Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 Notice (service of process) Places you under the PJx of the court 1. (waivable 4(d)) Dismiss with 12(b)(3)-(4) Waived if no object. 12(g)(2), (h)(1) 2. Federal 5th DPC (Mullane) and a. "reasonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise interested parties” FRCP 4 (see 4(e) for methods) PJx Power of the court over you (waivable) Federal 5th DPC and a. General i. Citizen (§1332 def), ii. Consent, or iii. Presence (Burnham pluralities) 1. Tradition or 2. Evolving fairness iv. Systematic & continuous contacts b. Specific (Shoe minimum contacts) i. Amount, nature and quality of contacts 1. Purposeful availment of, and 2. Reasonably foreseeable ii. Related to CoA, and iii. Fair FRCP 4(k): 4(k)(1)(A) = if PJx of state (see right) 1. Cure by venue transfer (CL) Dismiss with 12(b)(2) Waived if no object. 12(g)(2), (h)(1) 2. SMJx Power of the court over your case (cannot waive) 1. These are only the two MAIN types 2. Motion to remand in 30 days §1447(c) to cure lack of SMJX or procedural defects Venue Convenience over whole case (waivable) Dismiss with 12(b)(3) Waivable by forum selection clause 1. 2. State 14th DPC (see left), State RCP, and State 14th DPC (see left), and State long arm statute a. General = may or may not allow "gotcha Jx" b. Specific = one-step (ex. CA where long-arm collapses into DPC) or two-step Diversity SMJx (except probate and domestic relations), or US Const. Art. III § 2 (boundaries of power) = minimal diversity 28 USC § 1332 (Congress’ authorization defining original Jx--narrower than Const.) i. Complete diversity of citizenship at time of filing (Strawbridge) and 1. Individuals (presumption of continuing domicile) §1331(a)(1)-(3) a. Are physically, and b. Intend to remain indefinitely (CL) 2. Corporations §1332(c)(1) a. Inc. and b. PPB (nerve center) (Hertz) 3. Other (Belleville) a. LLC = partnership ii. Anchor claim > $75k for each D §1332(a) (Exxon) Federal Qs SMJx (primary ways for SMJx, but not only two) a. US Const. Art. III § 2 (power) = arising under US law/const. b. 28 USC § 1331 (authorization) i. Well-pleaded complaint (Motley) 1. "Arising under" narrowly construed (CL) or 2. Substantial question (FTB) a. b. Dismiss with 12(b)(1) Removal (State Ct --> Fed Ct) To give Ds access to fed protections 1. 2. 1. a. b. c. 28 USC §§ 1441, 1446-47 (purely statutory!) Within 30 days of service or becoming removable §1446(b) Notice of removal (not a motion) to district court §1446(a) Diversity exceptions i. No D can be a citizen of the state §1441(b) ii. Within 1 year of filing (extended with good cause) §1446(b) Purely statutory! 1. Proper venue: a. Any district where D resides if all Ds in same state §1391(a)(1), (b)(1) literal? b. Substantial part of events/omissions/property §1391(a)(2) and (b)(2) c. Iff not 1 or 2, then: Page 1 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 Waived if no object. 12(g)(2), (h)(1) 2. i. If only diversity, any district where any D is subject to PJx §1391(a)(3) ii. If not only diversity, anywhere any D is found §1391(b)(3) Transfer by motion for: a. Convenience and justice §1404 or b. Improper venue § 1406 --------------------------------------INTRODUCTION TO DUE PROCESS---------------------------------------- 1. Sources of authority a. Constitution (often a floor which can be legislated above) i. 14th Amendment DPC (states) ii. 5th Amendment DPC (federal) b. Precedent and common law i. Binding and persuasive c. Statutes (USC 28 = judiciary) (Note: 42 US 1983 = how to sue state for deprivation of Con. Rights) d. Federal/state rules of civil procedure i. FRCP/FRAP = Promulgated by SCOTUS but adopted by Congress’ silence 2. Values a. FRCP 1 = “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” i. Fairness vi. Consistency ii. Equality vii. Meaningful participation iii. Efficiency viii. Dignity iv. Finality ix. Accuracy v. Transparency x. Impartiality b. Tension between speed/cost and justice The Lingo GRANT/DENY motions DISMISS claims/complaints AppCt. AFFIRM/REVERSE/REMAND MOTION TO STRIKE if improper/untimely DEFAULT JUDGMENT if no answer (R55) -------------------------------------------------------OPPORTUNITY------------------------------------------------------DPC = “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” (5th and 14th) 1. Mathews test = what process if due under DPC? (originally