On Socratic Metaphysics
"…an infinite multiplicity of being…"
For all their differences of perspective and purpose, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
come together at their deepest moments into a shared metaphysics, one that might be
called 'diversity in unity', or 'relative complementarity', or what Parmenides called an
"infinite multiplicity of being"[144b]. i Developed at length in the work of all three
philosophers are diverse and interconnected perspectives on 'being' in all its various
senses. Aristotle uses a different method than Socrates, to be sure, and both of these
differ from Plato. But this is certainly because, as their collective metaphysics would
indicate, as individuals, they each had different challenges and potentialities within the
reaches and limits of their own histories and situations. In short, they had different 'bestselves'.
Whereas Socrates had his intellectual ancestors to answer to, and the apparent
knack for reaching and challenging people by what Parmenides calls 'idle talk'ii, Aristotle
had his own predecessors to build upon, most importantly Socrates himself, and
significantly, those who had misunderstood Socrates through Plato's explication of him.
Complex as they recognized reality to be, these ancient philosophers were able to find
and describe the order which organizes being into a system of systems which behaves for
comprehensive reasons. This then must be a metaphysics which is accountable to the
whole of reality, including both object known and subject knowing as part of that
'moment' where attention meets and participates in the changing world at the cutting edge
of time.
It is the contention of this argument that much contemporary controversy hinges
on our failure to remember the insights that these great souls revealed for us. And that
our future academic struggles might be eased considerably by proper respect for this
dialogical effort, this magnificent jewel from our past. Taking these and all ancient views
together, as a progression of thought -- a dialogue -- rather than as competing
metaphysical conceptions, might bring us a long way toward reconciliation of many
contemporary conflicts (including perhaps some of those involved in how we should
view the Platonic Dialogues themselvesiii).
My approach here is to follow through from dialogues involving the young
Socrates to those involving the more mature, and, as he himself claims on his deathbed,
more prophetic Socrates.[Phaedo]iv This progression of thought gives a foundation to
both the literary analysis that Plato would undertake, and the linguistic analysis that
Aristotle would further endeavor. None of their ultimate purposes or objectives seems to
be fundamentally different from Socrates' own in this, though often their more immediate
purposes differed, effecting the means of expression they choose. Rather, each simply
follows his own path toward the same center, as Socrates accounts for different views of
justice in Republic [Rep 327]v, as Zeno and Parmenides account for the existence of both
'the one and the many'vi, and as Aristotle accounts for unavoidable equivocation of terms
in all out dialectical inquiries.[Metaphysics, 1030b]vii
Plato and Aristotle alike perform their investigations under a light held high by
Socrates, and my claim is that it is toward the basic insights which are made clear
(though sometimes understated) by Socrates himself which Aristotle directs so-called
Platonists, if not Plato himself, to look. If we allow for variation of means and emphasis
in the way they expressed themselves, (such as Plato's recording in literary form what the
Socratic elenchus does in oratory form, and Aristotle's analysis of linguistic forms vs.
Plato's emphasis on the mathematics of nature, which (according to Vlastos) distinguish
his philosophy from the historical Socrates, and clearly provokes Aristotle's sharp
criticism), then we can better see that these philosophers together discover a great deal
more about the whole truth of reality than we seem to recognize today. Perhaps another
look at what these great minds were up to would remind us why each of them held the
whole truth to be the end of all inquiry...and hence, that inquiry has no real end.
Socrates says in the Republic:
"No measure that falls in the least degree short of the whole truth
can be quite fair in so important a matter...though people sometimes
think enough has been done and there is no need to look
further."[Rep VI 503]
[T]he genuine lover of knowledge cannot fail, from his youth up, to
strive after the whole of truth.(Rep VI 485)
“Now the whole course of study...has the corresponding effect of
leading up the noblest faculty of the soul towards the contemplation
of the highest of all realities...the main theme...the function of
philosophic discussion, into what division it falls, and what are it's
methods; for here, it seems, we have come to the procedure which
should lead to the resting-place at our journey's end.”(Rep VII 533)
"Further...this whole course of study will, I believe, contribute to the
end we desire and not be labour wasted, only if it is carried to the
point at which reflection can take a comprehensive view of the
mutual relations and affinities which bind all these sciences
together.”(Rep VII 532]
“The detached studies...will now be brought together in a
comprehensive view of their connexions with one another and with
reality....a natural gift for Dialectic...is the same thing as the ability
to see the connexions of things.”(Rep VII 537)
To this Aristotle adds:
"[D]ialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the
philosopher, for sophistic is Wisdom which exists only in semblance,
and dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being
is common to all things; but evidently their dialectic embraces these
subjects because these are proper to philosophy. For sophistic and
dialectic turn on the same class of things as philosophy, but this
differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from
sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is
merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is
what appears to be philosophy but is not."[Book IV/Chapter 2]
"Some of the sensible substances are generally admitted to be
substances, so that we must look first among these. For it is an
advantage to advance to that which is more knowable. For learning
proceeds for all in this way--through that which is less knowable by
nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our
task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without
qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what
is more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature
knowable to oneself. Now what is knowable and primary for
particular sets of people is often knowable to a very small extent, and
has little or nothing of reality. But yet one must start from that which
is barely knowable but knowable to oneself, and try to know what is
knowable without qualification, passing, as has been said, by way
of those very things which one does know."[Metaphysics: Book
VII/Chapter 3]
"Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door,
which no one can fail to hit, in this respect it must be easy, but the
fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular part we
aim at shows the difficulty of it....[N]o one is able to attain the truth
adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but
every one says something true about the nature of things, and while
individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union
of all a considerable amount is amassed"[Aristotle's Metaphysics:
Book II/Chapter 1]
"It is just that we should be grateful, not only to those with whose
views we may agree, but also to those who have expressed more
superficial views; for these also contributed something, by
developing before us the powers of thought."[Metaphysics, Book
II/Chapter I]
We can see this kind of dialectical progression then in the work of Socrates, Plato
and Aristotle. For example, to Socrates' emphasis on the sense in which the 'forms' or
'ideas' are unchanging and primary, Aristotle adds his own balancing view on the
importance of understanding the nature of change and the fluctuation of appearances and
relations. Forms of thought are causal, Aristotle emphasized, remembering from
Socrates.[Socrates in Parm 131b-e, 133; Rep V 472; Rep VI 500; Rep IX 591]viii Ideals
exist as targets, as patterns, that is, as end of human action which, properly understood,
might help humans move toward their higher potentials, their individual best
selves.[Aristotle in Phy 193b7-12; Psy Book IV; and perhaps Meta 1029a51] This is a
point Socrates emphasized time and again -- but one which many Platonists have casually
neglected, then as now.
