The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2006
Punctuated Equilibrium in Limbo: The Tobacco Lobby
and U.S. State Policymaking from 1990 to 2003
Michael Givel
Since the mid-1980s, U.S. tobacco policy has been an intense and acrimonious issue between
antitobacco advocates and the tobacco industry. In the United States, the tobacco industry has
responded to heightened state antitobacco litigation, adverse public opinion, and public health advocacy
by aggressively mobilizing against tobacco taxes and regulations. This article examines whether these
tobacco policy trends can be generalized to punctuated equilibrium theory ideas that policy monopolies
are stable over long periods and usually change because of sharp and short-term exogenous shocks to
the policy system. From 1990 to 2003, there was a sharp mobilization by health advocates in all states
and a significant rise in new legislation to control tobacco use. The tobacco industry, nevertheless, was
able to generally keep state tobacco taxes low and counter significant regulatory threats to tobacco sales.
From this, I conclude that the policy monopoly favoring the tobacco industry did not significantly
change, despite the symbolic appearance of punctuation in the policy system.
Introduction
During the 1990s, tobacco use came under increasingly intense political
opposition by antitobacco advocates who advocated for increased tobacco taxes
and stronger tobacco-use regulations (Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Studlar, 2002). The
tobacco industry responded to this heightened political threat in all 50 states in the
United States since the early 1990s by using its influence to politically mobilize and
advocate for lower tobacco taxes and weaker tobacco regulations than those
proposed by health advocates (Derthick, 2005; Givel & Glantz; Morley et al., 2002;
Studlar).
This article examines whether tobacco policymaking trends in all 50 states
from 1990 to 2003 correspond to ideas espoused in the punctuated equilibrium
theory at the federal level by Baumgartner and Jones and Worsham (Baumgartner
& Jones, 1993; Worsham, 1998). This theory holds that policy monopolies are stable
over long periods and they usually change in response to sharp, short-term
exogenous shock to the policy system (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; Jones,
Baumgartner, & True, 1998). Worsham added to punctuated equilibrium theory by
noting that competitive coalitions can challenge dominant policy coalitions or
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monopolies with varying effects on the degree of dominance by the policy
monopoly (True & Utter, 2002; Worsham, 1998).
In the case of state tobacco policymaking, coalitions of health groups
attempted to shock or punctuate the equilibrium of the tobacco policy system from
1990 to 2003 with their challenge to the state policy monopolies historically
exercised by the tobacco industry. Since 1990, the states have been a major venue
for tobacco policymaking with legislation proposed in the areas of youth-access
legislation, clean indoor air enforcement, and tobacco excise taxes. (Derthick, 2005;
Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Morley et al., 2002; Studlar, 2002). This article will
determine whether this punctuated shock to the equilibrium of tobacco policy
monopolies in the states from 1990 to 2003 was successful or not.
Literature Review
The specific focus of this research on state tobacco policymaking and punctuated equilibrium theory in the 1990s is on the “black box” or legislative policy
formulation and enactment in a subsystem (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993;
Easton, 1965; Jones et al., 1998; Sabatier, 1991). Punctuated equilibrium theory
was borrowed from a similar theory in evolutionary biology espoused by Gould
and Eldredge in 1977 (Gould & Eldredge, 1977). Gould and Eldredge argued,
contrary to the predominant theory of evolution that species evolve gradually;
species stay the same for long periods of geologic time; and new species can
arise suddenly. They also wrote that there are empirical examples of little evolutionary change for long periods of time in the geologic record of some snail
populations, followed by sharp and punctuated change, and followed again by
gradual change (Gould & Eldredge, 1977). Proponents of the punctuated equilibrium theory in political science have argued by analogy that public policy in
the United States usually changes gradually over long periods. However, these
incremental changes are interspersed with occasional sharp bursts of policy
change, resulting in fundamentally new policies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991,
1993; Jones et al., 1998).