for administrative proceeding for benefits) a. Case-by-case basis b. Balance: i. Risk of error and value of additional procedural safeguards ii. The importance to the private party iii. The importance to the government (including the cost burden) c. Pros/Cons i. + Realistic appraisal of the significance of procedural costs, flexible for many scenarios ii. -- Results-oriented / favors the government, judicial guessing game (requires extra hearings), doesn’t take dignity, equality or tradition into account (too scientific) 2. Hearings a. Hamdi = Citizen detained as combatants need notice and habeas corpus, but lower evidence hurdles b. Before seizing property? Not required by the DPC if statutory safeguards provide real judicial discretion such as bond or quick post-seizure hearings (Mitchell) 3. Right to a lawyer when: a. The stakes are high enough i.e., personal liberty (so for all criminal, but not all civil trials) Page 2 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 i. Presumption that if personal liberty isn’t at stake you don’t need a lawyer (Lassiter = as applied, DPC does not require right to counsel in parental termination proceeding because it wouldn’t change the outcome) b. The hearing is confusing (Walters = $10 lawyer $ limitation does not violate DPC b/c low risk of error, generally) -------------------------------------------------------------NOTICE------------------------------------------------------------Places you under the PJx of the court (waivable by returning waiver or failing to raise it in time) Federal court = 5th DPC and FRCP 4 State court = 14th DPC, state constitution, and state rules of civil procedure 1. DPC a. Must satisfy Mullane standard= “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interest parties…” NOT actual notice i. If notice failing to reach D is unusual, then ok (Greene = posting on doors in public housing--thereby satisfying state statute- is not “reasonably calculated” because they knew postings were taken down and there was an inexpensive, efficient alternative, i.e. certified mail) ii. Applies to notice for all issues of due process, not just service iii. Publication is ok if whereabouts are unknown (Mullane) 2. FRCP 4 a. Actual notice (or even the most likely to notify) is not necessary or sufficient (Mid Continent = technicalities of FRCP 4 need to be met. It doesn’t matter if D had actual notice P tried diligently, or D evaded service) b. Service of process i. Complaint and summons 4(c)(1) c. Methods of service i. Personal delivery 4(e)(2)(A) ii. Copy at dwelling or usual place of abode w/ one of reasonable age and discretion 4(e)(2)(B) 1. Can have more than one, just need sufficient indicia of permanence (Khashoggi = spent a lot of time and money fixing up his NY home, so it’s an “abode”) d. e. f. g. 2. Where personal belongings are (even if you travel) (CL) 3. Not where you only stay for business (CL) 4. Temporary stay elsewhere doesn’t change your usual abode (CL) iii. Delivery to an appointed agent 4(e)(2)(C) iv. Any method that applies in the forum state’s courts or state where service is made 4(e)(1) When 4(m) i. Within 120 days of filing complaint (can be extended for good cause) Who 4(c)(2) i. Anyone over 18 not a party to the action OPTION: Waiving service 4(d) (if D does not waive, P must still serve D) i. Incentive: gives 60 days to respond to complaint if D waives (instead of 21) ii. Preferred practice (if D doesn’t waive and can’t show good cause, then fees 4(d)(2)) iii. Effect = can’t complain about insufficient service or process later Notes Page 3 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 i. Need proof of service ii. Documents subsequent to process are served more leniently (FRCP 5) -----------------------------------------------------------------PJx----------------------------------------------------------------Power of the court over you (waivable) Federal court = 5th DPC and federal long-arm FRCP 4(k) (aka PJx over those subject to Jx of state court) State court = 14th DPC, state long-arm statute (one-step like CA or two-steps), and state constitution 1. Types a. General (for any COA) i. Citizens of (§1332 def)/corporations Inc. or PPB (nerve center) in forum state 1. DPC = enough minimum contacts 2. State Statute = always exists, but is not part of long arm b/c not reaching ii. Consent (waiving PJx by not challenging