Running Head: EMOTION REGULATION CHOICE
Emotion Regulation Choice: Theory and Findings.
Gal Sheppes
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Corresponding Address:
Gal Sheppes,
The School of Psychological Sciences
Tel Aviv University,
Tel Aviv, Israel
Email: [email protected]
Keywords: Emotion, Emotion Regulation, Self-Regulation, Choice.
Word Count main text: 6294.
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Abstract
Individuals have a remarkable ability to control or regulate their emotions in various
ways in order to adapt to dynamic and changing situational demands. Choosing
adaptively between these various available regulatory options is strongly related to
healthy functioning and well-being. Despite being clearly important, emotion regulation
choice has not been directly investigated or clearly conceptualized until recently. In this
chapter I review the importance of emotion regulation choice, and then present a new
conceptual framework that is utilized to explore central emotional, cognitive and
motivational determinants as well as underlying mechanisms of emotion regulation
choice. I end with broad implications and future directions.
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A few months ago, I had to take a long 12 hour international flight in order to get
home. Having more than enough time to spend, I started looking around me. While some
people were sleeping (in extremely creative body postures), or watching movies (with
delight that they finally have enough time to watch Tolkien's full trilogy), others
appeared quite alert and fearful, especially when the captain announced that the plane
started its final descent. While appearing fearful, luckily these individuals were able to
choose between different regulatory options to control their fear. For example, they could
choose whether they want to deal with their flight phobia by disengaging via closing their
window sheds while immersing themselves in unrelated yet demanding conversations.
Alternatively, they could be choosing to look outside the window while explaining some
facts including a decline in crashing statistics since autopilots took charge.
Emotion regulatory choices are an integral part of our daily lives in a dynamically
changing affective world. By emotion regulation choice I mean the choices individuals
make as to how they should regulate their emotions in a particular context when
regulation is warranted and more than one regulatory option is active. Furthermore, given
the abundance of knowledge on explicit emotion regulation strategies and the relative
lack of evidence on implicit emotion regulation, I limit this chapter to deliberate and
explicit forms of emotion regulation choice.
Can we consistently predict the regulatory choices individuals make to deal with
their emotions? Are there specific emotional, cognitive and motivational influences that
systematically affect these regulatory preferences? What are the major factors underlying
the regulatory choice process? And what are the broad implications of regulatory
choices? The present chapter tries to answer these important questions. Specifically, I
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will begin by introducing the importance of emotion regulation choice and its relative
lack of empirical investigation. I will then introduce a recent conceptual model that is
utilized to explain dominant emotional, cognitive and motivational determinants, and
underlying mechanisms of emotion regulation choice between dominant cognitive
emotion regulation categories. I will close by describing broad implications and future
directions.
The Importance of Emotion Regulation Choice
The different ways individuals can go about controlling their emotions has
attracted scholars for centuries. Nevertheless, emotion regulation has become an
independent field only recently (Gross, 1998, 2007, 2010; Koole, 2009; Tamir, 2011).
From its early days a central question in this field has been whether different forms of
emotion regulation have different consequences. However, in a first generation of studies
different forms of emotion regulation have been considered to be either generally
adaptive or maladaptive.
To give two well-known examples, consider first Nolen-Hoeksema's influential
response styles theory contrasting maladaptive rumination with distraction (Nolen
Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008 for reviews). Multiple
studies have widely established that ruminating on negative attributes of one’s self, is
strongly related to the development, maintenance, and recurrence of depressive episodes
relative to distracting attention away from negative self attributions. As a second
example, consider Gross's canonical process model and supporting evidence from
multiple studies showing the relative superiority of reappraising the meaning of negative
events over suppression of affective expressions, with respect to a wide range of
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affective, cognitive, and social indicators of adaptive functioning (Gross, 2002; Gross &
Thompson, 2007 for reviews). The centrality of the alleged dichotomy between
“adaptive” and “maladaptive” forms of emotion regulation is captured by a recent metaanalysis that summarized a decade of work on the relationship between some regulation
strategies (rumination, suppression) and psychopathology and other strategies
(reappraisal, problem solving) and resilience (Aldao et al., 2010).