Policy Monopolies
Adherents of punctuated equilibrium theory also argue that governmental
venues such as legislative policy subsystems are often characterized by long
periods of policy stability in the political system because of policy monopolies
favoring privileged groups like the tobacco industry. At certain points in the
policymaking process, rapid policy change occurs and the powerful groups lose
their dominance (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; Jones et al., 1998; Legro, 2000;
Pollock, 1994). During these short and dramatic periods of policy change, prior
policies associated with dominant policy monopolies in subsystems are either
replaced or substantially reformulated. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have characterized such policy changes as coming “quickly and dramatically” and in “short
periods” (pp. 17, 55). Baumgartner and Jones further clarify the time period
Givel: The Tobacco Lobby and U.S. State Policymaking from 1990 to 2003
407
involved for “dramatic changes” when they argued that, “At any one time, there
may be little change, but periods of stability may be punctuated by fitful bursts
of mobilization that change the structure of bias for decades to come” (pp. 10,
101–102).
Sources of influence typically cited by punctuated equilibrium theorists for
punctuated legislative policy and issue change include changes in: public opinion,
regulations, legislative oversight, market conditions, political activism, and majority ruling coalitions. Punctuated equilibrium theorists also argue that dominant
policy monopolies in subsystems often are characterized by a lack of interference
by other interest groups and advocates such as health advocates. Policy monopolies in subsystems rebuff the efforts of outside groups to become part of the
decision making process. This is done, in part, by deferring to the expertise of
existing policy experts and specialists who participate in the policy monopoly
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Powerful monopolies in subsystems will use
resources such as lobbyists, litigation, and public relations campaigns to ward off
sharp policy changes by political outsiders. Worsham refined the punctuated
equilibrium theory by noting that subsystem politics can be dominant like iron
triangles, transitory where members of the dominant coalition factionalize into
differing interests, and competitive where a new coalition with a significantly
different agenda can challenge the dominant policy monopoly of a particular
group in a subsystem. (Worsham, 1998)
Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
In addition, punctuated equilibrium theory also focuses on a balance of power
between opposing forces or even advocacy coalitions that can shift or move public
policies between equilibrium and disequilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993;
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Power, in this traditional view is described as the
ability of one person or entity to force or compel someone else or another entity
to do something, even against their will (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962).
For instance, the tobacco industry has publicly argued that unfettered
tobacco use is a matter of individual choice and freedom from unreasonable
government regulations and taxes (Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Studlar, 2002). Privately the tobacco industry also argues that less government regulation on
tobacco products and lower tobacco taxes support the industry’s objectives of
increased profits and sales (Givel & Glantz; Studlar). In contrast to the policy
ideas espoused by the tobacco industry, health advocates have countered with
policy ideas that stress better public health through reduced tobacco use by
stronger regulations, higher tobacco taxes, and litigation against the industry
(Derthick, 2005; Glantz & Balbach, 2000; Morley et al., 2002; Studlar). This conflict
and disequilibrium over policy goals between the tobacco industry and health
advocates represents an ongoing struggle for political and policy dominance and
power in state legislatures.
This focus on equilibrium and disequilibrium reflects a classic clock-like and
deterministic Newtonian scientific world view that is reflected in neo-orthodox
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economic theories (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Gleick, 1987). Under this orderly
and classical world view, empirically observed variables are scientifically analyzed
as policy systems that move in and out of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Policy
variables may include one or more independent variables that impact upon one or
more dependent variables (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have also written that when periods of punctuated change occur that permanently alter prevailing arrangements of power in
dominant policy monopolies, these changes reflect positive feedback because of an
exogenous shock on the policymaking system. Even in times of policy stability,
there will never be perfect equilibrium. Politics is in a constant state of disequilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). However, disequilibrium does not mean
anarchy; political institutions such as legislatures maintain stability. Stability can be
caused by powerful interests like the tobacco industry having access to decision
making through a dominant policy monopoly that repels advocates who espouse
policy goals and ideas contrary to their interests such as stronger tobacco regulations and higher tobacco taxes. Most policy change is because of heightened
public attention to issues. Change occurs when those with less power effectively
mobilize. Baumgartner and Jones noted that changes in issue definition by political
movements and insurgencies often result in positive feedback in the form of
desired policy changes (1991, 1993). Sometimes, those with less power can mobilize and negative feedback happens when little or no policy change occurs
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; Schattschneider, 1960).