Some followers of this dialogue have externalized the ideas as if they somehow
exist 'apart from' the human mind, while others took a more solipsist view of the matter,
as if ideas could exist only within the mind. Both of these views seem to ignore Socrates'
own account, which is that they exists both within and outside of the mind. As Socrates
said, "In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things
are like them, and resemblances of them--what is meant by the participation of other
things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them."[Parm 132d] Ideas cannot exist merely
'apart from' the mind, as Parmenides says, for then they face problem of being separable
from self, and thus confusing our conception of 'being', in the sense that it is one, unified,
and whole. According to Aristotle, this is what had indeed occurred as a result of
viewing the forms as if they are 'apart from' the minds which they are present in. But if
we look close we can see that Socrates does not hold this to be the case. When asked by
Parmenides whether he thinks ideas exist "apart from the likeness which we possess, and
of the one and many"[Parm 129e], Socrates affirms only that there are such ideas, but not
necessarily apart from the minds of individuals. "I have often been puzzled about those
things, Parmenides," Socrates said, "whether one should say that the same thing is true in
the case of humans as in the case of...trivial objects", like hair and dirt, which are not
puzzling as they do not have a form.[Parm 129d]ix
On the other hand, ideas, if merely "in us", are not connected to being, but exist
only relative to one another: such as slavery/mastery; which are not absolutely real, not
tethered to being, but only constructed relative to one another. Socrates was clear that
nothing is absolute in human relations [Parm 133e]. But 'truth' is absolute, objective,
and primary, and is recognized as such by a process which Socrates called 'tethering' our
beliefs to being.[Meno 98; Parm 134b]x Knowledge, in this strong sense, and even 'true
belief', must be related to being by this oft' neglected process -- and so it is that we have
little of it, as young Socrates reluctantly agrees with Parmenides.[Parm 134b] However,
this is not a necessary effect. Socrates certainly thinks we can have knowledge[Parm
133b] -- if it weren't for the fact that we do too little of what is necessary to distinguish
objective truth from subjective constructs. Only those ideas which are actually tethered
to being are in any sense absolute, eternal, primary, and so not true merely 'in our sphere',
yet not 'apart from' and outside of it either. Even the young Socrates answers to this
apparent problem of the one being separated from itself in Parmenides by showing how
being might indeed be thought to be, in a sense, inside itself.[Parm 145d]xi/xii Humans
are not merely 'like' nature, they are part of it -- though not 'part' in the sense we might
typically use the term, as if separable from other parts [Parm 133]. Rather, as Plato and
Aristotle seemed to agree, humans 'participate' (in a sense that is not easy to settle on) in
the patterns of nature by degrees -- and whether this participation is by likeness,
resemblance, or by assimilation [Parm 132d] -- which we can discover best by dialogue
and deliberation.
As Aristotle showed throughout his works, reconciling equivocal terms is a life
long task, but it is one he undertook for the sake of clearing up Platonist's confusion,
despite Socrates clear mind on these matters. The metaphysical picture which emerges if
we carry this dialogue through is a rich integration of many individual perspectives, an
approach which indeed makes for an even more 'objective' picture of the truth than any
narrower or less complex view can reveal. Just as two eyes provide depth to the
dimensions which can be seen by a single eye, so "two heads are better than one", as
Socrates often said.[Sym 174d] We can have evidence that our beliefs are true only by
'tethering' them with being, and only beliefs which have been sufficiently 'tethered' begin
to approach objectively reality. These are distinct from that which we merely believe to
be real, without this critical examination.
Aristotle took a similar approach to the analysis of words. Words, like untethered
beliefs, can be what some postmoderns might call merely 'subjectively constructed', and
thus not quite as 'real' as sometimes supposed by those who do not distinguish between
'knowledge' and something less, as Socrates worried. Aristotle helps reconcile this
equivocation on the term 'real', among others, in his distinction between primary and
secondary substance, which differentiates the most fundamental substance from that
which is 'predicated of' and 'present in' it, and thus is 'real' only in a secondary sense -which is to say, real in as much as it appears in our minds and language as we think and
talk about primary reality -- which is real whether we notice it or not. Aristotle attempts,
as did Socrates, to broaden our understanding of 'knowledge' such that we might
distinguish stronger from the lesser, but nonetheless real, senses. Perhaps one key
difference between these philosophers is then the disposition of their perceived audiences
-- Socrates' treating 'knowledge' too weakly, while Aristotle's treating it, in a sense, too
strong.