There is no doubt that the first generation of studies has enormously advanced the
field of emotion regulation. However, with its rapid growth a second generation of
studies that emerged has begun to find inconsistencies in the formerly unconditional
maladaptive/adaptive label given to different strategies. For example, the ostensibly
maladaptive strategy of rumination was found to have adaptive and maladaptive flavors
(Watkins, 2008) as well as to be advantageous in situations where a single goal needs to
be maintained in the face of distractors (Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010), and the
ostensibly maladaptive strategy of suppression was shown to be beneficial in extremely
adverse situations (e.g., Bonanno & Keltner, 1997). At the same time, the ostensibly
adaptive strategy of distraction was found to be maladaptive when long term adjustment
is required (Kross & Ayduk, 2008), and the ostensibly adaptive strategy of reappraisal
was found to be less effective when dealing with particularly high intensity emotional
situations (Sheppes, Catran, & Meiran, 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007, 2008).
The main conclusion deriving from the second generation of studies is that
emotion regulation strategies have different consequences in different contexts. This
means that healthy adaptation is the result of flexibly choosing between regulation
strategies to adapt to differing situational demands (e.g., Bonanno, 2005; Kashdan &
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Rottenberg, 2010; Troy & Mauss, in press, for reviews). To illustrate, Kashdan and
Rottenberg (2010) argue that different forms of psychopathology can be characterized by
different ways in which flexible regulation choice breaks down, and Troy and Mauss’s
(in press) and Bonanno's (2005) influential accounts highlight how flexible regulation
choice promotes resilience in the face of stress and trauma.
Although emotion regulation choice is now viewed as a crucial element in healthy
adaptation, until recently it has only been indirectly studied. Two forms of important yet
indirect evidence come from correlational studies involving self report questionnaires that
assess individual differences in people’s frequency of using different regulatory strategies
across situations (e.g., Garnefski et al., 2001; Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2007;
Nolen Hoeksema 2001) and from laboratory experiments that involve evaluating
spontaneous use of emotion regulation strategies in emotional inducing situations (e.g.,
Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, Schnülle, Fischer, & Gross, 2010; Gruber, Harvey & Gross,
2012). While showing important links to well-being and various forms of
psychopathology (see Alado et al., 2010 for a review), these studies do not assess the
factors that influence individuals to predominantly prefer using a particular regulatory
strategy over another. Even more conventional studies of emotion regulation did not
examine which regulation strategies are chosen in different emotional contexts, because
the experimental design involved directly instructing participants to use regulation
strategies in different situations. Consider for example, the most direct and convincing
evidence regarding the importance of flexible regulation patterns, which showed that the
ability to flexibly alternate between enhancing and suppressing emotion strongly predicts
healthy adaptation (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004), over an
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extended time period (Westphal, Seivert, & Bonanno, 2010), and that flexible regulation
can protect from complicated grief patterns in bereavement (Gupta & Bonanno, 2011). In
these and other studies, the regulation strategies employed by participants were
determined by the experimenter, leaving the important topic of determinants and
consequences of emotion regulation choice unexplored.
Conceptualizing Emotion Regulation Choice
Recently my colleagues and I developed a conceptual framework to explain (1)
major determinants and (2) underlying mechanisms of emotion regulation choice
(Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, Radu, Blechert, & Gross, in press). A central working
hypothesis in this framework is that healthy individuals would be sensitive to the central
costs and benefits associated with the implementation of each regulatory option under
different contexts. With this working hypothesis in mind, certain emotional, cognitive,
and motivational contextual factors are likely to bias regulatory choices in ways that are
congruent with the differential consequences of implementing these strategies under these
conditions. In illuminating the underlying mechanisms of emotion regulation choice a
further argument suggests that healthy regulation choice should require in some contexts
an ability to recruit deliberate executive control processes that can override contrasting
associative emotional processes. This interplay of higher control processes that can
override opposing associative processes is at the heart of many models of self regulation
(e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Moreover, the regulation choice process gives a
central weight to differences between strategies' underlying engagement/disengagement
dimension relative to other potent factors such as cognitive effort. To better help
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appreciate the broader context of this emotion regulation choice conceptual framework I
elaborate it below.
The starting point of this conceptual framework is that the limited cognitive
capacity individuals have poses permanent processing constraints. These constraints
result in a constant competition between emotion generation and emotion regulation
processes (Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011a,b) for dominance over behavior. Our
conceptual account draws upon major information processing theories (e.g., Hubner,
Steinhauser, & Lehle, 2010; Pashler, 1998) and the process model of emotion regulation
(Gross & Thompson, 2007) to suggest that regulating one’s emotions, involves recruiting
deliberate executive control mechanisms that try to modify the nature of emotional
information processing at two major cognitive stages (Sheppes & Gross, 2011, 2012).