Tobacco Policy Monopolies
Baumgartner and Jones argue that in the 1970s, the tobacco policy
monopoly with respect to public health and tobacco use at the federal level was
either destroyed or weakened (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). They argue that
when tobacco was characterized as an economic issue that supported the industry and tobacco farmers, federal policy was supportive. However, this changed
beginning in the 1960s, because of an E. E. Schattschneider-like “mobilization of
bias” by health advocates and government agencies regarding health dangers
due to tobacco use (Schattschneider, 1960). U.S. federal policy was mixed regarding the tobacco industry, which lost its policy monopoly, due to the inclusion of
public health concerns. Schattschneider argued that the way for the less powerful to create change is by expanding the scope of the conflict to make it as
public as possible. Some federal policy economically supported tobacco farmers,
while other federal policy was designed to counter the adverse effects of tobacco
use (Baumgartner & Jones). A sharp mobilization of bias by health advocates
with respect to tobacco use and public health also occurred from 1990 to the
early 2000s at the state level in the United States (Derthick, 2005; Givel &
Glantz, 2001a; Morley et al., 2002; Studlar, 2002). This article will examine
whether the pro tobacco policy monopoly subsystem in all states was or was
not maintained.
Givel: The Tobacco Lobby and U.S. State Policymaking from 1990 to 2003
409
Data Sources
The research in this study to discern the theoretical implications of legislative
policymaking as described by Baumgartner and Jones and Worsham was descriptive and analytical. This time period for this study from 1990 to 2003 was
examined to descriptively ascertain and measure on a long-term basis what has
happened to state tobacco tax and regulatory policy outputs in an era of heightened advocacy for more stringent state tobacco control policies.
The data necessary to test the application of punctuated equilibrium theory are
drawn from the STATE (State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System):
Tobacco Map Reports created by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office
of Smoking and Health (CDC). This CDC tracking system measures key state
tobacco control policy outputs, including the number of states that passed preemption of stronger local ordinances with respect to youth access and clean indoor
air and tobacco excise tax data from 1990 to 1999. Recent research studies indicate
preemption of stronger local ordinances, which is supported by the tobacco
industry, weakens effective local tobacco control policies that decrease health risks
(Austin-Lane, Girasek, & Barbour, 2004; Derthick, 2005; Givel & Glantz, 2001a;
Givel & Glantz, 2004–05; Morley et al., 2002; Studlar, 2002). In addition, over 100
peer-reviewed studies on state tobacco tax policymaking have indicated that a 10
percent rise in tobacco prices results in a decrease of between 2.5 percent to 5.0
percent in tobacco consumption (Chaloupka, Cummings, Morley et al., 2002).
In addition, I used data not obtainable from STATE with data from the
Coalition on Smoking or Health, American Lung Association, and Federation of
Tax Administrators to identify significant state legislative policy outputs associated
with tobacco taxes from 1999 to 2003, tobacco licensing, and state funding for
antitobacco education programs (American Lung Association, 2004, 2005b; Coalition on Smoking or Health, 1990; Federation of Tax Administrators, 2004). The
additional data were used in conjunction with the CDC STATE data to describe
state tobacco tax and regulatory policy outputs from 1990 to 2003.
Results
Background on State Tobacco Lobby Influence
The most robust factor in explaining the enactment of state tobacco policy
legislation and programs is the power and influence of the tobacco lobby (AustinLane et al., 2004; Chaloupka et al., 2002; Gamkhar & Sim, 2001; Givel & Glantz,
2000a, 2000b, 2001a; Morley et al., 2002). In tandem with the power of the tobacco
lobby, other factors that significantly contribute to the influence of the tobacco
lobby in state tobacco policymaking include the condition of the state’s budget,
gubernatorial involvement, a state’s tobacco economy, and state political priorities
(Austin-Lane et al., 2004). Despite public pronouncements that tobacco use is a
question of adult choice, privately the primary impetus for the industry’s state
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Policy Studies Journal, 34:3
legislative political efforts is to maintain and preserve its tobacco sales and increase
profits (Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Morley et al., 2002). For instance, a 1991 internal
Philip Morris memorandum stated:
During the next five years, PM-USA [Philip Morris, USA] plans to continue its profit growth, generating operating income increases of 13.5%
annually. Domestic cigarettes will contribute a cumulative $18.0 billion to
the corporate cash flow over the plan period. Market share will reach
49.6% in 1995, while volume will grow at a compound annual rate of half
a percent.
PM-USA volume growth will occur despite a 2.9% compound annual
decline in industry volume. Industry volume will be negatively affected by
increasing smoking restrictions, the decreasing acceptability of smoking
and increasing excise taxes. Corporate affairs will use direct lobbying, the
media, and industry allies to minimize state and local tax increases,
promote accommodation in public places [smoking with non-smoking in
public places] and preserve the industry’s freedom to advertise and
promote cigarettes to adult smokers (Philip Morris Tobacco Company,
1995).
