No Where Safe to Go:
A Study of Internally Displaced Population Movement for
the Affected Population in Syria
NGO Forum - Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
December 2015
This report is intended for organizations working on the Syrian humanitarian response.
This report should not be distributed outside of your organization or posted on Internet.
For more information on this report contact:
NGO Forum HTAU Coordinator
Email: [email protected]
Cover photo: Displaced Syrians in Aleppo City, Sept. 2015. Credits: AMC Fadi al Halabi.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...............................................................................................................3
Summary of findings ..........................................................................................................3
About the NGO Forum and Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit .........................................5
Methodology ..........................................................................................................................5
Overview of Displacement in Syria .......................................................................................7
Table 1: Key statistics on the Syrian affected population in 2015 .....................................8
Table 2. Displaced persons by type of residency. .............................................................9
Findings from Micro-Study ...................................................................................................9
Background before the first move ......................................................................................9
First move ........................................................................................................................12
Finding shelter..................................................................................................................15
Attitudes about IDP camps ..............................................................................................16
IDP employment ..............................................................................................................17
Multiple moves ................................................................................................................17
Reasons for moving .........................................................................................................19
Plans to return home.........................................................................................................19
Assistance needed to move home ....................................................................................20
Resources and displacement ............................................................................................21
Relationships and support ................................................................................................22
Decision making and communication ..............................................................................24
Summary and conclusions ...................................................................................................26
Appendix A: Syria IDP movement interview questionnaire............................................28
Appendix B: Acronyms and Secondary Sources on Syria ...............................................31
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Executive Summary
One of the main consequences for Syrians affected by armed conflict since 2011 is
population displacement. Of the pre-conflict population of about 22 million people,1 about
4.2 million have fled Syria and become refugees in other countries. The best recent
estimate of the population left in Syria is about 16.4 million,2 of whom 6.5 million3 have
been internally displaced. This means that about 40% of the remaining population are
displaced. On average, 50 Syrian families have been displaced every hour, every day,
since 2011. More than 1 million new displacements have occurred in 2015. 4 Furthermore,
many Syrians have been displaced multiple times, escalating the trauma and hardship.
The objective of this study was to conduct a micro-level analysis of population movement
pathways in northern Syria, including an examination of the movement process for
families during the first two to three months of movement, resources needed and available,
decisions being made, coping mechanisms, and how shelter needs are met. In general,
there are very few in-depth studies of how and why IDPs move in Syria, even though there
are 6.5 million IDPs and 4 million refugees, many of whom have made multiple
displacements, leading to a significant information gap that affects many aspects of the
humanitarian response.
This initial study design sought to have three case studies covering three different
geographical areas - Mare, Aleppo, Sahel al Ghab, Hama and Qaryatein, Homs. Semistructured interviews were done of 39 IDPs, who had moved in the last two to three
months. IDP subjects were selected using NGO contacts in Syria and snowball sampling.
Due to difficulties in accessing recent IDPs, the final list of IDPs interviewed included two
from Mare, Aleppo, 17 from Qaryatein, Homs, and 20 from Sahel al Ghab, Hama.
Interviews were conducted in Arabic, transcribed to English, and analyzed using NVIVO
data analysis software. It is important to note the primary source of data are informant
interviews, which are their perceptions of what is occurring in their local areas – such
perceptions may or may not be an accurate picture of the local situation. However, such
perceptions represent reality for the participants and affect their behavior and responses.
Summary of findings
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Both Rural Damascus and Aleppo governorates have about 1.25 million IDPs
currently, followed by Idleb with 704,000 and Hama with 500,000 IDPs. With
displacement come additional hardships, since most displaced Syrians have lost
their homes, livelihoods, local resources and everyday routines.
Of the 6.5 million Syrians currently displaced, 1.9 million are men, 1.8 m. women,
and 1.4 m. girls and 1.4 m. boys. These internally displaced Syrians are living in a
variety of shelters. About 1.7 m. are living in 3,030 formal or informal IDP camps
and collective shelters, some in abandoned buildings, some in schools, mosques
and other public buildings, and many with host families.
Many displaced families have been displaced multiple times, so the sense of a first
1
For recent demographic data see http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population/.
Aldo Binini. “Additional notes concerning estimates of sub-district populations in Syria, August 2015.”
Sept. 2015.
3
Humanitarian Needs Overview. October 2015.
4
Humanitarian Needs Overview. October 2015.
2
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move can be misleading. Some families have moved as many as nine times. Some
families have moved every one or two months to a new location due to the conflict
or availability of humanitarian assistance.
About two-thirds of respondents said they were with their immediate family, just
spouse and children. The other third said they were with their extended family,
with up to three or four families sharing a space or living in the same IDP camp.
The primary reason for the first displacement was safety due to the fighting or
bombing in their home towns. They were afraid for their lives and their families.
When asked about their concern for security in their home town just prior to being
displaced, the vast majority of respondents rated their concern as high. Using a
scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high), most respondents rated their concern at 5.
When asked about the first move, almost all respondents said they had to move
rapidly with little warning and only a few things. Most said they thought it would
be a temporary move, when in fact it turned into a much longer move.
With regards to the destruction of homes, of the 36 respondents who estimated the
level of damage from 1 (no damage) to 5 (totally destroyed), the average response
was 3.7. Fully 28 of the 39 IDPs gave their house a score of 3 to 5, meaning that
most houses are significantly damaged or destroyed. It appears that the worst
damage to homes was in the Sahel al Ghab area.
After arriving at the new destination, different problems arose for the IDPs.
Problems included finding shelter, food and other basic supplies; the high cost for
many basic items; lack of space and privacy due to overcrowded homes and living
spaces; more bombing forcing the IDPs to flee again to a new place; and seeing
other people living in difficult conditions, such as under trees and in fields.
Finding shelter was one of the major challenges for the Syria IDP respondents, due
to lack of availability of shelter and high rental costs. Average housing rental costs
in northern Idleb were about SP25,000 (US$65) per month, ranging from SP15,000
to SP70,000.
The actual living spaces used ranged tremendously, including caves, tarps hung
over the car, collective shelters, mosques, host families, family member’s houses
and IDP camps.
Overcrowded conditions were common for most IDPs living in collective shelters,
mosques, with host families, and family member’s houses. With overcrowded
conditions came problems of privacy and lack of quiet space to relax or sleep. In
many places, whether tents, mosques, and collective shelters, sexes were separated,
with women and children sleeping inside and men outside.
The vast majority of the IDPs interviewed stated that they were looking for work,
but could not find any work.
While a few IDPs only had one move from their original home to the final
destination, it was more common for the IDPs to have 3, 4, 5 or more moves before
arriving at the final destination. (The final destination was the place the IDPs were
staying when they were interviewed. It is not their home village and they may have
more moves.)
The two main causes for the additional moves appear to be safety (mainly moving
away from GOS air attacks) and finding affordable shelter.
Most Syrian IDP respondents stated that they would like to go home, but that they
did not think it would be possible to do so soon. In addition to attacks by GOS and
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ISIS, a significant level of inter-group polarization may exist between ethnic and
religious groups in Syria, which will affect IDP return.
As for what the Syrian IDPs need to return home, they mainly said safety,
rebuilding homes, and cash or jobs.
Most respondents said that their most important resources were the jobs and
incomes they had before the displacement.
Many IDPs said they had very little money, since they were poor and lived day by
day on their incomes.
As noted throughout these findings, support from family, friends and host families
(strangers) was important for survival and movement for the IDPs. It appears that
keeping the family together has benefits for supporting each other, whether through
division of household labors or emotional support during stressful moments.
However, there may be a significant loss of social capital for Syrian IDPs.
About the NGO Forum and Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
The NGO Forum is a coordination platform for international and Syrian NGOs providing
humanitarian assistance to populations affected by the Syria conflict in predominantly
northern Syria. Member organizations are mainly based in Gaziantep and Antakya, Turkey.
The Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit (HTAU) is a research unit of the NGO Forum for
NGOs Operating in Northern Syria.
The HTAU is a pilot research initiative on the affected population in Syria. The HTAU
goals are 1) To inform humanitarian programming in order to develop more effective
humanitarian and protection responses; and 2) To provide evidence for advocacy activities
of the humanitarian community operating throughout the region. HTAU data collection
has been continuous since June 2015, leading to general reports for June, July and August
2015. The HTAU is intended to meet a gap in the information needs of humanitarian
organizations working in Syria, complementing, not duplicating, other Syrian assessments.
The HTAU primarily uses a qualitative, semi-structured interviewing methodology that is
both exploratory and explanatory.
Methodology
The HTAU follows systematic data collection, analysis and reporting protocols to ensure
the credibility of findings, and confidentiality and protection of information sources. The
methodology is mainly qualitative and available upon request. This report examines IDP
perceptions and experiences during September and October 2015. The primary sources of
information were IDPs. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, transcribed to English, and
analyzed using NVIVO data analysis software.