Thus, Aristotle reminded us of the importance of understanding the language we
share in common and which could help us to better navigate the whole truth about reality,
that which changes along with that which lasts. As Socrates often suggested, words are
important tools of understanding, but too often they rationalize injustice, and so the
meaning of our words must needs be continually examined and justified with being, not
merely constructed in relation to each other [Parm 134b], as is slave to master. Words
too can prove to be simply different approaches to the same center. In this, again,
Socrates gives a respectful nod to this important distinction Aristotle draws between
primary and secondary being, both of which are 'real', though they are so in different
senses. As Aristotle says in the Metaphysics, "it does not matter at all in which of
the...ways one likes to describe the facts; this is evident, that [some terms]...in the
primary and simple sense belong to substances. Still they belong to other things as well,
only not in the primary sense." [Meta 1030b5-10] The metaphysics that grows out of this
is one that concludes that it's all one and many, unity and plurality, for "[W]hat seems to
be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and
one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not
to be."[Parm 166b]
And it is important to see how much is dependent upon how one looks at it -- for
changes in perspective makes being appear to change, but accumulation of perspective
might provide depth and broader vision. For as Socrates says:
"And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to
be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing
appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is
not?"[Parm 165c]
It is a question then of what we can conceive of, as "one cannot
conceive the many without the one"[Parm 166b]
Because things appear relative to one another, appearances can confuse, and so
the whole metaphysical truth then is going to have to involve both an affirmation and a
denial of every arguable position. Thus, Socrates continually uses and recommends the
dialectic method, which is illustrated in Parmenides, where discussion of Zeno's method
gives rise to how this variability of perspective is why dialectic participation is necessary
to learning and knowing.[Parm 165c] Zeno uses this 'method of controversy' to explore
the physical world, but Parmenides advises Socrates to take it a step further -- and apply
this method to the invisible world of abstract thought:
And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would
recommend?
That which you heard Zeno practicing [Parm 135d-e] i.e. ""In a word,
when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way
affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing
itself, and to any other things which you choose-to each of them
singly, to more than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must
look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you
suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly
and see the real truth."[Parm 136c]
And "I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only
the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but also the
consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that will
be still better training for you."[Parm 135d-e]
"At the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not
care to examine the perplexity in reference to visible things, or to
consider the question that way; but only in reference to objects of
thought, and to what may be called ideas."[Parm 135d-e]
"I should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves
which are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement
which you have shown to exist in visible objects."[Parm 129d]
And as he says in Phaedo:
"[F]irst principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully
considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a
sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow
the course of the argument; and if this is clear, there will be no need
for any further inquiry."[Phaedo p.40]
And as Plato says in his Seventh Epistle:
"The process however of dealing with all of these, as the mind
moves up and down to each in turn, does after much effort give birth
in a well-constituted mind to knowledge of that which is well
constituted."[Seventh Epistle]xiii
Thus, dialectic is seen to be a valuable method, and perhaps critical to good
science. At least and at best, this approach could help us to fill in the gaps between what
we think we know and the complex whole of what might be known by interconnection of
our differing perspectives on and common center about which we speak. It could take
western culture a long way to remember this, and perhaps admit to the 'diversity in unity'
which Socrates did his best to reveal, knowing he would be unable to do for his students
what we must do for ourselves.
Sadly, as Parmenides said, and as is still the case today, "most people are not
aware that this round about progress through all things is the only way in which the mind
can attain truth and wisdom."[Parm 136e]xiv
Perhaps it is worth looking deeper then, in other of the Dialogues, for clues to a
better understanding of what is meant by this dialectic progression. In the Republic he
suggests love is key to understanding this process which leads to the good itself. In
Symposium this is spelled out in finer resolution. Young Socrates gives us an interesting
angle on this learning process in his discussion with Diotima from Mantinea, a woman
who was an expert on many subjects, and who taught him by means of questions the
meaning of love. And in the process 'proved to' him that everything is not necessarily
either/or,[Sym 202]xv as Eros is neither beautiful nor ugly, neither good nor bad, but that
which exists in between these and all other opposing states, e.g. past and future, sleep
and wake, rest and motion. The unity of several passages from Symposium offer critical
insight into the dialectic interaction and the relation of knower to that which is known,
and what's more, the relation of love to learning.
As per Phaedrus' account of love:
"Love, more than anything (more than family, or position, or
wealth), implants in men the thing which must be their guide if they
are to live a good life. And what is that? It is a horror of what is
degrading, and a passionate desire for what is good. These qualities
are essential if a state or an individual is to accomplish anything
great or good."[Sym 178d] After all, as Socrates earlier said,
learning is not imparted form one to another simply by contact, as if
ideas can be transfused like liquid from one container to another by
means of a string between them, as if those of us who had few good
ideas could absorb them from those who had a lot.[Sym 175e]
As per Agathon's account:
"Eros is master of all forms of literary or artistic creation. After all,
no one can impart, or teach, a skill which he does not himself
possess or know. And who will deny that the creation of all living
things is the work of Eros' wisdom, which makes all living things
come into being and grow?"[Sym 196e-197] "He gives us the
feeling, not of longing, but of belonging, since he is the moving
spirit behind all those occasions when we meet and gather
together."[Sym 197c]
And Socrates agreed:
"Eros is a spirit, spirits are midway between what is divine and what
is human; he is a means of communication between gods and men.