it at the first opportunity) iii. Presence (in-state service) 1. DPC a. Tradition/“gotcha PJx” (Scalia Burnham plurality = ok for NY D to be sued for divorce in CA because he was served while in CA on business/visiting kids) b. Evolving standards of fairness/“transient PJx” (Brennan Burnham plurality = ok b/c NY D purposefully availed himself of CA by visiting, easy with modern travel, and foreseeable because of tradition) 2. State Long Arm Statute a. May or may not allow for gotcha/transient PJx (CA = DPC so ok) b. Specific (only in relation to this COA) i. Consent (waiving PJx by not challenging it at the first opportunity) 1. Appointing an agent (Szukhent = Mich. farmers appointed agent in NY through contract with NY equipment renter ok because no conflict of interest) 2. Choice of forum a. Prima facie valid—high burden of proof to claim unfairness (The Bremen = forum clause as part of huge contract between 2 big international firms was obviously thought about) b. Can overturn for policy considerations: i. If contract wasn’t valid because of fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power ii. If there wasn’t notice, the dispute is essentially a local one, or the forum is remote and alien c. Even if you aren’t a business (Carnival = cruisers didn’t satisfy high burden of proof and it’s reasonable for the company to have forum clauses which benefits passengers with reduced fares) i. Are form contracts with consumers really “consent”? Page 4 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 ii. Minimum contacts / long arm statute (see below) c. In personam = PJx over your person d. In rem = PJx over a thing e. Quasi in rem = PJx over you through thing (Pennoyer = state only has power over ppl and things inside it) i. No longer valid! (Shaffer = need minimum contacts for all PJx, can’t sue Ds in DE only because they had stock there… now DE long-arm gets directors and officers but b/c of their contacts, not stock) 2. DPC: Shoe 3-Prong Minimum Contacts test (see continuum below) a. Purpose i. Must have minimum contacts with forum state when COA accrued so the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice since you could have foreseen being haled into court for such an action b. 3-prong test i. Amount, nature and quality of contacts 1. Purposeful availment a. Voluntary act to purposefully benefit from the forum state b. Contrast w/ unilateral act of 3rd party (VW = customers took car from NY to OK) 2. Reasonably foreseeable a. In contrast with mere foreseeability where it is only imaginable 3. If commerce and not sold by D to directly P… (Asahi pluralities—for products only!) a. Stream of commerce (Brennan) i. Knowing it will end up there is enough to meet purposeful availment since D is benefiting and a suit is foreseeable b. Stream of commerce + (O’Connor) i. Knowing is not enough to meet purposeful availment, need additional showing D purposefully directed actions toward forum state (like advertising, help lines, special designs) ii. Relatedness of contacts with lawsuit iii. Fair play and substantial justice (burden shifts to D to prove it’s unfair…only in extraordinary cases [like Asahi where the burden on Japanese D who sold to a Chinese D, not a US one, is severe, and P is not even from the forum and had already obtained relief from other Ds]) 1. Burden on D to litigate in forum 2. Forum state’s interest in the claim 3. P’s interest in obtaining relief in the forum 4. Interstate efficiency (procedural—if no other state can take it then get rid of it!) 5. Interstate social policies (substantive, like preservation of family bonds) 3. Long Arm Statute a. Federal = FRCP 4(k) i. Anyone who is subject to PJx of the state b. State i. CA = one-step (to limits of DPC) ii. Others restrain their reach Page 5 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 4. Challenging PJx a. Direct attack (special appearance) i. Appear only to challenge the court’s PJx over you (not the merits) b. Collateral attack (ignore service and waive answer) i. Default judgment (FRCP 55) will be entered and D loses the right to appeal on the merits 5. Note a. US Constitution Article IV “Full Faith and Credit” clause = need to respect valid judgments of other states (Balk = NC can’t ignore a proper judgment by MD and make D pay twice) 6. Minimum Contacts Continuum No contacts Related COA No PJx Unrelated COA No PJx