This initial study design sought to have three case studies covering three different
geographical areas - Mare, Aleppo, Sahel al Ghab, Hama and Qaryatein, Homs, with 20
interviews planned from each area. It was believed that each area had unique
characteristics for IDP movement, including dominating groups, socio-economic status,
ethnicity, religion, and distance moved. Many IDPs in the Qaryatein, Homs group were
believed be Christians targeted by ISIS and to have moved about 200 kilometers to the
northern Aleppo area. The Mare IDPs were mainly Sunni Muslims fleeing ISIS and
moving a short distance to Azaz, Aleppo. The Sahel al Ghab IDPs were believed to be
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generally poor farmers who moved to the Darkoush and Sarmada, Aleppo areas due to
fighting between opposition armed groups and the GOS.
The three case study areas are unique.5 Qaryatein had a pre-war population of about
14,200, with another 2,500 inhabitants in the three surrounding villages of the Qaryatein
sub-district. Supposedly Qaryatein had remained neutral during most of the Syrian
conflict, until ISIS attacks in August 2015. Qaryatein sits on a key highway, Route 7,
linking Damascus, Homs and Palmyra, but is in the desert, so little very farming or local
industry. Mare town had a pre-war population of about 17,000, with neighboring villages
in Mare sub-district having another 24,000 inhabitants. The Mare area had a strong
farming industry, with the area dotted with well-planned fields and irrigation systems, as
seen via Google Earth. Mare was attacked by ISIS in August 2015, including with the use
of chemical weapons, as reported by Mare respondents. Sahel al Ghab is an area of heavy
farming covering an area of 63 by 12 kilometers along the Orontes River. The area was
originally a swamp, but was drained in the 1950s and 1960s through a large GOS water
management project. It created 41,000 hectares of irrigated farmland, which was settled by
11,000 families. Most of the al Ghab plain is located in the Al-Suqaylabiyah district of
Hama governorate, which had a population of about 240,000 in 2004. Sahel al Ghab was
attacked by GOS forces, especially with heavy air attacks, in September 2015. Hence, the
IDPs who responded to this study from Mare and Qaryatein are from more localized
geographical areas, while the Sahel al Ghab respondents came from a much wider
geographic area covering several small towns.
Semi-structured interviews were done of 39 IDPs. The target population was IDPs who
had moved in the last 2 to 3 months. IDP subjects were selected using NGO contacts in
Syria and snowball sampling. Due to difficulties in accessing recent IDPs, the final list of
IDPs interviewed included two (2 men) from Mare, Aleppo, 17 from Qaryatein, Homs (10
women and 7 men), and 20 from Sahel al Ghab, Hama (14 women and 6 men). Three of
the Sahel al Ghab informants were both IDPs and local council members.
The interview questions were chosen to cover the range of issues related to displacement in
Syria, including an examination of the movement process for families during the first two
to three months of movement, resources needed and available, decisions being made,
coping mechanisms, and how shelter needs are met. CCCM and shelter cluster leaders
provided input into the questions. The following were the principal displacement issues
believed to be important for the humanitarian response, and which guided the
questionnaire design.
1. Demographic questions for IDP interview subjects: to identify patterns for specific
demographic groups.
2. What is the situation for the AP prior to moving: to have a baseline to be able to
compare later statements and see what pre-movement planning is taking place.
3. What are the trigger events that lead to displacement: to identify the specific issues
that cause IDPs to move.
4. What is happening during the first move: to understand the challenges and
responses during the actual move.
5. What is occurring at the first location: to understand decision making for shelter
5
Most data on population, industry and demographics for Mare, Qaryatein and Sahel al Ghab is from
Wikipedia.
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and basic needs, and how relationships and resources interact with needs and
coping mechanisms.
6. Secondary movements: to understand dynamics that affect secondary and tertiary
movements, including push and pull factors.
7. Return movements: to understand what issues affect decisions to return home and
what assistance may be needed to support return movements.
For data collection, NGO contacts in Syria helped arrange private space for conducting
interviews and in some cases conducted the interviews. Staff conducting interviews were
trained in qualitative data collection. Interviews took about 30-45 minutes. Interviews
were done in Arabic using Skype or phone, translated to English and analyzed with
NVIVO data analysis software.
It is important to note the primary source of data are informant interviews, which are their
perceptions of what is occurring in their local areas – such perceptions may or may not be
an accurate picture of the whole situation on the ground in their local area. However, such
perceptions represent reality for the participants and affect their behavior and responses.
Data from interviews are supported by and triangulated with other assessments on Syria.
As a pilot project using qualitative methods, its credibility is high (credibility reflects the
extent to which the findings would be believable from the perspective of the affected
population in Syria - see Lincoln and Guba 1985), given the detailed accounts of issues
facing the affected population. However, the methodology limits making generalizations
to larger populations and is susceptible to researcher and informant bias.
The NGO Forum HTAU deeply appreciates the assistance from partner NGOs and IDP
respondents in data collection for this study.
Overview of Displacement in Syria
Understanding the broader context of displacement is important to fully comprehend the
micro-level dynamics examined in this study. A first issue is where IDPs are currently and
where they have come from. Data from the IOM Needs and Population Monitor identify
where most IDPs are currently located. As seen in the table below, both Rural Damascus
and Aleppo governorates have about 1.25 million IDPs currently, followed by Idleb with
704,000 and Hama with 500,000 IDPs. Displaced persons represents the number of
displaced persons from other governorates who are currently located in that governorate.
With displacement come additional hardships, since most displaced Syrians have lost their
homes, livelihoods, local resources and everyday routines. According to the 2015
Humanitarian Needs Overview, over 400,000 homes have been completely destroyed in
Syria and 1.2 m. damaged. In some shelters, 70 IDPs share one toilet. Many IDPs are
unemployed or underemployed. As families have lost their traditional sources of income,
children are being forced to leave school and start work, child recruitment in armed groups
has increased, and girl children are increasingly married early in life. Education is difficult
to maintain, with many schools damaged or destroyed (4,000 attacks on schools to date)
and those schools that are operating in areas with large IDP populations are overwhelmed
by large classroom sizes.6
6
Humanitarian Needs Overview. October 2015.
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Table 1: Key statistics on the Syrian affected population in 2015
Governorate
Aleppo
Al Hasakeh
Ar Raqqa
As Sweida
Damascus
Dara
Deir ez Zor
Hama
Homs
Idleb
Lattakia
Quneitra
Rural Damascus
Tartous
Total population
4,975,406
1,150,981
717,015
n/a
280,445
991,573
1,862,022
1,351,163
1,194,637
2,385,440
24,342
106,268
1,909,758
n/a
16,949,050
People in Need
2,804,853
755,254
541,272
244,131
1,066,261
615,603
745,024
1,052,578
1,023,033
1,224,773
708,062
65,266
2,147,167
553,790
13,547,067
Displaced Persons
1,246,968
301,618
201,350
61,696
436,170
320,773
318,684
500,801
526,510
704,511
377,974
38,700
1,269,202
258,505
6,563,462
% IDPs from same
governorate
49%
80%
54%
n/a
55%
98%
94%
22%
84%
39%
94%
43%
80%
n/a
Source: Data from NPM7
Of the 6.5 million Syrians currently displaced, 1.9 million are men, 1.8 m. women, and 1.4
m. girls and 1.4 m. boys. These internally displaced Syrians are living in a variety of
shelters. About 1.7 m. are living in 3,030 formal or informal IDP camps and collective
shelters, some in abandoned buildings, some in schools, mosques and other public
buildings, and many with host families. Of the 1.3 m. host families, many are in need of
humanitarian assistance. About 75% of the overall Syrian population live in poverty,
which means that both displaced and resident populations have few resources to survive on
or share.8
The Needs and Population Monitor summarizes where the affected population is staying in
Syria (with further breakdown by governorate) as of September 2015, as seen in the table
below. The largest number of displaced persons are IDPs forced to move away from their
original village or town, about 4.6 million people. About 930,000 local residents have
been forced to move from their homes, but live in the same community or area. About 1.3
million Syrians have returned to their original homes and communities.
7
People in Need and internally Displaced Persons, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2015; Total Population
taken from NPM Sept. 2015 data for the following categories: 1. Current resident population affected, 2.
Current resident population not affected, 5. Returnees, 6. IDPs, and 7. IDPs non-Syrians; % IDPs from same
governorate taken from NPM Sept. 2015 report.
8
Humanitarian Needs Overview. October 2015.
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Table 2. Displaced persons by type of residency.
Type of housing
Rented accommodations
With host without rent
In abandoned buildings
Formal collective shelters
Informal collective shelters
Organized camps
Self-settled camps
Their own house
Totals =
Local residents forced
to move from home
Number
%
241,708
25%
370,224
38%
265,058
27%
495
0%
4,500
0%
25
0%
1,250
0%
93,278
10%
931,320
IDPs living away from
their area of origin
Number
%
1,894,585
43%
1,003,289
23%
885,836
20%
145,044
3%
130,113
3%
118,280
3%
106,187
2%
123,173
3%
4,575,089
Returnees (former IDPs
who have returned home)
Number
%
36,880
3%
58,863
5%
40,135
4%
3,045
0%
4,615
1%
195
0%
1,580
0%
956,245
87%
1,295,172
Source: Data from NPM.