These two major cognitive stages include an early attentional selection stage and a late
semantic meaning stage. Specifically, regulation can be achieved via early disengagement
from emotional processing at the attention selection stage, or via an engagement with
emotional processing that is modulated at a late semantic meaning stage (e.g., Johnston &
Heinz, 1978; Lehle & Hubner, 2008). This conceptual framework focuses on two
particular regulatory strategies that are frequently used in everyday life and that have
their major influence in each of these two cognitive stages of information processing.
Incoming emotional information can be regulated at an early attentional selection
processing stage by disengaging from emotional information processing before it
undergoes elaborated processing. A classic early selection strategy is distraction, which
involves disengaging attention from emotional processing before it is represented in
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working memory by producing neutral thoughts that are independent from and not in
conflict with emotional information (e.g., van Dillen & Koole, 2007).
Engagement with incoming emotional information that passes the early
attentional selection stage can still be regulated at a late semantic meaning processing
stage before it affects behavior. A classic late selection regulation strategy is reappraisal,
which involves engaging with and elaborating emotional information prior to changing
its meaning in a late processing stage (e.g., Gross, 2002). In reappraisal, the neutral
reinterpretation is semantically dependent and in direct conflict with the original
emotional information.
According to our conceptual framework, these underlying characteristics of
disengagement distraction and engagement reappraisal result in a differential cost-benefit
tradeoff (Sheppes & Gross, 2011, in press). Specifically, the benefits of blocking
emotional information early before it gathers force via distraction are that emotionally
high intensity information can be successfully modulated. Cognitively, this successful
modulation involves relatively simple processes, because the generation of regulatory
neutral thoughts in distraction is independent from and does not conflict with the original
emotional information. Nevertheless, the major cost of distraction is that because it does
not allow processing, evaluating, and remembering emotional information, motivationally
it is less beneficial for one's long term goals and adaptation (Wilson & Gilbert, 2008 for a
review). Specifically, distraction does not allow for emotional events that are being
repeatedly encountered to be attended to and provided with adequate explanation, a
requirement that is at the heart of many long term goals where an individual has to face
difficulties in order to adapt.
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The underlying characteristics of engagement reappraisal result in a different set
of costs and benefits. Specifically, the elaborated semantic processing that occurs prior to
late modulation should be emotionally costly as it can less successfully block high
intensity emotional information. Cognitively, reappraisal engages relatively complex
processes, because the generation of alternative construals is dependent on and in conflict
with the original emotional information. Nevertheless, the major benefit of engaging with
emotional information is that motivationally it allows processing, evaluating, and
remembering emotional information which are crucial for long term goals and for
adaptation.
Direct empirical support for the costs and benefits of employing (rather than
freely choosing) distraction and reappraisal comes from behavioral and
electrophysiological studies. Specifically, several behavioral studies showed that
employing early disengagement distraction in high sadness emotional intensity situations
resulted in successful regulation (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007), and did not result in an
increased expenditure of cognitive resources (Sheppes et al., 2009; Sheppes & Meiran,
2008). At the same time, distraction’s lack of emotional processing was demonstrated in
an impaired memory for emotional information (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007, 2008), and
distraction’s motivational costs were evident in a lack of long term attenuation of the
intensity or quality of important negative autobiographical emotional events (Kross &
Ayduk, 2008). By contrast, these studies showed that while employing late engagement
reappraisal in low sadness emotional intensity situations was successful, under high
sadness emotional intensity situations resulted in less successful modulation, and resulted
in an increased expenditure of cognitive resources. The elaborated emotional processing
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was demonstrated in intact memory for emotional information (see also Dillon, Ritchey,
Johnson, & LaBar, 2007; Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000), and reappraisal’s motivational
benefits evinced in adaptation to distressing events that are important for one's long term
goals and functioning.
In two recent electrophysiological studies, my colleagues and I took advantage of
the excellent temporal resolution of electroencephalogram (EEG) and event related
potentials (ERPs) to provide further support for the differential underlying cognitive
mechanisms and consequences of employing distraction and reappraisal (Blechert,
Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, & Gross, 2012; Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes,
Rydstrom, & Gross, 2011). Recent ERP studies in emotion regulation showed that
distraction (e.g., Dunning & Hajcak, 2009; Hajcak, Dunning, & Foti, 2009) and
reappraisal (e.g., Foti & Hajcak, 2008; Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006) modulate the late
positive potential (LPP) - an electro-cortical component that is enhanced during
emotionally arousing viewing and which reflects enhanced attentional and semantic
meaning processing of emotionally salient information (Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet,
2010).