He takes requests and offerings to the gods, and brings back
instructions and benefits in return...plays a vital role in holding the
world together.
He is the medium of all prophecy and
religion...There is no direct contact between god and man. All
association and communication between them, waking or sleeping,
takes place through Eros. This kind of knowledge is knowledge of
the spirit; any other knowledge...is purely utilitarian. Such spirits
are many and varied, and Eros is one of them'."[Sym 202e-203]"
Neither destitute nor affluent, neither wise nor foolish, Eros is of the
intermediate class of spirits.[Sym 204b]
Pausanias emphasizes in his account:
"[T]he true position, I think, is that...there isn't one single form of
love. So love is neither right nor wrong in itself. Done rightly, it
is right; done wrongly, it is wrong.[Sym 183e] "It is in general
true of any activity that, simply in itself, is neither good nor bad.
Take what we're doing now, for example -- that is to say drinking, or
singing, or talking. None of these is good or bad in itself, but each
becomes so, depending on the way it is done. Well and rightly
done, it is good; wrongly done, it is bad. And it's just the same with
loving, and Eros. It's not all good, and doesn't all deserve praise.
The Eros we should praise is the one which encourages people to
love in the right way."[Sym 181].
And Diotima says to Socrates:
"Reproduction, Socrates, both physical and mental, is a universal
human activity. At a certain age our nature desires to give
birth....What is mortal tries, to the best of its ability, to be everlasting
and immortal. It does this in the only way it can, by always leaving
a successor to replace what decays. Think of what we call the lifespan and identity of an individual creature. For example, a man is
said to be the same individual from childhood until old age. The
cells of his body are always changing, yet he is still called the same
person, despite being perpetually reconstituted as parts of him decay.
And when we come to knowledge, the situation is even odder....as
far as knowledge goes; the same thing happens with each individual
piece of knowledge. What we call studying presupposes that
knowledge is transient.
Forgetting is loss of knowledge, and
studying preserves knowledge by creating memory afresh in us, to
replace what is lost. Hence we have the illusion of continuing
knowledge....This, Socrates, is the mechanism by which mortal
creatures can taste immortality....Those whose creative urge is
physical tend to...produce children....In others the impulse if mental
or spiritual...and under the general heading 'thought'...".[Sym 205d]
"Such a person, "if he comes across a beautiful, noble, well-formed
mind, then he finds the combination particularly attractive. He'll
drop everything and embark on long conversations about goodness,
with such a companion, trying to teach him about the nature and
behavior of the good man. Now that he's made contact with someone
beautiful, and joins with his friends in bringing his conception to
maturity. In consequence such people have a far stringer bond
between them than there is between the parents of children; and they
form much firmer friendships, because they are jointly responsible
for finer, and more lasting, offspring....at this state his offspring are
beautiful discussions and conversations. Next he should realize that
the physical beauty of one body is akin to that of any body, and that
if he's going to pursue beauty of appearance, it's the height of folly
not to regard the beauty which is in all bodies as one and the same.
This insight will convert him into of lover of all physical beauty..."
breaking his tie to a single beauty [Sym 209c];
"The next stage is to put a higher value on mental than on physical
beauty. The right qualities of mind, even in the absence of any great
physical beauty, will be enough to awaken his love and affection. he
will generate the kind of discussions which are improving to the
young. The aim is that, as the next step, he should be compelled to
contemplate the beauty of customs and institutions...and from human
institutions his teacher should direct him to knowledge, so that he
may, in turn, see the beauty of different types of knowledge.
Whereas before...he was dominated by the individual case...now he
directs his eyes to what is beautiful in general, as he turns to gaze
upon the limitless ocean of beauty. Now he produces many fine and
inspiring thoughts and arguments, as he gives his undivided attention
to philosophy. Here he gains in strength and stature until his
attention is caught by that one special knowledge -- the knowledge
of beauty....And when a man has reached this point in his education
in love, studying the different types of beauty in correct order, he
will come to the final end and goal of this education. Then suddenly
he will see, a beauty of a breathtaking nature, Socrates, the beauty
which is the justification of all his efforts so far. It is eternal,
neither coming to be nor passing away, neither increasing nor
decreasing.... If a man progresses (as he will do, if he goes about
his love affairs in the right way) from the lesser beauties, and begins
to catch sight of this beauty, then he is within reach of the final
revelation. Such is the experience of the man who approaches, or is
guided towards, love in the right way, beginning with the particular
examples of beauty, but always returning from them to the search for
that one beauty. He uses them like a ladder, climbing from the love
of one person to love of two; from two to love of all physical beauty;
from physical beauty to beauty in human behavior; thence to beauty
in subjects of study; from them he arrives finally at that branch of
knowledge which studies nothing but ultimate beauty. Then at last
he understands what true beauty is."[Sym 211b]
"That, if ever, is the moment, my dear Socrates, when a man's life is
worth living, as he contemplates beauty itself."[Sym 211d]
"That's what Diotima said to me, and I, for one, find it convincing.