The type of housing the Syrian displaced population lives in is very important for
understanding their current situation. About 2,173,000 Syrian IDPs and returnees live in
rented accommodations, about 1,432,000 IDPs live with host families without paying rent,
and about 1,191,000 IDPs live in abandoned buildings. Each of these living situations has
consequences. For those IDPs paying rent, the rental fees as noted below of about
SP25,000 per month are very high, using up limited savings or income. For those IDPs
living with host families, the lack of resources and potential for tension due to expenses,
and lack of food, space and privacy all increase the likelihood of conflict between host and
IDP families, and further displacement, as evidenced by the findings below. For those
IDPs living in abandoned buildings, the adequacy of the shelter during the winter months
raises concerns about their basic survival needs. This analysis just scratches the surface of
the consequences of the present shelter and housing situation for Syrian IDPs and
returnees.
Findings from Micro-Study
The findings summarized here reflect the responses and perceptions of the 39 IDPs who
were interviewed for this study. All 39 respondents stated that their ethnicity was Arab
and religion was Sunni. We had expected some of the Qaryatein respondents to be
Christian, 9 since Qaryatein has a large Christian population that was reportedly fleeing
ISIS between August and October, but no Qaryatein Christians were interviewed.
Background before the first move
Many displaced families have been displaced multiple times, so the sense of a first move
can be misleading. In this case, the first move was the displacement around August 2015
from their original homes, but some families may have been displaced previously and
returned back to their homes prior to this move. Some families have moved as many as
nine times. Some families have moved every one or two months to a new location due to
the conflict or availability of humanitarian assistance. The Mare respondents were staying
9
Source: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-isis-kidnaps-150-assyrian-christians-qaryatain-including-womenchildren-1514496
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in the Azaz, Aleppo area, while the Sahel al Ghab and Qaryatein respondents were mainly
staying in the Dana, Idleb area or Atma IDP camps. One IDP leader noted that when the
Sahel al-Ghab population moved out, part went to al-Zawiya Mount, and others moved
towards the camps located near the Turkish border.
About two-thirds of respondents said they were with their immediate family, just spouse
and children. The other third said they were with their extended family, including adult
siblings and in-laws, with up to three or four families sharing a space or living in the same
IDP camp and helping each other through the displacement. One male IDP moved by
himself.
Work and incomes: About a third of the respondents said the men of the family were
working in the informal sector before the displacement. About half the families did not
have anyone in the family working before the first move. The men who were working had
jobs as day laborers, shop owners or workers, construction workers, drivers, nurses or local
council members. A few were government employees, including police, army and
teachers. Some men who had steady work had unstable incomes, such as from sales or
farming. Most women said they were housewives and not working outside the house. The
women who were working mainly did so in farming.
For those IDPs who had work, they generally had income of between SP15,000 and
60,00010 prior to their first move. The two respondents from Mare had income of
SP15,000 to 30,000. About half of the 17 respondents from Qaryatein noted that their
incomes ranged from SP20,000 to 50,000. Similar responses on income occurred from the
Sahel al Ghab respondents. Several Qaryatein and Sahel al Ghab respondents were
farmers who had seasonal or annual incomes of SP100,000 to 200,000. In some cases the
women respondents did not know how much their husbands normally earned each month.
Level of damage to homes: When the IDP respondents were asked about the level of
damage to their homes, many mentioned that they had gone back to check on their houses
and found significant damage. Three respondents said they didn’t know the condition of
their house at interview time. Of the 36 respondents who estimated the level of damage
from 1 (no damage) to 5 (totally destroyed), the average response was 3.7. Fully 28 of the
39 IDPs gave their house a score of 3 to 5, meaning that the most houses are significantly
damaged or destroyed. It appears that the worst damage was in the Sahel al Ghab area,
where GOS forces were systematically destroying all the houses in some villages,
reportedly with heavy construction equipment. One respondent said that 800-900 houses
in his village have been destroyed by the GOS: IDPs watch the destruction through
telescopes from their new location. In some cases in that area the GOS is also reportedly
destroying crops and farmland, a scorched earth policy.
Concern for security: When asked about their concern for the level of security in their
home town just prior to being displaced, the vast majority of respondents rated their
concern as high. Using a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high), most respondents rated their concern
at 5. They elaborated on their ratings by making statements such as: no security at all,
constant bombardments or fighting, or there were air raids all night. This concern for
security existed across respondents from all three case studies – Mare, Sahel al Ghab and
10
As of Oct. 28, 2015, the informal exchange rate was SP350 to the US dollar, rising to SP380 per US dollar
by Nov. 25, 2015.
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Qaryatein.
When asked about their concern about security at the place they were staying as an IDP,
most said the place was somewhat to very safe. One Mare respondent said there was still
concern about chemical attacks and shelling. Qaryatein respondents often said the IDP site
was more or less safe, but several made comments like there was no safe place left to go in
Syria, that it is unstable everywhere in Syria, or that they are always afraid of air strikes.
Family situation: When asked about the family situation before the move (bad, ok, good)
and how many people were living in their house, respondents had a range of answers. For
family size, the average family size was 10 for both the Qaryatein and Sahel al Ghab
groups. The largest was 25 people for one family in Qaryatein and the smallest was 2 for
two families, in Qaryatein and Sahel al Ghab. Many families were made up of extended
family members, including adult siblings with children, in-laws, and adopted, orphaned
relatives.
As for their opinions on the family situation, one from Qaryatein and three from Sahel al
Ghab said it was bad. In one case it was because the respondent was a recently divorced
woman with her mother and no income. Another said it was bad due to constantly having
to flee. Another said it was bad due to 16 people in household: parents and adult children
with their own families. The family of 25 said it was bad as well: the head of household
was a widowed mother with 25 people in the extended family. Their first move after the
Qaryatein attacks, with just the clothes on their backs, was to the desert for 45 days, where
they hid under bridges to stay safe. About 10-20 of their family members died from a
mine planted by ISIS. They had to pay a lot of money for a car/taxi to get to Dana, Idleb,
and have received little assistance as an IDP. They had little income before the first
displacement and the adult children were unable to find regular day work. About 11 of the
respondents (23%) from Qaryatein and Sahel al Ghab said their situation was good before
the move. Over half said it was simply ok.
Trigger event: The initial trigger event that caused the displacement differed between the
three case studies. In Mare ISIS attacked and was fighting OAGs on the ground, with
some bombing by unknown aircraft (either Coalition or GOS). In Qaryatein, ISIS attacked
and then heavy GOS air bombing followed through the town. In Sahel al Ghab, the initial
attacks were by the GOS and GOR aircraft; supposedly the GOR were using stronger
bombs that caused more destruction. In a few cases, people in Qaryatein and Sahel al
Ghab fled to underground shelters or nearby caves immediately when the attacks started at
night, and then fled the village in the morning when they could see what was happening.
On the issue of deciding whether to stay in their homes and villages or flee the fighting, for
many respondents survival was the overriding concern at the moment of fleeing their
homes, so consideration of staying at home was not an option. Some respondents said they
very much wanted to stay in their homes, but the air attacks and fighting simply got too
intense and they had to flee. In several cases concern for the safety of the children was
paramount: one said her daughter was so traumatized that she faints whenever she hears an
airplane. Some were afraid they would never see their homes again. Others were
concerned about losing their employment and incomes. A few people had thought before
the trigger event occurred about where they would go if they had to flee: some to nearby
fields and villages, others to family members in safer areas of Idleb and Aleppo. In a few
cases, one family member stayed in Qaryatein for a few days while the rest of the family
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fled, but then that person realized that ISIS was too risky, so they fled as well.
While this one anecdote is unusual in that it documents GOS army actions instead of GOS
air attacks, it identifies the types of problems for people living near the frontlines who
suffer ground attacks and terrorization from opposing armed groups.
Our villages are adjacent to the pro-governmental villages, and the people
there were already afraid of sudden attacks, since it was raided more than
five or six times by the regime army; each time with 15-20 martyrs from
our villages due to the raid. So the people there used to move out
temporarily till the army got out and then moved back in (after a month or
a month and a half), since those people are farmers and have only their
farms to provide their living. But now after the last attack, the regime
army has burnt all houses and even took the electrical wires and all
materials from the houses of the village. They even cut the trees. So, even
if we decided to return there’s no place to stay or live there. And nobody
has the financial capability to re-build a room even… But this issue with
our village precisely, and the nearby villages, is that they are adjacent to
the pro-governmental villages (Alawite villages), so it’s not safe to return
anyway. As you probably know, Sahel al-Ghab contains multiple
ethnicities; Alawites, Sunnis, Christians, and Murshidians. And this has
led to many problems since the beginning of the crisis. So, our Sunni
village is surrounded by all sides by Alawites, Murshidian, and Christian
villages. Thus, whenever there was a raid from the regime to our village,
the people from those surrounding villages would enter as well stealing
everything they can get. There’s one incident, where the Shabiha [GOS
supported militia] entered the village after the last regime raid, and they
found a 90 years old woman in her house, so they burnt her inside her
house.