Consistent with the framework, we found that implementing distraction resulted
in a strong modulation of an initial phase of the LPP that represents early disengagement
of emotional information before it is represented in working memory, and reappraisal
only modulated the late phase of the LPP representing engagement and elaborated
meaning prior to late modulation (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). In that same study, we
also tested our prediction that motivationally, distraction relative to reappraisal cannot
accord with major long term goals. Specifically, distraction does not allow attending and
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explaining emotional information, which result in subsequent attenuation of emotional
responses relative to novel emotional situations (Wilson & Gilbert, 2008). To that end,
our participants were re-exposed to emotional materials they have previously distracted
or reappraised. Consistent with our prediction, we found that emotional materials with a
distraction but not reappraisal history demonstrated an enhanced LPP during re-exposure
which represents an extended influence of negative emotional processing beyond the
regulatory episode. Prolonged influence of emotional events is considered maladaptive
with many long term goals that require dealing with emotional events that are repeatedly
encountered (see also MacNamara, Ochsner, & Hajcak, 2011). In a similar vein, we
recently showed that repeated reappraisal efforts with biologically significant emotional
stimuli (i.e., angry facial expressions) resulted in a gradual change to the basic evaluation
and thus representation of these emotional stimuli (Blechert et al., 2012).
Emotion Regulation Choice: Emotional, Cognitive, and Motivational
Determinants
In a recent set of studies my colleagues and I have evaluated central
determinants of emotion regulation choice (Sheppes et al., 2011; Sheppes et al., in press).
Prior to discussing these studies I wish to briefly describe the novel paradigm we
developed to enable the evaluation of emotion regulation choice. In short, participants
that come to the lab initially undergo a learning phase followed by a training phase where
they are being taught the differences between distraction and reappraisal as well as how
to implement each. In the actual task, participants are exposed to series of trials that
involve a brief presentation of an emotional stimulus followed by a choice screen where
they decide their preferred regulatory strategy. Following a short preparation period, the
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emotional stimulus reappears and participants are instructed to implement their chosen
strategy and to rate how they feel. In general, participants are instructed to freely choose
between distraction and reappraisal and to base their choice on the strategy they think
will make them feel less negative. The main dependent measure is the proportion of
choice of each regulatory option. To evaluate adherence of participants' reports of their
chosen regulatory strategies (achieved via which button they pressed during the choice
screen), we either asked participants to talk out loud their chosen strategies during
strategy implementation or we administered a surprise memory test for emotional
materials that were presented (see Sheppes et al., 2011). These two methods have proven
satisfactory. Specifically, adherence levels were evident in high agreement between
participants button responses and their talk out loud protocols, and in finding that on
trials that participants indicate that they chose to distract, memory was worse (and not
significantly different from chance) relative to trials participants indicated that they chose
to reappraise (Sheppes et al., 2011).
The first determinant of regulation choice examined is emotional intensity which
is a key dimension of variation across emotional contexts (Sheppes et al., 2011). Based
on the emotion regulation choice conceptual framework, we predicted that under low
negative emotional intensity situations, individuals would prefer to choose late selection
engagement reappraisal over early selection disengagement distraction because
reappraisal can both successfully modulate emotional responding and provide long term
affective adaptation. However, we predicted that under high negative intensity situations
participants would switch to prefer to choose early disengagement distraction over
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reappraisal, because only distraction can successfully block emotional information early
before it gathers force.
To test our predictions, we manipulated emotional intensity with emotional
images or unpredictable electric stimulation and had participants choose between
distraction and reappraisal (Sheppes et al., 2011). The results strongly supported our
predictions in both emotional contexts. Specifically, participants preferred to reappraise
their emotional reactions to low negative intensity pictures and to a threat of low intensity
of electric shocks, but they preferred to distract from their emotional reactions to high
negative intensity pictures and to a threat of high intensity electric shocks.
In a follow up study we wanted to examine the robustness of the effect of
emotional intensity on regulation choice (Sheppes et al., in press). To that end, we
examined whether individuals would keep their regulatory preferences under different
emotional intensities even when offered a potent reinforcement (monetary incentive) to
engage in a counter preference regulatory option. Although we found that monetary
incentives influenced regulatory choices in the expected direction, the basic preference to
reappraise low intensity emotional situations and to distract high intensity emotional
situations remained evident even when participants were paid high monetary amounts to
choose the contrasting strategy. These results suggest that emotional intensity strongly
influences regulatory preferences.
