lack of action, due to political, economic, and geostrategic interests, has also
led to the Americans and the French remaining silent about Morocco’s human rights violations.
However, as important as finding a political solution to the dispute is, pressure by the U.S. and
France on Morocco or negotiations between the parties to the conflict is not enough.
The Moroccan narrative’s power on the Moroccan populace currently does not mean that
support for it cannot wane. A change that could truly lead to a solution and to the end of human
rights violations in the territory may lie in the hands of Moroccans themselves. The monarchy has
focused so much of its energy on ensuring that the Western Sahara remains a part of Morocco
because of concerns about losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the Moroccan people. The biggest
threat to the monarchy would be if Moroccans were to join with the Sahrawis, being attracted to their
democratic ideals in place of remaining under the Moroccan absolutist monarchy. Whether this
could ever occur is questionable, but it is an interesting possibility to consider and that deserves
further examination. Thus far, Moroccan irredentism has managed to undermine Sahrawi selfdetermination due to not only Morocco’s support by the U.S. and France, but also its powerful,
durable narrative that sees as unquestionable the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara.
60
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