Efforts to maintain sales and profits have occurred through ongoing advocacy
in all state legislatures by the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry has consistently opposed vigorous antitobacco regulations and educational programs and
higher taxes on tobacco products (Derthick, 2005; Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Morley
et al., 2002; Studlar, 2002).
Tobacco Lobby Tactics in States
The primary approach by the tobacco industry, which has been a powerful
force in all states, in advancing this policy goal has been the ongoing employment
of well established and astute contract lobbyists. The state contract lobbyists often
have decades of experience and expertise in working with state legislatures to
advance or block legislation. For instance, in Missouri, tobacco lobbyist John
Britton began his career as a lobbyist over 45 years ago (Givel & Glantz, 2000b).
The tobacco lobbyists have advanced on an ongoing basis the tobacco industry’s policy agenda and clashed with the health advocates’ agenda, such as
supporting stronger clean indoor air regulation. (Chaloupka et al., 2002; Derthick,
2005; Givel & Glantz, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Givel, Dearlove, & Glantz, 2001; Morley
et al., 2002; Pertschuk, 1992; Studlar, 2002). Coordination of these state lobbying
efforts occurred through a top-down relationship with top tobacco industry
management at the national corporate level developing and consulting with the
contracted state lobbyists (Givel & Glantz, 2001a). This consultation included the
development of uniform policy positions that should be promoted or discouraged
in each state (Goldstein et al., 1997).
Givel: The Tobacco Lobby and U.S. State Policymaking from 1990 to 2003
411
The state lobbyists employed a bundle of tactics to influence states’ tobacco
policies. These tactics included direct campaign contributions, indirect campaign
contributions to organizations such as political parties designed to assist legislator’s election campaigns, and gifts and honoraria to legislators. Other tactics
included occasional alliances with other allied interest groups (such as the hospitality industry to counter clean indoor air ordinances) and the development of
front groups such as the National Smokers Alliance primarily funded by Philip
Morris (Dearlove & Glantz, 2000; Givel & Glantz, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002;
Givel et al., 2002; Glantz & Balbach, 2000). The development of myriad front
groups allowed the tobacco industry and its political allies to act without being
publicly associated with the tobacco industry. Tactics of the front groups often
included orchestrated grassroots advocacy campaigns through the mail or phone
calls to pressure policy makers (Dearlove & Glantz, 2000; Givel & Glantz, 2000a,
2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Givel et al., 2001; Glantz & Balbach, 2000). Other tactics
have been testimony before legislative bodies, without any real formal contact with
legislators or their staff.
In contrast to the tobacco lobbyist’s tactics, organized health advocates in state
legislatures have primarily used insider advocacy tactics to advance their agenda
of better public health (Aguinaga-Bialous & Glantz, 1997; Begay & Glantz, 1995;
Bialous & Glantz, 1999; Bialous, Fox, & Glantz, 2001; Dearlove & Glantz, 2000;
Givel & Glantz, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001b, 2002; Givel et al., 2001; Glantz &
Balbach, 2000; Ibrahim & Glantz, 2003; Magzamen & Glantz, 1999; Monardi &
Glantz, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b; Monardi, O’Neill, & Glantz, 1996; Nixon
& Glantz, 2002; Studlar, 2002). Insider advocacy is based on advocates lobbying for
their policy goals and ideas in the “halls of power” in state capitals. By contrast,
outsider tactics occur beyond official institutions of power to pressure legislators
in conjunction with insider lobbying. Outsider tactics have included: low-cost
newspaper issue advertisements, free media interviews, letters to the editor and
opinion editorials, community forums, rallies, and public demonstrations
(Derthick, 2005; Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Morley et al., 2002; Studlar, 2002).
State Tobacco Policy Outputs from 1990 to 1999
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a sharp rise in antitobacco
activism, adverse public opinion, litigation, and new legislation to counter the
tobacco industry and reduce tobacco use (Derthick, 2005; Studlar, 2002). Despite
this sharp rise in activism, CDC data suggest from 1990 to 1999, including in 1999
when payments to the states began from the historically significant state Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA), which was signed in 1998 between 46 Attorneys
General and the tobacco industry, that key policy outputs primarily favored the
tobacco industry. As shown in Figure 1, from 1990 to 1999, state tobacco excise
taxes and their effect on tobacco consumption remained low in 20 states with
tobacco excise taxes 25 cents or lower per pack and 12 states with tobacco excise
taxes between 26 cents and 49 cents per pack (Coalition on Smoking or Health,
1990; Office of Smoking and Health, 2000).