The second determinant we examined was the cognitive complexity of generating
an emotion regulation strategy (Sheppes et al., in press). Emotion regulation can be
viewed as involving several sequential cognitive processes that involve generation,
implementation and maintenance (Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Generation
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involves finding an adequate regulatory option that can replace emotional information
processing. Implementation involves activating a regulatory strategy, and maintenance
involves holding it in an active state as long as regulation is required. Because generation
operates early in the sequence of an emotion regulation episode, it is likely to affect
emotion regulation choice. In distraction the generation process is simple because the
neutral thoughts that are produced can be of any content as long as they are absorbing.
However, in reappraisal the generation process is complex because the formation of an
alternative neutral reinterpretation depends on the original emotional information. To
examine this disparity we showed that when the generation process was simplified, by
providing participants concrete regulatory options for distraction and reappraisal,
reappraisal was more frequently chosen.
The third determinant of emotion regulation choice involved investigating the
influence of motivational goals (Sheppes et al., in press). An important motivational goal
for choosing a regulatory strategy involves evaluating whether an emotional stimulus will
be encountered once or multiple times. While an emotional stimulus that is encountered
once can be regulated with strategies such as distraction that provide short term relief,
emotional stimuli that are encountered multiple times can be better regulated with
strategies like reappraisal that involves engaging with emotional processing that results in
gradual adaptation (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, 2008; Blechert er al., 2012). We therefore
expected and found that when participants were told that they would encounter emotional
stimuli more than once they preferred to reappraise more, relative to when they expected
to encounter an emotional stimulus once.
Emotion Regulation Choice: Underlying Mechanisms
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The previous section established that central emotional, cognitive, and
motivational factors strongly influence individuals' preferences between two regulation
strategies that modulate emotional responding at an early attentional stage (distraction) or
a late semantic meaning stage (reappraisal). In this section I turn to the issue of the
mechanisms that are at the core of emotion regulation choice.
According to our conceptual framework, emotion regulation choice should
involve a general ability of deliberate executive control processes to override competing
associative emotional processes. In line with central models of self control (e.g., Muraven
& Baumeister, 2000), an ability to recruit central control processes that can moderate the
influence of drives and emotions is crucial for daily functioning. In addition, the actual
regulatory choice process is heavily influenced by the engagement/disengagement
dimension where people are weighting their preference to employ early attentional
disengagement from emotional processing (distraction) versus engagement with
emotional processing prior to late modulation at the semantic meaning processing stage
(reappraisal).
Providing supporting evidence for the involvement of deliberate executive control
processes that override associative emotional processes in emotion regulation choice is
important, given a potential alternative more parsimonious account. According to this
more parsimonious account emotion regulation choice can be fully explained by a direct
influence from simple associative emotional processes (e.g., Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbet,
& Lang, 2001). Specifically, according to an associative emotional process account as
negative emotional intensity increases it directly activates a basic defensive system to
shift from an engagement (or sensory intake) preference which leads to preferring
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reappraisal, to a disengagement (or sensory rejection) preference which may result in an
increased preference to distract. Alternatively, according to the emotion regulation choice
account individuals can use deliberate executive processes in preferring to reappraise in
low negative intensity situations and to distract in high negative intensity situations.
Because both accounts lead to the same regulatory choice prediction in negative
emotional situations, in order to determine between them we investigated downregulation of positive emotional situations -- an emotional context where the two
accounts diverge. Specifically, the associative emotional process account would argue
that as positive emotional intensity increases it directly activates a basic appetitive system
that would lead to an increased preference to engage. By contrast, the emotion regulation
choice account would predict that the operation of deliberate control processes, whose
goal is to provide down-regulation of positive emotional situations, would involve
overriding the associative tendency to engage, resulting in an increased preference to
disengage as positive emotional intensity increases. The results, which showed a clear
tendency to disengage via distraction as positive emotional intensity increased, clearly
support the involvement of deliberate executive control processes that override opposing
associative emotional processes originating from the appetitive system (Sheppes et al., in
press).
While these results support the involvement of deliberate executive control
processes in emotion regulation choice, an important question remains: what are the
dimensions that receive central weight in the choice between distraction and reappraisal?