And it's because I'm convinced that I now try to persuade other
people as well that man, in his search for this goal, could hardly hope
to find a better ally than Eros. That's why I say that everyone should
honour Eros, and why I myself honour him, and make the pursuit of
Eros my chief concern, and encourage others to do the same. Now,
and for all time, I praise the power and vigour of Eros, to the limits
of my ability."[Sym 212c]
Socrates makes much of this conception of 'the moment' of understanding in
Parmenides, where he explores how change finds it's locus in the 'now', the 'present',
where attention meets the world at the cutting edge of time, where past meets future,
sleeping meets waking, and where 'the one' participates in both rest and motion.
Plato adds in the Seventh Letter:
"After much effort, as names, definitions, sights, and other data of
sense, are brought into contact and friction one with another, in the
course of scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by
question and answer without ill will, with a sudden flash there shines
forth understanding about every problem, and an intelligence whose
efforts reach the furthest limits of human powers."[Epist]
And as he says in Republic:
Here at last, then, we come to the main theme, to be developed in
philosophic discussion. It's...progress is like that of the power of
vision...the summit of the intelligible world is reached in philosophic
discussion by one who aspires, through the discourse of reason
unaided by any of the senses, to make his way in every case to the
essential reality and perseveres until he has grasped by pure
intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is what
we call Dialectic.(Plato's Republic, p. 252]
It is this moment of choice then when one is tested and what was only potential
becomes real. "The real Socrates -- I don't know if any of you has ever seen the figure
inside. I saw it once, and it struck me as utterly godlike and golden and beautiful and
wonderful...."[Sym 216e] Alcibiades has this to say, after having been unable to tempt
Socrates with his beauty by sleeping next to him all night, all the while teasing and
seducing him, but the pleasures of the body were unable to tempt Socrates to sin -- in this
case, by exercise of the wrong love for the wrong reason at the wrong time. Alcibiades
admits Socrates to be the love of his (or perhaps any other) life for this -- the only one, he
said, who knew and could raise Alcibiades better self -- which made his actual and lessor
self feel ashamed all the rest of the time. He cried rivers of tears for this great man, he
said, who saved his life in battle, and raised his standard for humanity throughout a
lifetime of respect, proven in that one moment of trial. And he was not the only one who
felt this way about Socrates, he said, but one of many who crave what Socrates has to
give -- but only to the right lover for the right reason at the right moment.
"The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of
which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is
not from the state of rest as such, nor, from the state of motion as such;
but there is this curious nature, which we call the moment lying
between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out
of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into
motion....And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will
change to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in
changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in
no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest."[Parm 156d157b]
"[I]n becoming, it gets to the point of time between "was" and "will
be," which is "now"[Parm 152b]. "[T]hat which is becoming cannot
skip the present; when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and
is then whatever it may happen to be becoming."[Parm 152c] "And
when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no
longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be
reached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to
touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and
seizing the future, while in process of becoming between
them."[Parm 152c] "Then the one always both is and becomes older
and younger than itself" [Parm 152e] "[T]o be (einai) is only
participation of being in present time, and to have been is the
participation of being at a past time, and to be about to be is the
participation of being at a future time."[Parm 152]
There is this at least, which is not either/or [Sym 202] -- as Eros is neither
beautiful nor ugly, neither good nor bad -- rather, there is an intermediate state between
them, as true belief is between understanding and ignorance [Sym 202].
"And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when
it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into
becoming -- then it passes between certain states of motion and rest,
and, neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed....And on
the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many
to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor
aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike
to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor
of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to great and equal and
back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state
of increase, or diminution, or equalization....All these, then, are the
affections of the one, if the one has being."[Parm 157b]
"Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at
rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater,
nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort;
for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will
participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as
has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether
and in every way devoid of the one....Therefore if one is, the one is all
things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other
things."[Parm 160b]
"Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be
both at rest and in motion....And must be the same with itself, and
other than itself; and also the same with the others, and other than the
others; this follows from its previous affections."[Parm 146b]
Thus, the epistemology which flows from this ontology is one John Stuart Mill
would remember for us many centuries later. The fact is, we begin in different places in
this world, thus we have differing experience, differing perspectives, learn different
lessons, and thus follow different paths toward the single end we have in common with
all living things -- that of their own good.[Sym 205] We may all see the world
differently, but it is nonetheless the same world that we share, and so our perspectives
are, as Socrates said, like 'radii converging on the same center'.[Rep 327] There is thus,
quite logically, an infinite number of perspectives from which any object of knowledge
might be viewed, and we must consider it from as many of those views as possible before
we can even begin to approach the whole truth about it. What's more, when the subject
of our study is itself conscious -- such as are other human beings -- then they have their
own point of view, which is to say, from inside looking out, that must be taken into
account before we can begin to claim 'knowledge' of this subject. The truth then will
depend upon a balance struck between opposing views on any given object of knowledge,
and the whole truth, which is the end of inquiry, will never fully be attainable, but rather
is an ideal which is realized to the degree that we participate in this process.
It follows from this complex conception of reality that, since one person's
knowledge may be another person's blind spot, our worst enemy may very well be our
best teacher. To be fair, we might better operate on the premise, quite foreign to us these
days, that everyone's point of view matters, and serves to round out the whole of truth.