This response raises questions about deep-rooted ethnic conflict in Syria, which may have
a significant impact on ethnic relations now, such as where people from specific ethnic
groups feel safe about displacing to, and longer term peace and development prospects.
First move
When asked about the first move, almost all the respondents said they had to move rapidly
with little advance warning and only a few things – often with just the clothes on their
backs. They weren’t able to take more things due to the danger and need to move quickly.
When respondents had time they took a few items with them, such as money, identity and
family registration documents, blankets, and basic kitchen utensils. Most said they thought
it would be a temporary move, when in fact it turned into a much longer move.
Moment of move: In Mare, the respondents said most people in the town left very quickly
after the ISIS attacks started at 10 pm. Most of the Qaryatein respondents said the fighting
erupted rapidly when ISIS attacked, with heavy shelling and missiles. In Qaryatein they
ran out of their houses with very few items, in some cases even bare foot and just the
clothes they were wearing. In many cases there was no advance planning: they just
jumped in any vehicles that were available and fled without knowing where they were
headed. Since Qaryatein is a medium size town of about 14,000 people in the desert with
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few local villages, people had to flee further away from Qaryatein. A similar dynamic of
rapid movement without planning occurred in Sahel al Ghab, where most people were
surprised by the unexpected GOS air attacks and fled with few possessions. A few
displaced people in Sahel al Ghab had more warning due to attacks in nearby villages, and
prepared more for the move by packing more possessions, including mattresses, kitchen
utensils, essential tools, etc. Some Sahel al Ghab residents moved initially to nearby fields
or villages, since they expected to return quickly back to their homes. One respondent said
they had prepared for an emergency move, but were unable to take any items due to the
rapid onset of fighting. It appears that those people from Sahel al Ghab who fled earlier,
before the air attacks and fighting escalated, were able to pack more belongings for the
displacement. A few families had cars to flee in, other families were able to get rides in
vehicles of family members or neighbors. Some simply ran on foot outside the village
away from the fighting.
Location for first move: varied considerably among the respondents, but depended
considerably on safety and shelter for all respondents. Again, in some cases the first move
was to nearby fields or caves, since they expected the fighting or bombing to stop quickly,
and had made these nearby, short-term moves occasionally in the past. Once they had
made a decision to leave and go farther away, the question of where to go became
important. When possible, they tried to go to family members’ houses in safer areas,
usually in western Idleb or Aleppo governorates. Some of the people displaced from
Qaryatein fled east to Tadmor and other Deir Ez Zor locations, since it was the safest route
to flee.
Most displaced respondents mentioned the uncertainty about where to go for safety and
shelter. In some cases there was a debate between family members and neighbors over
whether to stay near the home village, go north to Idleb or go to Turkey. Some IDPs
changed locations and shelter frequently, from sleeping outside on farms for days or
weeks, then finding space in mosques, schools or IDP camps, and finally getting space
with relatives or a rented house. In some cases houses in safe areas were so full that family
members had to split across 7 or 8 different houses since no one house could host the entire
family. In some cases there was family separation, with the husband finding a safe place
for the wife and children, such as with relatives or in an IDP camp, and then leaving them
to look for more permanent shelter, such as in rented units or with family members.
Transport: most IDPs made the first move in vehicles while others walked. For vehicles,
sometimes they had their own motorcycles or cars, or family members had space in their
vehicles. In other cases they found space in strangers’ vehicles, such as trucks that were
moving out of the area being attacked. Some respondents said they paid money for a taxi,
with one paying SP17,000 for a 2 hour ride and another paying SP180,000 for moving the
large family from Qaryatein to Dana, Idleb. All the Qaryatein respondents were able to go
by vehicle. For Sahel al Ghab, about 25% of the respondents said they fled on foot. The
Sahel al Ghab inhabitants may have been poorer or had fewer resources than other IDPs.
Movement time: the time it took to reach their first location varied for each family, and
depended on how they moved and how far they moved. The shortest moves took 30
minutes and the longest took two days. One Mare respondent stated that it took his family
4 to 5 hours to reach their destination. For the Qaryatein respondents, the average travel
time was about 24 hours, with two respondents stating 30 minutes and four stating it took
two days or more. For the Sahel al Ghab respondents the average travel time to the first
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destination was about 4 hours. Most of these respondents took less than 1 or 2 hours to
reach their first destination, although one took 30 hours and 2 took 5 hours. For the
families who were walking, the times ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours. In many cases,
the first move was to a temporary location for a few days (often 5 to 10 days) before
moving on to a more permanent displacement location. In one case, the first temporary
location ended being 45 days, due to uncertainty about the fighting and a safe place to go.
Movement problems and solutions: there were diverse problems faced by the IDPs
during the first move. These included: high cost of taxis or transportation, high living
expenses, checkpoints, lack of food and water, trauma from the displacement, exhaustion,
landmines, GOS air attacks, sleeping on the road or in schools with no supplies, among
other issues. One Qaryatein IDP said they had to drink from a puddle of water because no
clean water was available. Several Qaryatein IDPs mentioned landmines planted by ISIS.
Some cars with civilians were targeted by GOS air attacks while driving on the road.
Some IDPs found difficult situations at the IDP camps, which were just being set up and
lacked clean water, electricity, and lights: reportedly the first 20 days in that camp were
terrible. Also, many roads were damaged so travel by road was slow and difficult. Almost
all the Sahel al Ghab respondents said GOS air attacks were the biggest problem. Only a
few Qaryatein respondents had that problem, but more had problems with ISIS
checkpoints. A few IDPs said there were no major problems during the first move.
Various solutions arose to the problems encountered during the first move: FSA fighters
helped IDPs through checkpoints; they and civilians offered some IDPs assistance with
food and shelter upon arriving to the final destination. Protection from air attacks meant
parking under trees or bridges when jet engines were heard. Many IDPs had to buy food
and water, since emergency assistance was not available.
After arriving at the new destination, different problems arose for the IDPs. Problems
included finding shelter, food and other basic supplies; the high cost for many basic items;
lack of space and privacy due to overcrowded homes and living spaces; more bombing
forcing the IDPs to flee again to a new place; and seeing other people living in difficult
conditions, such as under trees and in fields. In some cases the search for housing at the
first location was not successful, so they had to move on, sometimes to IDP camps.
One of the Mare IDP respondents described the various problems well:
The problems that arose [during the first move] are the same problems we
are suffering from today. The number of individuals living in the same
house. There is nowhere to go to just sit and relax. That is one of the
problems we faced, the other problem was the supplies. We weren’t
exactly sure what we would need when we left and we discovered upon
arriving that there were a lot of things that were left behind that we should
have brought with us. For example, mattresses and things like that. Then
there arose other problems such as finances. The money that we brought
with us is slowly running out. And everything is so expensive. I started
thinking of how and where I would find employment to be able to support
us. These are the most important issues we faced… In regards to our
living situation, it is no longer an option to rent. So we are forced to just
accept our situation. In regards to an income, we are facing a lot of
problems with this issue. I am looking for employment but it’s very
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difficult to find a job in an area you are not from originally. The local
council is helping us out a little bit. They distributed to us NFI and food
baskets - nothing major, but they helped.
Various sources of assistance existed for IDPs at the first location. The most common was
from relatives or friends, followed by local councils and strangers who opened their homes
as host families. One IDP said camp managers provided mattresses and other basic items.
Many IDPS said they did not receive any assistance, or very little if anything. In many
cases, they expected the first location to be a short stay, but it turned into several weeks or
even two months.
Finding shelter
Finding shelter was one of the major challenges for the Syria IDP respondents, due to lack
of shelter and high rental costs. The range of available options was often limited by the
resources available to the IDP families: many IDPs wanted to rent but could not afford it.
Respondents said the average housing rental cost in northern Idleb was about SP25,000
(US$65) per month, ranging from SP15,000 to SP70,000. The actual living spaces used
ranged tremendously, including caves, tarps hung over the car, collective shelters,
mosques, host families, family member’s houses and IDP camps. Overcrowded conditions
were common for most IDPs living in collective shelters, mosques, with host families, and
family member’s houses. With the overcrowded conditions came problems of privacy and
lack of quiet space to relax or sleep. In many places, whether tents, mosques, and
collective shelters, sexes were separated, with women and children sleeping inside and
men outside.
IDP statements help understand the various problems they faced.