One central dimension in my conceptual account is engagement/disengagement
according to which when people prefer to reappraise they wish to engage in emotional
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processing and when they want to distract they want to disengage from emotional
processing. However, a second potential key dimension is the amount of cognitive effort
people wish to exert (e.g., Chajut & Algom, 2003; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick,
2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) according to which when people prefer to
reappraise they are willing to exert considerable effort and when they want to distract
they wish to preserve cognitive effort. Accordingly, when people prefer to distract in high
negative emotional intensity situations, do they prefer to disengage from emotional
processing or do they prefer to reserve their cognitive resources and go with the easy
regulatory option?
To determine between these two options, weI had participants choose between
two types of distractions that involve making mathematical computations (e.g., see Erber
& Tesser, 1992; van Dillen & Koole, 2007 for similar operationalization of attentional
distractions): one regulatory option was cognitively simple and involved minor
disengagement from emotional processing (subtract 2s) and a second regulatory option
was cognitively effortful yet highly disengaging from emotional processing (subtract 7s).
The logic was that if the cognitive effort dimension is central in regulatory choice then
one should expect that the preference to use the more simple subtract 2s distraction would
increase as negative emotional intensity increases. However, if the
engagement/disengagement dimension is central in regulatory choice, we should expect
that the preference to use the more disengaging (despite it being also more effortful)
subtract 7s distraction would increase as negative emotional intensity increases.
Results strongly supported the centrality of the engagement/disengagement
dimension where participants preferred to disengage from emotional processing in the
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high intensity condition despite this regulatory option was clearly more effortful
(Sheppes et al., in press). In addition, when participants were performing the subtract 7s
option their actual mathematical performance was interfered with less by the intensity of
emotional stimuli relative to performing subtract2s. This result indicates that the more
effortful subtract 7s option indeed resulted in a stronger disengagement from emotional
processing relative to subtracting 2s.
In a complementary fashion we wished to show that the
engagement/disengagement dimension is central within the reappraisal category.
Although, reappraisal is generally considered to be an engagement strategy (Gross &
Thompson, 2007; Sheppes & Gross, 2011), there is also a considerable variation in this
broad regulation category (Ochsner et al., 2004; McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012).
Specifically, in a classic situation-focused reappraisal engagement with emotional
processing is central in order to reinterpret the meaning of ongoing events. However,
other forms of reappraisal such as reality challenge involve a disengagement element
where emotional consequences are simply not considered and the basic authenticity of the
event is being questioned. In a regulation choice study we showed that whereas
participants preferred to engage via situation focused reappraisal under a low intensity
condition, they preferred to disengage via reality challenge reappraisal under a high
intensity condition (Sheppes et al., in press).
Broader Implications
In the two prior sections, I tried to establish key emotional, cognitive and
motivational determinants and underlying mechanisms of emotion regulation choice. In
this section I zoom out in order to provide broader implications of emotion regulation
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choice. In doing so I concentrate on implications for emotion regulation science, decision
making and clinical science.
Implications for Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation choice provides an important extension to the general field of
emotion regulation. Previous studies of emotion regulation have almost exclusively
focused on the consequences of implementing different emotion regulation strategies
(Gross, 2007; Koole, 2009 for reviews). Multiple studies have instructed participants to
engage with different emotion regulation strategies and examined the costs and benefits
associated with successful implementation. Understanding the consequences of
employing different regulation strategies is a crucial and important step towards a basic
understanding of the basic elements of emotion regulation strategies. Nevertheless, the
emotion regulation choice findings extend this work by illuminating a step that precedes
the implementation of emotion regulation. Specifically, when an emotion regulation goal
has been activated, individuals need to select a regulation strategy out of all the available
options. Our conceptual account has highlighted some emotional, cognitive, and
motivational factors that can strongly influence the regulatory choices individuals are
inclined to make in any particular context.
Combining the recent knowledge on emotion regulation choice with existing
knowledge on the consequences of implementing emotion regulation strategies, leads to
important conceptual extensions. For example, individuals' regulatory preferences as
indexed by their regulatory choices should be considered when evaluating individuals'
ability to implement different strategies. Specifically, initiating a particular strategy may
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not only require generation, implementation and maintenance, but may also require
overriding a default regulatory preference. To give laboratory and real life analogues, it
may be that when participants in the lab or patients in the clinic are asked to engage via
reappraisal when dealing with high intensity situations, in addition to generating
implementing and maintaining reinterpretation of an emotional situation, they also need
to override their strong default preference to disengage via distraction.