Arguably, this is the task each of these philosophers undertakes. And perhaps these great
souls give nod here to some feminist and multicultural critiques of the academy. xvi
Recognizing this inherent diversity of perspective in being gives immediate import then
to the need for dialogue and deliberation. Seeing a certain complimentarity in our
perspectives becomes incentive to listen and to teach, for no one ever completely
understands anything, and thus there is always something to learn -- even and most
especially, Socrates would say, about what we might think we 'know' best. And while the
whole truth is never grasped once and for all, it might be gleaned in a moment of honest
contemplation by thoughtful individuals who put themselves through the process of
examining as many perspectives as are available on any given object of knowledge, and
most importantly -- of remembering them.
As Mill says in his autobiography:
"the title of Platonist belongs by far better right to those who have
been nourished in, and have endeavored to practice Plato's mode of
investigation, than to those who are distinguished only by the adoption
of certain dogmatical conclusions, drawn mostly from the least
intelligible of his works, and which the character of his mind and
writings makes it uncertain whether he himself regarded as anything
more than poetic fancies, or philosophic conjectures."xvii
This is true, it is suggested, for the same reason Parmenides recommended 'idle
talk' as the best training for Socrates -- because only in this way does the spark jump from
one person to another, to another, and so on. Certainly the divine spark has jumped from
Socrates to countless other great minds, contributing in every case to the good of the
individual as an individual. It is only in the actualization of each individual good that the
common good is ultimately accomplished. And so it is our individual work -- the
creativity of our different kinds of 'children', as it were -- by which we participate in time
by guide of Eros. And if this seems to be a reiteration of the lessons of 'love', then so be
it -- for this is no less than Socrates and Aristotle would have us remember. As Socrates
says, without hesitation -- "love is the only thing I ever claim to know anything
about."[Sym 177e]
In conclusion, I think we have much to learn from the perspectives of our ancient,
and largely neglected, philosophical heroes -- great souls whose vision held the light of
reason so much higher than any has been able to reach since. The potential of these
philosophies to find unity in a common center continues to go virtually unrecognized in
the many centuries since ancient Greece. Yet it is a line of discourse which contemporary
dialogues literally beg for, as well as continually reveals. Tending these days to ignore
the legitimacy of multiple points of view which might be considered on any given object
of knowledge, we tend to take differing perspectives as competing versions of truth, an
assumption which locks us into cycles of conflict where defense and the will to win
prevents our listening to diverse views and voices which are necessary to true
understanding. The ancients tried to teach us a kind of inquiry which requires humility, a
point which Socrates illustrated by his practice of elenchus, Aristotle illustrated by his
multi-perspectival analysis, and which Sophistic arrogance apparently precludes.
This is, I think, the primary challenge of our age. Our situation has long called
out for a deeper analysis of human relations than traditional sophistic methods allow.
Taken to heart, key elements of the Socratic and Aristotelian methods together offer a
potential for integration by dialogue of many diverse schools of thought. These
philosophers could shed much light on the revelations of our age, which would be a giant
step in the right direction toward true science.
This is perhaps the best lesson history has to teach contemporary discourse on the
reaches and limits of its adopted methods. The unifying perspective they provide on our
contemporary power struggles is powerful enough, I think, to help reconcile many a
calculated, if not deliberate, misunderstanding. It is a metaphysical conception which is
quite compatible with modern and even postmodern insights -- but one which differs
from our contemporary scientific methods in its emphasis on the importance of dialectic
interchange and dialogue as a necessary means to 'knowledge'. These great minds were -as ours might better be -- guided by the will to reconcile differing experience, differing
perspectives, reveal incompatible beliefs, and to follow reason in all cases to the truth
which can never be refuted, and so is left standing when all the hardest questions have
been asked.
i
Plato's PARMENIDES, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
"I certainly do not see my way at present, said Socrates. Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates,
out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous
training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday.
The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art which is called by the
vulgar idle talking, and which is of imagined to be useless; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you
are young, or truth will elude your grasp."[Parm 135c]
iii A recent book by Jacob Klagg examines the different approaches taken on the Socratic dialogues. He begins with
Gain Fine's analytic analysis of the relationship between Socrates and Aristotle, and moves through a number of
differing perspectives on this subject. In this paper, I am arguing that a dialogical reading of these ancient philosophers
reveals a metaphysics which, in the end, dignifies all of these various perspectives on the Socratic dialogues, in the
process, showing the true beauty of what is perhaps the greatest single work of art that human beings have ever
produced. Working from the pattern of the ideal, Plato arguably created the closest thing to perfection in philosophical
literature, and we would be wise to settle for no less than the whole truth about his work.
iv Plato's PHAEDO, translation by Benjamin Jowett.
v Plato's REPUBLIC, translated by Francis McDonald Cornford.
vi "I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one with you in friendship but your second self
in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling us something
which is new. For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other
hand says There is no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm unity, he denies
plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are saying different things when really you are saying
much the same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us."[Parm 128b]
vii Aristotle's METAPHYSICS, translated by W. D. Ross.