[Mare IDP] Anywhere you go in Syria you can find a house to rent, the
problem is with the cost of rent. The area that we came to is very
expensive. For example a two bedroom house here [Azaz, Aleppo], they
are asking for SP30,000 a month for it. Not everybody has the ability to
pay that kind of money. And this is the reason we did not rent. As for
public places, naturally the conditions are very bad. The most basic
necessities are not available, no water, no electricity. The shelter situation
is very bad, especially if it is shared between huge families. That is why
we decided to stay where we are… The situation is bigger than us.
[Qaryatein IDP] We stayed in our relative’s house - they lent us the house
till we found something to rent. We stayed there for two weeks then we
found a house to rent. We wanted to rent and don’t want to stay anywhere
else. In the first house there were many families. Now we are renting with
my sister in law’s family in a three room house. The land lord has raised
the rent from SP20,000 to SP25,000 because he has seen that there are too
many people in the house.
[Qaryatein IDP] We were going into the unknown, but almost 50% of us
had our minds set on going to the IDP camps. Once we arrived to Dana
we stayed in tents we erected ourselves. No one had money and no one
had any idea about what was going to happen.
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[Qaryatein IDP] In Tadmor we were hosted by our friends there. For the
travel to Dana we stayed in schools and other collective centers. In Atareb
we rented a house and here in Dana we are renting. The problem
regarding shelter is the rent itself because it is too expensive - SP35,000.
[Qaryatein IDP] We stayed in collective centers and abandoned
governmental buildings. The women stayed inside and men outside.
[Qaryatein IDP] We stayed in a makeshift shelter using two tarps and the
car for seven days. The problems there were the shortage of water and
food, hygiene issues because we were living in the open space and we
didn’t have much clothes, and no food for our children. A friend lent us
money to travel to Dana, because we didn’t have any.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] Tent! We bought it with our savings. The tent is old.
We cook with it, we bath in it, and we sleep in it.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] The mosque was the only choice. The problems there
in the mosque was that it was overcrowded and there was no privacy.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] We fled four times in about a week, away to the
nearby villages, before we fled to the Atma camps.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] We stayed in an underground cave. It was damp and
stinky and my kids got asthma from it. The only choice was Atma camp.
The cave also got bombed, but it was safe because it was underground.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] My uncle’s family was happy to have us, but we felt
that we were imposing because it was overcrowded in their house. Later
their area started to get bombed and we had to flee. Even though they
were getting bombed, it was much better [safer] than Sahel al Ghab.
When asked what their preferences were for shelter, the IDPs provided various
answers: a safe house away from shelling and bombardment, a place that was
disease free, going back home, any place with work so they could get money to
pay rent, or no specific preference.
Attitudes about IDP camps
A number of IDPs viewed the IDP camps as good places to find shelter and get assistance.
For them, the IDP camps were the first or only choice for the final displacement location.
This may be due to the limited information they had from friends or family. Other IDPs
criticized the IDPs due to lack of tents, food, or water, unsanitary conditions, and lack of
privacy or personal security, especially for women and girls.
One Sahel al Ghab IDP respondent gave a detailed explanation of why he refused to live in
an IDP camp, with the lack of services, broken sewer systems, and general atmosphere in
the camps.
At first when we and most of the people moved out towards the camps,
those camps were still under construction. So, we suffered from the lack of
water and electricity. The water condition was terrible, and not even pure
enough for drinking. In addition to problems with the electricity
generators and lack of power. Some people have motorcycles and would
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go to other areas to bring clean water. And we brought chargers and lids
for the power and lighting. It lasted the first 20 days, the living conditions
there were very terrible. And as for the electricity, it’s the same till now.
People living in camps are still suffering from the lack of electricity.
A second Sahel al Ghab IDP suggested an alternative to IDP camps, and explained why
many IDPs don’t want to go to camps.
We have been trying since 2012 to establish a project where we can
provide individual tents so the people can have their own shelter in the
place or land they find the most suitable for them. This project has not
been approved yet. [Why?] They said that there’s not enough budget or
capacity to build a camp inside Syria. But we already told them that they
only need to provide tents for the people and not a whole camp. That will
solve a huge problem for the majority of people who have nowhere to go
but schools or mosques or open roads. [What’s the preference of those
individual tents than going to the camps?] You mean people would go to
the camps located on the borderline cities? No, they won’t go for different
reasons: those are far from their original areas and relatives, secondly the
security conditions that may prevent their crossing all the way to get there,
and mostly because of the mixed society within those camps that won’t be
a comfortable or acceptable environment to live in. The overlap between
people from the villages and cities there results in lack of social
consensus. So, the best solution is to provide families with individual tents
where they can put those tents within the various and vast public lands that
we have here.
These two responses may not be representative of all IDPs, but they may reflect some of
the attitudes of IDPs regarding the IDP camps. In general, only about 340,000 IDPs are in
camps in Aleppo and Idleb governorates, out of an IDP population of about 2 million11 in
those areas.
IDP employment
The vast majority of the IDPs interviewed stated that they were looking for work, but
could not find any work. Men with skills in teaching, farming, construction and the
military were unable to find work. The few places that seemed to provide work were
around the border crossing areas and near the camps. The husband of one IDP was
working as a grocer in Turkey making about SP500 per day. One Qaryatein IDP was
planning on opening a clothing store.
Multiple moves
The IDPs had a wide variety of experiences with the moves from the home location to the
final location where they were interviewed. In this analysis, it should be noted that
respondents were identified by NGOs in specific locations – in this case near Dana, Idleb
and the Atma camps. While a few IDPs only had one move from their original home to the
final destination, it was more common for the IDPs to have 3, 4, 5 or more moves before
11
Needs and Population Monitoring Report Round 3. September 2015.
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arriving at the final destination.
The best way to understand the IDP movements is by looking at the specific travels of each
family – since there are few patterns for where they went and how long in each place.
Responses from Qaryatein IDPs
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From Qaryatein to Big Orm, Atareb, Aleppo then to Dana, Idleb.
From Qaryatein to Dana, Idleb.
We moved a lot in the desert for 45 days, then to Dana, Idleb.
Three moves - first to the bomb shelter, then Tadmor for 1 day, then to Dana.
Three moves - the bomb shelter for 10 days, then Khenyfis for 4 days, then Dana.
Five moves – to Tadmor for 1 week, then Al Thawrah, Ar Raqqa for 2 days, then to
Atareb, Aleppo for 20 days, then Dana.
From Qaryatein to Abu Kamal for 10 days, then Dana after 3 days on the road.
Six moves - to Sarmada for 6 months, then to Turkey for 6 months, then back to
Qaryatein, then Khneifis Eldosa for 10 days, then to Sarmada, then to Dana.
Four moves - first to Mahata for 2 days, then to a nearby village called Qanas for 1
week, then to Sarmada for 1 month, then here in Dana.
From Qaryatein to Al Mayadin, Deir-ez-Zor for one day, then to Dana.
First to Sarmada for 30 days, then to Dana.
To Siwana for 10 days, then to Dana.
To Mahata for 10 days, then to Khenayfis for 10 days, then to Dana.
Responses from Sahel al Ghab IDPs
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Five moves - from Duqmaq village to camps in Salquin, Idleb, then returned to
Bara village, al-Zawiya Mount, then Muzra village.
In several places till we found a place in the northern countryside of Idleb.
Four moves - from Sahel al Ghab to Zayzun, then Zaidiyh, and then to Balyun
Ehsem, Idleb for 1 month, then to Atma.
Seven moves – first to the olive farms for 1 day, then to Jabal Al Zaweyh for 4
months, however we were getting bombed so we were fleeing back and forth, and
then we moved into a school, then to Atma camps.
From Zayzun to Msheek for 7 days, then back to Zayzun, only to move right away
to Atma.
From Maar Tahroma to Naqir village, Idleb, then to Tramla. The next move was
towards Sha’abon in Sahel al-Ghab.
Four moves - first to my family for 4 months, then to my sister for 2 months, then
at my grandparents for 1 month, and then to Atma.
Four moves - first to Sahen for 2 months, then in the olive trees, then to a village in
Jabel Al Zaywoeih, and then to Atma.
From Sahel al Ghab to Balyun for 7 days, then to Atma.
From Sahel al Ghab to Jabl Al Zawyieh for 25 days, then to Atma.
From Sahel al Ghab to Kafar Nobol for a week, then to Atma.
As seen by these diverse responses, one of the trends is multiple moves. The norm appears
to be at least three moves, and as many as six or seven for these IDPs, with little difference
for the Qaryatein and Sahel al Ghab IDP families.
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Reasons for moving
The two main causes for the additional moves appear to be safety (mainly moving away
from GOS air attacks) and finding affordable shelter. Less common reasons were to move
away from IDP camps due to the difficult conditions there, to move from ISIS-held areas
for those IDPs who initially went there, or to find a school for the children. While safety is
the main push factor initiating the need to move, once the decision to move is made the
question of where to go is influenced by such pull factors as safety, shelter, food assistance
or employment. They are generally looking for safe places that have inexpensive or free
shelter, and sometimes for food aid. Almost all IDPs seek employment.