Implications for Decision Making
Emotion regulation choice is an instance of general choice behavior and as such it
is important to place it under the broad umbrella of general decision making. Classic
examples of choice behavior involve deciding between different external outcomes in
one's environment. For example, in inter-temporal choice paradigms such as temporal
discounting (Reynolds, 2006), individuals choose between receiving smaller sooner
monetary rewards (e.g., $5 today) and between receiving bigger distant monetary rewards
(e.g., $8 tomorrow). Other examples of choice behavior involve deciding between
different internal processes to deal with external demands such as in mathematical
strategies children choose in order to solve math problems (Siegler, 2005) or the
strategies adults choose to solve chess problems (de Groot, 1978). Emotion regulation
choice is a special case of decision making because it involves choosing between internal
cognitive processes to control one's internal emotional environment.
Although emotion regulation choice appears to be unique in some ways, it shares
basic assumptions about strategy choice with other theories. Like classic theories in
decision sciences (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993), the emotion regulation
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choice account argues that individuals are sensitive to central factors (emotional,
cognitive, and motivational factors in the case of emotion regulation choice) when
making their regulatory selections. In addition, just like other models highlight the role of
learning (e.g., Rieskmap, 2006; Rieskmap & Otto, 2006), in the emotion regulation
choice account to some extent regulatory decisions are based on prior knowledge with the
consequences of implementing different strategies in different contexts.
Implications for Clinical Psychology
Emotion regulation choice also has important clinical implications. Central
conceptual accounts argue that psychological well-being requires flexibly adapting
emotion regulation strategies to fit with differing situational demands (Gross, 2007;
Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Watkins, 2011). The flipside of flexible regulatory choice
is a rigid and maladaptive regulation choice which may be related to various forms of
psychopathology.
The recent empirical evidence maps emotional, cognitive and motivational
determinants of regulation choice in healthy adults and thus deviations from healthy
regulatory choice can be used to understand different forms of psychopathology.
Consider first the emotional intensity one is facing. As previously described,
healthy individuals prefer to use reappraisal with low intensity emotional situations and
distraction with high intensity situations. Regulatory preferences that deviate from the
flexible regulation choice observed in healthy individuals might be related to different
psychopathologies. Specifically, deviation from a preference to choose to disengage from
very high intensity stimuli is expected from individuals who are prone to develop major
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depression. According to the response style theory, rumination involves engaging with
strong emotional experiences and repeatedly thinking about their causes and
consequences in an abstract and repetitive way (e.g., Nolen Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen
Hoeksema, Wisco, &Lyubomirsky, 2008 for reviews). Rumination has been proven to be
related to onset maintenance and relapse of depression, whereas depressed individuals
that prefer to use positive distractions when dealing with strong emotional experiences
show better prognosis (e.g., Nolen Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991, 1993). Emotion
regulation choice is likely to be an important target in the context of depression, because
empirical studies have showed that depressed individuals are able to effectively
implement distraction when instructed to (e.g., Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann,
Siemer & Gotlib, 2007), but that that they hold a favorable view of rumination by
believing that it helps understanding better the reasons for depressed mood. Nevertheless,
an over generalized preference to engage with emotional contents may also depend on
impaired ability to shift attention away from negative contents (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib,
2008).
A second type of deviation from the healthy regulatory choice patterns involves
diverging from engaging with low emotional intensity stimuli. Common to several
anxiety disorders is a tendency to over-generalize a disengagement or avoidance
regulatory response (see Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007; Foa & Kozak, 1986 for
reviews). Avoidance usually starts in response to high intensity emotional stimuli, but
over time, it ends up spilling over to seemingly low intensity stimuli. As pointed in our
conceptual model, while disengagement strategies are helpful in providing short term
relief, they are maladaptive in the long run and can perpetuate anxiety and fears.
23
The cognitive factor highlighted is the ease with which a regulation strategy is
generated. Specifically, aiding the generation process resulted in increased reappraisal
choice. These results are relevant for many cognitive behavioral therapies where patients
are encouraged to reappraise strong emotional events (e.g., Campbell Sills & Barlow,
2007). While the final objective is to have patients generate their own regulation
strategies, therapists should be mindful that their patients might need aid in generating
alternative ways to think about upsetting events, until patients can gradually build their
skill. Complimentary, one can expect that with continued practice in reappraisal an
improved generation process can aid patients to choose it more frequently.