Isolated (depending on their nature) Regular but not substantial Systematic and substantial General PJx Specific PJx No PJx Specific PJx · Gray = OH sold valves to Penn water heater who sold to Ill. Resident · McGee = Insurance company solicited 1 CA resident for business by mail · Calder = FL writer should have foreseen being sued for libel by CA target in CA · VW = NY sold car to NY resident who crashed in OK (unilateral act of 3rd party) · Asahi = Not fair to sue in CA for Japanese parts sold to Taiwanese manufacturer for sale in CA motorcycles · Kulko = not foreseeable for NY father to be sued by wife who moved to CA · Pavlovich = passive positing online by TX resident that harms CA business through unilateral acts of 3rd parties (measure site interactivity and commercial nature) · Shoe = 12 salesmen who show samples and solicit orders, so it’s fair · BK = Long term contract with Fl choice of law btwn Michigan resident and FL corp. shows personal availment · Keeton = regular monthly sales of magazine in NH means NY resident can be sue OH corp. there for libel No PJx No PJx General PJx (by definition) ---------------------------------------------------------------SMJx--------------------------------------------------------------Power of the court over your case (cannot waive) Federal court = limited original SMJx through §§1331-1332 and US Constitution Art. III § 2 State court = general SMJx (concurrent SMJx by 10th Am. except for those in exclusive SMJx of feds) 1. Diversity vs. Federal Qs as a means to original federal SMJx a. Diversity cases are less welcome as shown by the limits on removing them, > $75k requirement, §1391(a)/(b)(3) distinctions, and 4(k)(2)(A)’s catch-all b. While the substantive law that governs follows the suit, you may prefer: i. Jury pool ii. Rules of civil procedures Page 6 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 iii. Docket backlog iv. Judges 2. Diversity SMJx a. Purpose = notion that states prefer their own so it’s not fair for foreign D to fight where P has home-field advantage i. Exceptions (b/c “local” concerns) 1. Probate (but federal courts can hear actions related to property in probate) 2. Domestic relations claims (but federal courts can hear tort actions arising within) b. US Const. Art. III §2 (boundaries of power), and i. All cases where the parties include citizens of different states (minimal diversity SMJx) c. 28 USC §1332 (authorization by Congress defining original Jx under US Const. Art. III §1) i. Complete diversity at the time of the filing of the lawsuit/petition for removal (Strawbridge) and 1. Theory a. All Ps must be diverse from all Ds (dismiss nondiverse parties to cure) b. Disregard citizenship of (CL): i. Parties who are properly in federal court on a federal qs claim ii. Nominal parties (non viable claims) iii. Foreigners c. See §1332 for aliens, insurers, estates, and infants/incompetents 2. Individuals §1332(a) citizenship = domicile (residence needed but not sufficient) a. Where you 1) are physically and 2) intend to remain indefinitely (CL) i. Fact-finding mission to determine intent (indicia of domicile sufficient but not necessary) 1. College ≠ intent, but doesn’t hurt (Mas = student in Ill. With intent to move to LA is still a citizen of Miss.) 2. Marriage does not necessarily change citizenship (Mas = wife’s domicile does not change when she marries a French national) b. Presumption of continuing domicile (CL) i. Retain last citizenship until both prongs for a new state ii. Can be “stateless” (CB ex. living abroad with intent to stay and no indicia of 3. Corporations a. §1332(c): PPB and Inc. i. PPB = “nerve center” (Hertz) i.e. where decision makers are (brain over brawn) 4. Other a. LLC (Belleville) i. Not a corporation ii. Equated to a partnership for purposes of diversity Jx b. Need to know the citizenship of every investor/partner ii. Anchor Claim on each D > $75,000 §1332(a) Page 7 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 1. Theory a. P’s good faith claim controls (burden on D to disprove) (CL) i. Doesn’t matter if P is eventually awarded nothing §1332(b) b. Includes intangible damages like injunctions (CL) i. Asses value of injunction to P or cost of complying to D 2. Aggregation (joinder) (CL and §1367) a. 1 P can add multiple claims against 1 D to get > $75k b. 1 P cannot add claims against multiple Ds to get > $75k