We can assume a number of consequences from the multiple moves: increased uncertainty
and stress about where they are going and what they are going to find in the new location;
increased transportation costs; disrupted livelihoods; and difficulty in collecting and
keeping the various goods needed to run a normal household, like cooking utensils,
clothing, mattresses, blankets, medicines and food supplies.
Plans to return home
Most Syrian IDP respondents stated that they would like to go home, but that they did not
think it would be possible to do so soon. Most respondents stated it would not be safe to
return home until ISIS and the GOS were eliminated. Others stated that their homes or
villages were destroyed, but that they didn’t have money to rebuild or pay rent. Most said
they would stay where they were until it was safe. The level of destruction of homes and
villages in Sahel al Ghab by the GOS appears to be a formidable barrier to returning home
for those IDPs.
A few quotes from IDPs show some of their thinking about returning home.
Yes, I would love to go back home, but once it is safe. But it will not be
safe not until ISIS is kicked out of Mare and its vicinity. If that happened,
not just me, all of these displaced people would go.
I wish, but now seeing how the situation is [in Qaryatein], I am not going
anywhere. Unless the GOS goes down I cannot go back home. I live here
next to people I know and next to my family.
No, it is safe here. I cannot take my children there - it is not safe. I will
stay here as long as it is safe.
I cannot live without my house and farm, but it is not safe. I want to stay
here now because it is safe.
We cannot - it is a wasteland now. There is nothing there. What makes
me want to stay here is safety.
Well, there are many people returning. But the problem is that most of the
houses there are demolished, and people need a huge support to be able to
re-build their lives there… For me it’s not possible, at least for now, since
both my house and my parents’ house were completely demolished.
We can’t wait to return home to be honest with you, because we are not
used to living like this; we are farmers and used to having plenty of water,
vegetables, and the simple and beautiful life of farms. Now, you have to
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buy and transfer your water, no electricity. Everything has changed
drastically for us. So, we can hardly wait till we can go back home.
A significant level of inter-group polarization may exist between ethnic and religious
groups in Syria, which will affect any return programs. This appears to occur more often
in areas where the different groups lived in nearby villages, such as Sahel al Ghab. One
IDP described this conflict well:
From the moment we left our original village we have no doubt that we
will return someday. And we dream and pray for this to happen every
day. And no matter how long we’re going to wait, we will return to our
village - they won’t always have control over our land. [What about the
nearby villages of Alawites and Murshidian? Will it be ok to return living
next to them if the area didn’t contain any armed groups anymore?]
Impossible. After all the killings and massacres, it’s impossible to return
living next to them as if nothing happened. It’s either us or them. This is
something we all know. Our village has suffered 77 martyrs and dozens
of detainees and people injured daily. In addition, they also demolished
our houses and stole everything we had to leave behind during our sudden
movement. So how can we return with them staying there! Some people
would return to their original areas that’s true, but this is the case of our
village. If anyone decided to go back, they will be executed on the spot by
those villages that I told you about – different ethnicities means danger.
So, since everybody knows that they will be dead once they return, it’s not
going to happen. It’s very much known that Aziziyah village is the most
radical and extremist village in Syria, and this was the case even before
the beginning of the revolution. We know them very well, and we know
that they will never accept for any Sunni to come back while they are
there.
This polarization will affect any plans for returning home for IDPs, and requires further
study.
As part of the process for returning home, many IDPs are checking their homes regularly
to see if they are damaged or if anything has been stolen. They also often use these trips to
collect more household items and legal documents. When possible they go themselves or
they ask other friends who are going to check on their homes. The Qaryatein IDPs have
been less able to visit their homes due to ISIS control and the longer, more difficult trip
from northern Idleb, than the Sahel al Ghab IDPs. Many IDPs know that their homes are
completely destroyed. Eight of the Sahel al Ghab IDPs reported that their homes were
completely destroyed, and two others said partly damaged. Fewer Qaryatein IDPs reported
damage: one home destroyed and two damaged. In some cases, the IDPs have family who
stayed in the village, and are reporting and sending pictures using phones and Facebook.
Assistance needed to move home
When asked what assistance they needed to return home, Syrian IDPs from Mare,
Qaryatein and Sahel al Ghab mainly said safety, rebuilding homes, and cash or jobs. The
most frequent response was security and safety, which included requests for a no fly zone
and a cease fire, and weapons to fight back and protect themselves. Less frequently,
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respondents mentioned rebuilding homes and getting all the household goods that were
destroyed or stolen, along with electricity and water supplies. A few IDPs specifically said
they needed cash assistance and jobs.
One IDP from Sahel al Ghab described the amount to work needed to rebuild:
There are around 170 houses in my original village, and we counted the
ones that are totally demolished, which is 40 houses, and 60-70 partly
demolished houses. Thus, half the village is not fit for living. So, we need
reconstruction of those houses, and we need to repair the electricity
network which is damaged. The electricity is important for pumping
water. So those factors are the most important for our return.
While safety and security were the most common needs for returning home, assistance
with rebuilding homes, infrastructure, and livelihoods were also needed by IDPs.
Resources and displacement
The issue of what resources IDPs had before they were forced to move and what resources
they had during the moving should be insightful for understanding their needs and
capacities. Most respondents said that their most important resources were the jobs and
incomes they had before the displacement. Several IDPs mentioned income from teaching,
farming or shop sales. Often their resources were tied to the land or village, and not
moveable. In a few cases, the IDPs had skills that were transferrable, such as being a shop
owner, construction worker, or farmer, but most IDPs were not able to employ these skills
in their new locations.
Many IDPs said they had very little money, since they were poor and lived day by day on
their incomes. A few IDP families provided details on the amount of money they had
when they were displaced: the amounts were SP20,000, 50,000, 50,000, 100,000, 100,000,
150,000, 200,000, and 200,000. With current rates of inflation and high cost for rent and
goods in Syria, these savings would not last very long. Only one family mentioned
receiving money from remittances from family in Lebanon – and that source said the
remittances had stopped. Most IDPs said they had little money left at interview time.
Many of the IDPs were not able to take much with them when they moved because it was
such a hurry – just the clothes on their backs. Many of the people from Qaryatein and
Sahel al Ghab were farmers, and they said they couldn’t take anything from their farms.
Some farmers mentioned that their crops, which were almost ready for harvest, were
destroyed just before the move. One family was able to take mattresses, pillows, and
cleaning tools.
Quotes about resources:
[Mare IDP] Before becoming displaced my work in the school was my
resource. And my brothers income from his work in the hospital. And
what my dad made from the land… You are talking about almost five
years of continuous war, there were no banks.
[Qaryatein IDP] We are a very poor village, we worked in farms… that’s
it. We lived day by day.
[Qaryatein IDP] We had the shop, that’s all but the income was good. We
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did take some clothes with us. We thought it would be two or three days,
but that was not the case.
Regarding resources received during the move, most IDPs did not answer the question. Of
those that did resource assistance, most received food, hygiene kits or NFIs. A few
mentioned receiving shelter assistance during the move. It appears that most of the
assistance came from host families along the travel route, with just a few families receiving
aid from NGOs. Most IDP families used their savings to purchase what was needed during
the move.
Relationships and support
One of the intangible resources that is assumed to be important in the Syrian economy is
social relationships: given that many people worked in the informal sector or as farmers,
and only traded locally at the village level, the social relationships that they had built over
decades was a valuable resource for the IDPs. With the rapid and chaotic displacement,
many people lost these extended relations. This reduced their ability to share resources
and support each other, such as through space, goods or employment. While the comments
below document the support received from the IDPs’ social networks, the level of social
capital that was lost was still very significant.
As noted throughout these findings, support from family, friends and host families
(strangers) was important for survival and movement for the IDPs. The IDP
responses on whether they were separated from their families and the amount of
support they received from each other vary considerably.
Many IDPs said they were able to stay with their immediate family during the move, but
got separated from the extended family (parents, etc.) and neighbors during the move. In
many cases they still have not re-connected with the extended family. In a few cases, the
extended families and neighbors all moved together and have stayed together through the
displacement. It seems that the most hurried moves, during intense attacks, led to most
chaos and separation during the move: families that moved early or had more time to plan
the move went with larger groups and stayed together. In a few cases, the immediate
family was separated during the initial move, because the husband or father stayed behind
while sending the rest of the family to safety; usually these separated families were able to
reconnect in safe areas.
Several IDPs noted that they had family in Turkey and Lebanon, or other parts of Syria,
and were unable to communicate with them, in some cases for two or three years. In some
cases the separated extended families are still able to communicate by phone, which
provides some relief from worrying about their safety and health.
Most of the IDP respondents stated that the family was closer and more supportive now,
after the move, with everyone helping each other much more. Also, strangers have been
very supportive as well.