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Policy Studies Journal, 34:3
In addition, states significantly increased from 7 to 19 from 1990 to 1999 the
number of laws that preempted stronger local clean indoor air ordinances. At the
same time, by 1999, a few states had enacted effective state clean indoor air
legislation (Figure 2). Recent research and government reports indicate that
because of severe illness and death for nonsmokers, exposure to tobacco smoke
should be avoided, which can only occur in smoke-free areas (California Environmental Protection Agency–Air Resources Board, 2006; Pion & Givel, 2004;
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1992). In addition, by 1999, 20
states (up from one in 1990) had enacted new tobacco youth-access ordinances that
25
Number of states
20
15
10
5
0
Less than 25 cents per pack
25 cents to 49 cents per pack
Greater than 50 cents per pack
Tobacco tax distributions
Figure 1. Tobacco Tax Distribution by Number of States in 1999.
Source: CDC STATE: State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System.
No smoking
60
Number of states
50
40
Smoking areas
with separate
ventilation
30
Has designated
smoking areas
No smoking
restrictions
20
10
0
State government work sites
Private work sites
Restaurants
Total states
without effective
smoking
restrictions
Public areas
Figure 2. State Public Smoking Restrictions 1999.
Source: CDC STATE: State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System.
a
Total number of states without effective smoking restrictions include the categories of: smoking
areas with separate ventilation, designated smoking areas, and no smoking restrictions.
Givel: The Tobacco Lobby and U.S. State Policymaking from 1990 to 2003
413
preempted local ordinances (Coalition on Smoking or Health, 1990; Office of
Smoking and Health, 2000). Public health advocates had very modest legislative
success from 1990 to 1999, with 30 states requiring the licensing of tobacco sellers’
vending machines and over-the-counter sales (Coalition on Smoking or Health;
Office of Smoking and Health). Tobacco licensing allows for the tracking of tobacco
sales violations and subsequent revocation of licenses to sell tobacco (Coalition on
Smoking or Health, 1990; Office of Smoking and Health, 2000).
Master Settlement Agreement
In 1998, 46 Attorneys General and the tobacco industry negotiated the MSA,
which awarded the states $206 billion, adjusted for inflation over 25 years, with the
first payment beginning in 1999 (Campaign For Tobacco Free Kids, 2004). This
agreement represented a significant and historic development in state tobacco
control policymaking. The MSA had no restrictions on how the funds were to be
spent including on tobacco control efforts (Campaign For Tobacco Free Kids). Nor
has the MSA had a significant and detrimental impact on tobacco sales and profits
(Sloan, Mathews, & Trogdon, 2005). In addition to funding from the MSA, from
1999 to 2003, 14 states increased their tobacco excise taxes to greater than 50 cents
per pack (Figure 3). By 2003, only four states had fully, and eight states had
partially, funded state tobacco prevention programs from MSA funds and other
state revenue sources that met the CDC’s minimum level of state funding for
vigorous tobacco control prevention efforts (Campaign For Tobacco Free Kids;
Sloan et al.).
35
30
Number of states
25
20
Number of states year 1999
Number of states year 2003
15
10
5
0
Less than 25 cents per pack
25 cents to 49 cents per pack
Greater than 50 cents per pack
Tobacco tax distribution
Figure 3. Tobacco Tax Distribution by Number of States for 1999 and 2003.
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators located at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/cigarett.html
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Policy Studies Journal, 34:3
State Tobacco Policy Outputs from 1999 to 2003
In the post-MSA period from 1999 to 2003, state regulation of tobacco use
through effective public smoking restrictions in government work sites, private
work sites, and restaurants increased slightly (Figure 4). On the other hand, state
preemption of stronger local clean indoor air ordinances increased from 19 to 21
from 1999 to 2003 (American Lung Association, 2004). State preemption of stronger
local youth-access ordinances also increased from 20 to 24 from 1999 to 2003
(American Lung Association). Finally, from 1999 to 2003, the number of states that
licensed tobacco sales increased from 30 to 49 (American Lung Association, 2005a).
