An Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) First
Strategy
By Robert Bunker
Journal Article | Aug 30 2014 - 9:16pm
Op Ed: An Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) First Strategy
Robert J. Bunker
Much has changed in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya since my writing of two short essays on democractic
revolution and democratic realpolitik in the Islamic world in Small Wars Journal roughly three and a
half years ago. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has not only complicated this
potential democratization dynamic but has qualitatively changed it as a spoiler—at least in the two states it
is presently operating in. Some context is required, however, to better understand what the assumptions
were for the U.S. in its international policies directed at this area of the globe.
A simple choice model (see Figure 1) provides an overview of U.S. and allied state preferences for all of
the Arab Spring and pre-Arab Spring (e.g. Iraq) countries. All of these countries began with secular
autocratic states (0 value) as their baselines—exemplified by the strongmen Saddam Hussein in Iraq,
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. The thinking was
that—with demise of these autocratic states—the power and institutional vacuums that would emerge
would be filled by a U.S. created democracy in Iraq and the revolutionary forces of democracy (+ value)
in the other countries.
As it turns out, the sword of democracy was a rather blunt instrument and no match—when wielded by the
indigenous peoples of these countries—to that of the sharper blade held by the various Islamist forces with
their deeper spiritual and ideological commitment. These armed groups are composed of warriors gladly
willing to die for their cause. The same, sadly, cannot thus far be said for the local forces of democracy.
As a result, as secular autocratic states lost internal control of their terrorities, an Islamist state ‘jacking’ (value) of the expected transition to democracy has taken place.
This development has been a painful realization for many U.S. foreign policy professionals who fully
supported the rise of the pro-democracy movements in these countries. However, these movements have
proven themselves toothless on the battlefield where the ultimate veto to the ballot box takes place. As in
Iraq, partisan and sectarian politics between Shia, Sunni, and Kurd further complicates fielding effective
pro-democracy military forces.
Presently, we have an increasingly fragile Libyan state bereft of Muammar Gaddafi with warring factions
fighiting over the key economic nodes of Tripoloi and a recent coordinated United Arab Emirates and
Eyptian airstrike on Islamists in that capitol. We also have a military dominated Egyptian state which,
until the military’s intervention, was on the path of radicalization under the newly elected Muslim
brotherhood dominated government after the fall of Hosni Mubarak. The Syrian regime of Bashar alAssad has also been greatly weakened by the internal uprisings that have taken place—but has been able
to survive and win back some territory with Hizbollah foreign fighter support. On the other hand Iraq,
with the demise of Saddam Hussein and his Baathists, has increasingly fragmented (with direct Iranian
support of its Shia allies) into its sectarian based regions.
The rise of ISIS and its subsequent spread throughout Syria and Iraq has futher complicated American
foreign policy choices in these two particular states of interest. One of the old axioms of international
relations—drawn from earlier historical truisms—is that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This
logic, however, does not hold up in modern international relations, especially as it relates to present
American values and perceptions. As a result, “the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy” axiom
dominates.
Still, some enemies are more dangerous than others and based on the simple choice model an Islamist
state (- value) has to be considered more dangerous than a secular autocratic state (0 value). This is
because pre-existing autocratic states have little expansionist ability due to that fact that they are
ideologically bankrupt. Islamist states on the other hand are the main competitor form to the democratic
state in the Muslim world. These states—based on Sunni and Shia variants—have very real expansionist
potential and, as a result, have to be considered far more dangerous because of their spiritually based
ideological component. This component is based on Islamist views of 7th through 9th century Jihad as
holy war as opposed to more modern and moderated interpretations of Jihad as one’s internal struggle.