ii
viii
As Parmenides asks the young Socrates, "But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas
of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, become
similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that
just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?" "Yes, certainly," said
Socrates, "that is my meaning."[Parm 131b-e]
"[W]hen we set out to discover the essential nature of justice and injustice and what a perfectly just and
perfectly unjust man would be like, supposing them to exist, our purpose was to use them as ideal patterns;
we were to observe the degree of happiness or unhappiness that each exhibited, and to draw the necessary
inferences that our own destiny would be like that of the one we most resembled. We did not set out to show
that these ideals could exist in fact."(Republic V 472)
"[P]erhaps there is a pattern set up in the heavens for one who desires to see it and, seeing it, to found one in
himself."(Rep IX 591)
"[H]appiness can only come to a state when its lineaments are traced by an artist working after the divine
pattern....He will take society and human character as his canvas, and begin by scraping it clean... Next, he will sketch
in the outline of the constitution. Then as the work goes on, he will frequently refer to his model, the ideals of justice,
goodness, temperance, and the rest, and compare with them the copy of those qualities which he is trying to create in
human society...he will reproduce the complexion of true humanity, guided by that divine pattern whose likeness
Homer saw in the men he called godlike. He will rub out and paint in again this or that feature, until he has produced,
so far as may be, a type of human character that heaven can approve."(Rep VI 500, emphasis added)
"Time, then, and the heaven came into being at the same instant in order that, having been created together, if
ever there was to be a dissolution of them, they might be dissolved together. It was framed after the pattern of the
eternal nature, that it might resemble this as far as was possible; for the pattern exists from eternity, and the created
heaven has been, and is, and will be, in all time. Such was the mind and thought of God in the creation of time....These
things at some future time, when we are at leisure, may have the consideration which they deserve, but not at
present."[Timeaus]
ix Plato's PARMENIDES, translated by Francis McDonald Cornford.
x "But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which
we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?"[Parm 134b]
xi
"Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other
mode of participation?
There cannot be, he said.
Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?
Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.
Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore
be in a state of separation from itself.
Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with
itself; in this way each idea may be one; and the same in all at the same time.
I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail
and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many-is not that your meaning?...And would you say
that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men?
The latter.
Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them
only and not the whole idea existing in each of them?
That seems to follow. But..."[Parm 131b-d]
He goes on:
"Let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we
say, it partakes"[Parm 143b]
"And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?...And three are
odd, and two are even?...And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that
is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three? There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and
there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?...If there are three and twice, there is twice
three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?...Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken
odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times....And if this is so, does any number remain which has
no necessity to be? Then if one is, number must also be..."[[Parm 143e-144]
"But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in
multiplicity, and partakes also of being: am I not right? And if all number participates in being, every part of number
will also participate?...Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however
small or however great, is devoid of it? "[Parm 144b]
"And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all
things; the divisions of it have no limit."[Parm 144c] And so, "Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and
does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?"[Parm 144d] "Then the one if it has
being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?"[Parm 145]
Consider this, he says later on:[Parm 148d]
"Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?-Consider.
I am considering.
The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
True.
And also in other things?
Yes.
In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from
touching them, and would touch itself only.
Clearly.
Then the inference is that it would touch both?
It would.
But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which it is to
touch, and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?
True.
Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself
is?
It ought.
And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this, while it is one, will never
happen.
No.
Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?
It cannot.
Neither can it touch others.
Why not?
The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and
no third thing can be between them....Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?....And if to
the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?...And every additional
term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first
two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of
contacts by one in like manner; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is
added to the contacts....Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less."[Parm 148d149c]]
"But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole,
the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself."[Parm 145d]
"And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself; and, as containing itself, will be
greater than itself; and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself."[Parm 151].
"[W]hat seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one
another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be."[Parm 166b]
xii
As an important aside, it is a curious, but not altogether surprising, phenomenon that twenty-three hundred years later
we should rediscover this insight of this nestedness with the recognition and proliferation of what is widely called
'chaos theory', which is perhaps better called 'fractal geometry' in this context. Socrates long ago gave us logical
evidence of the 'nestedness' of being, but it has apparently taken until now to discover the empirical evidence for it. In
a nutshell, chaos theory reminds us of what we, the cultural beneficiaries of ancient Greece, have long known:
"Nature forms patterns. Some are orderly in space but disorderly in time, others orderly in time but
disorderly in space. Some patterns are fractal, exhibiting structures self-similar in scale... The dynamics seem
so basic--shapes changing in space and time--yet only now are the tools available to understand them."[James
Gleick, CHAOS: Making a New Science (Penguin Books: New York) p. 311]
"To some physicists chaos is a science of process rather than state, of becoming rather than being."