In summary, from 1990 to 2003, one modest tobacco control policy trend was
an increase in state licensing of tobacco sales. From 1999 to 2003, another pro
tobacco control policy occurred with 14 additional states enacting tobacco excise
taxes at 50 cents or greater per pack. However, overall spending in 2003 from the
MSA and other state revenue sources for comprehensive state antitobacco programs favored the tobacco industry. State tobacco control efforts from 1990 to 2003
in the areas of state preemption of local clean indoor air and youth access
enforcement ordinances and state public smoking restrictions continued to
strongly favor the tobacco industry. In the aggregate, these policy outputs represents a failure from 1990 to 2003 to punctuate or replace the tobacco policy
monopoly equilibrium in the states despite a sharp mobilization for increased
tobacco regulation, higher tobacco taxes, and litigation against the industry.
(Derthick, 2005)
60
50
Total states
40
Total states without effective
smoking restrictions in 1999
30
Total states without effective
smoking restrictions in 2003
20
10
0
State government work sites
Private work sites
Restaurants
Type of public area
Figure 4. Total States without Effective Smoking Restrictions in 1999 and 2003.
Source: CDC STATE: State Tobacco Activities Tracking Evaluation System.
a
Defined as public areas with some form of allowed smoking.
Givel: The Tobacco Lobby and U.S. State Policymaking from 1990 to 2003
415
Discussion
From 1990 to 2003, the primarily negative feedback occurring through the
“rules of the game” that shaped state tobacco legislation, meant that the dominant
policy monopoly favoring the tobacco industry did not significantly and sharply
change in the 50 states (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Worsham, 1998). Instead,
despite the symbolic appearance of punctuation in the policy system, the tobacco
industry was able to use its political resources to counter the health advocates’
mobilization, adverse public opinion regarding tobacco use, litigation, and even a
rise in new state tobacco control legislation. In fact, the feedback loop in this case
was primarily negative. This confirms Baumgartner and Jones and Worshams’
assertion that not all mobilizations or sharp shocks to the system by the less
powerful will be successful. This does not mean that another (or different) shock
to the system will not result in punctuated change.
While protobacco state policy monopolies were challenged by mobilizations
of health advocates at the state level, the continued dominance by the tobacco
industry was reflective of neopluralist theory that posits that while a wide variety
of groups compete in the political process, only business organizations have a
privileged position (Dahl, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1990, 1996; Lindblom, 1977, 1982a,
1982b, 1983; Manley, 1983). According to Lindblom and Dahl, polyarchy includes
freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to vote and fair elections,
competition among politicians and political parties, alternative sources of information, and peaceful transitions of political power (Dahl, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1990,
1996; Lindblom, 1977, 1982a, 1982b, 1983; Manley, 1983). From the neopluralist
view, corporations often use their financial resources for political purposes in a
variety of government venues like state legislatures to advance policy goals like
reducing or eliminating taxes and regulatory oversight over businesses such as
the tobacco industry to the disadvantage of less powerful groups like health
advocates.
This maintenance of policy dominance has resulted in a sharp rise in the
ongoing and acrimonious conflict between the tobacco industry and public health
groups. Because the public health groups’ mobilization was not successful, there
has been no agreement on a new policy idea or direction with respect to tobacco
control in the states. At the center of these differences are largely irreconcilable
views of what should be proper state tobacco policy. On one side is the tobacco
industry who views more strenuous regulation of tobacco use and higher tobacco
taxes as a threat to its sales and profits. On the other side are health advocates who
view tobacco use as a serious public health problem. Without a change in
mobilization tactics by the health advocates or some new form of an exogenous
shock such as the election of more protobacco control politicians, the tobacco
industry’s use of its vast financial resources and state lobbying network will likely
prevail into the near future in terms of advancing its policy goals.
This state of disequilibrium where much friction and heat generated by the
mobilization of health advocates, adverse public opinion, litigation, and new state
tobacco legislation occurred with modest favorable state tobacco control policy
416
Policy Studies Journal, 34:3
results meant that this attempt to punctuate equilibrium was thwarted. While the
mobilization against the tobacco industry and tobacco use appeared to be a sharp
and punctuated policy change regarding tobacco control, in reality, the dominant
policy monopoly that the tobacco industry enjoyed in the states prior to the
mobilization was primarily and successfully maintained.
Michael Givel is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Oklahoma
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