under §1367(b) i. Must meet > $75k for each D alone c. Multiple Ps cannot add multiple claims together to get > $75k against 1 D i. But if 1 P has a claim against D worth > $75k, then related claims of additional Ps can be joined (Exxon) 3. Federal Question SMJx a. Purpose = to allow definitive interpretation of federal law b. US Const. Art. III §2 (power), and i. “Arising under” (broad): 1. US Constitution, or 2. US laws or treaties c. 28 USC §1331 (authorization under US Const. Art. III §1) i. “Arising under” (narrow) ii. Well-pleaded complaint = P must allege: 1. Constitutional violation, 2. Violation of federal law, or 3. Substantial question of federal law (FTB) a. Where P’s relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law b. Can’t claim federal qs in anticipation of a counterclaim (Motley = breach of contract claim that P guessed would be defended as required by an act of Congress. Federal claim doesn’t have to be addressed since the contract could be void) 4. Removal (no constitutional authority, just 28 USC §§1441, 1446, 1447) a. Purpose = To give Ds access to the protections of the federal system as well b. Who = All defendants (CL) c. What = Actions that could have been brought in district court §1441(a) i. If one claim is removable and others are not § 1441(c) 1. All can be removed or 2. Court can decide to remand all matters in which state law dominates d. When = Within 30 days of service upon D or of becoming removable §1446(b) e. Where = BUILT IN VENUE. To the DCt. in the district and division of the state court §1441(a) f. How = File notice of removal w/ federal court (state court immediately loses power) §1446(a) g. After removal i. If no SMJx, court shall remand §1447(c) (can only remand if case had been removed) ii. P can file motion to remand within 30 days of removal §1447(c) for any other defect Page 8 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 1. Procedural problems with removal (improper place/method, not timely, diversity exceptions not followed…) iii. Remand is not reviewable, but failure to remand is §1447(c) 1. P should also file interlocutory appeal or extraordinary writ of mandamus (Caterpillar = considerations of finality and efficiency trump as long as federal Jx requirements are met when the judgment is entered) iv. If P seeks to join Ds to destroy diversity, court can deny or remand §1447(e) h. Diversity Jx limits i. Not removable if any D is citizen of state §1441(b) (state not prejudice against its own) ii. Not removable more than a year after initial filing §1446(b) (can be extended for good cause [CL]) i. Federal Qs limits i. Non-federal qs claims can be joined and removed, or district court can remand claims where state law dominates §1441(c) -------------------------------------------------------------VENUE-------------------------------------------------------------For convenience and justice (waivable by failing to raise it or forum selection clauses) Federal court = 28 USC §§ 1391-1392 (no constitutional authority) State court = state statutes 1. Venue generally §1391 a. Can have multiple venues or none at all b. Turns on residence (contrast with citizenship for diversity) i. Residence of corporations §1391(c) = NEED FACTS 1. Any district where it has PJx at filing if district were a state (general where inc.) 2. If no such district, then where most significant contacts c. If diversity then 3-part test §1391(a) i. If all Ds reside in same state then any district where any D resides §1391(a)(1) 1. Spirit of law is to limit to geographic area Ds hold in common 2. But literally may go beyond if a corporate D is in many states a. Ex. Corp. D is inc. in CA w/ PPB in NV. D2 is in N.D.CA. Venues = any in CA and even D.NV (although that’s pushing it) ii. Where §1391(a)(2): 1. Substantial part of events/omissions giving rise to COA occurred or 2. Substantial part of the subject property (real property) iii. IFF not 1 or 2 then any district where any D is subject to PJx at filing §1391(a)(3) 1. General (gotcha Jx counts) or specific PJx related to the COA d. If not just diversity then 3-part test §1391(b) i. Same as above ii. Same as above iii. IFF not 1 or 2 then any district where any D is found 1. Easier than §1391(a)(3) and consistent with preference for federal qs SMJx Page 9 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 2. Transfers (substantive