A few quotes describe the range of responses about relationships and separation:
[Mare IDP] Being an IDP caused a lot of my relationships to become cut
off. For example, my relationships with my brothers and sisters have been
cut off. Each of my sisters are now in a different village, and my brothers
as well. It’s not like we have problems or anything like that, but it’s very
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difficult to communicate with each other now. We visit each other on
holidays and things like that, but the lack of electricity and internet access
causes this difficulty.
[Qaryatein IDP] When I first arrived here I didn’t know anyone, but then
later on we became friends. I didn’t come with my family or friends.
However, later on everyone followed us here.
[Qaryatein IDP] We stayed together in the move with our family, but our
friends and my parent’s family is scattered all over Syria.
[Qaryatein IDP] This experience had made our relationship stronger and
made us stand by each other no matter what. We got separated from my
in-laws and my original family, since some had fled and others preferred
to stay.
[Qaryatein IDP] All our neighbors went in different directions. We don’t
know anything about them. However our family is still together and we
are standing by each other.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] I have a son that went to Lebanon. My daughters are
married in rural Aleppo. My husband has a second wife and he went to
Turkey. We are scattered now. Sometimes we call each other. And my
neighbors are also scattered.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] My husband and I got separated for two months,
however we were able to find each other here in Atma. All of my friends
and neighbors are scattered now all over Syria. I can’t communicate with
them. I fled here with my children alongside strangers.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] Our relationships got stronger. We feel sympathy for
one another and this experience have brought us closer to each other. We
feel like a one family now.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] I lived for a while without my family, and it was a
very difficult time for me. Being away from your wife and kids makes you
always worried and confused, especially since the distance is far between
me and them and there were no communication. So I brought them
immediately once I managed to get a house for us. It’s always better to
have your family with you in all times.
While not directly discussed in these comments, it appears that keeping
the family together has significant benefits for supporting each other,
whether through division of household labors, or emotional support during
stressful moments. In fact, family support may be one of the best
remedies for the psychological trauma occurring for many Syrians: more
research is needed on this mental health issue.
It was assumed that a second set of key relationships existed between IDPs, and host
communities and local councils. About half of IDP respondents said they did not receive
any aid from the host community or local council: in some cases they did not know what a
local council was. About half the people said they received assistance from NGOs or the
host community. One IDP mentioned they received assistance from the local council, and
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one IDP was a local council leader. The IDPs that received assistance from the host
community and NGOs said they received food, mattresses, and shelter: they were grateful.
There seemed to be a split in the nature of the relationships between IDPs and host
communities. A number of IDPs said they had little relation with host communities, and
kept to themselves. Other IDPs said they knew their neighbors and had good relations
with them.
Several quotes from IDPs exemplify these responses.
[Qaryatein IDP] We have not received any aid except for one NGO that
came into the house and registered our names and distributed mattresses
for us. Other than that we didn’t have any interaction with the local
councils or NGOs.
[Qaryatein IDP] It is good and without the local council we were not able
to survive, also there is an NGO that gave us mattresses and other NFIs
[Qaryatein IDP] No, I don’t have any relations with them, the local
councils have not even registered my name.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] The local councils can only coordinate with the
NGOs. For example, our village moved out to another nearby village, so
the local councils would coordinate with each other and in turn with the
NGOs to provide them with the beneficiaries’ lists to get aid.
In summary, the IDPs received some support from family, friends, host families and
communities, local councils, and NGOs, but to varying degrees.
Decision making and communication
One assumption of this study was that IDPs make important decisions during their
displacement. Better understanding of what critical decisions were being made and how
those decisions were being made would help humanitarian response planning. In hindsight
these questions on decision making and communication were probably too broad, due to
the wide variety of responses.
It appeared in the interviews that it was difficult for some Syrian IDPs to think about or
describe their decision making process. About half of the IDPs said that they had little
time during the immediate attacks to think – they just had to react and move quickly with
whoever or whatever they could. They were not able to make any decisions – they just
responded to the chaotic situation without thinking. Their explanations of how they made
decisions sometimes addressed the question of where they received information, such as
from family members or neighbors who had experienced the same displacement problems
previously. In some cases, the person (usually the husband) made a decision on his own,
without discussing the situation with anyone. Often they didn’t know where to go, so they
just went to the place they thought safest, or which had humanitarian assistance or
employment. One IDP said they tried to go to Turkey, but were unable to cross the border.
Some of the IDP responses reflect the difficulty in thinking about decision making:
[Qaryatein IDP] We really didn’t make any decision as we kept moving.
[Qaryatein IDP] We asked people from Qaryatein where to go, and there
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were already some people from Qaryatein who have already fled to Dana
18 months ago. So that’s why we came here.
[Qaryatein IDP] When we stayed there [in Qaryatein], there was a force
greater than us so any decision we made is meaningless.
[Qaryatein IDP] In Mahata we were overwhelmed with the surprise and
there was no ability to make any decision as we thought this was
temporary and we will be soon getting back home. However when we
made the decision to move to Khinayfis it was because we made our
minds to move north, since all the transportation was going there.
[Sahel al Ghab IDP] We didn’t have anything planned. We were living
each day at a time and safety was our main goal. When we fled we went
towards the safest area.
As can be seen by these responses, the chaos of the attacks often seemed to lead to a
simple flight response, without much thinking.
About half of the IDPs described where there got their information from. In a number of
cases, they asked other people who had fled to Dana or Atma, and followed their advice.
The people they asked included neighbors and strangers near their destination. Much of
the information used for decision making was first hand observation, such as GOS
bombing and increased armed group activity.
When asked if anyone helped with making the decision, some people said they made the
decisions by themselves and others said they made it with immediate family members or
the larger group, possibly including the extended family and neighbors. Sometimes those
family members were with them and other times the family members were already at the
northern Idleb IDP camps. Sometimes OAG or ISIS fighters helped IDPs make decisions.
The most important issues for the IDP decision making appeared to be safety and security,
with family location, shelter, education, and employment as less frequent responses.
Familiarity with where they were going affected their perceptions of safety and security,
and having family or friends at the destination location provided the information to gain
such familiarity. This reliance on family and friends for information and support also leads
to separation from the local original community: as individual families respond to and
follow the recommendations of their information sources, each family may go in different
directions. This supports the earlier finding on the loss of social networks and capital.
Communication: One important part of the displacement process is the communication
that occurs, especially who they communicate with and what information they receive. A
few IDPs stated that they did not communicate with anyone during the displacement. Most
IDPs stated that they received their information on when to evacuate and where to go from
family, friends, other IDPs who moved previously and returned, IDPs in the camps, and
the local population and local councils in the areas they moved through. Often they
assessed the need to evacuate by directly observing the frequency and proximity of the
bombing and fighting.
Often the communication is done face to face, by getting together whenever they can. The
IDPs also used various forms of technology, including smart phones, What’s App,
Facebook, and other applications. One IDP mentioned that there is a What’s App group
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for IDPs near Dana, Idleb that provides information on shelter and assistance.
In some cases the communication involved group decision making, especially about where
to go or how to get there. Often the messages dealt with safety issues, such as informing
others that they were safe, leaving one place or arriving to another place. Other topics
included where to find shelter, food, and water, and where to register as IDPs. People also
were communicating often about the status of their original villages and homes, and
whether it as safe or advisable to return.
Summary and conclusions
The limits of the HTAU methodology must be stated. Since it is qualitative research based
on the perceptions of a small number of IDP sources who are in a volatile, rapidlychanging armed conflict, biases and inaccurate information are possible. Therefore, it is
important to limit generalizations from these findings: what may be true in one area or with
one Syrian community may not be the same with others. However, the findings
documented here represent the perceptions of the IDPs, which reflect their understanding
of reality, and influence their actions, attitudes and social relationships.
Below are a series of comments and reflections arising from these findings.
Two critical assumptions are connected to the displacement numbers and findings. The
first is cause of displacement. While it is hard to get accurate numbers of why individual
families and communities displace, anecdotal reporting shows three main causes: fleeing
from GOS and GOR air attacks, ground fighting and fear of arrest and torture. First, the
heavy, widespread air attacks by the GOS/GOR mainly occur on opposition controlled
areas, and to a much lesser extent on ISIS controlled areas.12 While other factors may be
relevant, the fact that Rural Damascus and Aleppo governorates have the highest number
of GOS security incidents and the largest number of IDPs who have fled (2.14 million and
3.51 m. respectively)13 is noteworthy. About 50% of all security incidents in 2015 were
GOS/GOR air attacks, 87% of which were targeting OAGs.14 The ground fighting takes
many forms, from artillery to small arms fire, but is much more localized to the front lines.
Historically the ground fighting has been initiated by a wide variety of actors, including
OAGs, Kurds, ISIS and GOS, with frequency usually dependent on available resources,
especially manpower and ammunition.
The second assumption deals with movement patterns - the places where IDPs go to.