"The microscopic pieces were perfectly clear; the macroscopic behavior remained a mystery. The
tradition of looking at systems locally--isolating the mechanisms and then adding them together--was
beginning to break down. For pendulums, for fluids, for electronic circuits, for lasers, knowledge of the
fundamental equations no longer seemed to be the right kind of knowledge at all."[Gleick, p. 44]
"There was always one small compromise, so small that working scientists usually forgot it was there,
lurking in a corner of their philosophies like an unpaid bill. Measurement could never be perfect. ... Given an
approximate knowledge of a system's initial conditions and an understanding of natural law, one can calculate
the approximate behavior of the system. This assumption lay at the philosophical heart of science...[that]
arbitrarily small influences don't blow up to have arbitrarily large effects.'"[Gleick, p. 15] "[S]mall errors
proved catastrophic."[Gleick, p. 17]
"[S]omething was philosophically out of joint. The practical import could be staggering."[Gleick, p. 17]
"[T]he spaces between the sensors will hide fluctuations that the computer will not know about, tiny
deviations from the average."[Gleick, p. 21] "[A]ny physical system that behaved nonperiodically would be
unpredictable."[Gleick, p. 18] "The Butterfly Effect was no accident; it was necessary."[Gleick, p. 22]
"The Butterfly Effect acquired a technical name: sensitive dependence on initial conditions."[Gleick, p. 23]
"In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events can have a point of crisis that could magnify
small changes. But chaos meant that such points were everywhere. They were pervasive. In systems like the
weather, sensitive dependence on initial conditions was an inescapable consequence of the way small scales
intertwined with large."[Gleick, p. 23]
"It completely changes what it means to know something."[Gleick, p.175]
"Chaos breaks across the lines that separate scientific disciplines. Because it is a science of the global
nature of systems, it has brought together thinkers from fields that had been widely separated. ... Chaos poses
problems that defy accepted ways of working in science. It makes strong claims about the universal behavior
of complexity. ... Believers in chaos--and they sometimes call themselves believers, or converts, or
evangelists--speculate about determinism and free will, about evolution, about the nature of conscious
intelligence. They feel that they are turning back a trend in science toward reductionism, the analysis of
systems in terms of their constituent parts: quarks, chromosomes, or neurons. They believe that they are
looking for the whole."[Gleick, p. 5]
Thus, what we have here is both an ancient and a revolutionary method of knowing -- but only revolutionary
because we have nearly forgotten Socrates' dictum of humility and Plato's ideal of integrated truth. This method
provides a way of understanding the universe, indeed, the multiverse, even human beings themselves, as interconnected
in nested systems, constrained but not determined by their contexts. Just "as a growing snowflake falls to earth,
typically floating in the wind for an hour or more, the choices made by the branching tips at any instant depend
sensitively on such things as temperature, the humidity, and the presence of impurities in the atmosphere...[thus], any
pair of snowflakes will experience very different paths...[and] the final flake records the history of all the changing
weather conditions it has experienced, and the combinations may well be infinite."[Gleick, p. 311] So the choices
made by a growing human at any instant depend sensitively on many things, and thus, any pair of human beings, even
those who share quite similar initial conditions, will experience very different paths. The final person records the
history of all the changing conditions it has experienced, and the combinations may well be infinite.
As fractal geometry is the geometry of movement and growth, the physics of flow. The ideal form of motion
is seen in the complex circular flow of matter through time, contained but infinite, ever-deeper in its convexity. But
motion is contrast with movement in interaction where consciousness is involved.[Laban] Our potential for growth is
subject to many interacting forces which change human potentials into their actualized forms, by the woven effects of
the interacting causes in the course of the life-process. The parts played by attention and intention in such a process are
critical variables which steer us by ever finer choices inherent within life-plans and policies. It is a principle similar to
that of the half way to the door paradox, in which it seems as if one can never really get out the room because one
always has to go half-way first; time is the force perpendicular to the space between us and the door which changes as
we choose to move toward the door, thus changing our conditions such that the choice is ever new, and always in need
of reevaluation. The geometry of deep psychological reality and growth is non-linear, and as it is an emergent reality,
understanding it calls for a sort of psychological travel or penetration of the generic human subject/object to be known.
Such that that persons under consideration become subject to the psychologist when they can empathize, insidelooking-out. When we are able to get beyond objectivity in the human sciences, and see from inside the systems we
wish to know, our method is no longer observation, but consideration, and what's evident from this view is often
something we have long known.
This is an insight which helps us answer many an ancient question, including those involving free-will,
determination, and social conditioning -- and it is especially important for the light that it sheds on the importance of
choice in the process. A snowflake may 'choose' in a different sense than a community or a culture 'chooses,' and all of
these differently than an individual human being makes a choice. But the role of self-determination of an individual
system within the context of other systems is made far more comprehensive within the context of this world-view
which we have remembered...with a vengeance.
What could better support the humble ideal of Socratic ignorance, after all, than the discovery that there
actually are an infinite number of points of view from which any object of knowledge might be viewed? What better to
keep us remembering how little we know and much we still have left to learn? We are compelled then to reiterate the
key Socratic question, what does it mean, after all, to 'know' something -- most especially something fundamental and
primary; something objective, not constructed; something of the natural world, not the artificial?
xiii Plato's SEVENTH EPISTLE, translated by J. Harward.
xiv Perhaps because, as Thomas Hobbes reiterated from Socrates, to know others in this way, one must first know
oneself.[Hobbes, Author's Introduction: Leviathan] And as Meiklejohn reminds us that "We must try, therefore, to
think in the terms of Socrates and Jesus -- to first 'Know thyself' and then to 'Love thy neighbor as thyself'. Only this
will "bring intelligibility back into the social order."[Meiklejohn, The Meaning of America; p. 30]
xv Plato's SYMPOSIUM, translated by Tom Griffith.
xvi Contemporary contraversy swarms with resistence to 'multicultural' voices in the academy. The primary substance
of contemporary discourse is quickly lost in argument over methods and perspectives; e.g. whose is most right, most
accurate, most reliable and valid. Any student of contemporary philosophy readily sees the venom flow between socalled 'objectivists' and 'subjectivists', between 'absolutists' and 'relativists', 'traditionalists' and 'multiculturalists', 'right'
and 'left', as between 'analytic' and 'postmodern' philosophers -- all without real dialogue between them, which certainly
does not enhance the liklihood of reconciliation between these polarized oppositions on the whole of truth.
Contraversy swarms, but the method used is not one of dialogue, and so the issues seem unlikely to be resolved.
xvii Autobiography of John Stuart Mill (Humphrey Milford: Oxford Univeristy Press: London) p.19.