Derived from this realization, and the very real fact that domestic terrorist attack potentials now exist
(which includes the recent #AMessageFromISIStoUS Chicago focused tweet), an ISIS first strategy is
presently required to be undertaken by the United States. This logic appears to be in line with evolving
Obama administration policies. When military force is directed at ISIS forces in Syria, this means that
we do not have to ally with Bashar al-Assad and/or Hizbollah foreign fighters. When military force
directed is directed at ISIS forces in Iraq, this also means we do not have to ally with Iranian foreign
fighters. On the flip side, this also means, in both instances, that we should ignore those anti-ISIS forces
because coming into conflict with them would directly benefit ISIS in the process.
Such an ISIS first strategy should be undertaken as cost-effectively as possible based on a combination of
airpower (e.g. aircraft and drone strikes) and special operations forces. Certain requirements exist when
following such a strategy. The first requirement is that mission creep does not somehow draw us back into
Iraq and into Syria as a result of these operations—our nation can not financially afford such long term
boots on the ground (or even worse more failed nation-building) entanglements.
The second requirement is that as ISIS is weakened relative to the other forces operating in these regions
(i.e. forces belonging to Assad, Hizbollah, Iran, the Kurds, et. al.), some sort of achievable American geopolitical vision needs to be articulated. Creating such a vision is beyond the scope of this op ed. However,
it must determine how the conflict environment can be shaped in order to achieve the preferred democratic
state (+ value) outcome over the baseline autocratic state (0 value) and even more negative Islamist state
(- value) outcomes. Such a vision will be incredibly complicated to implement because, as ISIS forces
(and influence) are eliminated in various regions of Syria and Iraq, the ‘political and institutional
vacuums’ that will be created will be haphazardly filled by the competing internal and external factions
and interests presently engaged in this transnational conflict.
Additionally, the determination will have to be made early on if an ISIS first strategy means the primary
objective is the actual elimination of that terrorist and insurgent organization or if it means that the severe
degradation (attrition of personnel and materiel) of that organization is the primary objective. The reason
for a potential second strategy variant is that a severely weakened ISIS: (a) might have some benefit as a
counter-balance to other influences and forces in Syria and Iraq and (b) might have some benefit in order
to continue to create a Sunni Islamist schism as an Al Qaeda competitor.
Regardless of which strategy is ultimately directed against ISIS, the realization readily exists that
expediency requires an ISIS first strategy to be immediately undertaken by the U.S. against this
expansionist terrorist and insurgent organization. The U.S. is not required to befriend certain elements in
Syria and Iraq to undertake such unilateral and coalition military actions against ISIS—far from it—but
must be cogniscent that the second and third order effects of those attacks will create new geographic
‘power vacuums’ in those states which will be exploited by those hostile to our interests. With this in
mind, the end game needs to be devised now prior to the sustained assault on ISIS that is now beginning
starts to dramatically weaken it.
About the Author
Robert Bunker
Dr. Robert J. Bunker is an Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College and Adjunct Faculty, Division of Politics and Economics,
Claremont Graduate University. He holds university degrees in political science,
government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history
and has undertaken hundreds of hours of counterterrorism training. Past professional
associations include Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; Futurist in Residence, Training
and Development Division, Behavioral Science Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Academy, Quantico, VA; Staff Member (Consultant), Counter-OPFOR Program,
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center-West; and Adjunct
Faculty, National Security Studies M.A. Program and Political Science Department,
California State University, San Bernardino, CA. Dr. Bunker has hundreds of
publications including Studies in Gangs and Cartels, with John Sullivan (Routledge,
2013), Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training, with Stephen Sloan (University of
Oklahoma, 2011), and edited works, including Global Criminal and Sovereign Free
Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies: Dark Renaissance
(Routledge, 2014), co-edited with Pamela Ligouri Bunker; Criminal Insurgencies in
Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War (Routledge, 2012);
Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge, 2011);
Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (Routledge, 2008); Networks, Terrorism and
Global Insurgency (Routledge, 2005); and Non-State Threats and Future Wars
(Routledge, 2002).
Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-isisfirst-strategy
Links:
{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/robert-bunker
{2} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-we-should-support-democratic-revolution-in-the-islamicworld
{3} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/realism-idealism-and-us-foreign-policy-in-the-islamic-world
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