Again, anecdotal reporting shows that IDPs tend to go where they know people or where
NGO Forum HTAU report “A Study of Attacks by Armed Groups in Syria and Syrian Civilian Casualties
in 2015.” November 2015. See also air attacks maps from Institute for the Study of War blog.
13
NPM Sept. 2015 report. Table 6.2
14
Reliable security source.
12
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there are people with similar political or ethnic characteristics. Most moves are within the
same governorate. People living in GOS areas or supporting the GOS regime policies
generally go to GOS areas, such as Damascus, Tartous and Lattakia. Likewise, Alawite
and Christian minority groups also go to GOS areas, since they are afraid of Islamic
extremists and feel safer in GOS areas. People living in opposition-held areas tend to
move to other opposition-held areas, often because they fear being arrested and tortured by
the GOS. Many IDPs in OAG-held areas have said they cannot go to GOS areas due to
being on the GOS wanted list. The frequent detention and torture by the GOS of anyone it
perceives as being a “terrorist” reinforces this fear among civilians in OAG-held areas.
The fact that there were at least 790 deaths from torture by the GOS from January through
October, 2015 supports this argument.15
In sum, there appear to be very few Shia, Alawites and Christians in opposition-held areas,
and a limited number of Sunnis in GOS held areas. Getting a better sense of why Syrians
are moving, where displaced Syrians are going, and why they choose to go where they go
has significant implications for protection and humanitarian response. While the
respondents in this study all moved to opposition-held areas, it would be helpful to know
how many IDPs move to GOS or ISIS-held areas by their choice, and why they move to
those areas. The respondents in this study may have had a choice to move to GOS-held,
but elected not to, for whatever reason.
For humanitarian protection reasons and to predict future IDP movements, one important
research question is: what is the primary trigger event for IDP movement? This should be
done using survey methods to systematically assess the reasons for movements across a
larger IDP population. The limited data here shows that GOS/GOR air strikes are the main
cause of IDP movement.
Much more research is needed on the conflict and polarization between religious and
ethnic groups in Syria, given the historical marginalization of some ethnic and religious
groups, and manipulation of groups under the Assad regimes.16 The breakdown of the
conflict along ethnic and sectarian (religious) lines, with perceptions of massacres and
human rights violations taking place along ethnic lines, may have increased the
polarization between groups in Syria. The blatantly false propaganda put out by GOS and
other armed groups increased this schism. This ethnic and religious conflict impacts the
humanitarian needs of the Syrian affected population, the ability of NGOs to respond to the
humanitarian crisis, and the longer term prospects for peace and development in Syria.
The findings in this report on population displacement, shelter issues, and multiple moves
highlight the tremendous problem of finding a safe place in Syria to go to: it may well be
that there is No Where Safe to Go. The Dana and Atma areas appeared to be safest at the
time of data collection, but GOR air attacks have occurred in those areas since then and
other risks exist for safety and survival in the IDP camps. With the Jordanian, Lebanese
and Turkish borders literally closed, there may well be No Where Safe to Go.
NGO Forum HTAU report “A Study of Attacks by Armed Groups in Syria and Syrian Civilian Casualties
in 2015.” November 2015.
16
For more resources on the social conflict, marginalization and political manipulation in Syria, see
Appendix C.
15
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Appendix A: Syria IDP movement interview questionnaire
NGO Forum IDP Movement Interview Questions
Hello. My name is _______. I work with the NGO Forum in Antakya, Turkey. We are
conducting interviews of Syrian who have recently had to move from their homes due to
the armed conflict. We want to know more about what problems they are facing during
these moves and how they are dealing with these problems. Your information will help
NGOs and the United Nations improve humanitarian assistance.
Please answer the questions based on your experiences moving from your home in Syria.
There are no right or wrong answers. You can stop the interview at any time or refuse to
answer any question. You only have to give as much information as you feel comfortable
giving. Your responses will be anonymous and confidential. Do you have any
questions before we start?
Ice breaker
1. To start, can you tell me about where you are currently living?
Demographic questions
Next we have a few demographic questions to help us understand your specific situation.
2. How many family members are living with you now?
3. Can you please tell me if your ethnicity is Arab, Kurd, Armenian, Turcoman, or
Circassian?
4. Can you please tell me if your religion is Sunni, Shia, Christian, Druze, Alawi, or
Ismaili?
5. What is your job or occupation?
6. What was your monthly income before becoming an IDP?
7. Is your household a single headed family - yes/no
8. What was the level of destruction of your home - scale 1 (no damage) to 5
(destroyed)
9. What was your level of concern for security in your home town - scale 1 (low) to 5
(high)
10. What was your level of concern for security at the IDP site or town - scale 1 (low) to
5 (high)
Pre-move situation [probe when possible]
Thanks for those answers. Next we have more questions about your IDP experience.
11. What was your family situation before the move (bad, ok, good)? How many
people were living in your house?
12. Where were you living?
13. Were you working? If yes, was it steady work? What was your monthly income?
14. Did you do any planning for the move, like transport, bags packed, or plan for where
to go?
15. What were your thoughts about staying versus leaving your home?
Trigger event
16. What was the event that triggered the move? Who caused that event?
17. What did you do when you heard about this event?
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The first move
18. Where did you go to on that first day? What options did you have?
19. How did you get there? With whom?
20. How long did it take to get there?
21. What problems arose? How were they solved?
The first location
22. Where was the first place that you stayed for a while? How long did you stay there?
How long did you expect to stay?
23. What shelter options were available? (rent, public buildings (schools or mosques),
host family, unfinished/empty building, tarps or tents in fields, camps) What was
your preference? What was the final choice for shelter? What shelter problems
occurred?
24. Were you able to work as an IDP? What kind of work did you do? How much did
you make (daily or monthly income)?
Secondary or additional moves
25. How many additional moves have you made? How long did you stay in each place?
26. Why did you move again? What was the reason?
27. Where did you go to? How did you decide to go there?
28. What issues pushed or pulled you to make these additional moves?
Return move
29. Do you plan to return home? When? If not, why do you want to stay here?
30. Are you checking on your home? How?
31. What assistance do you need to move back home?
Resources
32. What resources did you have before the move? What things did you take with you?
Were you able to access funds before your left – cash or hawala? Did you have
money? If so, how much?
33. What resources did you get during the move?
34. Were you able to get assistance at the first location? From who? What assistance
did you get?
Relationships
35. How have your relationships with family, friends and neighbors helped or
complicated your IDP situation? Were you separated from family or friends? Were
you with family, friends, or neighbors at the first location?
36. How have your relationships with host communities or local councils helped or
complicated your IDP situation?
Decision making
37. What key decisions did you make at the various steps in the move (pre-move, first
move, first location, for food and shelter, secondary moves, returning home)? What
decisions did you have to make to get shelter, food, water, healthcare, and other
basic needs?
38. What kind of information did you have to make these decisions? Where did you get
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it from?
39. Did anyone help you make these decisions? If so, who?
40. What issues influenced your decisions the most? What issues are influencing your
decision to return home - shelter, security, work, relations with hosts, aid, etc.?
Communication and information
41. What communication was taking place at each step in the move (pre-move, first
move, first location, for food and shelter, secondary moves, returning home)?
42. How did you get information about the need to evacuate and where to go?
43. How did you get information on where to get shelter, food or water?
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND INFORMATION!!!
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Appendix B: Acronyms and Secondary Sources on Syria
Acronyms
1. CCCM: Camp Coordination and Camp Management
2. FSA: Free Syrian Army
3. GOS: Government of Syria
4. GOR: Government of Russia
5. HTAU: Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
6. IDP: Internally Displaced Person
7. ISIS: Islamic State
8. JAN: Jabhat Al Nusra
9. NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
10. NFI: Non-Food Item
11. OAG: Opposition Armed Group
12. PIN: People in Need
13. SP: Syrian Pound
14. SVBIED: Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
15. USD: United States Dollar
16. VBIED: Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
17. WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
18. YPG: Kurdish People’s Protection Units
Secondary resources
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Geneive Abdo “The New Sectarianism” Brookings Institute, 2013.
Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, 1999.
Ayse Fildis, “The troubles in Syria” Middle East Policy Council, 2011.
Steven Heydemann, “Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism” Journal of
Democracy, 2013.
Raymond Hinnebusch, “Syria: from ‘authoritarian upgrading’ to revolution?”
International Affairs, 2012.
Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, 2013.
Roberto La Rovere, et al, “Targeting Research for Poverty Reduction in Marginal
Areas of Rural Syria,” Development and Change, 2006.
Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, 2001.
Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly,
2015.
Aaron Reese, “Sectarian and Regional Conflict in the Middle East,” Institute for
the Study for War, 2013.
Mark Tomass, “Religious identity, informal institutions, and the nation-states of the
Near East,” Journal of Economic Issues, 2014.
Nicolas Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, 2011;
D. Vanderwalle “Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict 19461970,” Political Science Quarterly, 2000.
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