The motivational factor highlighted the goals individuals have when choosing to
regulate their emotions. It was shown that when participants expect to encounter
emotional events repeatedly they increase reappraisal choice which offers long term
benefits. The ability to override regulatory preferences that offer short term relief (i.e.,
distraction) in favor of regulatory preferences that offer long term benefits (i.e.,
reappraisal) is likely to require self control, and impairments in self control ability have
been linked to various psychopathologies including addictions, and eating disorders such
as bulimia (see Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Vohs & Baumeister, 2011 for
comprehensive reviews).
Future Directions
Despite promising preliminary results and clear broad implications, emotion
regulation choice has only began to develop. In closing I wish to point out several
potential future research directions.
24
First, to date the influence of only one emotional (emotional intensity), one cognitive
(generation of a strategy), and one motivational (short versus long term goals)
determinants of emotion regulation choice were examined. While these factors appear
important, future studies should evaluate the influence of the many additional factors that
are likely to influence regulatory preference. To give just one example, the availability of
cognitive resources is likely to influence individuals’ regulatory choices. Specifically, a
temporary state of self-control resource depletion (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007;
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) is likely to lead individuals to prefer strategies like
distraction that provide short term relief. Therefore, studying how various novel factors
affect regulatory choice is an important future research direction.
Second, while distraction and reappraisal are considered classic disengagement
and engagement strategies (Parkinson &Totterdell, 1999), and while they are widely used
in everyday life, studies of choices between other emotion regulation strategies are
urgently needed. In everyday life, individuals choose from many more regulatory options
that should be studied in future studies. Several promising avenues involve allowing
people to choose from regulatory options that are considered less adaptive in certain
contexts (e.g., suppression and rumination). Another option involves investigating how
individuals switch their regulatory choices when dealing with dynamic and prolonged
emotional events that constitute many of our daily experiences (see Aldao & Nolen
Hoeksema, in press for a related discussion). Relatedly, a crucial test of the applicability
of the emotion regulation choice paradigm and its supporting findings, should involve
studying regulatory choices in daily emotional experiences, such as when patients wait to
receive potentially stressful news in medical settings, or when clients face a stimulus they
25
feel anxious about. Although, distraction and reappraisal are widely used in real life
situations, it remains unclear whether we would observe somewhat similar preferences
when individuals spontaneously choose between regulatory options in daily emotional
situations.
Third, the goals of the present study were to generally characterize the influence
of different factors on emotion regulatory choice. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that
studying individual differences in emotion regulation choice is crucial. Recent relevant
studies have shown that individual differences in the ability to modify emotions are
tightly linked to long term adaptation (e.g., Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal,
&Coifman, 2004; Westphal, Seivert, & Bonanno, 2010). Therefore, future studies should
evaluate how multiple individual differences can moderate the influence of central factors
on emotion regulation choice. One promising venue, which was mentioned in the clinical
implications, involves studying impairments in regulatory preferences among individuals
with mood, anxiety and personality disorders whose psychopathology revolves around
emotion dysregulation.
Fourth, according to the emotion regulation choice account healthy individuals
are sensitive to central costs and benefits of different regulation strategies when trying to
choose between regulatory options and in general these individuals showed adaptive
regulatory choice profiles. Nevertheless, multiple demonstrations in general decision
making studies have showed important limitations in human reasoning (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), and therefore future studies should investigate situations where
individuals' regulatory choices would not necessarily lead them to the best outcome. In a
related vein, while conscious regulation strategies have been a major focus in the field of
26
emotion regulation, and while they are an integral part of many cognitive behavioral
therapies targeting emotion dysregulation (e.g., Linehan, 1993), many emotion regulation
choices are likely to be determined implicitly and without deliberate control.
Finally, until now emotion regulation choice has been investigated separately
from studies on the consequences of implementing regulation strategies. Future studies
should make stronger connections between the developing studies on emotion regulation
choice and the well-established studies on the consequences of regulation
implementation. For example, studies should evaluate whether the effectiveness of
implementing a given strategy is moderated by an ability to override default regulatory
choice preferences. At the same time, future studies in emotion regulation choice should
utilize multiple levels of analysis that combine the concurrent assessment of the
effectiveness of a chosen regulatory strategy.
27
Author Note
This chapter draws upon and updates previous reviews by Sheppes & Gross (2011, 2012)
and upon two recent empirical manuscripts (Sheppes et al., 2011; Sheppes et al., in
press). The writing of this chapter was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant
No. 1393/12).
28
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