law follows) a. When? With or after other objections (or they are waived). b. If in proper venue (If a case has been removed then it is in the “proper” venue) i. Standard of convenience + justice as long as it could have been there originally §1404(a) 1. P’s choice weighs heavily, but if all Ds agree and witnesses/evidence are there… 2. When? Any time! Although at some point it’s not longer convenient ii. How 1. All parties agree §1404(b) 2. Sua sponte §1404(a) iii. Take the law with you! (good for forum shopping) c. If in improper venue i. Dismiss 12(b)(3) or transfer in the interest of justice §1406(a) (ex. statute of limitations) ii. Lose the law when you transfer d. Forum Non Conveniens = dismiss so it can be brought in a foreign court if only proper place 3. Note: CA districts = ND (San Fran), ED (Sac), CD (Los Angeles), SD (San Diego) ----------------------------------------------------------PLEADINGS--------------------------------------------------------- 1. History a. Writ system: needed to plead one claim in one particular category in law ($/jury) or equity (specific performance/judge) b. Code pleading: plead facts supporting each element of a claim, not evidence or legal conclusion c. FRCP in 1938 i. Merged law and equity ii. Requires notice pleading and plausibility, not facts for each element (see below) 2. Generally a. Allowed 7(a)(1)-(7) i. Complaint/3rd party complaint ii. Answer to complaint/counterclaim/cross claim (i.e. D against D)/3rd party complaint iii. If the court orders one, a reply to an answer b. Form 10(a)-(c) c. Can plead in the alternative 8(d)(2)-(3) d. Construed so as to do justice 8(e) 3. Complaint a. Purpose i. How wide the gate should be (efficient/economical) ii. Notice pleading for D and court (scope and framing for discovery) iii. Commences the action FRCP 3 b. Must contain: i. Short and plain statement of Jx 8(a)(1) ii. Short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief 8(a)(2) 1. Used to be possible (Conley = not dismissed unless there’s no set of facts to support P’s claim) Page 10 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 2. Now must be plausible (Twiqbal = more than possible but less than probable in all cases) a. Ignore legal conclusions but take facts as true b. Don’t need to meet all elements of a prima facie case (Swierkiewicz) 3. Example = Form 11 a. After Twiqbal, these facts are plausible for a car accident but not for something less familiar iii. Demand for relief sought 8(a)(3) c. Heightened pleading 9(b) i. For fraud or mistake, must plead those circumstances with particularity, although conditions of the mind may be pled generally ii. Leatherman = no heightened pleading outside Rule 9(b) d. Does it meet pleading standard? Consider: i. Asymmetrical access to information pre-discovery ii. Cost/benefit of discovery iii. May want to be vague in order to survive 12(b)(6), but specifics help get specific answers 4. Answer a. Serve within: i. 21 days after being served summons and complaint 12(1)(A)(i) or ii. If waived under 4(d), 60 days after request for waiver was sent 12(1)(A)(ii) or iii. 14 days after court denies a motion or more definite statement is served 12(4)(A)-(B) or iv. 14 days after service of amendment (if more than time remaining for original) 15(a)(3) b. Must contain: i. Admissions 8(b) 1. Not in contention so related evidence is not admissible (Fuentes = amended answer day of trial to admit to negligence but P still proved circumstances of the car wreck = not ok) ii. Denials 1. Must fairly respond to substance 8(b)(2) a. Need to be clear about what you’re denying/admitting or ineffective denial (Zielinski = denied big paragraph that included negligence and ownership, but wasn’t clear to P that ownership was denied. Statute of limitations barred P so equitable estoppel meant D was held liable anyway—ok because D and real D had same insurance) 2. General 8(b)(3) / Specific 8(b)(4) 3. Absence has effect of an admission 8(b)(6) iii. Lack of Knowledge 1. Effect of a denial 8(b)(5) c. Avoidance/Affirmative Defenses 8(c) i. Burden on D ii. Must be raised before trial to avoid unfair surprise (Ingraham) iii. 8(c)(1) is not exhaustive 1. Ingraham = limitation on damages is an avoidance (allegation of new matter which, admitting the facts, shows cause why they should not have their ordinary legal effect) 2. Gomez = qualified immunity is an avoidance, not prima facie case…about knowledge asymmetry d. Other defenses (these—and these only—can also be raised in motions): Page 11 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 What Where When Lack of SMJx §§ 1331-1332 & Art. III 12(b)(1) Any time 12(h)(3) Lack of PJx 4(k) and DPC 12(b)(2) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) Improper venue §§ 1391, 1404, 1406 (also waived by forum selection) 12(b)(3) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) Insufficient process 4(a)-(c) (also waived by returning waiver) 12(b)(4) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) Insufficient service 4(d)-(e) (also waived by returning waiver) 12(b)(5) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) Dismiss for failure to state a claim 8(a) 12(b)(6) Through trial 12(h)(2) 5. Replies a. Court can order a reply 7(a) i. Must be served within 21 days after being served with the order to reply 12(a)(1)(C) ii. Lets heightened pleading in the back door b. Also 12(e) motion for a more definite statement if complaint is vague i. Must be obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order 6. Notes c. Pretrial conferences can affect deadlines FRCP 16 d. Default judgment if D has failed to plead or otherwise defend FRCP 55 7. Amendments e. Pre trial i. Once as a matter of course: 1. 15(a)(1)(A): 21 day after service or 2. 15(a)(1)(B): 21 days after service of responsive pleading or 12(b), (e), or (f) motion (whichever is earlier) ii. All other cases only with 15(a)(2): 1. Opposing party’s written consent or 2. Court’s freely given leave when justice requires f. During trial i. If objection: 1. Court should freely permit amendments if they will aid in presenting the merits and not prejudice the other party on the merits 15(b)(1) ii. If no objection, then express or implied consent = as if it were in the pleading 15(b)(2) g. Relation back (only matters when statute of limitations bars an amendment) i. Adding claims 15(c)(1)(B) Page 12 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 1. Can have different legal theories, but needs to “arise out of” same factual situation (Barcume = first sexist hiring and then sexual harassment = no relation back) ii. Adding parties 15(c)(1)(C) 1. As long as: a. The added party has constructive notice within 120 days of filing and 15(c)(1)(C)(i) b. The added party should have known it would have been sued absent mistake 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) (not just not knowing!) 2. Depends on what the party to be added knew or should have known, not the amending party’s knowledge (Krupski = P sued the wrong version of the cruise ship co. and knew the other existed, but don’t conflate knowledge of party’s existence with absence of mistake—can be unaware of its role) 3. Can add parties after a case has gone to judgment, but they must be given notice and the opportunity to respond (Nelson = need to follow Rule 15’s niceties) ------------------------------------------------------------MOTIONS----------------------------------------------------------- 1. General a. A request for a court order must be made by motion 7(b)(1) b. Must be in writing 7(b)(1)(A) and state: i. With particularity the grounds for seeking the order 7(b)(1)(B) ii. Relief sought 7(b)(1)(C) c. Must be joined if available 12(g) 2. Possible motions: a. Judgment on pleadings 12(c) b. More definite statement pointing out defects and details desired 12(e) i. Before filing a responsive pleading ii. Must be obeyed within 14 of order or pleading is stricken c. To strike redundant, immaterial or scandalous matters 12(f) i. Sua sponte 12(f)(1) ii. Any time before response or 21 days after service if no response needed 12(f)(2) 3. Possible defenses (see chart ↑ in ANSWER) 4. Notes a. Pretrial conferences can affect deadlines FRCP 16 b. Default judgment if D has failed to plead or otherwise defend FRCP 55 ---------------------------------------------------------SANCTIONS---------------------------------------------------------1. Rule 11 (whether what’s in the lawyer’s mind when he signed the paper was objectively reasonable) (Franzt = focus on offending party, not the moving party’s response) a. Elements i. TRIGGER? 1. Signed paper 11(a) (everything must be signed or will be stricken) (Young = read papers entirely/in context) Page 13 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 a. Submitted or b. Later advocated 11(b) i. Only oral statements that relate directly to a paper and are discussed in furtherance of the matter 2. That was formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances (Business Guides = signing denotes merit, so you better be sure a law clerk can’t prove your facts wrong in 10 minutes) 3. And that: a. is presented for improper purpose 11(b)(1) i. Politics / bully pulpit (but if it also had merit, like gay marriage?) ii. Isn’t every suit to harass? Isn’t hoping for a settlement efficient? iii. Filing for discovery is ok (Arista = needed univ. to name IP addresses) b. has claims not warranted by existing law or frivolous arguments for changing the law 11(b)(2) i. All a matter of timing…Brown v. Board was frivolous before c. has no evidentiary support for facts (and will likely not have any after discovery) 11(b)(3) (Kraemer = enough that attorney hired a PI and was stonewalled by Ds—reasonable to think facts could have been justified after discovery) i. **Tension with FRCP 8** 1. Need to show plausibility for FRCP 8, but need to know more for FRCP 11 2. Can lose on 12(b)(6) but not be liable under 11 (and can win and still be liable under 11(b)(1)) d. has no evidentiary support for factual denials 11(b)(4) ii. ON WHOM? May lead to sanctions on: 1. Attorneys / unrepresented parties 11(c)(1) 2. Law firms (held jointly responsible) 11(c)(1) 3. Represented parties 11(c)(1), but no $ sanctions for frivolous legal claims 11(c)(5)(A) ok for pro se parties iii. HOW? 1. The moving party files a separate motion 11(c)(2):or a. Specifically describing the conduct, b. Served under Rule 5 and c. Filed only after 21 day safe harbor where the offender can: i. Withdraw or ii. Correct the offending paper 2. Sua sponte with show cause hearing 11(c)(3) iv. WHAT SANCTION? (more lenient with pro se litigants) 1. Limited to what suffices to deter (nonmonetary, $ to court, or costs) 11(c)(4) 2. If $, then not sua sponte unless show cause order before voluntary dismissal or settlement 11(c)(5)(B) 3. Note: order imposing sanction must describe conduct and explain basis 11(c)(6) (Mattel = can’t sanction for “boorish behavior” during of Barbie-thrower during discovery, so had to remand for a more specific order) v. NOTE: Inapplicable to discovery 11(d) Page 14 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 b. Standard of review by higher courts i. Deferential (they are more familiar w/ it, so only overturn if abuse or clearly erroneous) ii. De novo (Cooter and Gell [1990] mentioned in Saltany v. Bush dissent) c. Policy = Respect for the court / efficiency (deterrence) / make litigants whole d. Evolution of 11(c): 1983-1993 1993-present “Shall impose” sanctions if a violation is found 11(c)(1): “May impose” sanctions if a violation is found Every Rule 11 motion was filed 11(c)(2): 21 day safe harbor No sua sponte sanctions 11(c)(3): sua sponte leads to a show cause hearing “Appropriate sanction” 11(c)(4): sanctions limited to what suffices to “deter” Law firms were not liable 11(c)(1): law firms are held jointly responsible 2. Comparing Sanctions Rule Trigger? On whom? How? What sanction? DISTRICT COURT FRCP 11 Signed paper submitted or advocated (not discovery) that is: 1. for an improper purpose 2. legally frivolous 3. without evidentiary support for facts 4. w/out evidentiary support for denials 28 USC 1927 Unreasonable/vexatious multiplication of Counsel proceedings Power to manage its own affairs… Inherent Authority Can only award costs if: *try to use 1) Acted in bad faith or vexatiously rules first* 2) Willful disobedience Attorney Separate motion + Law firm 21 day safe harbor OR Party Sua sponte with show cause hearing Anyone Limited to what suffices to deter (nonmonetary, $ to court, or costs) Sua sponte Costs Sua sponte (Chambers = even if other rules will do) Separate motion OR sua sponte, w/ Costs or double costs Vacate/dismiss Discipline Disbar Costs APPEALS COURT FRAP 38 Frivolous appeal Anyone Page 15 of 16 Civ Pro Hsieh Fall 2010 opportunity to respond 5. Sanctions and values a. Sanctions promote: i. Efficiency (use of court resources) ii. Fairness (don’t harass the other side) b. Sanctions hinder: i. Fairness (safeguard access to courts and justice) ii. Equality (sanctioning the less resourced) Page 16 of 16
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